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Politics in Eastern Europe has become increasingly defined by apparent paradoxes, such as 
majority voting for the ex-communist parties in the early 1990s and strong support for 
populists and the radical right later in the 1990s and 2000s. The tendency in political science 
studies is to speak about the losers of transition, and to explain success of the ex-communist, 
radical and populist parties and politicians in terms of the politics of resentment or protest 
voting. However, what subjectivities have been produced during post-socialism and 
why/how they are articulated in particular dialogues among politicians and people, are 
questions that have not been discussed in most studies. In this dissertation I explore political 
subjectivities to explain voting behavior in the period of 2003-2004 in Lithuania. I analyze 
nostalgia for socialism and individuals’ relations to social and political history, community, 
nation, and the state. I argue that voting is an enactment of a social text or a performance of 
social history, in which a subject embodies his/her experience and knowledge. Voting is a 
meaningful action not just a protest. Electoral politics is a semantic and symbolic 
competition.  
My analysis is informed by phenomenology, semiotics, interpretative anthropology, 
post-structuralist theory as well as post-socialist and post-colonial studies. The research was 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Texts come before us as the always-already-read; we 
apprehend them through sedimented layers of previous 
interpretations, or—if the text is brand-new—through the 
sedimented reading habits and categories developed by those 
inherited interpretive traditions (Frederic Jameson 1981). 
 
The culture of people is an ensemble of texts, themselves 
ensembles, which the anthropologist strains to read over the 




The history of Eastern Europe has become increasingly defined by apparent paradoxes, such 
as large-scale voting for the ex-communist parties in the early 1990s and support to the 
populist and the radical right in the 1990s and 2000s. The tendency in political science is to 
speak about the losers of transition, and to explain the success of the ex-communist, radical 
and populist parties and politicians in terms of the politics of resentment, or protest voting 
(see, e.g., Ebata 1997, Kapetanyannis 1995, Minkenberg 2002, Betz 1994, Lubecki 2004). 
However, what subjectivities have been produced during post-socialism, and why/how they 
are articulated in particular dialogues among politicians and the people, have not been 
discussed in many studies.  
In this dissertation I explore political subjectivities to explain political communication 
in the elections of 2003–2004 in Lithuania. I analyze nostalgia for socialism and people’s 
relations to social and political history, community, nation, and the state. I argue that voting is 
a meaningful action and the expression of subjectivity and experience. Voting is not acting 
against one’s interest, as is argued in common explanations of American voting behavior (see 
Lakoff 2004). In this dissertation I show how experience and subjectivity are translated into 
votes during elections and how electoral campaigns gain success by exploiting shared 
meanings and values.  
 
My analysis is informed by phenomenology, semiotics, interpretative anthropology, 
post-structuralist theory as well as post-socialist and postcolonial studies. Following 
phenomenologists (see, e.g., Jackson 1996, Merleau-Ponty 1962, 1963) I prioritize the 
knowledge which people share and I make their voices audible. Applying a semiotic 
approach I seek access to the conceptual world in which subjects live; I also inquire into 
meanings, signs, and signification (cf. Geertz 1973, Baudrillard 1981, Lotman 1990, Barthes 
1972). Following poststructuralists I locate the subject primarily in language or discourse 
(see, e.g., Foucault 1977, 1984). I see language as the primary medium to understand 
people’s thinking and their subjectivities. I explore informants’ ideas and stories they tell 
about themselves and to themselves (Geertz 1973). Experience and action are important as 
articulated and narrated by an individual himself/herself. I use the notion of a “social text” 
to speak about shared discourses, ideas and meanings. A “social text” is a web of 
significance,1 which actors have spun and in which they are suspended. It is a narrative 
about history, community and self containing particular meanings, values and beliefs. Texts 
people use are reflective of their experiences, subjectivities, and ideological positioning. 
Elections are textual performances (cf. Edelman 1988) and voting is the enaction of social 
texts.  
I see social texts as dialogic, open and changing. Social texts reflect dialogized voices 
(Bakhtin 1981). Speaking implies inhabiting multiple voices that are not “self-enclosed or 
deaf to one another,” but rather “hear each other constantly, call back and forth to each 
other, and are reflected in one another…” (Bakhtin 1984:75, cited in Yurchak 2003:485). 
The new nodes of texts become integrated into existing articulations of society. Even abrupt 
                                                 
1 C. Geertz, following Max Weber, argues that “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance 
he himself has spun” (Geertz 1973:5). Geertz takes culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be an 
interpretative science in search of meaning (Geertz 1973:5).  
  2
changes like the demise of the Soviet discursive empire, leave tracks in narratives about 
social and political history. Social texts are intersubjective (Taylor 1979). They are socially 
shared interpretations (Geertz 1973:453). Taking the position of interpretative anthropology, 
I see my writing as an interpretation of social texts which are informants’ interpretations.  
I use the concept of “social otherness” to understand particular experiences and to 
describe emergence of particular subjectivities. “Social otherness” refers to regimes of 
difference, which produce subjects as outcasts to publicly imagined community and deprive 
them of particular privileges, resources, and opportunities. In the Soviet state there were 
people like deportees and Catholics who were marginalized publicly. In the post-Soviet state 
there are the dispossessed poor villagers and former industrial town workers who are among 
the public outcasts (cf. Humphrey 2002, Kideckel, forthcoming). Understanding of 
circulation of difference, of recognition, values, and meanings as well as technologies of 
articulation of society, control and discipline is key to understanding post-socialist political 
subjectivities and voting.  
Informed by postcolonial studies (see, e.g., Ashcroft et al. 2002) I approach subjects 
as hybrid, embodying traditions of socialism and post-socialism. I borrow the terms 
“marginality” and “subalternity” to speak about certain forms of experience as peripheral to 
the ideology and hegemony of the official history. The marginalized are the others produced 
in the gaze of the center (Ashcroft et al. 2002). They are the excluded or “mastered” 
subjects created by the discourse of power (Spivak 1985). 
  3
1.1 THE RESEARCH SITES 
1.1.1 Villages 
The villages2 where the research was conducted are different in respect to population, 
location, and history. They lie in the eastern and central parts of Lithuania. The smallest village 
is located in eastern Lithuania. The name of the village was mentioned on the 2nd of January, 
1707 in the baptism documents of church archives.3 Most probably the village was founded 
in the middle of the 16th century. The village is one of the Wallachian reform4 examples still 
preserved in Lithuania. The agrarian reform known as the Wallachian reform took place in 
that area in 1557.  
The village was part of Poland from 1920 to World War II. People report that the 
village was ethnically Lithuanian all the time. Under the Poles the state officials and teachers 
at school were Poles, but the priest was Lithuanian. At present there are two Russian 
women, Old Believers who bought a house in the village several decades ago. Lithuanian-
speaking Russian women, their parents and grandparents always lived in Lithuania.  
The smallest village lies in between two towns which are 4 km away from the village. 
The nearest city is 20 km away. The village is crossed by the road, connecting urban places 
of Lithuania to Belarus. Buses pass several times a day. The relative isolation comes from 
inability to travel very often. Many informants considered a trip to the city expensive.  
Most of the younger village people moved to cities after World War II. The ones 
who stayed and still live there are the generation born in the 1910s, 1920s or 1930s. In the 
village there is also a family with a 12 year old daughter and four men in their 30s and 40s. 
Some of the elderly villagers moved back to the village in the early or mid 1990s. During my 
research 29 people lived there. 
                                                 
2 The names of villages are not mentioned and the names of informants are changed following 
American Anthropological Association Code of Ethics (see, e.g., Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban (1992) Ethics. In: 
Bernard H. Russell, ed. Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology. Walnut Creek, Lanham, New York, 
Oxford: Altamira Press. P.173–203.) and University of Pittsburgh, Institutional Review Board suggestions.  
3 National History Archives of Lithuania (Lietuvos Valstybės Istorijos archyvas). 
4 The agrarian reform of 1557. It is known for distinct house arrangement patterns. 
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 The elderly are retired and receive state pensions. The younger generation depends 
on temporary jobs. Pensioners are seen as well-off by the unemployed. However, according 
to the Department of Statistics,5 pensioners are one of the most vulnerable strata of society.  
The church, a shop, and a primary school for the only child in the village are 4 km 
away. In 2003 the only public institution in the village was a small wooden milk delivery 
post. Due to low buying prices and decreasing delivery of milk, the milk delivery post was 
closed in 2004. The small house itself was sold to one of the inhabitants of the village who 
turned it into a steam bath.  
The other important public place that belongs to village’s past is a poultry farm. 
Eight buildings constituted the poultry farm, which closed in the mid 1990s. Inside one of 
the buildings which I entered by breaking through the tall grass and bushes, were remnants 
from the times when the farm was working. Smashed windows were decorated with weeds, 
the broken roof and walls witnessed time-caused destruction or someone’s attempts to 
acquire building materials for small scale home projects. Most of the women of the village 
were employed in this poultry farm. They came there every morning and the building was 
full of noises of humans and chickens. At present in one of the former farm buildings there 
is a lumber mill. Several people from a nearby town work there.  
In his memoirs about the village Adomas Subačius (1999) writes that he could never 
find his village on the maps or in the encyclopedia. According to Subačius, the village is 
dying out. Reading his book with abundant pictures of weddings and children from the past, 
I get a similar impression. The same ideas come to mind walking through the village, talking 
to the old villagers, visiting the cemetery which is large and “populated” much more densely, 
incomparably more densely, than the village itself. Some names of the living villagers are 
already inscribed on the gravestones and they come to take care of their own graves. During 
the fieldwork two informants passed away. One villager passed away when I started research 
in the village. Two other informants passed away when I left the field. One family with 
children moved in. 
                                                 
5 See “The index of life level and relative poverty,” Department of Statistics. 
http://www.std.lt/lt/pages/view/?id=1333. Accessed on 01/02/2005.  
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In the village there is a cross built on a small hill. The cross is for the partisans of the 
village. Some villagers argued that these “partisans” were not involved in any anti-Soviet 
activity, but hid in the shelter under a barn floor to avoid mobilization by the Soviet Army. 
Someone from the village informed the Soviet authorities, the barn was set on fire and the 
men died. Building a cross is an attempt to reread one’s family history in the social texts of 
the post-Soviet official history, which speaks of partisans as fighters for the freedom of 
Lithuania, contrary to the Soviet images of partisans as “bandits.” 
 
The second largest village in which I conducted research is located in the central part of 
Lithuania. The archives of the village were burned during one of the wars. People remember 
that in the middle of the 19th century the village was part of the upheavals in the region. In 
the surrounding forests there are monuments for the insurgents of 1863.  
At present the village has 115 inhabitants, 56 men and 59 women. According to 
Bronius Kviklys (1966), in 1923 in the village there were 49 houses with 237 inhabitants, in 
1959 230 people lived there. According to the librarian from a regional center, in 1991 there 
were 32 houses and 100 people. It is not clear whether these numbers include scattered 
other small villages. 
Ethnically the village is predominantly Lithuanian. There is one Lithuanian-speaking 
Russian, a former Soviet state militia officer. His wife is a Lithuanian. There are also some 
people who come from mixed families (Lithuanian and Russian), but consider themselves 
Lithuanians.  
The village is located in the woods. The larger settlement, a regional center of about 
2,000 inhabitants is 7 km away. One has to pass these 7 km taking a route through a forest 
and riding on a sand road. The bus that connects the village to Kaunas, the large city 
approximately 40 km away, comes two times a week.  
The land in the village is poor and not suitable for intensive cultivation. Still, in the 
Soviet period most of the land was used for cultivation. Currently, only a few villagers work 
on the restituted land. None of families own large farms (100 ha or more). Most of the 
cultivation on small plots (2–3 ha) is carried out for family needs. 
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Informants remember that in 1987–1988, before the movement for independence, 
the state planned to revive the village. There were 11 new houses built. Young families, 
willing to work in the kolkhoz (the collective farm), were invited to settle in the village. 
Several houses were populated by newcomers; others were assigned to native villagers. 
In the village there is a wooden church, built in 1933 by the villagers themselves. In 
1936 a parish was established in the village. During the Soviet period the village had a 
parson who lived by the church. Recently, the visiting priests have worked in the village.  
A primary school was founded in the village in the 1920s. In the late 1980s a new 
primary school was built as part of the village revival project, a two-story brick building with 
a gym. In the early 1990s, the school was led by a former party secretary and had a Catholic 
profile. It was closed in the late 1990s due to insufficient financing. Villagers report that 
there were not enough children to attend the school. The school was privatized, bought by a 
parliament member who reconstructed it including the gym. The former school is mainly 
used as a summer residence for the parliamentarian’s family. Some villagers call it a fazenda (a 
term which most likely they borrow from the Mexican soap operas) to connote the large 
size of the residence. The settlement with the primary school is 7 km away. There is a school 
bus during the school year.  
A medical center was also a part of the village revival project, but it burned down a 
few years after it was built. The nearest medical center is 7 km away. 
The village is decorated with wooden poles depicting mythological creatures. The 
villagers themselves are ambivalent about these poles and see them as strange to their 
environment. They could not explain the mythic scenes on the poles and ironically 
presented them as the kolkhoz chairman’s (currently a businessman with a prosperous 
private business in the major cities of Lithuania) endeavor. As in the first village, marking 
the space with crosses was a more usual practice with a known purpose. Some crosses were 
built by priests, others by villagers to commemorate the dead of their family. Crosses in the 
village arose in the years of post-independence. 
In Soviet times many villagers were employed in the kolkhoz or the forestry industry. 
Dissolution of the kolkhozes in the early 1990s and the contraction of the forestry industry 
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left many villagers without jobs. At present, as in the first village, many people are retired 
and unemployed. In summer much of the income for some families comes from gathering 
berries and mushrooms. Some work in the forestry industry, but few work outside the 
village because they have no transportation and cannot afford traveling.  
 
The third village in which I conducted research is located in the central part of 
Lithuania, 70 km away from the second largest village. Historical sources mention the 
surroundings of the village in the 14th century and the landlord’s estate in the middle of the 
15th century. According to the subdistrict head (seniūnas), there are about 705 inhabitants, 
336 men and 369 women in the village. District municipality internet pages as well as the 
subdistrict information booklet indicate that there are 745 inhabitants. According to the 
encyclopedia on the region, in 1902 there were 75 inhabitants in the village and 28 on the 
estate. In 1923 there were 20 inhabitants in the village and 72 on the estate. In 1959 there 
were 397 in the village, in 1970—503, in 1992—687 inhabitants. Unlike in the two previous 
villages, the largest village population increase was during the Soviet period. 
The subdistrict head argued that the population of the subdistrict is older compared 
to the average of the district population. He reasoned that most distant villages of the 
district, including the village where I conducted the research, have older populations. Closer 
to the city of Kaunas the population of villages is younger. Most probably the young stay in 
those villages due to low housing prices and relatively low commuting costs. Farther from 
the city, costs of commuting (unless one is able to secure a good salary) are too high to 
afford traveling. However, in the village every morning there are several cars which leave for 
Kaunas, carrying several people who share travel costs. The closeness of the highway (5 km 
away from the village) is another reason why some people choose to travel to Kaunas.  
In the village there is a brick church which was built in the mid 18th century, at the 
landlord’s initiative. The village had a parson from 1985 to 1990. At present the church is 
run by a visiting priest. Religious festivals attract many people from outside the village. 
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The village school was founded in 1923. Until 1951 it was a primary school; until 
1981 an elementary school. A new brick two-story primary school with a stadium was built 
in the late 1980s. At present there are about 120 children and 15 teachers. 
In the subdistrict there are many large-holding farmers. About 10–12 farmers have 
200 ha or larger farms. Three farmers who each have about 1000 ha live close to the village 
or in the village. They lease the land and hire villagers, especially for seasonal work. Some of 
the farmers have several full time workers.  
The village had a working brickyard from 1896 to 1990. The brickyard was built by 
an estate landlord. The book on the region states that the landlord was a Pole, but loyal to 
Lithuania and was not involved in Polish politics. I heard people talking about the region as 
being Polish, but no one could explain this “Polishness” of the region without referring to 
the estate landlord and to some people of the oldest generation who spoke some Polish. 
According to the municipality data, in the whole subdistrict there are 4,780 (97.4%) 
Lithuanians, 59—Russians, 47—Poles, and 18—others. No data exist for the village 
separately. 
Unlike the other two villages this village has a medical center (since 1954), a public 
library, a post-office, and some small industries, such as a sewing factory and an interior 
decoration enterprise. The sewing factory employed many women. The interior decoration 
enterprise hired only several men. Some people worked in the municipality subdistrict 7 km 
away from the village or in a city which is 30 km away. The Agriculture Institute in the 
subdistrict hires many people every summer for seasonal work. While in the first two 
villages mostly the retired and unemployed live, the people interviewed in this village were 
of various socio-economic statuses.  
According to the subdistrict head, the largest village is divided into two parts, one, 
associated with the former kolkhoz, and the other, associated with the brickyard. The latter 
part is called Shanghai, because there are a lot of small shelters or stalls for animals built 
around the two-story block houses. In these houses live families whose members worked in 
the brickyard. Hiring of new workers by the brickyard brought new people to the village in 
Soviet times. New people also joined the kolkhoz. The kolkhoz built about 5 new houses 
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(alytnamiai) each year, 2–3 for new specialists to live in the village. Tractor or harvester 
drivers, an animal husbandry specialist (zootechnikas) were invited to the kolkhoz. At present 
there are about 40 houses in the village. The last house was built around 1989. 
 
The three villages reflect some general developments in Lithuania. The migration 
flows from rural to urban and from urban to urban characteristic of the period prior to 1990 
have now reversed to the migration flow from urban to rural (Ministry of Agriculture, 2003). 
In the post-1990 period some new families, most of whom were not able to survive in the 
city or town where they lived, joined the villages. Some of the newcomers lost their jobs due 
to the restructuring and privatization of industries. In the villages the newcomers survive on 
gardens, seasonal jobs, and benefits from the state. “Nobody is hungry in the village,” the 
village head’s (visuomeninis seniūnas) wife from the second largest village assured me. Many of 
the newcomers say that they would have never come to the village, if they could survive in a 
town or a city. From the older generation some arrived/returned to the village because it is 
easier to live in a village, if one is living just on small retirement benefits.  
According to the subdistrict head from the largest village, because of newcomers the 
population in the third largest village remains stable. The newcomers also balance the aging 
population of the village while the birth rate has decreased constantly from the 1990s (with 
the exception of 2003). Approximately in the whole subdistrict (the village was part of it) the 
birth rate was 50 births and 70 deaths for 5000 people. This meant that about 20 people 
from urban areas joined the subdistrict every year. The newcomers in the largest village were 
mostly young families with several children. 
Compared with the general population of Lithuania, a large part of the villagers 
interviewed were among the most vulnerable part of post-Soviet society: the retired who 
have had to survive on small state pensions, the unemployed—on state benefits or 
temporary low salary jobs, the employed in private industries and farms—on small salaries. 
A majority of the unemployed in rural as well as urban areas did not have professional 
education. However, many unemployed people with professional education indicated that 
skills gained in Soviet times are not in demand in the post-Soviet labor market.  
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1.1.2 The city of Kaunas 
Kaunas is the second largest city of Lithuania, with a population of about 380,000.6 It has 
been a geographic, industrial, business, cultural, and educational center. The city is located at 
the crossroads of the country's two major highways.  
Situated at the confluence of the two largest rivers of Lithuania, Kaunas has been 
one of the most important cities in the country's history. The settlement, which grew to 
become the city of Kaunas, was first mentioned by the chroniclers in 1361. In 1408, 
Magdeburg rights were granted to Kaunas by the privilege of Vytautas the Great. From 
1920 to 1939, when Vilnius was part of Poland, Kaunas was the provisional capital of 
Lithuania.  
In Soviet and post-Soviet times Kaunas was known for its ethnic homogeneity in 
contrast to multicultural Vilnius. At present the residents are 93.9% Lithuanians, 4.4% 
Russians, 0.4% Polish and 1.2% other ethnicity residents (The Department of Statistics, 
2001). Kaunas is also known as one of the most pro-Lithuanian cities. One of the well-
known public protests against Soviet rule took place in Kaunas in 1972, when 19-year-old 
Romas Kalanta self-immolated in the square in front of the Musical Theatre.  
Belonging to a city is usually defined by being born in it. If a person lived most of 
his/her time in a city, but was born elsewhere, he/she usually refers to both places when 
asked where he/she is from. Most of those I interviewed in the city of Kaunas were born 
and had lived there for most of their lives.  
                                                 
6 Data provided by population census of 2001; Source: Lithuanian Development Agency and Kaunas 
County Governor's Administration. See http://www.kaunasregion.com/local.industry.phtml. 
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1.2 METHODOLOGY, DATA, AND BIASES 
My research was carried out from April, 2003 to September, 2004 (with a break from 
December, 2003 through April, 2004). I also conducted preliminary dissertation research in 
the summers of 2001 and 2002 and follow-up research in the summer of 2005.  
I have conducted multisited research (see Marcus 1998), traveling to villages and 
Kaunas many times, staying there for short periods of time. I also traveled to other cities, 
towns and villages to observe presidential candidates and people at various electoral 
campaign events during the period of elections. The interviewing of Parliament members 
and other politicians was carried out in Vilnius. Involvement with electoral campaign 
organizers and strategists also took place in Vilnius.  
The study is based on unstructured interviews conducted in the three villages, 
Kaunas and some other cities. It also relies on semi-structured and unstructured interviews 
with Parliament members and other politicians, such as former parliamentarians or different 
party members as well as electoral campaign strategists and organizers. Informal interviews 
were carried out with some officials from the State Department for Election Analysis, public 
relations specialists, and members of academia. 
I conducted participant observation in several settings. I worked with the presidential 
campaign organizing staff of one presidential candidate from May, 2004 to June, 2004. I was 
mostly involved in the program developing group. In addition to working in the campaign 
headquarters, I joined the candidate on various trips, at meetings, and events. I also joined 
people at the meetings with three other presidential and two parliamentarian candidates in 
several cities, towns and villages. For a week I was involved with the electoral strategy 
planning group for a candidate who ran for reelection to the Parliament in Vilnius.  
There were other occasions to observe the political field (not directly related to 
elections) in Vilnius and the Vilnius region. I observed and/or participated in events, such 
as the referendum for integration to the European Union (EU) (in May, 2003), joined the 
public and Parliament celebrations for joining the EU (in May, 2004), participated in the 
State day celebrations (in July, 2003 and July, 2004), the 10 year commemoration of the 
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withdrawal of the Russian army (in August, 2003), and other events. I also observed part of 
the process of the impeachment of the President of Lithuania, Rolandas Paksas (in 2003–
2004) and attended various protest rallies. Monitoring media, studying archives, participating 
in press conferences and Parliament sessions informed my understanding of political 
communication in general. In the dissertation I limit myself to the analysis of the political 
field invoked at electoral contexts in the period of 2003 and 2004. 
The period from April, 2003 to September, 2004 was marked by preparations for 
three elections: the presidential elections of 2004, the first elections to the European Union 
Parliament of 2004, and the parliamentary elections of 2004. The presidential elections and 
the elections to the EU Parliament took place during my stay in Lithuania. I started my 
research 4 months after the presidential elections of 2002. I interviewed people about 
former and coming elections, followed up their opinions during the electoral campaign 
periods and went with them to vote on election days.  
The three villages were selected because I had contacts in each of them. These 
contacts helped me to find potential informants, introduced me to them, and provided 
information about the villages. None of the villages appeared to differ in important ways 
from other villages of Lithuania, with the exception of the smallest village, which was part 
of Poland from 1920 to 1939. In the smallest village people experienced independent 
Lithuania only from 1939 to 1940. Belonging to Poland provided for some differences 
between people of this and other villages to be mentioned in my dissertation. Observing 
media, traveling to other villages and towns yielded similar data of post-Soviet history to the 
one collected in my research sites.  
I purposefully selected people who were older than 35, and, thus, had experience of 
Soviet Lithuania and post-Soviet Lithuania as adults. My selection was based on the 
observation that people younger than 35 years old related differently to social and political 
history as well as to the present. Consequently, they share different political subjectivities 
from the older generations.  
The discussion relies on interviews with 179 people (including several life histories, 
about 180 hours of recording) in the villages and cities (mainly Kaunas). Interviews with 86 
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people (approximately 86 hours of interviewing) were conducted in the villages (6 of which 
were conducted in nearby towns because informants who owned land or worked in the 
villages and, thus, were part of the village life lived there). In the first village I interviewed 23 
inhabitants. In the second largest village I interviewed 19 inhabitants, in the largest 38.  
Sixty of all those interviewed in the villages did not have college education, 4 had 
some vocational training, 12 were professionals, such as teachers, engineers, agriculture or 
forestry specialists, etc. Ten people were professionals and had a high standing, e.g., one was 
a school director, the other a private business owner, the third the subdistrict administrator. 
Most of the so-called “professionals with high standing” had high positions during the 
Soviet period as well, i.e., they were kolkhoz chairmen, state farm chairmen, kolkhoz 
engineers or agronomists. 
In the villages 14 of the interviewed were unemployed, 42 retired, 1 working after 
retirement, 2 unable to work because of disability, 2 seasonal workers, 25 employed (3 had 
private businesses, 1 was employed in a private business). Fourteen arrived in the villages in 
the post-Soviet period. Fifty-nine of all those interviewed were women, 27 were men. The 
average age of the interviewed was 58.4. 
The discussion also relies on interviews with 82 people carried out in Kaunas and 
with 11 people carried out in other cities, Vilnius and Ignalina. People were interviewed in 
Vilnius and Ignalina because they were related to village communities; they either were born 
in the villages, or worked in the villages for a longer period of time. Since they lived in a city, 
I classified them together with the city informants. There was approximately 94 hours of 
interviewing carried out in the cities.  
Twenty-seven of those interviewed in the cities had no college education, 9 had 
vocational training, 44 were professionals, 4 were professionals with high position, 5 were 
professionals with a Ph.D., 4 professionals with a Ph.D. and a high position. Sixty-one of 
the interviewed had a job, 4 were unemployed, 21 retired, 6 working after retirement, and 
one was not working because of a disability. Five of the interviewed had a private business, 
13 were employed in private businesses. Among the interviewed in the cities the average 
informant age was 53 years. There were 56 women and 37 men.  
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Interviewing people in the largest village and the cities I tried to find informants of 
different age, socio-economic status, and a variety of personal histories. Among the 
interviewed there were Soviet-period industrial factory directors, former Communist Party 
(CP) members, political prisoners and/or deportees, farmers, workers, private business 
owners, professors, doctors, teachers, and engineers.  
The questions given to villagers and city informants were similar. Unlike city 
informants, the villagers were asked about the village, which constituted the first part of 
questions in village communities. The other parts included questions about the liberation 
movement period, the experience of the post-Soviet period (which often diverted to 
discussions of personal experiences in Soviet times), and questions about the EU, elections, 
and voting. The questions about the liberation movement and personal experiences of social 
changes in Lithuania became the basis for understanding political subjectivities, as well as a 
source of information about attitudes towards politics. The questions about elections and 
voting usually produced short answers. The answers were not well articulated and often 
diverted people to considerations about more general issues. In Giddens’s (1986) terms 
informants lacked discursive consciousness in these particular cases. For example, when 
asked “Why did you vote in the last elections for a particular candidate?,” a person tended to 
respond with indefinite answers: “I think he is a good candidate,” “I don’t think there is a 
better choice,” “I usually vote for him/her,” “he is young,” etc.7 Later in my research I 
tended to inquire about personal experiences of changes, informant’s ideas about 
himself/herself, the state and society rather than elections themselves. Towards the end of 
my research I felt that after talking to a person for some time about social and political 
history, society, and the informant himself/herself, I could answer a question on how 
he/she voted even without asking the informant about it.  
The questions which structured my research included open forms, such as “How did 
you see/experience the liberation movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s?” or “What 
was your experience of the post-Soviet period?” I tried to follow informants’ knowledge in 
                                                 
7 A small minority who were members of particular parties voted for these parties and their 
candidates. Their voting was an expression of their membership.  
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my prompts. In many cases the open questions were acceptable to informants; they had 
their story to tell. In some cases informants wanted to know what exactly interested me. I 
responded that I wanted to get their general impression, to see understanding of post-
independence time, of personal experiences of it. If that was not enough, I asked the person 
to tell about his/her job, whether there were any changes in requirements, relations among 
employers and employees, etc. This usually turned to some other experiential terrains that I 
asked him/her to elaborate on.  
Soviet times became the unintentional reference point in most of the interviews. In 
the beginning of my research in the villages, the villagers themselves were comparing 
present social history to what was “then,” “in Soviet times,” “under the Russians.” Later in 
my research, when asked to make my questions more concrete, in some cases I pointed to 
Soviet times myself, asking an informant about his/her life in Soviet times and at present. 
During the research in village communities and cities I interviewed almost twice as 
many women as men (115 women, and 64 men). In the first village most of the inhabitants 
were women. In other villages, visiting the oldest inhabitants to get information about 
villages meant that I was going to talk to women.8 Villagers themselves suggested that I 
speak to women in many cases. Several times my insistence on talking to men was 
approached with the response “all men in the village are drunk.” By seeking men I aimed to 
balance my approach. However, my (probably “gendered”) interest in informants’ personal 
experiences of social history was better met talking to women. Men tended to represent 
post-socialist history as “it really was.” Many men listed events with details excluding 
themselves from the narrative, while women tended to talk about how she/her family 
experienced post-socialism. Later in my dissertation I outline some of the gender 
differences. I approach social history and change with particular attention to women’s 
stories. 
Interviews from villages were coded with NUD*IST. NUD*IST was especially 
helpful for analyzing particular themes. However, to see themes in the context I coded 
interviews from Kaunas on paper.  
                                                 
8 It is due to lower life expectancy for men. 
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 I also conducted interviews with politicians in office; mainly Parliament members or 
political ideologues, Parliament committee (such as Education, Science and Culture 
Committee) members, radical and populist party leaders and other politicians. There were 26 
Parliament members interviewed in 2003: 5 were members of the Homeland Union, the 
Lithuanian Conservatives fraction (3 of which were Homeland Union members, 2 were 
members of the Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees); 9 were members of 
the Parliament Social Democratic coalition, 7 were members of the Liberal and Centre 
fraction, 5 belonged to the Mixed group of the Parliament (2 among which were the 
Lithuanian Christian Democrats, 1 was a Lithuanian Freedom Union leader, 1 was a leader 
of the “Young Lithuania,” the New Nationalists and Political Prisoners Union, 1 was a 
leader of the Party of National Progress).  
I have also conducted 17 interviews9 with other politicians: 4 were employed at the 
Education, Science and Culture Committee at the Parliament, 1 was the former Minister of 
Education, 1 was the former Prime Minister’s advisee for Culture Affairs, 4 were former 
Parliament members, 5 were leaders or members of the so-called radical and populist 
parties, 2 were party ideologues.  
The interviews with Parliament members lasted from a half an hour to one hour and 
took place at the Parliament. Other politicians were interviewed from about 1 hour to 1.5 
hours. Some interviews lasted several hours. These interviews formulated my general 
approach to political life in Lithuania. Some of them are included in the dissertation. 
However, they are not discussed in the dissertation separately because of my decision to 
focus more on voters rather than on both politicians and voters as I had initially planned. 
 
My observations of post-Soviet history explored in village communities and Kaunas 
parallel some other research carried out in Eastern Europe (see, e.g., Hann 2002, Creed 
2002, Verdery 2003, Kideckel, forthcoming, Ramonaitė 2005). Some responses to my 
                                                 
9 During the preliminary dissertation research in 2002 summer, I conducted 6 interviews, which are 
included in these numbers. 
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research by several professors and politicians in Lithuania who objected to some of the 
findings of my research encouraged me to carefully localize, contextualize and reflect upon 
the knowledge and social history I present in this dissertation. One mainstream party 
ideologue argued that he was unfamiliar with the discourse of my interviews (some of which 
he read) and that his party had little to say to people like some of my informants. He 
claimed that there are many prosperous villages and well-off villagers in some parts of 
Lithuania (e.g., Samogitia) who are “established capitalists” and successful at present. Thus, 
my study is not about the “established capitalists” of post-socialist transitions. In general, I 
must admit that any social history which could be explored by utilizing the categories of 
“prosperous village,” “well-off villagers,” and “established capitalists” remained obscure to 
me despite my intention to collect varying data.  
Another response that I wish to mention, which is indicative of the limitations and 
particular situatedness of my research, was conveyed by an émigré doctor in Chicago. I gave 
a presentation at the annual conference of the Lithuanian Community on the village 
communities researched. In the presentation I talked about villagers’ experiences of the 
present as regression and their memories of the past as welfare and prosperity. After my talk 
the émigré doctor asked why I did not talk about deportees, the owners of large farms in the 
interwar period who were deported to Siberia, returned after Stalin’s death and work on 
their restituted “dear land” at present. “You must have talked to them… In Suvalkija [a 
region of Lithuania] there are many farmers who work on their land.” His angry voice 
suggested that the social history I presented had no right to exist. He did not deny the ideas 
I discussed, but he was embarrassed by my choice and focus. Like one professor in Kaunas, 
he considered my informants “unreliable narrators” who could not articulate the social 
history of Lithuania. The doctor’s comment was correct—many deportees do not to share 
many of the ideas I presented in the talk. However, I think my focus is relevant, while values 
and meanings shared by the “unreliable narrators” are useful in understanding the dynamics 
of post-Soviet electoral politics and political communication.  
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1.3 ON BEING NATIVE 
During field research I tried to nurture some degree of distance from the observed and the 
learned, knowing of critiques of native anthropologists (see, e.g., Hernandez 1993, Stoll 
1999, Fox 1991). However, I felt that knowing and having experienced some culture allowed 
establishing rapport with people easily and was helpful in understanding some of their 
sensibilities and relations to social history. I think I was accepted both as an insider (a 
Lithuanian) and an outsider (someone from outside the community). I did not find that the 
fact that I had been studying in the United States influenced the data I collected. While it 
raised some excitement when I was introduced as a student from the United States, there 
were multiple cases when people did not know this fact and told me similar stories.  
C. Geertz argued that the “culture of people is an ensemble of texts, themselves 
ensembles, which the anthropologist strains to read over the shoulders of those to whom 
they properly belong” (Geertz 1973:452). I was part of these texts because of my Lithuanian 
background, and I read myself as well as others. Some of this reading is included in the 
dissertation. 
1.4 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
In chapter 1 I discuss memories of socialism among village communities and some city 
residents, which reveal alternatives to generally accepted conceptualizations of socialism as 
well as to the rhetoric of the revolutions of 1989–1991 that were founded on strong criticism 
of socialism. Many people interviewed invoked socialism as a space and time of security, 
social welfare, prosperity, a sensible way of life, as well as a moral and just order. Conversely, 
the present was narrated in terms of decline, chaos, and regression. I argue that memories 
about the past are comments on the post-socialist changes and personal experiences of post-
socialism. What is often labeled “nostalgia for socialism” are articulations of present-day 
marginalization.  
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Experiences of marginalization, knowledge of changing social history, physical and 
social environment as reflected in discussions of work, money, and milk are explored in 
chapter 2. The past very often was associated with full employment, “real” money, and good 
prices for milk. The predictability, security, and fullness of the past were contrasted to the 
changing, uncertain, and restricting present. In chapter 2 I illustrate how ideas about work, 
money and milk express changing values, meanings, social relations, individual 
accommodations and resistance, as well as how these ideas are addressed in political 
campaigns and marketing.  
In chapter 3 I discuss alternative approaches to social history and contrasting political 
subjectivities from those discussed in chapters 1 and 2. I present articulations of Soviet-
period social history as oppression by analyzing excerpts of life histories of two women of 
different generations, social standing, and experience. These two women’s factual 
presentations of Soviet and post-Soviet life were in many ways similar to the articulations of 
the past and present discussed in chapters 1 and 2. The significant difference was in 
articulating meanings of social history as well as assigning values to the known, observed, 
and/or experienced. I define “oppression” as an experience of foreignness of social history, 
which limits individual agency and which produces an individual as the other to the publicly 
imagined community through various techniques of constraint and discipline. In such a 
perspective, there is no general oppression of a society, only oppression in particular cases 
when the relationship between an individual and history is of perceived foreignness and 
constraint. 
Chapter 4 introduces the idea of biographic social others and spaces of difference in 
Soviet constitution of “class” and late Soviet and post-Soviet “nation”-building projects. I 
develop a concept of biographic cleansing, i.e., techniques of exclusion and intolerance 
towards people with a particular biography, such as a deportee identified as a class enemy in 
the Soviet Union, or a Communist Party member in post-Soviet countries. This chapter 
explores how social difference is produced by state officials, in communities and social 
interactions as well as articulations and inactions of the stigmatized person. I further develop 
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the idea that experiences of social otherness are translated into social texts of opposition, 
such as the ones analyzed in chapters 1, 2, and 3.  
In chapter 5 I argue that during the liberation period in 1989–1991 a specific cultural 
artifact—“nation-state” was produced redefining “nation” in the context of the Western 
tradition, i.e., binding it to the values of statehood, sovereignty, and national citizenship 
prohibited in Soviet times. I explore how “nation” was imagined in the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s and discuss why that imagination does not exist at present. I argue that the 
present negotiation of “liberation,” which questions the necessity of a nation having a 
sovereign state as important, is expressive of dissatisfactions with post-socialist social and 
moral orders, and also of sensibilities about subjectivities, values and authority that are 
ignored in post-socialist history.  
I explore people’s relations to the state in chapter 6 by looking at people’s 
understanding/experience of authority and power. I argue that “cynicism” is the common 
structure of feeling embedded in perceptions and experiences of the state (cf. Žižek 1995, 
Navaro-Yashin 2002). It entails negativity, distance, and irony rather than resistance towards 
the state. Cynicism has an effect on the lives people live and the communication they carry 
out with the “state” whether in everyday conversations or at elections. Cynicism encapsulates 
criticism of the state officials, seeing them as self-interested, immoral, and unjust. It also 
manifests distrust of the authorities and difference between the people and the power elites. 
Cynicism derives from various contexts: experience of power as omnipresent, immutable, and 
threatening prevalent in the socialist period, beliefs in equality and loyalty to a collective 
which no longer inform social relations, mysterious post-socialist circulations of wealth from 
which people feel completely or partly excluded, experience of destatization (Verdery 1996) 
and of marginalization.  
Chapter 7 analyzes examples of the two presidential campaigns of 2002 and 2004. 
Electoral campaigns are the competition over meanings and power to signify. The successful 
electoral campaign is a political spectacle which appeals to meanings, values, and passions 
people share. Political subjectivities and experiences of social history are transformed into 
votes. People vote for a candidate and ideas that are consistent with their experience and 
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knowledge. The Enlightenment notion that it is irrational to go against one’s self-interest is 
correct, if self-interest is defined in terms of people’s knowledge, not neoliberal economists’ 
views. People vote their economic self-interest, if they identify with it (see Lakoff 2004). 
Voting is the interplay of social history, perception, and experience embodied in individuals 
which make politics discernible and votes legible. It is a meaningful action. 
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2.0  HISTORICAL CONTEXTS 
The first time the name of Lithuania was mentioned was in the Quendlinburg annals in 1009 
AD. According to the annals, Lithuanians were recognized as a distinct ethnic group among 
the Baltic peoples and resided in an area roughly conforming to present-day borders of 
Lithuania (Ashbourne 1999). The Lithuanians were the only Baltic tribe which in the first 
half of the 13th century created a state. The state developed in the space of the eastern 
border of Central Europe, which was not filled by any strong states, in between civilizations 
to the west and east of Lithuania (Kiaupa et al. 2000). A native chief, Mindaugas (Mindovg) 
who presided over the state, seeking peace with Germanic invaders, attempted to integrate 
his newly established realm into the West European political system. He converted to Latin 
Christianity and was crowned King (the first and the last king of Lithuania) on the authority 
of Pope Innocent IV (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:2). In 1263 Mindaugas was murdered 
by his rivals. The society returned to the pagan customs of their ancestors. 
During the 14th century, the Lithuanian rulers Gediminas (Gedimyn), Algirdas 
(Olgerd), and Kęstutis (Kenstut) contained the assaults of the Teutonic Order and expanded 
eastward in the wake of the recession of Tatar power. Considerable East Slav territory was 
absorbed into Lithuania, making Lithuania a major power in Eastern Europe (Misiunas and 
Taagepera 1983:2–3). The state, whose rulers and ethnic core maintained their pagan 
religion, became a battleground between Latin influences and the Orthodox traditions of the 
incorporated East Slav population. A resolution of this conflict came in 1386, when Great 
Prince Jogaila (Jagiełło), pressed by continuing incursions of the Teutonic Order, sought 
Polish support. As a condition of his marriage to the heiress of Poland, Jadwyga, and his 
accession to the Polish throne, he agreed to baptize his pagan Lithuanian subjects into the 
Latin rite (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:3). In 1387 Jogaila (King Władysław II of Poland) 
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began the baptism of his pagan Lithuanian subjects as Christians of the Roman Rite. 1387 is 
the date of Lithuania’s turn from paganism to Christianity. The people of Lithuania were the 
last pagans in Europe.  
The rule of Jogaila’s cousin Vytautas (Vitovt), as Viceroy according to theoretical 
West European designation, but as independent Great Prince in practice, reached the 
apogee of Lithuanian power. The realm of Vytautas’s Lithuania stretched from the Baltic to 
the Black Sea, from the outskirts of Moscow to Poland. In 1410 the combined armies of 
Poland and Lithuania defeated the Teutonic Order at Grünwald (Tannenberg). The Order 
was never able to recover, and thereafter ceased to be the threat to Lithuania that it had 
been for two centuries (see Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:3, Rowell et al. 2002). In some of 
historiography (e.g., Šapoka 1990) Vytautas’s Lithuania is among the most glorious 
moments of history of Lithuania. 
Nearly two hundred years of personal union with Poland, never clearly defined in the 
political sense, lasted until 1569 and had two long-term effects on the ethnic core of the 
Lithuanian state: the Christianization of the Lithuanians and the Polonization of the 
Lithuanian nobility (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:3).  
The Union of Lublin of 1569 united Poland and Lithuania in an official 
Commonwealth with a single sovereign, a common legislative body, and a united foreign 
policy in an attempt to provide a defense against the expanding Russian state. Although 
about one third of the former territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was transferred to 
Poland, the rearrangement preserved Lithuania’s independent identity (Packer and 
Furmonavičius 2000). The 17th and 18th centuries were marked by wars with Sweden and 
Russia which reduced the territory and sovereignty of the Commonwealth significantly. 
During the course of the three partitions of the Commonwealth (1772, 1793, and 1795), the 
Lithuanian state fell under Russian rule.  
In the 19th century developments in Lithuania depended on who was tsar. The reigns 
of Paul I (1796–1801) and Alexander I (1801–1825) were periods of relaxation and there 
were even plans to revive the Lithuano-Polish Union as a united Kingdom of Poland under 
Russian protection or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under Russian guardianship (see 
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Rowell et al. 2002). Later the policy toward Lithuania changed (with the exception of the 
years of Alexander II (1855–1881), the years of a thaw). The changed policy was called 
“removing the root causes of the country’s separation from Russia,” “depolonization,” or 
simply “restoring [Lithuania’s] Russian roots” (see Rowell et al. 2002, Aleksandravičius and 
Kulakauskas 1996). It was based on a theory that the Grand Duchy was essentially a Russian 
state before its union with Poland in 1386 and that only after the Union of Lublin (1569) the 
Poles destroyed those Russian roots by aiming to polonize the “Russian state of Lithuania” 
or “Western Rus” (see Rowell et al. 2002). The implementation of policy to restore “Russian 
roots” took various routes. The Russian language was introduced into all state institutions. 
Vilnius University, founded in 1579, was closed down in 1832. There was repression of the 
Catholic Church. After 1864 Russian primary schools were founded. The use of the Latin 
(Polish) alphabet was banned in Lithuanian texts (until 1905), which were to be printed in 
Cyrillic characters (see Subačius 2005). Lithuania was considered an “ahistoric nation” by 
the Russians and a historic province of Poland by the Poles (Aleksandravičius and 
Kulakauskas 1996). “Lithuania is completely a thing of the past,” wrote the poet Adam 
Mickiewicz in 1828 (cited in Rowell et al. 2002:17).  
The various liberation attempts marked the late 18th and 19th centuries beginning 
with the Tadeusz Kościuszko uprising of 1794. Napoleon’s attempt to raise hopes for the 
restoration of the former Commonwealth of the Two Nations were celebrated in 2003 by 
reburying the Napoleon soldiers found during the construction work in Vilnius. The 
uprisings of 1830–1831 and 1863–1864 had the aim to liberate from Russian hegemony and 
to reestablish the Commonwealth. The insurgents as well as the Russian authorities 
promoted social causes to gain the support of local peasants (see Rowell et al. 2002, 
Aleksandravičius and Kulakauskas 1996). 
Emancipation, with the right to limited landholding, came in 1861, along with the 
general abolition of serfdom throughout the Russian Empire (Misiunas and Taagepera 
1983). The peasants of Lithuania’s Užnemunė region—the area southwest of the Nemunas 
River, which had belonged to Napoleon’s Grand Duchy of Warsaw—were freed during the 
first decade of the 19th century. Natives to this region, sons of better off peasant families 
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who studied at universities in Russia became the leaders of 19th century Lithuanian 
nationalism which epitomized the establishment of the Republic of Lithuania after World 
War I in 1918.  
The nation of Lithuania as ethnosocial and ethnopolitical community formed on the 
basis of peasant culture. At the end of the 19th century the nobility of Lithuania were 
polonized and did not support Lithuanian national upheaval (Aleksandravičius and 
Kulakauskas 1996:232). They became foreigners in their own country and many fled to 
Poland after the establishment of the independence of Lithuania in 1918.  
The Lithuanian language which became the primary marker of Lithuanian identity 
was a property of only 7.8% of people of cities. The predominant public languages were 
Russian and Polish. Lithuanian language, as well as Yiddish,10 often was a language of 
interpersonal communication between people who claimed this language as native. In other 
numbers, the population, whose language was Samogitian or Lithuanian, historiographically 
Lithuanians, constituted the following estates: 93.3% peasants, 3.9% townspeople, 2.5% 
nobility (Aleksandravičius and Kulakauskas 1996:233).  
The Lithuanian national movement of the 19th century began with a desire to 
maintain the native language (Rowell et al. 2002). The illegal press had an important role and 
a book smuggler (knygnešys) who smuggled the books and newspapers in Latin script in the 
Lithuanian language from Prussia became a hero of Lithuanian national history. The illegal 
newspapers Aušra (The Dawn) and Varpas (The Bell) promoted a separate, Lithuanian, 
nationalist movement, disconnecting it from the aims of the Polish national movement and 
the tradition of the Two Nations (see Rowell et al. 2002). The resolutions of the Congress of 
1905 sought autonomy, a centralized administration for the ethnic Lithuanian region of the 
Russian Empire, and the use of the Lithuanian language in administration (Misiunas and 
Taagepera 1983).  
 The establishment of Lithuania was the culmination of a particular national 
movement. It also was an outgrowth of the Russian revolutions, a by-product of World War 
                                                 
 10 42.1% of population of the cities held that their native language was Yiddish, 24%- Polish, 21.5%- 
one of the Slavic languages (Aleksandravičius and Kulakauskas 1996:232).  
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I, and a reflection of the twentieth century Zeitgeist of democracy and national self-
determination (Senn 1959:221). Senn (1959) argues that no new state as small as Lithuania 
could have arisen, if the international situation had been different. There were three large 
neighbors each with its own ideas about Lithuania’s future. The collapse of Russia, the 
defeat of Germany, and the exercise by the Entente of restraint on Poland were essential 
factors in Lithuania’s birth (Senn 1959:229).  
The independence period of 1918–1920 was marked by armed conflicts with Russia 
and Poland. After the military conflict with Poland, which sought to restore their state 
within the same borders of the Commonwealth of the Two Nations, Lithuania lost part of 
the territory to which it had pretensions, including its historic capital Vilnius in 1920. 
According to Rothschild (1998) unfulfilled territorial claims to Poland’s Wilno, a city 
regarded as the Lithuanians’ historic capital though they were but a small minority of the 
interwar population, together with anxiety lest Germany reclaim Lithuania’s only port of 
Klaipėda (Memel), gave Lithuania’s interwar politics a far more explicitly nationalistic tinge 
than was the case in Estonia and Latvia which had no territorial-revisionist pretensions of 
their own (Rothschild 1998). 
The period of 1926 to Lithuania’s incorporation into the Soviet Empire in 1940 was 
a time of authoritarian rule like in most of East Central Europe (see Okey 1986, Rothschild 
1998). In the course of World War II, Lithuania as well as Latvia and Estonia lost their 
formal independent statehood, unlike the rest of East Central Europe. They were absorbed 
into the Soviet Union as constituent socialist republics in the summer of 1940. Lithuania’s 
fate was then reconfirmed by the war’s outcome (Rothschild 1998). Within the Soviet 
Union, the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic possessed Vilnius (Wilno). In Soviet 
historiography the Soviet Army was the liberator of Lithuania from Hitler’s Germany and 
was responsible for returning Vilnius to Lithuania. 
Soviet historiography declared that the class struggle in Lithuania had always taken 
precedence over national questions and that the “bourgeoisie” had always chosen their class 
interests over any considerations of national liberation (Senn 2002). It was asserted that the 
period of independence, 1918–1940, was notable only for the ruthless exploitation of the 
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toiling masses and for the stagnation of Lithuanian culture (see Senn 2002). President 
Antanas Smetona’s authoritarian rule, 1926–1940, was represented as the triumph of fascism 
in Lithuania (Senn 2002). Once the Lithuanians had found their proper place in the Soviet 
system, “proletarian internationalism,” following the lead of their Russian brothers, would 
replace the narrow “bourgeois nationalism” of the past (see Senn 2002).11
In terms of Soviet historiography, the change of the state system was effected by the 
People’s Seimas (the Parliament) elected on democratic grounds. On July 29, 1940, the 
Seimas adopted a resolution on Lithuania’s entrance into the Soviet Union (Kancevičius 
1976:15–16). An “Extract from the Declaration of the People’s Seimas Proclaiming 
Lithuania a Soviet Socialist Republic” of July 21, 1940 states: 
The regime of Smetona [the President of Lithuania in 1926–1940], indifferent to the real 
interests of the people, pushed the Lithuanian internal and external policy into a hopeless 
impasse. The vital interests of the Lithuanian working people were sacrificed to the selfish 
interests of small groups of wealthy people and exploiters. The destiny of the working people 
of the cities and villages were: unemployment, uncertainty for the future, privations, and 
inequality of ethnic groups. For many years the people were oppressed by this reactionary 
regime. […]  
In these days the Lithuanian people expressed its will to abolish the political domination of 
landlords and capitalists forever, and also to form a real people’s Government and with its 
own hands to begin the reorganization of the governmental structure of our country. The 
victory of the Union of the Working People of Lithuania is a historic turning point, granting 
to the working people all civic and political rights, guaranteeing a better future for them and 
future generations. […] 
The People’s Seimas, expressing the unanimous will of the working people, proclaims that the 
Soviet system shall be introduced in Lithuania. […] 
The People’s Seimas is firmly convinced that all inhabitants of Lithuania will rally around the 
Soviet Government to assure welfare, economic and cultural prosperity to give our country 
freedom and happiness, and to lead the country towards final victory of the people.  
Long live the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic!” (cited in Kancevičius 1976:211). 
                                                 
11 Presenting the Soviet-period historiography Senn specifically referred to Romas Šarmaitis essay 
Some Questions of the History of the Lithuanian National Liberation Movement in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century 
(1953) (see Senn 2002:24).  
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In émigré and post-Soviet historiography of Lithuania the events of 1940 and Soviet 
rule are considered to be an occupation. For example, Joseph Kajeckas, Charge d’Affaires 
a.i. of Lithuania in Washington, D.C. in the foreword to émigré Jack Stukas’s book 
“Awakening Lithuania” writes: 
In 1940, after Lithuania had achieved an impressive record of accomplishments as a member 
of the 20th century family of free nations, she was viciously seized and subjugated by the 
Soviet Union, in a treacherous act of aggression that continues to the present day. The tragedy 
that has befallen Lithuania in the 20th century is a paradigm of everything that freedom-loving 
men must fear and fight against” (Stukas 1966:vii-viii).  
In June, 1941 Lithuania faced the first mass deportations (see chapter 4). Between 
1945 and 1953 there were 34 mass deportations of Lithuanian citizens to the depths of the 
Soviet Union (Rowell et al. 2002). The deportees were classified as the “enemies of people.” 
They included large holding farmers, the state sector employees of Lithuania, members of 
various parties and organizations as well as everyone who disagreed with communist 
ideology and opposed the Soviet state (Anušauskas et al. 2005, see also chapter 4).  
“Forest Brothers” was the name by which the population called the anti-Soviet 
partisans in all Baltic countries. At peak size they involved 0.5 to l% of the total population. 
This is comparable to the peak Viet Cong strength in South Vietnam (discounting the North 
Vietnamese supplements) of about 170,000 fighters and supply runners out of a population 
of 20 million (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:81). In nationalist narratives the post-war 
partisan battles are presented as struggles for independence (e.g., Klumbytė 2003). Misiunas 
and Taagepera argue that people went to the forests mainly when they could no longer take 
the insecurity of civilian life (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983). The first wave of forest 
brothers consisted of willing and unwilling German collaborators and draftees, later men 
avoiding the Soviet draft and Red Army deserters. The Soviet land redistribution and other 
social restructuring measures produced new waves, as did Soviet screening and deportation 
campaigns. The last major wave was to come during the 1949 farm-collectivization process 
(Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:82). The last known trial of a partisan leader was held in 
Kėdainiai on May 6–8, 1963 (Vardys 1965:249). 
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Despite the career opportunities involved, only 0.3% of the Lithuanians had joined 
the CP after five years of continuous Soviet occupation. This rate was about 10 times less 
than the USSR average at that time (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:78). According to 
Misiunas and Taagepera (1983), by the early 1950s it was becoming evident that Soviet 
power was likely to stay and that career opportunities required party membership. Partisan 
activities, which had at times made such membership dangerous, were subsiding. Moral 
condemnation of collaboration with the enemy also became muted, as deportations silenced 
people. At Stalin’s death in March 1953, total CP membership was 36,000 in Lithuania. 
Lithuanians formed 38% of the members, and the percentage later increased (Misiunas and 
Taagepera 1983:81). In 1964, the Lithuanian party (2.5% of the republics population) was 
still smaller than the Soviet average. In 1965, Lithuanians made up 61.5% of the LCP; by 
1968, the figure had grown to 66.2% (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:142). 
Like other new Soviet states and Soviet satellites in East Central Europe, policies of 
collectivization, industrialization, and urbanization were carried out in Lithuania. 
Collectivization was the ultimate goal of agricultural planning (Misiunas and Taagepera 
1983). Primarily an agricultural country, Lithuania was fully collectivized in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s (Anušauskas et al. 2005). Reconstruction and expansion of industry were 
among the Soviet priorities for a series of economic and political reasons. Network of roads, 
factory buildings, housing, and schools were to be used for industrialization purposes 
(Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:104). The industrial proletariat was considered superior to the 
peasantry and was expected to be more supportive of the Soviet regime (Misiunas and 
Taagepera 1983:104). From a colonial viewpoint, industrialization offered a way for settling 
large numbers of Russians among a reticent local population. As Latvia and Estonia were 
more industrialized and less resistant in the postwar period, they attracted more capital 
investment (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:104). In more agricultural Lithuania, the local 
rural labor pool seemed to supply most of the relatively modest increase in the industrial 
work force. New immigrants could hardly be attracted to the countryside, especially under 
conditions of continuing partisan resistance. The influx was hence largely limited to 
functionaries and the armed forces (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:108). Misiunas and 
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Taagepera conclude that at times such colonization seems to have become a goal in itself 
rather than a means of industrialization. In particular, it made little economic sense to 
deport Lithuanian farmers to Siberia, and then import Russian labor to the cities of 
Lithuania (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:104).  
Within the USSR, the Baltic republics increasingly surpassed the other republics in 
per-capita national income. By 1968, Lithuania exceeded the Soviet average by 15%, Latvia 
by 42%, and Estonia by 44% (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:177–178). While USSR per-
capita income increased 67% from 1958 to 1968, Estonia’s and Latvia’s went up by about 
90%, and Lithuania’s by 108%. During my research informants remembered that in Soviet 
times Lithuania was the most prosperous republic of the Soviet Union.  
Despite their clear russification tendencies, the Soviet authorities did not remove the 
native language (Rowell et al. 2002). The schools of Lithuania became an instrument of 
training “Communistically educated people.”12 The guidelines to this goal were 
polytechnism, collectivism, a materialistic world view, atheistic and antireligious ideas, 
proletarian internationalism, socialist patriotism, the friendship of Soviet peoples, love of the 
Socialist motherland, hate for the Kremlin’s enemies, and Communist принципиальность13 
(Vaitiekūnas 1965:179). 
Under Soviet rule, in Lithuania, religion added a particular facet to resistance unlike 
in Latvia and Estonia. Catholic parishes represented a grass-roots institution encompassing 
the majority of the population (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:82). The Soviet threat to their 
existence in itself fostered resistance (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:82, see also Vignieri 
1965). The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania, which began publication in 1972 and 
was the well-known form of resistance, recorded the struggle for religious freedom (Senn 
2002). The close identification of Catholicism with nationalism has persisted in Lithuania to 
the present day (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983:6–7). 
In response to Mikhail Gorbachev’s Perestroika (Reconstruction movement), Sąjūdis, 
the Movement for Perestroika in Lithuania was founded in 1988. Like in many other 
                                                 
12 See Tarybinė Mokykla, No.12 (December, 1960), p. 3. 
13 See Švietimas Tarybų Lietuvoje, p. 31; Liaudies Švietimas, p. 22; Tarybinė Mokykla, No.1 (January, 
1958), p. 3; ibid., No.1 (January, 1959), p. 8; ibid., No.12 (December, 1960), pp. 26–27. 
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Eastern European states members of Sąjūdis were intellectuals, i.e., representatives of the 
Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, members of the creative unions, well-known artists and 
writers. Almost half of the Sąjūdis Initiative Group were members of the Communist Party 
(see, e.g., Senn 2002).  
Sąjūdis and the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) were the major forces in the 
liberation movement. Sąjūdis with its more radical inclinations towards the liberation from 
the USSR and promotion of nationalist ideas soon became a symbol for the struggle for 
independence.14 Many people supported Sąjūdis candidates in the first elections to the 
USSR’s Congress of People’s Deputies which ended in a victory for Sąjūdis. Furthermore, 
the elections of 24 February 1990 to the Supreme Council of Lithuania secured the majority 
for Sąjūdis candidates.15 The Supreme Council pronounced Lithuania an independent state 
on the 11th of March, 1990.16 However, until the unsuccessful Communist coup in Moscow 
on August 19–21, 1991, the independence of Lithuania was not internationally recognized.17 
At the referendum of 9 February, 1991, three fourth of the citizens of Lithuania voted in 
favor of an independent democratic republic as the form of the Lithuanian state. 
In 1992 Algirdas Brazauskas, the former First Secretary of the Lithuanian 
Communist Party, organized the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDDP), a successor 
of LCP, to an overwhelming victory in the elections to the Lithuanian Seimas (the 
                                                 
14 The more radical political force in Lithuania was the Lithuanian Freedom League (Lietuvos Laisvės 
Lyga). The league made clear its dedication to the principle of Lithuanian independence, “a free Lithuania in a 
confederation of European nations.” The realization of the various issues in the League’s program, it 
declared, “will create the bases to restore Lithuania’s sovereignty and independence” (Senn 2002:82–83). In 
the early days of Sąjūdis, Vytautas Landsbergis, the leader of Sąjūdis, had represented the absolute center in 
the group. In Sąjūdis provisional program of June 13th, 1988 the assertion about political independence was 
not stated (Senn 2002:255). Sąjūdis tended to conform to the discursive boundaries provided by Perestroika. 
Many conservative émigrés had doubts about Sąjūdis (Senn 2002:255).  
15 In the elections of 24th, February, 1990 (turnout 71.72%) and the repeated elections of 4th, 7th, 
8th, 10th of March (turnout 66.4%) and 7th of April there were 101 seats out of 141 won by Sąjūdis 
supported candidates (source: Lietuvos Suvereniteto Atkūrimas 1988–1991 Metais. 2000. Vilnius: Diemedžio 
leidykla). 
 16 Senn argues that Lithuanian “nationalism” of 1988–1989 had a broad democratic character (Senn 
2002). According to him, ethnic conflict should be considered minimal throughout this period. In drawing up 
plans for citizenship, the Lithuanians adopted the so-called “zero option,” accepting any person resident and 
employed in the republic on a given day, as a citizen (Senn 2002).  
17 Iceland was the first (February 11th, 1991) to recognize the Republic of Lithuania de jure. The 
United States recognized the Republic of Lithuania on the 2nd of September, 1991, the USSR on the 6th of 
September, 1991. On the 17th of September, 1991 Lithuania became a member of the United Nations.  
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Parliament). Brazauskas was elected President in 1993. Lithuania was the first country of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to return its former communists to power. To 
many outside observers, particularly in the Western Europe and the United States, the 
return of the LDDP and Brazauskas was a shocking return to the communist past, and the 
repetition of the “Lithuanian syndrome” in several other post-socialist states led to great 
concern about these societies’ commitments to change (see Abdelal 2002:464, see also 
Vardys and Sedaitis 1997).  
In 1996 Lithuanians gave the majority to the Homeland Union, a successor of 
Sąjūdis. In 1997 Valdas Adamkus, the American Lithuanian, unaffiliated with any party, was 
elected to President’s office. In 2000, the former communist parties gained a majority again. 
In 2004 the majority was captured by the Labor Party founded in 2003 and led by the 
Russian-born Lithuanian citizen Viktor Uspaskich. Regardless of the leaders and parties in 
power, integration into NATO and the EU has been the major foreign policy goals of post-
Soviet Lithuania. Lithuania became a member of NATO and the EU in 2004.  
Reflecting on post-Soviet history Edvardas Gudavičius, a well-known historian, 
concluded that “we are the last pagans and the last serfs. This backwardness [atsilikimas] 
probably is the major reason of all troubles.”18 On a more optimistic note Gintaras 
Beresnevičius (2003), a prominent culture historian, suggests beginning building a new 
democratic empire which extends its influence towards the East, Ukraine, Belarus, and the 
Caucasus region.  
                                                 
18 See ELTA interview with E. Gudavičius “Visa Lietuvos istorija—elgetiška: Garsus istorikas 
visuomenės ydų ištakų siūlo ieškoti praeityje” (“All history of Lithuania is beggarly: The well-known historian 
suggests searching for origins of social vices in the past”). Lietuvos rytas. 03/29/2004.  
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3.0  CHAPTER 1: SOCIAL HISTORY, MEMORY, AND EXPERIENCE 
A society is what it remembers; we are what we remember; I 
am what I remember; the self is a trick of memory (Wendt 
1987:79). 
 
Who said we didn’t live well? 
Like everyone else we ate, slept, and drank,  
Lamented, laughed, and loved… 
Who said we didn’t live well? 
(Samuel Volkov, a Russian poet reminiscing about socialism, 
cited in Lankauskas, forthcoming). 
 
Culture is supremely negotiable for professional culture 
experts, but for those whose identity depends upon a particular 
configuration this is not the case. Identity is not negotiable. 
Otherwise, it has no existence (Jonathan Friedman 1992:852). 
 
 
Post-socialist political history in Eastern Europe has become increasingly defined by 
apparent paradoxes, such as voting for the ex-communist parties in the early 1990s, support 
for the populist and the radical right, or nostalgia for socialism. Lithuania, for example, was 
the first country to break away from the USSR by declaring independence in March, 1990. It 
was also the first country to vote for ex-communist parties in 1992. The former First 
Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party A. Brazauskas was elected President. Most 
recently a leader of the so-called populist party of Liberal Democrats, Rolandas Paksas, was 
elected to President’s office in 2003 only to be ousted from it in 2004 for violation of the 
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Constitution of Lithuania and breaking the President’s oath. While the first presidential 
impeachment in Europe was approached by the political elites of Lithuania as “a successful 
test of democracy” that everyone assumed had been passed, the victories of Russian 
millionaire V. Uspaskich in the first elections to the European Parliament in June, 2004 as 
well as to the Lithuanian Parliament in October, 2004 brought discussions of populism back.  
Post-socialist political history appeared paradoxical because of reliance on 
assumptions that socialism was “immoral,” “imposed,” “oppressive,” etc., and that it was 
experienced as such by people subjected to socialist governments (cf. Yurchak 2003, 2006). 
Based on these assumptions, descriptions of the Soviet regime employed binary contrasts, 
such as “the Party vs. the people,” “repression vs. freedom,” “oppression vs. resistance,” 
“truth vs. dissimulation,” “official economy vs. second economy,” “official culture vs. 
counter culture,” “totalitarian language vs. people’s language,” “public self vs. private self” 
(Yurchak 2003). Notions of duplicity, deceitful behavior, a doubled and divided conscience 
(Kligman 1998), or of hidden transcripts (Scott 1990), i.e., resistance to domination, the 
“infrapolitics of the powerless,”19 were some of the conceptual tools developed and/or used 
to explain socialism. Such an approach to political history is built into Cold War rhetorics, 
dissident and intellectual critiques, such as those of Václav Havel in Czech Republic or V. 
Landsbergis in Lithuania, and ideologies of the liberation movement of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  
In this chapter I discuss memories of socialism among village people and some city 
residents, which revealed alternatives to these generally accepted conceptualizations of 
socialism as well as to the rhetoric of the revolutions of 1989–1991, which were founded on 
strong criticism of socialism. Many people interviewed invoke socialism as a space and time 
of security, social welfare, prosperity, a sensible way of life, as well as a moral and just order. 
Conversely, the present is narrated in terms of decline, chaos, and regression. The memories 
are comments on the post-socialist changes and personal experiences of post-socialism. 
Dialectically, the past and the present, or socialism and post-socialism, are reproduced in all 
narratives.  
                                                 
19 Scott’s term “hidden transcripts” in his own works is used for postcolonial politics.  
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In this chapter I claim that what is often labeled “nostalgia for socialism” is 
articulations of experienced marginalization and present-day subalternity. The narrative 
about the “better Soviet times” is a critique of post-socialist developments. It usually implies 
people’s dissatisfaction with everyday life rather than their political statements about the 
Soviet regime. The questions I raise about social history, memory and experience are 
essentially about the present. By focusing on the present, the arguments that memory 
displays the past fictitiously, selectively, and partially (as it does) lose their relevance, while 
memory (whatever it is) is the essential constitutive part of the individual’s present self and 
his/her present projections of social history (cf. Strathern and Stewart 2001).  
3.1 THE BETTER TIMES 
My first trip to the smallest village of the three studied was also my first encounter with the 
ideas of history often summarized in the idiom “it was better in Soviet times.” The “Soviet 
period” was invoked in most conversations about the present. People constantly compared 
the present to the socialist past assuring me that they had lived better “then.” Elena, the 
informant interviewed in the smallest village on my first day there, started her talk with the 
words: “the young maybe would like to return, but we, the retired… I, for example, would 
not like to return.” I asked whether she meant return to the city. She responded: “No, not to 
the city, to those [Soviet] times.” This dialogue showed that I was not part of the community 
of the common discourse20 which prevailed in this village as well as in other villages and 
urban spaces. 
My first informant was Ona, a 78 year old woman who lived in this village all her life. 
On one of our first meetings, I asked her to tell me about the village, the people, and their 
lives. Ona responded that everyone will tell me that it was “better under the Russians.” Later 
I learned that Ona was from a highly respected family in the village. Their house was a 
                                                 
20 See Thomas Wolfe on discursive communities (Wolfe, Thomas C. 2000 Cultures and Communities 
in the Anthropology of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Annual Review of Anthropology 29:195–
216). 
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Lithuanian school during the time when the village was part of Poland. In this house they 
used to stage plays and read Lithuanian books. In the years of World War II, Ona’s husband 
was a “forest brother,” a partisan fighting for Lithuania against the Soviet powers. He 
returned home after an amnesty. Ona saw deportations of her neighbors. She also witnessed 
how the Soviet authorities burned two young men alive who had hidden from mobilization 
to the Soviet army. After the amnesty Ona’s husband was forced to become a kolkhoz 
director. He resigned as soon as he was able to, becoming a kolkhoz worker. Ona worked on 
the poultry farm. When the liberation movement started in the late 1980s, her husband, sick 
and in bed was very happy and organized their family trips to Vilnius to support 
independence agendas. However, liberation, which was so important in her family life in the 
late 1980s, had little relevance for Ona at present. Ona argued that the time of post-
independence was worse than the Soviet period. What such a position means is a guiding 
question of this chapter. Ona’s and other informants’ memories about the past are taken as 
the lens through which together with interlocutors I can look at the present.  
The past becomes an important structuring principle in the context of social change. 
Like changes in personal lives that are often marked in society by rites of passage, change in 
“society’s life” instigates perception of a symbolic difference between the past and the 
present. Outside official histories and ideologies, social change is reflected in personal and 
personalized stories. Personal accounts are collisions of structure and agency (Bourdieu 
1977, Giddens 1984), reflections of habituses in flux, and interplays of change and form.  
Experiencing post-socialism, people invoke the past and the present as different 
symbolic systems to understand change, to locate themselves in changing history and 
environment. Past and present are also invoked to make arguments about the state and 
politics, to consider morality and justice issues.  
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3.2 THE REGRESSIVE PRESENT 
 “Soviet times” marks a real and symbolic time and space invoked in informants’ stories 
about their lives “under the Russians,” “in Soviet times,” “then,” and/or “under the other 
state” (prie anos valdžios). People usually recollect the 1970s and 1980s, i.e., late socialism. 
“Post-Soviet times” refers to the “present,” the time “under Lithuania,” or “under this state” 
(prie šitos valdžios). The living conditions of many who thought that it was better earlier 
declined in the early, mid or even late 1990s. However, the Soviet/post-Soviet distinction 
was a symbolic boundary invoked in most conversations to classify personal experience and 
to narrate social history.  
For many villagers the present emerges as regression, which is primarily a physical 
destruction of observable surroundings: ruined kolkhoz buildings, closed schools and culture 
centers, and terminated construction of the late 1980s. These are the landmarks of the early 
1990s. Villagers will point to them and say:  
They put so much money into the brick factory. Look now. It is like a ghost. People find 
stolen cars there. The factory is home to thieves. You know what it was? It was, listen, 
thousands of employees lived there and made a living. In the beginning we made little, then 











The ruined farms, lumber mills, and brick yards have social significance; very often 
they indicate the loss of jobs. Loss of jobs is one of the major themes of post-socialist life. 
Unemployed people feel unneeded, while in the Soviet period everyone had “one’s own 
place.” “It is good that I have a job” or “if I worked, it would be different” are oft-repeated 
phrases which indicate the importance of having or not having a job. Unemployment is 
thought to be related to many negative post-socialist developments, such as criminality, 
migration, injustice, immorality or alcoholism (see chapter 2). 
Closed schools and culture centers imply disruptions in social practice; termination of 
celebrations, the end of meetings with poets, writers, painters, and other non-local well-
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known people, the loss of local recreational groups, choirs, and dancing circles. In the past, 
the villagers had also been able to go to the opera and ballet in the capital city, Vilnius, as 
well as on tourist trips outside the country; e.g., to the Caucasus or Crimea. Now, in the 
words of a woman who was responsible for cultural programs in the late 1980s, “No one 
organizes such things. Even if someone did, a ticket to an opera… or somewhere else costs a 
lot. Nobody takes people anywhere anymore.”  
The land is another sign of regression. Villagers claim that in Soviet times fields were 
sown. After the dissolution of the kolkhoz and agricultural partnerships in the early 1990s, 
most of the villagers cultivate only small plots. They lack the machinery to work on the 
restituted land. Furthermore, they say that farming today is not cost-effective. For villagers 
the horses that appear on small cultivated plots and the trees emerging from former fields 
are signs of “developing backwards.”  
Villagers present some ironic (for them) inversions of their lives. A village sexton 
remembered that his relative from Russia asked to take her picture on a horse. “In Russia [in 
the Kaliningrad oblast] they looked with their eyes wide open in surprise [at the picture] 
[laughs]. Are you here on a horse? Well, she [the relative] said: “They [Lithuanians] work 
with horses there.” For Russians it was interesting,” concluded the sexton. The sexton 












Such memories contradicted memories about the Kaliningrad oblast and Lithuania of 
the Soviet period. Villagers remembered Kaliningrad as poor. Povilas from the second 
largest village recollected that once, on a trip to the Kaliningrad oblast, he observed what he 
considered famine there. His wife remembered other signs of the region’s “backwardness” 
compared to Lithuania: “There was a shepherd herding sheep. It looked so funny to us.” 
“And now it is the same [in the Kaliningrad oblast and Lithuania],” claimed Povilas. 
Adolfina from the same village also remembered the trip to the Kaliningrad oblast. She 
recalled that “nowhere could we find food. Something to eat that we would love… Fish was 
so salty… But they had dishes [in the shops]. We bought them.” Aldolfina also recalled that 
it was dirty everywhere in Kaliningrad. Like Povilas, she thought that probably it is the same 
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there now. However, in Lithuania, according to Adolfina, cities are more beautiful. Unlike 
many others, a woman concluded that “It is more beautiful everywhere [in Lithuania].” 
The present emerges as regression in talks about social decline. Social decline is 
observed in education. According to Stanislova, the teacher, in her late 50s, education 
(mokslas) is not valued by students anymore. Students graduate, go to Spain or somewhere 
else in search of work, get back, earn money on a farm as seasonal workers, spend that 
money for alcohol, and then maybe go abroad again. She invoked “darkness” to name the 
situation she encountered. Again the past and the present stood for significant differences: 
Brighter people had grown up… they come from those Soviet times. […] And the young? The 
young are already ours, grown in free Lithuania… they don’t value education. 
Social decline was also discussed by referring to the increased number of mentally 
retarded children at school. One teacher from the largest village claimed to have two of them 
in a class of thirteen children (another teacher was said to have three in a class). Valė, the 
teacher, argued that one girl comes from the family of a father who lost his health during the 
Afghanistan war (1979–1989) and a mother who is also sick. That family has four children. 
Her student was the smallest. However, another girl, according to Valė, is from a family 
which can but does not show any interest in their daughter’s education. The teacher 
reasoned that poverty and alcoholism could account for the situation as well as instability 
and the constraints of social life. Both parents of the second girl are unemployed. They take 
temporary jobs. In Valė’s opinion, when parents have no permanent jobs, all of life falls 
apart. Sometimes they start drinking and the children stay uncared for.  
Social decline is also seen in high suicide rates. The article in Lietuvos rytas, the 
mainstream newspaper, of October 19, 2002 considered the World Health Organization 
(Pasaulio sveikatos organizacija) research data presenting Lithuania as leading in Europe in 
suicide rates (among Russia, Byelorussia, and Ukraine as well as 21 other states). The 
journalist asked whether “Lithuanians can be called a suicide nation” (the headlines of the 
issue). This was reflected among the villagers: 
Sexton: It is said that Lithuania takes the first place in suicides. There are so many tragedies—
some jump from a roof, others poison themselves, some get killed, some hang themselves.  
Neringa: Why, do you think, it is like this?  
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Sexton: Well, those suicides. A person in a city, let’s say, he comes to a dead end: it’s either 
suicide, or … What can he do? If there was a better situation, people maybe would live better. 
[…] Now we are so low [žemai nusiritę]. It’s so hard.” 
 The signs of social decline, more observable in the cities than the villages, are the 
homeless people, beggars, and begging children. 
Look. Children are on the streets. In the morning, in the afternoon, you can see many 
children. They are not at school. What is happening? It is terrible. Look how they are dressed. 
They ask for [a few] cents for a bun. I do not give any coins, I buy them a bun [a city resident, 
a pensioner Zina]. 
Another sign of social decline is alcoholism. Villagers and some city residents refer to 
villages in general as “drowning in alcoholism.” According to many villagers, “maybe earlier 
they did not drink less. But they had jobs. Maybe they drank on Fridays. And now—
everyday…” Similarly to other men, Povilas, known not to refuse a drink, from the second 
largest village argued that “earlier there was no time to drink. You had to work. How will 
you drive a tractor drunk? How will you work? Maybe sometimes on Fridays or when we got 
paid. We used to meet and celebrate [aplaistyti]. […] There was discipline, and the trade union 
watched. They came, if they found you drunk, you lost half of your pay. That’s how it was.” 
Povilas’s wife who like Povilas was unemployed after the dissolution of the kolkhoz 
complained about him drinking too much; she also agreed that earlier Povilas drank less. 
Like everyone in the kolkhoz, according to her, he “had to work, and care for cattle at 
home.” 
Villagers also think that people are changed now. According to Bronė from the 
smallest village, there are so many bad people. She remembered that one girl from their 
village after her return from “America,” i.e., the United States, argued that people are 
different there, “better.” A woman, in her 70s, from the same village argued that “there is no 
unity among people, earlier people were better. […] Now they are angry. They don’t love 
each other, they envy each other. You want to talk to someone, but it is better not to try.”  
People are also presented as less cheerful and less happy, more disappointed, living in 
stress, and sad. Povilas remembered that they went to excursions with songs. An 80 year old 
woman from the largest village claimed that “it is sad in the village.” There are no concerts, 
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cinema, or dances as before. In Soviet times a movie was shown every week. She claimed 
that in other villages even now concerts take place.  
Informants also referred to emptiness in cities and villages. Earlier many gathered for 
potato harvest seasons. Children and grandchildren from the cities used to come.21 “The 
time was much more alive” [a city resident, a pensioner, born in the second largest village]. 
Cities are claimed to be empty in the evenings because people are afraid to go out. “Why go 
to a restaurant, if you may get robbed or beaten after you leave it,” wondered a businessman 
and a farmer from the largest village. 
Informants’ stories are full of personal regressions. Many had to discontinue going to 
theaters, or on vacation, or exchanging visits with relatives and friends, even using a 
telephone. In the example cited below, Stanislova, a teacher, regrets that she cannot go to 
the theater or buy books. Her students do not go to the theater because parents are busy 
working or have no money for tickets. The changing social relations, the emphasis on work 
or money rather than what had been considered “culture,” are lamented. A Kaunas resident 
Zina, currently a pensioner claimed:  
I like theater. I used to buy books. What kind of culture can we speak about now? Look to our 
youth. Sometimes I take children to the puppet play. Their moms do not take them. 
Grandmothers or nannies take some kids. One elderly woman was sitting beside me in the 
theater. She said: “A mother cannot take her child, she is busy, working.” The other woman 
said that she buys a ticket and takes her grandson. Otherwise the child would grow up seeing 
nothing.  
The “regression” metaphor is partial and generalizes experiences and sensibilities of 
many in the villages and of some in cities. Meanings of “regression” convey increased 
isolation, poverty, insecurity, disorientation in a changing environment. The present acquires 
meanings of “regression” in relation to the past, remembered as a time of well-being. 
                                                 
21 See, Rogers, Douglas (2004) on labor and exchange relations. 
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3.3  PAST WELL-BEING AND PROSPERITY 
Informants invoke socialism as a time of social well-being and personal prosperity. People 
claim that in the socialist past, everyone was able to travel (mostly within the former Soviet 
Union), to go on vacation every year (usually to a resort on the Baltic sea), and to spend 
some time each year at a health spa. The memories invoked are that everyone could get a 
job, even at an old age. People could have several jobs, if they wanted to. Children were at 
day care centers for almost no charge, secondary and college education was free. Medical 
care was free as well. Many lived in apartments owned by the state; and the cost of utilities 
was modest. Some villagers say that then they lacked nothing. Marija who arrived in the 
village two years ago because she could not subsist in a town argues: 
Then, neither I, nor my children lacked anything. I could myself afford everything I wanted. 
We used to go with my husband to a restaurant or a bar. We could go with the children for a 
vacation. We used to go to a resort by the sea every summer. And now? Nothing. Now I have 
no money to go to the city to get the allowance for children. When I have to take a child to 
the doctor we ride a horse. 
Late socialism is remembered as a time of prosperity, when cows and pigs were fed 
with bread, when even beggars had a job, when there were no homeless people, and you 
could buy a lot with the money you had: “People lived well [in the late 1970s and 1980s]. All 
beggars lived well. They had bread and money, and money was different [worth something].” 
“I remember one used to give bread to cows. A loaf of bread was 16 kopecks… The ruble 
was not the litas [LTL, the national currency of Lithuania]. For the milk of two cows I used 
to get about 700 rubles per month. Now I get only 29 cents per liter” [Algimantas, a 50 year 
old man from the smallest village]. 
Socialism may even be invoked as a time of progress, when a daily life was improving. 
Usually, after graduating from a school or a college, an individual was given a job. In many 
cases, he/she was provided with housing as well:  
It was better then. You finish school, you get a job… We got an old apartment from the 
kolkhoz. We got a new one later. For free. It is hard to think that you could get anything for 
free now. Later we applied for a house… Nowadays, if you had to save money all your life to 
buy this house, it would not be enough [a farmer, in her 40s, from the largest village]. 
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Some informants were also able to save some money themselves and to buy a house 
and/or a car: 
We bought a house and we paid for it, then we bought furniture. Later, we bought a very nice 
new car—a Moskvich. And now what? Of course, everything is there, but… there is no 
money. In Russian times it was better. Oh, if those times came back, it would be different 
[said with a smile] [a pensioner, in her late 60s, from the second largest village]. 
The pensioners claimed that in the Soviet period they would have been provided with 
firewood for heating, they would not have had to worry about the price of medicine, high 
utility or telephone bills, and travel costs. A former teacher, a pensioner, in her 70s, claimed: 
“In Russian times, there was such a law that, if a teacher, living in a village, retires, 
compensation for electricity, heating has to be guaranteed to that teacher. Firewood had to 
be delivered until the end of the teacher’s life.”  
3.4 MORAL CLAIMS AND MEANINGS OF JUSTICE 
Memories of the past often carry moral overtones and concerns with justice. Invoking 
present insecurity and crime, people remember that they lived without locks on their doors, 
were not afraid of burglars, did not think or hear about murders. Many used to travel or go 
outside at night, if they needed to. Now “people get killed. Earlier, in Russian times, I don’t 
know, but maybe the laws were different. And now it is no big deal to kill a person. If you 
steal a chicken, you may spend more years in prison than with a case of murder. I don’t 
know…” [a 60 year old pensioner from the second largest village]. 
The discourse on present insecurity and crime is influenced by the media, which gives 
a lot of attention to criminal topics, and which is followed by informants as they themselves 
acknowledge. However, these are also the narratives of experience. The Vitkus family from 
the second largest village report that their cow was taken right from behind the house and 
was butchered on the field. One older man from the largest village was locked outside his 
apartment until burglars took what they wished. Bronė from the smallest village was once 
approached by the two young men and asked to give money, which she did not have and did 
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not give away. Milk cans, chickens, anything valued cannot be left outside at night; 
figuratively Bronė concluded that “if you leave them outside—they are not yours anymore.” 
She also said to go to sleep with one thought: “My God, I wish nobody comes and tortures 
me when I am asleep [laughs].” Another woman from the smallest village argued that: 
People have no conscience now. Earlier we did not need locks on the doors. Nobody needed 
prisons or the police. And now? In the evening you have to make sure you don’t leave a 
bucket or a cart. They steal in the daytime also. I lost my milk cans from my yard. 
In the city of Kaunas a couple of doctors remembered how one woman came to their 
house and asked for money for medicine for her ill daughter. The first time a doctor gave 
her money. When the woman came the second time, the doctors asked about the diagnosis 
of her daughter. The woman asked whether they were doctors and then fled away. Other 
stories included State Social Insurance Fund Board “employees.”22 A woman, in her 40s, 
visited the elderly people as a State Social Insurance Fund Board employee. She talked about 
updating their information and the possibility of raising their pensions. While in the 
apartment, she was able to find money and get away. Such criminality is “the norm already, it 
is not a surprise to anyone,” argued a village librarian.  
The state was also approached as criminal in its different manifestations. The police 
were thought to be involved in smuggling and co-operation with criminals; state officials 
were expected to be corrupt at subdistrict or government level. Bronė argued that earlier 
“such crooks” complained that they are being liquidated [naikinami]. Now they are friends 
with the police.” State deception was seen in distributing kolkhoz wealth, restitution of rights 
to land and in other spaces of interaction between people and various levels of authorities 
often connected to the “state” in popular perceptions. Jadvyga M. from the largest village 
argued that she bought 20 a23 by her house for 5 thousand rubles. Later she refused 3 ha of 
her inherited land in another village on the agreement that she will be able to take 3 ha by 
her house. The 20 a of land, which was bought previously, was included in the 3 ha plot 
Jadvyga’s family was assigned. These 5 thousand paid for the 20 a have disappeared, 
                                                 
22 See also “Aferistų slaptažodis—didesnės pensijos” (“The password of cheaters—higher 
pensions”). Respublika/ Vakarų ekspresas. 09/02/2005. No.203. P.5. 
23 1 are (a) is 100 square meters; 1hectare (ha) is 10,000 square meters. 
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according to Jadvyga M. She recalled that she had receipts for buying the land, but 
“bureaucrats could not find the documents proving that. It means there is no land [that they 
bought].” Similar experiences invoke shifts between disappointment, even anger, and 
hopelessness. Jadvyga M. reiterated that “people are fooled, fooled in all ways. […] They 
know that we won’t go anywhere to complain, because there is no place [an institution] to 
complain. They [bureaucrats, authorities, etc.] will always be right. […] Everything is just to 
make things worse for people.” 
Jadvyga M. argued that the police should work honestly, try to help, to make order. 
However, according to her, many work for their own benefit. Like the Parliament members, 
the policemen also know that they are not going to stay long in office. Jadvyga M. said that 
her brother argued that, if he was valdžia (state authority), he would do the same, first for 
himself, then for his relatives, then his term in office would end. According to Jadvyga’s 
brother, and some other informants, those who do not get or take (are not involved in 
corrupt dealings or the like), are angry. Similarly, some informants like Ramutė admitted not 
to be able to or not to know how to steal, which reminds me of a popular saying repeated in 
Soviet times “poor is stupid” (kaip kvailas, taip ir biednas) as well as of a “culture” of pilfering 
reiterated on many occasions by informants themselves: 
I don’t have anything because I didn’t steal [prisivogt neprisivogiau]. We are common people… if 
we had more brains [jei proto būtų buvę daugiau], we could have made a haul [būtume prisivogę]. But 
we were not clever then… And now what? He [her husband] is without a job. I am without a 
job. He was a driver all his life… so we live in poverty.  
Ideas of injustice and immorality very often are invoked to interpret unhabitual 
behavior or experience. Claims about justice and morality also imply a criticism of the 
observed outcomes of post-Soviet changes, such as increased social stratification and status 
shifts in the present: 
I think about justice. If we have to tighten our belts, all of us have to do that. Not only those, 
so-called masses. Those who are in Vilnius [i.e., the political elite] they don’t tighten their belts. 
Not likely! When the Lithuanian Supreme Council dissolved [the members of the Council] got 
enormous compensations. Thousands and thousands. This was because they lost their job 
[said ironically]… Now they have allocated retirement benefits to signatories [signers of the 
Independence Act of 1990]. People resent this,… intellectuals get 300 LTL… When one pays 
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all the bills, there is not much left for food. I have an acquaintance in Jonava. She was an 
obstetrician all her life. She gets such a [small] pension that she has to choose between getting 
food and buying medicine. She said that she chose to eat. She doesn’t see doctors and has no 
money for medicine [Elvyra, a doctor, in her early 60s, a Kaunas resident]. 
Customary hierarchical relations of the past, such as those between teachers, 
students, and parents or, as in the examples above, between intellectuals or professionals and 
others are phrased as common sense issues, the social values in terms of which people 
develop the moral criticisms of the present. For the informants, changes in behavior that 
divert from past hierarchies mean a retreat from what is moral. While new modes of 
interaction are familiar, they are unacceptable. One teacher lamented:  
Earlier no child would think of telling his parents that a teacher is stupid. Now they say so. 
And parents agree to that. They even encourage their children to talk that way… Then you 
cannot say anything to a child. It’s considered terrorism or something. If you comment on a 
student’s behavior, he counts how many times you mention his name, and then complains that 
“the teacher is harassing me…” Earlier, even if a father was a drunk, he used to say: “I will 
show him” [meaning he will punish his child]. You had to calm him… Earlier a student 
understood what he or she did wrong. 
Ideas about justice in some cases refer to official Soviet ideology according to which 
all people were equal, as one villager pointed out: “My son-in-law was an engineer. He used 
to get less than a laborer… There were no masters and we did not need them. People were 
equal, friends to each other… That was justice.” Or: 
She fell so low. She had college education. Now she is retired. She cannot subsist on what she 
gets. She sells apples, which she grows in her yard… It’s good that she has those apples [said 
ironically]. My other friend, the architect, she doesn’t have a yard. She would be eager to sell 
apples. It is so unjust. We have to tighten our belts. You see, actually we were all equal earlier. 
We did not have much, but… but there were a lot of social benefits. Education, daycare, spas, 
all was there [Elvyra, a Kaunas resident, a doctor]. 
In contrast to the injustices of the present, the past is imagined as the time of assured 
justice and available mechanisms to settle disputes: 
Under the Russians there was a friendly court. If someone takes anything from you or insults 
you, you can bring a claim to that court. The court used to invite everyone, [then] consider, 
reprove, and lecture. Neighbors were reconciled. Now nothing… Now nothing. Courts are 
  49
unavailable. If an official says a few words, you have to pay 100–200 LTL [Jadvyga M., a 
retired woman from the largest village]. 
The present is narrated as a time of moral degradation. It appears in alcoholism, 
selfishness, crime, unwillingness to work or improper work, and debauchery. The past is 
claimed as either free/or almost free of it. 
The earlier generation came from the countryside. It was a healthy peasant generation… it was 
a healthy country then. Without alcoholism [or] degradation… These people even Sniečkus 
[the long-term leader of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania]… they weren’t so selfish, I 
think, as people are now… They are so self-serving. I remember when I was small we used to 
say “my word of honor.” That meant everything, everyone had to trust you. And now… Does 
anyone remember what one promises?.. What I don’t like is this invasion of American culture. 
Everyone goes after it. What I see in Russia [Russia is also affected by American culture]. Such 
debauchery… Lithuanians were modest [Elvyra, a doctor]. 
Justice and morality may be invoked in any context and articulations of regressions of 
the post-Soviet period. In many cases, by making justice and morality arguments people 
convey metacommentaries on experiences of changes as well as reiterate the values and 
meanings of the past. The terms of injustice, immorality, or disorder (discussed in the 
following section) are used to articulate the present by incorporating, even in a discontent 
tone, various changes in society, community, the state and personal lives. 
3.5 SYMBOLIC SPACES OF ORDER 
“Order” is a symbol often used to interpret the present and recall the past. People describe 
the present as “chaos.” “Disorder,” “disarray,” and “destruction” are the other common 
symbols to articulate contemporary changes: 
They did away with all cattle. Everything was wiped away. People were thrown into chaos. 
Destroyed, demolished, neither for the people, nor for those in power-—for no-one… 
Everything is dismantled, windows are smashed, such disarray. No order [Alina from the 
second largest village, a former city resident]. 
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Disorder refers to everything that is unusual, disliked, discordant, and confusing. In 
many cases what is confusing and unusual are unarticulated and inexperienced sets of 
relations or regulations brought about by post-socialist changes. Reforms in medicine, 
agriculture, and education are regarded as destructive, unnecessary, or absurd. For example, 
speaking about the reform in medicine, people refer to the new regulations regarding 
patients, doctors, and health benefits as irrational, disorderly, and wrong: 
We used to have preventive medicine, everyone had to have check ups. Now tuberculosis is 
spreading. It is terrible. The rates of cancer cases are increasing. Nobody screens for that… 
The reform of medicine is an absurdity. Earlier [in socialism] everything was much better 
organized. The family doctor may know all the patients in a village, but not in a city. The 
family doctors in a city don’t care about their patients, he/she cannot manage all the 
appointments. I had an appointment once, and the doctor didn’t even look at me. He didn’t 
care at all. Then I asked him to take my blood pressure. He said: “OK, I will do it.” I said: 
“thank you, I do not need such a doctor” [Elvyra, a doctor]. 
 “Order” as a symbol is open to various conceptualizations. People can consider it in 
terms of state reforms, as in the previous example, narrate personal histories, locate 
themselves in a changing social environment, and in some cases express political stances.  
Ideas about order range from the very general, such as “I did not want that time to 
return. However, you know, there was order then,” to specific concerns over present issues, 
such as unemployment, price changes, corruption, or bureaucracy:  
It would be good, if people had jobs. Nobody would complain, if one was paid for cattle meat 
or milk properly. I am OK. I get a pension. I just cannot stand the officials [in the 
municipality]. You can find four officials in one room. They direct me from one to another. I 
cannot stand this. There is no order. And you cannot complain to anyone. All of them are 
corrupt. They find ways to show that they want money. Earlier under the Russians there were 
few officials in the neighborhood. Now they only drink coffee and take money from the 
people. I do not know what they do. They just sit and talk whenever you go there. There is no 
order. It is really disorder… Under the Russians everything was in place. You asked, you got 
[Stasė from the largest village]. 
Present disorder is a relational observation conceived in terms of past experiences 
that stand for orderliness: 
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There is too much freedom for people. It’s thuggery around here. They kill and shoot each 
other. They cannot live together. They kill in order to feed at the trough… Probably too much 
democracy is harmful. Sometimes discipline would help [people]… Killings, prostitution, 
burglaries… where are our rulers? Yesterday it was reported that a son killed his parents. This 
is already happening [a man, in his 50s, from the second largest village]. 
Or: 
Nobody gets punished for anything. You can kill someone, nobody cares. Nobody says 
anything, as if it has to be so. Earlier there was order. I don’t know… it was stricter. You were 
punished for everything. And now nothing… [a woman, in her 60s, from the second largest 
village]. 
The multivocality of order/disorder is successfully exploited in election campaigns in 
Lithuania. Order was one of the major catchwords of the last presidential campaign (2003) in 
statements, such as “there will be order!” (see chapter 7). Many of the informants reported 
that they voted for Rolandas Paksas because he promised to establish order. In the 
campaigning and since, people have been able to relate their personal experiences of post-
socialism and memories of the past to political rhetoric about order.  
3.6 WHOSE “BETTER TIMES”? 
The discourse of “better times” was shared by many villagers and some urban interlocutors. 
Some other urban informants never referred to the past as “better,” and some, especially the 
younger ones, never compared the Soviet past to the present. However, many city 
informants noted at some point during the interviews that people in villages thinks that it 
was better during the Soviet period.  
“Better times” is a generational discourse. By 1990, the Baltic population below age 
50 had no experience of the independence period and little experience with Stalinism. For 
increasing numbers of people, the independence period was receding into a past beyond 
one’s own date of birth (see Misiunas and Taagepera 1983). Thus, for many experience from 
the Soviet period, often mediated by the Soviet-period’s values, comprised the only 
meaningful universe and common sense knowledge on the basis of which people fashioned 
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their identities and interpreted social histories. Consequently, people who lived most of their 
life in Soviet times, i.e., the ones in their 40s, and especially in their 50s and 60s, tended to 
utilize variations of the discourse of “better times.”  
The younger generations, those who experienced the Soviet period as children or 
teenagers (the ones in their 20s and early 30s in 2003–2004), usually did not invoke Soviet 
times as the “better times” unless they recited their parents’ views. For them, the Soviet 
period was bound to school experiences and childhood memories usually colored in pleasant 
emotions having nothing to do with the symbolic power of the “times.”  
The oldest generations (people in their late 70s and 80s), having some experience of 
pre-Soviet Lithuania, often remarked about the differences of the Soviet period as well as 
compared Soviet times with the first independence period of Lithuania. Their judgments 
about the Soviet period partly depended on how they lived during the first independence 
times as well as how they lived during the Soviet period. The oldest generation’s memories 
of the Soviet past were divided into sequences of the post-war period, life after the death of 
Stalin, and the late Soviet period (usually the 1970s or/and 1980s). The post-war times were 
remembered by invoking the partisan movement, deportations to Siberia, the founding of 
kolkhozes, work in the kolkhozes, tributes, taxes, low/no salaries, and hunger. The post-
Stalinist period marked changes in personal lives usually referred in general terms: “it got 
better,” “easier,” etc. People were able to earn more, they did not face hunger, the partisan 
movement was suppressed, and deportations stopped. Only the late Soviet times were the 
“better times.”  
3.7 POST-SOCIALIST SUBALTERNITY 
Post-socialism produced new subalterns in Eastern Europe. Among the new subalterns the 
most visible are the populations of former industrial towns and rural areas (cf. Kideckel 
2002, Hann 2002). In Lithuania the experience of subalternity correlates with the discourse 
of “better times” in the Soviet period. Most of the people cited and included in this chapter 
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were from the three villages as well as some people from Kaunas, such as pensioners, living 
on small pensions, unemployed factory workers, employed with small salary people, and 
people living on benefits.  
In Soviet times, the rural population’s status was connected to its role in the economy 
as well as the recognition deriving from this role. Villager income (their pay plus income 
from the private plots) in the late Soviet period in many cases was higher than the income of 
city inhabitants (cf. Humphrey 2002). In 1975, the private sector was producing 39% of 
Lithuania’s total agricultural output despite the fact that the Soviet state’s feelings toward 
private agriculture were negative in principle (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983). In the Soviet 
period measures were frequently made to make private farming inconvenient, for example, 
by pricing livestock feed higher than bread, which led to feeding bread and even macaroni to 
many private pigs and cows24 (cf. Misiunas and Taagepera 1983). However, the importance 
of private farming in “feeding” the cities was realized and villagers recall “feeding the cities” 
(see Misiunas and Taagepera 1983).  
The rural population’s income allowed for accumulating savings, which instigated 
feelings of security. The production of the private sector was also used for exchange, which 
promoted social relations with other villagers as well as city inhabitants. Villagers’ production 
provided city residents with scarce goods (like smoked ham), also with goods that the city 
residents otherwise had to buy from their small (in many cases) salaries. Thus, money earned 
from private plots, salaries and production was relevant to the social status of the villagers. 
As the following chapter shows, at present the private plots and rural employment do not 
yield similar benefits. Villagers lost their role in the economy as well as recognition deriving 
from this role.  
A relevant, but more controversial and understudied issue (but see Kideckel, 
forthcoming, Verdery 1983) is the status of villagers and industrial workers stemming from 
the ideological support of the Soviet state. Images, such as the hammer and sickle, which 
marked public space by appearing on flags and statues and on the TV every time a person 
                                                 
24 Informants referred to feeding bread to cows and pigs to illustrate Soviet time prosperity. 
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watched a Moscow Film Studio film25 promoted the working class (peasants and workers) as 
the central figures of the Soviet state and the major protagonists of Soviet history.  
In late socialism the rhetoric on industrial and agricultural progress lauding the 
workers’ and the peasants’ role, achievements and missions created the visibility of the 
“working class” as well as nourished the imagination of the possible and the fulfillment 
located in the future (cf. Kideckel, forthcoming). Socialism facilitated worker agency by its 
ideological emphasis on the creativity of labor, policies promoting worker 
professionalization, education, and cultural participation, the provision of steady and secure 
work, and subsidized food and housing as well as by promoting images of the worker-as-
hero (Kideckel, forthcoming).  
It is less clear how villagers and workers consumed discourses of privilege and 
recognition. Many sought opportunities to migrate from villages. However, some reiterations 
of Soviet ideology by informants in villages of Lithuania, such as claims that everything was 
for the common people, for the workers (Jadvyga N., a former kolkhoz party secretary) or 
endorsements of perceived equality show that some people subscribed at least in part to the 
ideology of the Soviet state. Estonian tractor drivers, mentioned in Kirss’s (2004) study, also 
replicated Soviet-period ideologies. Like Lithuanian informants, women fashioned their lives 
as simple farm girls who had been lifted to the heights of the Soviet pyramid of power 
because of their “heroic work” in the fields (Lauristin 2004). For example, Elmine, a 
Russian-born female tractor driver from an Estonian kolkhoz, had been a celebrity, a 
symbolic figure who represented the core of Soviet ideology, the myth about the happiness 
of simple working people (Lauristin 2004:181). Lauristin claims that Elmine’s life was 
formed as a replica of the system’s values and officially communicated meanings. Elmine 
had a heroine role model of another woman tractorist, upon whom she patterned her 
actions. Elmine by the end of the 1980s wrote in the newspaper Sakala: “We believed in the 
future. We worked almost without pay in the name of our homeland. We sincerely believed 
that our work would help to achieve our ideals” (Otsman 1988:3, cited in Reinvelt 2004:174). 
                                                 
25 The Studio logo was the image of a statue of a man holding a hammer and a woman holding a 
sickle with a triumphantly raised crossed arms. 
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Ten years later, Elmine spelled out that the ideals of her life had been shattered with the 
regaining of independence. Reinvelt (2004) concludes that “For many common workers the 
ending of the Soviet era brought with it the shattering of the ideals that had inspired them 
throughout their working lives, substituting them with the understanding of having lived 
their lives wrongly” (Reinvelt 2004:175). Reinvelt thinks that Soviet state “propaganda” 
about a happy tomorrow primarily infected young people. Elmine remembers that  
We, the youth of the Soviet country of the time, believed in our leader. The press helped us 
greatly. All great things were connected with Stalin’s name.—It took superhuman effort and 
creative, self-forgetful work to take the backward, ruined, hungry and barefoot country to 
where it is today. All this had its appeal to young people. Our belief in the ideals of our 
country, in their honesty and purity knew no boundaries. We were positive that everything 
that was done was right. People went to death in the war with this belief, and it helped them 
to rebuild the country after the war [Ostman 1987:2, cited in Reinvelt 2004:176].  
Not surprisingly, Elmine cannot exhibit her Hero’s Golden Star and Orders of Lenin 
any more. In Estonia, like in Lithuania, society “lives” with new heroes (and new subalterns). 
According to Elmine, she sold the Star and Orders of Lenin and bought a TV set and a 
power saw. “Otherwise we could not have got them” [Palli, Lepassalu 2000:13, cited in 
Reinvelt 2004:177].  
The Soviet state may have secured some support for itself through policies of social 
welfare as well as through increased standards of living compared to the pre-World War II 
period. Verdery (1983) in her study of a Transylvanian village reports enthusiasm about 
improved standards of living and opportunities for employment and education in the 1970s. 
The most uniformly enthusiastic people often came from those who used to be among the 
village poor. Opinions illustrate the positive relations between a subject and a socialist state: 
The state does a lot for us, and our leader Ceauşescu is for the people. No government here 
ever helped people before, you just did what you could on your own. Sometimes the collective 
farm doesn’t pay us our pensions, but we don’t really worry, because our government won’t 
just let us die.  
Collectivization, now that’s another story. It was dreadful when they took away our land, and 
it’s a scandal how this farm works. But even so, things were never so good before as now. […] 
Before, we peasants were dirty and poor, we worked like dogs all summer and then a hailstorm 
would come and destroy the whole crop in a second; we took all day to go to market to sell 
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eggs and a chicken for a little cash. Now a bus comes and you go to the factory and get your 
salary. Was that a good life? No, sir, it wasn’t. Now we can get good jobs. If we want, we can 
send our kids all the way through university, if they’re smart, and it hardly costs us anything. 
[…] 
And believe me, back in the old days we didn’t buy sugar by the kilogram as we do know, we 
bought it by the lump. Today everyone’s a gentleman, everyone’s dressed in fur, you don’t see 
a poor person anywhere. I was a miserable sharecropper and my son is an engineer. That’s 
really something26” [Verdery 1983:33–34]. 
The workers and villagers lost ideological, economic, and social support after the 
dissolution of the Soviet state. Recently the various policies and ideologies of marginalization 
and othering have extended to low budgetary investments into regions outside the major 
cities and continuous support of large-holding farmers and large businesses. Othering is 
expressed in narratives about villages and little towns drowning in alcoholism (repeated by 
the informants themselves), women giving birth to children to get benefits on which they 
survive, and people avoiding work or relying on a questionable work ethic and dishonesty. 
Othering can even be observed in the media, which, like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, 
positively emphasizes new kinds of employment and related material culture. Advertisements 
portray middle-class professionals engaged in “clean” activities. They advertise high-tech 
products like cell phones and computers with little actual or symbolic connection to villagers 
or city residents who cannot afford such products (cf. Kideckel, forthcoming).  
In Lithuania among the most prominent othering discourses are the ones invoking 
“two Lithuanias.” “Two Lithuanias” means that there exist two regions which diverge in 
their economic, social and political constitution and which emerged after the post-Soviet-
period reforms and transformations. In the media and political discourse the inhabitants of 
the first region are often presented as rural, poor, unemployed or employed with a low 
salary, supporting populist and radical ideas, going on strikes, nostalgic for socialism and 
resentful towards the present. In Minkenberg’s terms these people are the losers of transition 
                                                 
26 In her footnotes Verdery remarks that the opinion cited is from the 1970s, before the food 
shortages and rationing of the early 1980s, which resulted from mismanagement and the global economic 
crisis and which provoked deep discontent among rural as well as urban Romanians (Verdery 1983:33).  
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(Minkenberg 2002). The winners are the ones thriving economically and enjoying transition, 
often living in the capital Vilnius or the other big city.  
Some politicians deny that “two Lithuanias” exist; others reinforce the image by 
continuously reifying it27 and urging to unite Lithuania. For example, the impeachment 
process of the former President Rolandas Paksas forced forward the idea that “Lithuania” is 
split into supporters of President Paksas and his opponents. The supporters are presented as 
poor, rural, and/or the most vulnerable part of the population, the “second Lithuania28” (see 
also chapter 7). Exploring this division, the post-impeachment presidential candidate of the 
2004 elections Česlovas Juršėnas invited people to vote for him because he could be “the 
President who will reconcile Lithuania as well as secure stability and prosperity”29 (see also 
chapter 7).  
For villagers “two Lithuanias” do not mean the losers and the winners of transition, but 
the political elite or the “lords/masters” (ponai),30 their environment and “people” (see 
chapter 6). According to a retired former kolkhoz employee: 
I think that there is Lithuania and a small Lithuania. Lithuania is where the masters of Vilnius 
reside [the political elites], a small Lithuania—all the rest. Two Lithuanias. There and here are 
Lithuanians, but our Lithuanians are poor people. 
Unintendedly the images of “two Lithuanias” produce class distinctions already 
“catalogued” by Soviet Lithuania. For example, in the “Extract from the Speech of Acting 
President of the Republic, Paleckis, at the First Session of the People’s Seimas” of July 21, 
1940 it is claimed: 
I would like to dwell on the situation which we have lived through so that we could better 
appraise the present situation and the prospects before us. Looking back into the past, to the 
period of our national renaissance, we see a clear-cut and constant struggle between the two 
Lithuanias—between the Lithuania of the landmasters and the Lithuania of peasant serfs, 
between the Lithuania of reactionary clericals and the Lithuania of progressive free thinkers, 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Gentvilas, Eugenijus “Po dvi Lietuvas—kiekviename kaime” (“Two Lithuanias in every 
village”). Veidas. 01/22/2004. No.4., Monkevičius, Algirdas “Supriešinimo miglas išsklaidyti gali žinių šviesa” 
(“The light of knowledge can diffuse the mist of polarization”). Veidas. 01/15/2004. No.3.  
28 See, e.g., Algimantas Šindeikis “Antroji dviejų Lietuvų dvikova” (“The second combat of two 
Lithuanias”). Veidas. 06/17/2004. No.25. P.12. 
29 Source: http://www.jursenas.lt. Accessed 27 June 2004. 
30 Sometimes the “masters” means “rich people” in general. 
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between the bourgeois and the proletarian Lithuania. All the stages of the nation’s history are 
marked by the struggle between these two Lithuanias [Kancevičius 1976:189–190, emphasis 
added].  
Like similar others in Eastern Europe villagers and others are best kept under wraps 
for fear that their otherness and decline will also tarnish and discomfort the passage to the 
future (Kideckel 2002). Such intentions are especially visible in the metaphors applied to 
these people, such as “sugar beets.” The name “sugar beets” emerged after the early 2000s 
strikes of sugar beet farmers in Suvalkija, the south region of Lithuania, and soon it was 
extended to include many of the resentful, the poor, the rural and other others. During the 
strikes the farmers blocked the highway connecting all Baltic countries to Poland. As one 
professor of political science explained—“our way to Europe.” Among the many responses 
to the strikes there was one worth special attention—a poster erected in Vilnius in 2003 







Figure 3. The billboard advertising drinks. The above statement: “Using alcohol you risk your 
health, the family’s and society’s well-being.” The strawberry has a sign: “The sugar beets will not stop us!” 
The apple: “We are for Europe!” The lower statement: “Cider Cool Drink—a new advanced taste.” I thank 




The socio-economic problems facing people from the regions and in the cities are 
addressed during electoral campaigns. Then, these people become unexpectedly visible, 
somehow exotic, but the beloved subjects of all candidates. Even if they are remembered 
during elections, most informants mentioned in this chapter through the excerpts of their 
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talk feel forgotten in general. Forgetting, exoticizing or othering distance these people from 
society in general and restrict their sense of agency with which they perceive their social 
history, themselves, and the future (see also Kideckel, forthcoming). 
Subalternity derives from not having any social/cultural capital with which people 
could orient themselves in a changing environment. Those who had resources and abilities 
to adapt to changes were less likely to digress into considerations and generalizations about 
the better past (but see chapter 4). These people would include large-holding farmers, some 
of whom were kolkhoz or state farm directors, kolkhoz engineers, and other elites of the 
villages. Former high social standing does not necessarily imply present farmers’ benefits 
from the dissolving farms (benefits varied from one case to another with almost no benefits 
in some cases) (cf. Lampland 2002). Despite farmers’ links to privatization in the early 1990s, 
most of them had and used social relations and personal capabilities to adapt to the changing 
environment. 
3.8 TRAJECTORIES OF POST-SOCIALIST DECLINE 
Informants, even if they agreed that it was better “under the Russians,” in some cases 
qualified their conclusions by recalling some aspects of the Soviet-period life which did not 
fit their proposed framework of thought. A truck driver from a city remembered that there 
was irrational use of resources in Soviet times: “In Siberia if one cuts three trees, only one 
reaches the destination. Two rot.” Others remembered that “it was hard,” even if claiming 
that Soviet times were better compared to the present. Stasė from the largest village 
remembered that when she raised kids, she had constantly to run between work and her 
house: “I had a hard life. The salary was very small. Even if that ruble had a value [it did not 
mean much to her, she still had little money]. But we had a cow, a pig, somehow we 
survived. We built a house.”  
Various facts of the past may be reflected upon to make an argument about the 
“better times.” For some building a house was an illustration of the Soviet time’s progress 
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and prosperity, others, like the above cited Stasė, invoked building a house in a story of 
hardships. Thus, facts were integrated in one or the other social text dependent on the 
argument an individual tried to make. In all examples, memory was socially mediated, i.e., 
filtered through socially available texts and symbols, and connecting a person to 
communities of meanings.  
In the communities studied most people were not making political statements about 
socialism. Positive memories about socialism in most cases did not become translated into 
political support for the “Soviet state.” They were translated into critiques of the present 
authorities. Sometimes these criticisms have been made by the politicians themselves, by 
appealing to memories of the past and imaginaries of the present (see chapter 7).  
Trajectories of post-socialist regression are discontinuous; however, they are found 
throughout most of the post-socialist area. Vitebsky (2002) writes that in the Sakha Republic 
(Yakutia) of Even, among one of the Tungus-speaking peoples an apocalyptic vocabulary of 
despair, crisis, inertia and paralysis is very popular (cf. Ries 1997). Casual conversations are 
peppered with words like raspad (decline), polnyy krakh (total crash) or konets sveta, which 
conveniently means both the “end of the world” and the “end of light.” Questions like 
“Mummy, what did we use for light before we used candles?” “Electricity, my dear.” 
(Vitebsky 2002:181) are very reminiscent of villagers conversations about getting water from 
a well and using candles to save electricity in Lithuania (see chapter 2). Vitebsky claims that 
while the Soviet mystique has been demystified, the post-Soviet mystery has only deepened. 
“Why are people so unhappy now that they are ‘free’?” (Vitebsky 2002:181).  
Kideckel (forthcoming) claims that in Romania socialist days—as contradictory as 
they were—are invoked by some workers as the best ever (cf. Humphrey 2002). Despite the 
misery of lives in late socialism, when workers compare socialist life to today, they focus on 
the security of the former and uncertainty of the latter. One 35 year old Făgăraş worker 
echoed socialist time in his sentiments and sounded very much like a villager in Lithuania: 
In the first place, at that time you had an assured job. When you finished school you would 
make an application and within a week you’d be hired. You could live on your salary. You 
could buy furniture for your house. Then it was much less expensive to live. The people today 
who say that ‘the communists did bad’, well, maybe they did, but they certainly did good 
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things for young people. Also, they didn’t allow divisions to be created between poor and 
wealthy people. If you happened to get too much, they would ask you ‘hey, where did you get 
all that stuff?’ But today on your salary you can’t live from one day to the next. Now we have 
come to where we have to purchase second-hand clothing and in the time of Ceauşescu, there 
wasn’t even such a thing. Everyone was able to buy new clothing of good quality31 (Kideckel, 
forthcoming). 
Kideckel reports that people claim to have had quality life conditions under socialism, 
workers display appliances and other expensive housewares stating that “everything we have 
here was bought when Ceauşescu was in power.” People claim to live in stress and 
uncertainly about the future, to experience job losses and job insecurity, a sense of betrayal, 
and alienation. Increased depression, suicide, heart disease, stroke and a general increase in 
rates of morbidity and mortality all characterize worker communities in post-socialist times 
(Kideckel, forthcoming, see also Skultans 1998). 
Similar structures of feeling and thought seem to characterize other societies of 
change. Discussing nostalgia in China, Rofel argues that workers of the oldest generation has 
nowhere to turn in the current moment, no location from which to speak with any pride, 
thus, they “turn to their memories as the only thread that leaves a trace of more complex 
selves, of selves who belong in the nation as socialist subjects because they have spoken 
bitterness and, therefore, deserve recognition” (Rofel 1994:240). 
                                                 
31 See the next chapter on buying second-hand clothing in Lithuania. 
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4.0  CHAPTER 2: WORK, MONEY, AND MILK 
Experiences of marginalization, knowledge of changing social history, physical and social 
environment were reflected in discussions of work, money, and milk. The past very often 
was associated with full employment, “real” money, and good prices for milk. The 
predictability, security, and fullness of the past were contrasted to the changing, uncertain, 
and restricting present. In this chapter I illustrate how ideas about work, money and milk 
express changing values, meanings, social relations and individual accommodations as well as 
resistance. Ideas also reflect emerging emotional regimes and encounters of social 
displacement. The alternative voices are the excerpts of dialogues going on in village 
communities or city spaces about meanings of the present social history. Experiences and 
knowledge of the present and the past in terms of work, money, and milk are constituted by 
and constitute social texts explored in the first and the following chapters. 
4.1 WORK 
4.1.1 The value of work 
Work is the primary theme brought up in discussions about the past and the present in 
villages and city spaces. Informants considered how they lost jobs, how they could find a 
job, what jobs other people had, in the villages—how they could travel to a work place, if 
they got a job outside a village. Some informants claimed that it was better “then” because 
people had jobs, while others, even if they questioned the “goodness” of the past, often 
added “we had jobs then.” The usual response among villagers to the question of how they 
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see their life and environment as having changed during the post-liberation period was 
connected to issues about work. For example, Valė, the school teacher and wife of a large-
holding farmer, argued that “The village looks sadder. In a sense that there are no jobs for 
people. […] Earlier people had jobs. Maybe the salary was smaller, but a person was 
guaranteed that he would get something. Now most are unemployed.” A 70 year old former 
brickyard worker claimed that “It was good to live in the end [of the Soviet period]. There 
were enough jobs, everything. Even now some people say: it was so good then. There was 
work.” 
The ones who disregarded freedom and disliked life “under Lithuania” pointed to 
unemployment as the major reason of their discontents. Jadvyga N., a former party secretary 
from the largest village, claimed that she knew that “it was not going to be better under the 
Lithuanians because people would have no jobs.” A retired 70 year old woman from the 
largest village, when asked whether it is important that Lithuania is free now, responded that: 
Maybe for some… you see. Not for everyone. For most it is not important… They started so 
fast… People have no jobs… People are very worried about these jobs. I get a pension… I 
am not hungry, I can handle it.  
Others inverted the meanings of freedom of the liberation movement (see chapter 5) 
saying that “you are free, you don’t have to work; you can do what you want;” “it’s real 
freedom—no jobs” (emphasis added).  
Conversely, “coercion” was given a positive meaning. The fact that people were 
“forced to work,” “dragged to their work places,” etc. was conceived as a positive event in 
the past. Daiva, a school janitor, claimed that “earlier everyone knew that one is going to be 
under compulsion [the word used was prievarta “coercion,” “compulsion,” “constraint”]. You 
will be forced to sit [at work] and you will sit, you will get paid.” Bronė, a woman, in her 
early 70s, remembered that “under the Russians, when they were here, it was good that 
everyone had a job. If you were unemployed, you were forced to work. These alcoholics, as 
we call them today, were put to work by the state.” Jadvyga N. claimed that “if a drunk 
refused to go to work, he was forcefully taken there by militia.” Bronė argued: “and now, any 
person [unemployed], even with higher education, may become a drunk. Many fell into that 
trap.”  
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Social problems, such as alcoholism and crimes, were related to the fact that people 
had no jobs. People believed that unemployment led to burglaries, thefts, and killings. An 
older couple in their early 70s from the second largest village claimed that now that the 
young finish school, they cannot find jobs, thus, they have to steal: “What else can they do? 
It is understandable.” Another woman, in her late 60s, from the largest village wondered 
about orphans from the orphanage in a nearby town: “When they leave, maybe some will 
study for two three years. But there are no jobs. They will go out on the street. They will 
have to go to prison, to get something to eat…”  
In villages people prefer having a low status job to being unemployed. Daiva, a 
school janitor, in her early 40s, and a former accountant, remembered how everyone 
wondered and ridiculed her when she took the job of a janitor. Her friends thought it was 
terrible. “How could she take such a job?” reflected Daiva upon others’ comments on her 
decision. Now she was very happy to have this job. The janitor’s job was even considered 
prestigious. “In our village it is important to have a job, it does not matter what kind of job 
you have. Any job is prestigious, because there are no jobs in the village,” the woman 
argued. Marija from the second largest village claimed that “earlier it was shameful for a child 
to say that one’s mother was a janitor.” She remembered children at school who used to 
ridicule someone in Russian—“мамка—уборщица!” (“mom—a janitor!”). Stressing the 
importance of having a job, Marija said that “Now I would go to clean city toilets [public 
restrooms] and I would not be ashamed, really.”  
The examples of Daiva and Marija show that work is appreciated among villagers. 
Employed informants claimed that they are very happy to be employed. The unemployed, 
like Marija, argued that they would agree to do any kind of work. However, among 
informants there were some who could not stay at “any kind of work.” Milda, in her early 
40s, acknowledged that after she lost her job at a helicopter factory in a city when it closed, 
she did not want to work at a tailor’s shop. She argued that she could not survive such hard 
work even a week. Later she and her husband who also lost his job as a militia man bought 
an old house in a village and moved there with their three children. Inga, another young 
divorced 30 year old woman from Kaunas, quit working at a tailor’s shop several times 
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because of the small salary and hard work. However, not finding any other jobs she 
returned. Visiting her after a year I saw how much effort she had put into adjusting to the 
situation. A newly discovered faith in God was part of her effort. Milda’s and Inga’s work 
experiences reveal the dialectics of women’s resistance and accommodation. Both women 
resisted their situations by quitting their job. They accommodated to the situation; one by 
leaving the city, another by taking a job again and disciplining herself. Like women workers 
elsewhere (see, e.g., Constable (1997) on Filipina workers), Inga started to tolerate difficulties 
for the sake of her family, resigned herself to helplessness and passivity and changed herself 
to continue to work in a tailor’s shop.  
Losing jobs, subsisting on small salaries or pensions challenged previous imaginings 
of what family, neighbor, and friend relations are like. Many pensioners regretted that they 
could not help their children as they previously could (however, there were some adult 
children who, because they could not find a job, lived with their mothers and shared the 
small pensions their retired mothers received). Others mentioned that they could not throw 
big parties like before, or travel to visit friends or to family reunions. Such experiences 
affected what people thought about themselves; some felt unneeded, forgotten, and 
worthless. Ramutė, a former kolkhoz storage administrator, a 50 year old woman, claimed: 
We lived well then, we had jobs. Everyone was needed somewhere. For example, I was an 
administrator [of a warehouse]. I worked for three years. I started to understand that work and 
I was a needed person. Now you are trash, not a person. If you don’t work, who considers you 
a person? 
Work was important to people’s subjectivities, social standing, and their 
interpretation of social/political history. The remembered past structured understandings of 
the present. The practices, such as taking lower status jobs or refusing to work hard signaled 
domestication of change or/and resistance to it. 
4.1.2 Relations and accommodations 
Changing labor markets and work relations produced accommodations informed by 
tradition and change. Informants from the second largest village engage in the berry and 
  67
mushroom picking “industry.” These villagers claim that the village recovers only during a 
berry and mushroom season. The village has the highest percentage of unemployed people 
of all three villages and is surrounded by forests. People outside this village are also involved 
in this kind of “industry.” During the summer and early autumn some highways, which run 
through forested areas, such as the Vilnius—Kaunas or Vilnius—-Marijampolė highways, are 
populated by people selling berries or mushrooms at the roadsides. In early summer they sell 
wild strawberries, later blueberries, in late summer—raspberries, cranberries and 
mushrooms.32 Some people leave their older children to sell berries and mushrooms. Some 
children take the initiative themselves and gather and sell berries or mushrooms to earn 
some money. Berry and mushroom picking has a long tradition in Lithuania, extending to 
most families. However, the tradition of gathering berries or mushrooms for sale on such a 
scale is largely “post-Soviet.”  
The berry and mushroom picking “industry” extends to cities. Zina, a city resident, in 
her mid 50s, claimed that in the summer months she was able to earn the equivalent of 
another pension. She used to travel to the forests by bus early in the morning and come back 
late in the evening. Then she sold the berries at the market. Most of the gatherers choose to 
sell their products themselves while shops, which buy berries and mushrooms, pay about 
half of what one can get at the market or on the highway. Stopping on the highway is illegal. 
However, many ignore the rule and the authorities and participate in this economy. 
Informants reflect on their employer’s accommodations to labor markets and an 
economy in flux. Many people complain that, even if you work, you agree to work for less 
“on paper,” while actually you get more “into your hands.” In this way, the employer has to 
pay less to the State Social Insurance Fund Board (SoDra). In some cases employers in cities 
pay the whole amount in cash without formally employing a worker. Then, the employee 
earns nothing for his or her retirement and is ineligible for health benefits.  
The first time I heard the notion of “white money” (the opposite of the widely used 
“money in an envelope” (pinigai vokeliuose)) was during my interview with a designer, Dalius, 
at a café. Our interview was interrupted when a man came in, as I learned later for a “job 
                                                 
32 Berries and mushrooms are used for home consumption as well. 
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interview.” When I realized what was going on, I asked whether I had to leave them alone. 
They thought my presence did not matter. The young man, the only candidate to whom the 
job was offered, wondered about the job and the salary. The designer informed him about 
the job briefly, said that the co-workers are young and very nice, and that he, if decides to 
join them, he will get “white money.” The young man had another job with about the same 
salary, i.e., 1000 LTL “in hand,” 400 LTL “on paper.” Therefore, “white money” (1000 LTL 
in hand, but more “on paper”) became, as I observed, one of the major attractions for a 
young person to switch jobs. The interview lasted about 10 minutes, and the final agreement 
was not reached at that moment. Dalius, the designer, explained that the term “white 
money” was used because this money was legal (all taxed). It is “white, because ‘white’ is 
what is good, legal, and beautiful. The other money [earned illegally] is ‘black.’” Such “social 
coloring” of money in city spaces could be interpreted as a manifestation of more formalized 
work relations within a still flourishing informal “on paper/in hand” employment market.  
Discontent about employment signaled the changed/ing work relations between 
employers and employees. On the farm “you have to work,” if employed in any enterprise, 
“you can make decent money, if you work very hard,” there “nobody counts hours.” “It is 
not like in the kolkhoz where you stay the hours you are required to be at work. You have to 
work” (a 70 year old pensioner from the largest village). At the tailor’s shop women were 
said to work like slaves, not to earn even 400 LTL (a retired school teacher). If you don’t like 
a job or a salary, you will be told to leave (a worker at a lumbermill by the smallest village). 
Ramutė described her summer on a farm: 
I wanted to do some renovations inside the house [padaryti remontą usually means to paint 
walls, ceiling and floor or some other work inside a house]. I worked on a farm for three 
months. The farmer didn’t let me sit down for a minute. You could earn 15 LTL [per day] 
there. Eight hours. I fed 47 pigs. All by myself. Cleaned stables, made pig swill, brought water. 
There was a pump, but it takes energy. So why [use it; the farmer saved money this way, 
according to Ramutė]? It was better [to ask her] to bring two, four hundred liters of water. 
And then you have to give it to the pigs. […] If you have a minute, then you peel potatoes, 
God forbid, you should sit down. Not a minute. […] I fell down once with a cart of manure. 
It was hard. I lost 20 kilos [about 44 lb] in those three months. My clothes didn’t fit. 
However… how much did I earn, without free days? […] I made those renovations. … 
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Ramutė quit working when her own cow calved. She said she had no time to do all 
the work at home and on the farm. The farmer was adamant that she stay. I asked whether 
she would have stayed on the farm, if the farmer had paid more. Ramutė responded: “no.” 
She reasoned that “all my work was beginning [on her own small farm]. I had a garden… to 
weed… When I worked, I couldn’t do much around my own house. If I didn’t have my own 
cattle, I would have worked for the money I got.” Ramutė chose to follow practices she has 
been following for many years. Timing and the hard work on the farm prevented her from 
staying at the farmer’s. When asked if it was not worth working on a farm or somewhere else 
and having fewer cattle, Ramutė responded that she was “not used to that way of life.” I 
think she felt the risk and uncertainty implicit (for her) in my question. She asked 
rhetorically: “How could you have nothing yourself [no cattle, etc.]? You have to have 
something for yourself. If something goes wrong, I have no bread, but I have potatoes [from 
the garden]. I have carrots, a cabbage. If such a day dawns [when she cannot buy bread]. I go 
to the cellar, I have everything. And a cucumber and a tomato [said in a diminutive form].” 
Practices, like subsistence on a private plot, were grounded in Ramutė’s experience. They 
meant comforting certainty and survival. 
Informants noted that many want to hire younger people. Algimantas, a man from 
the smallest village, argued that when he calls in response to an advertisement, the first 
question is “how old are you?” That is it, according to him. He is 50, thus, no one hires him. 
The retired claimed that the young have to work; the retired can survive on their pensions, 
even if they are small. Working after retirement was sometimes blamed for “not letting 
young people work.” A town resident, a pensioner, in his early 80s, maintained: 
I thought they could fire me, I was a pensioner. It is a fact—a pensioner can live. That’s it. 
One gets a pension. It is more difficult, you won’t live prosperously, but you can survive. You 
will have bread. You don’t need much. It is most important that the young not hang around 
without work. Those who build our future. Now they keep those decrepit pensioners at work. 
And there are no jobs for the young. 
 The employers disregarded alcoholism and work ethics and argued for 
unemployment as a relative and situational issue. A village librarian argued that her friend, a 
farmer, contends that the hired workers do not work, if you do not sit on their tails. Several 
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large farmholders argued that actually there are no people to hire when a season comes. “No 
people” meant “no good people,” as one farmer formulated. “Good” meant responsible, 
working and not drinking.  
The farmers develop strategies to adapt to the labor market in the villages. Petras, a 
former state farm director working a 300 ha farm, argued that one of his major employees 
(out of four permanently working on the farm) has to be given special care. Petras takes him 
every morning from his home, drives with him to the farm, then, after the work day, 
“delivers” him back to his “wife’s hands.” He goes with his employee to a shop, buys food, 
and gives him money only at the end of a month or when work ends. Petras said that he 
bought several cars for his employee. However, the employee crushed two of them in car 
accidents. According to Petras, he cannot drive, because on his way home he stops by the 
first house of his acquaintances and gets drunk. Now Petras has started to take him right 
from his home by going 12 km (7.5 miles) each day. This way Petras is guaranteed that he 
will have the employee at work. “I drive into their yard, honk, his wife opens the door, I get 
him into the car, and go to work. He finishes work, I bring him back, honk, his wife takes 
him… it means he will be at work tomorrow. Cigarettes, everything… I have to buy him. 
Everything, one hundred percent. Actually, he is not the only one. I have to take such 
measures with two…” 
Employee drinking was a major problem for many employers. Petras claimed that: 
The most important problem is people. Those who can they work. Those who cannot work 
for themselves they don’t work well for others. The problem is drinking. They get their pay, 
and then it is not predictable, when they will start drinking. Well, the combine driver, he is 
good, clever, and hard-working… but you don’t know when he will go on a binge. Last 
summer he drank for seven days. The combine waits, the sun shines, and… In a day we thresh 
80, 000 tons of grain. It means we lose 40 000 LTL [per day, about $15,000 at 2005 rates]. 
This is because the combine driver drinks. You understand how it is. You see, it is not all the 
time, but for some periods of time. They go on a binge, then sober up, start working, and then 
you don’t know when they will start drinking again… I cannot fire them, because I don’t have 
anyone to hire. The hard working people are already taken. 
Similar stories circulate in the city. A couple of retired doctors said that they heard 
how one unemployed man came uninvited to a farmer’s house and asked for food. He was 
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asked to weed a field, and then the farmer promised to pay him and feed him. He got angry. 
One of the doctors commented:  
He doesn’t want to work. He wants to get by without working. He got a meatball with bread. 
No, he wanted a steak. Such impudence!… They feel like lords. They do what they want. 
There are many like that… they don’t really want to work. Unemployed. But they all want to 
live very well. That’s why they steal. […] I don’t know why. This generation… It has the 
understanding that you don’t have to work. But you have to live very well. 
The subdistrict head of the largest village argued that unemployment is a relative 
issue. According to his data, the number of people registered at the employment office is 
stable. The number for the village is approximately 42 (out of 750 inhabitants; 5.6%). Some 
of the registered drink, others work, if hired, some can work, only if supervised or 
“watched.” Some of the registered are unwilling to take a job for a minimal salary, because 
their social benefits, which, in some cases equal a minimal salary, terminate. Usually the 
number of the registered unemployed strongly increases before the cold period. The 
registered can expect compensation for heating. The subdistrict head remembered that once 
in summer he put up a note by a shop that a subdistrict needed a worker who could mow 
and do household work. Most men in the village qualified for that. No one responded for 
two weeks. Another time a farmer was looking for seasonal workers. The administrator 
asked the postman to ask people whether anyone would be willing to work for the farmer. 
After several days three well-known drunks appeared willing to take the job.  
The vice-director of a small interior decoration enterprise, located in the largest 
village, claimed that they, employers, “educate” their workers. They pay only at the end of 
the week. Earlier, on Mondays there were only two out of six workers left. Now they do not 
have that problem. Most of them are not even hung over on Mondays. The situation has 
improved since 1997 when the enterprise opened. Many were hired and fired. Once they 
needed a driver. They placed announcements that they were looking for a driver everywhere 
in the village. Ten men came. According to the vice-director, it was clear from the beginning 
that most of them would not be able to work, i.e., one could see that they were drunks. They 
barely decided to hire one of the ten and they had to fire him later.  
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Now there are six people from the village who work permanently at the interior 
decoration enterprise. The employers bring six more each morning from Kaunas. In general, 
the vice-director thought, the smartest leave the village. Some maybe are willing to work, but 
they cannot because of an alcohol problem. According to him, in a village labor is of lower 
quality. Many drink and cannot be trusted. He thought that the quality of village labor is 80% 
less than the quality of labor in a city. Thus, the fact that labor is cheaper does not make 
much difference. When asked how he could explain the lower quality of labor in the village, 
the vice-director responded that such are village traditions. Furthermore, the attitudes 
toward work derive from the kolkhoz times. The enterprise was established in the village not 
because of cheap labor as one could expect, but because the director of the enterprise could 
afford to buy the former kolkhoz pig barns. In the city of Kaunas, where the enterprise was 
located previously, they had to pay high rent. 
Some of the villagers agreed that the unemployed could work, if they wished. Saulė, a 
school teacher, in her late 30s, argued that her father is always called upon during the season. 
Saulė’s father is retired and never seeks a job himself: 
He [Saulė’s father] does not face unemployment. […] There are so many young men who 
wander around village why? Can’t they work? They can. They don’t work. They don’t need to 
work. […] In those ten years of independence [actually thirteen] we raised an army of slackers 
[lodoriai]… They don’t see the need to work […] There is a way out. I don’t want to believe 
that there are no jobs. Maybe there are no well-paid jobs… You can find a job, if you wish. 
Really. Anyone who works, puts in effort, such a person is welcome. […] People don’t work, 
don’t study, don’t do… There’s something wrong with the person himself, if he cannot… 
Saulė herself is very active at school. She is also enrolled in the master’s degree 
program in Kaunas. She works diligently and thinks that “We choose our way. We know 
very well where we go, what we do, our life doesn’t depend on the state. If I am here, it 
means I am not capable of anything else. If I was able, I would go somewhere else. But if I 
am here, it means, I have to work here.” Saulė’s thoughts contrasted with most villagers’ talk 
about work. Not surprisingly, she was of the younger generation. 
Some city residents claimed that they were able to secure their work even after 
bankruptcy or reconstruction of a factory or any other industry. The reason was that they 
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were “good” and “valued.” Regina stayed at her work even after the factory was liquidated. 
The former directors formed a small private firm with some of the workers of the factory. 
Regina was one of them. According to her: 
You can get a job for a minimal salary. If one wants to work, one can get such a job. A better 
one… maybe not. Maybe it is hard to get a job according to one’s specialty. […] Qualified 
workers, good specialists, they did not lose their jobs. There were firms established, even in a 
garage or somewhere else. They found a job. Those who were worse they lost their jobs and 
don’t have anything to grasp at. Many started to drink. […] We have some who have gone 
abroad. There are some who have returned. We take them back. Many have lower education. 
Young people, eighteen, nineteen, twenty years old… They come to us, fill out an application. 
It is terrible to look at it. So many spelling mistakes… We pay no attention. Usually they work 
for a minimal pay. They think maybe they will go back abroad to earn more money. They 
don’t worry. We teach them to give them some kind of qualifications. I see there aren’t too 
many to choose from. 
Zina, a retired city resident, assured me that, unlike her children in their 30s, she 
could always find a job. According to others who knew Zina, working hard and responsibly, 
she was always valued by her employers. Having a disability with no right to work, she was 
able to find all kinds of unofficial employment. Zina took care of children and cleaned 
houses. She also knitted clothes for sale (which became less and less popular because, 
according to Zina, many started to buy at second-hand stores). Zina gathered berries and 
engaged in all kinds of temporary home jobs, such as packing women’s hose for a private 
business. This allowed her to buy new furniture for her small two room and kitchen 
apartment in Kaunas, to renovate the apartment itself, and to install costly new windows to 
save energy during the cold period. Zina also helped her children, whom she jokingly called 
“racketeers” (reketininkai). According to Zina, she does not understand “what the state 
officials are thinking.” She gets 300 LTL. Her utility bills reach 350–400 LTL in winter. 
“How can I live? How do they count? I cannot understand that. […] Clever men sit in the 
Parliament, valdžioj [in the government]. This is what I say: let’s say not to the President, but 
to those in the Parliament, let’s give them 300 LTL or 500 LTL. And no more from 
anywhere. Ask them to pay their bills, as we do, buy socks, medicine, and food. How?” 
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The farmer Petras, the subdistrict head, the interior decoration enterprise vice-
director and teacher Saulė approached unemployment predominantly as an individual 
problem. Alcoholism, unwillingness to work and poor work ethics were among the major 
reasons named to account for work relations and unemployment. By reiterating these ideas 
Petras and others repeated the social text produced in Vilnius and other spaces on the new 
subalterns of post-socialism (see chapter 1). Furthermore, they positioned themselves 
outside such a community of marginalized. Their perceptions, subjectivities and successful 
experience in post-socialist times were essential for their outsiderness to the predominant 
discursive community in the village. 
Conversely, many others listed structural reasons, such as restructuring of job 
markets and changed work relations that they found hard to accommodate to. Among the 
interviewees there were some with secondary or specialized education who could not find 
another job and had no money/were too old to change their qualifications. There were 
others who were very willing to work, but were not hired because of “old” age (such as 40 or 
50 years old). There were also many who worked hard for small salaries and in some cases 
had no social benefits and no health insurance. Limited education and age were among the 
major reasons for unemployment in the village. Individual initiative and work ethics 
mattered as well. However, the villages were certainly not split into alcoholics who say that 
everything is tragic and wrong, and industrious people, as the well-known philosopher A. 
Šliogeris inferred in a popular TV program “Spaudos klubas” on December 29, 2004 
(Lithuanian Television, LTV). Experiences are multiple. Data is abundant on those who are 
willing to work, but cannot find any job.  
Zina’s story shows that people who have no individual “problems” (to use Petras and 
others rationale) like alcoholism and poor work ethics feel/experience marginalization. Zina 
was taking risks by finding new jobs; she was employing her initiative and industriousness to 
earn another “pension” and make ends meet. Her lack of education, and older age for the 
current labor market (she was in her mid 50s), and her previous experience of work for 
many years in a factory made her ill-adapted to the changed economy. In the past she lived 
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in a three room co-operative apartment,33 had a car, and new furniture. At present a similar 
situation does not inspire the feeling of living well. Having about the same, she feels like she 
has less. For Zina there is also no promise of prosperity in the future. Thus, Zina looks at 
the past to promote herself as a person and a society member. Her narratives are 
articulations of the “self” as a new “social” subject in a changing grammar of social history.  
“Work” is so omnipresent not only because of actual unemployment, but also 
because of the prospect of being unemployed, and sensibilities related to money shortages 
and work relations. Many informants experience social displacement and insecurity. Social 
displacement is experienced by those who are unemployed or employed with a minimal pay, 
who are not paid “white money” and experience downward social mobility. People feel 
worthless, unneeded, and forgotten. 
Insecurity is present in multiple spaces among both the employed and the 
unemployed. Informants report that they are not sure about their jobs and their future. Even 
if not affected personally, those who work, like Regina, have stories to tell about their 
friends, relatives or co-workers who could not survive on their small pensions, salaries, or 
unemployment benefits (if any); who have nothing to eat, got very sick, or even committed 
suicide. For example, the most striking story was told by Regina who remembered how one 
co-worker killed herself in front of the counter at the factory where workers received their 
pay in cash, when it was announced that the pay was delayed again. These intertwining social 
and personal trajectories create insecurity and longing for stability. According to Genovaitė, 
a city resident, in her early 40s, employed the entire time since her graduation: 
The most terrible thing in this epoch is instability, uncertainty about tomorrow. We live hand 
to mouth [gyventi šia diena]. […] You are exploited by every employer and you are like a serf. If 
you don’t like something, you are told that there is a line behind the door [of potential 
workers]. […] Earlier [in Soviet times], if you don’t like it here, the pay is too low, you can 
leave tomorrow. You can say what you like fearlessly, say what you don’t like. You could 
choose and not be afraid of tomorrow. I knew that a salary would be paid on a particular day. 
If I spent all I have, I can borrow [from a neighbor]. I knew that I will repay tomorrow. Now 
                                                 
33 A co-operative apartment (kooperatinis butas) was different from a state apartment (valdiškas butas). 
People had to pay for a co-operative apartment while state apartments were for free. Co-operative apartments 
were owned by co-operatives and usually were considered neater and tidier than state apartments. 
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it isn’t like this. I work today, tomorrow I may be unemployed. And I don’t know whether I 
will have this job. Maybe I will have no one to borrow from, nothing to eat. I have no savings, 
we live hand to mouth. […] You try to think that everything is well, but sometimes thoughts 
come, what if something happens. If we had to take medicine every day, the prices of 
medicine are enormous. This uncertainty is so pressing. 
Thus, even many who do not face unemployment and are not socially displaced 
become part of a discursive community of social displacement and insecurity by reiterating a 
social text on work. Empathy and proximity to the marginalized make informants 
susceptible to the politicians’ rhetoric of “better life,” “changes,” securing of job places and 
higher pay.  
Multiple work relations and various forms of accommodation to the labor market 
illustrate sensibilities about the present and the future. The older generations and people 
with limited education are the most disadvantaged. However, many others empathize with 
them and experience some insecurity, instability and uncertainty brought about by post-
socialist changes. The intertwining social and personal trajectories create communities of 
common discourse. These communities articulate themselves as different “socials” (from the 
ones they were in socialism) in a changed grammar of social history. They incorporate 
meanings and values of post-socialism which reflect subjectivities of subalternity. Imaginings 
about work, essential to informants’ identities and their understandings of social history, rest 
on the dialectical presence of the actual and the probable. 
4.2 MONEY 
4.2.1 Money shortages and food 
Reflections on social history and the present were often centered on money. People 
calculated how much they earned or how big their pensions were, compared their income to 
the wages and pensions of others, considered possibilities of raises in salary or pensions, 
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agreed that they would live much better, if their incomes were higher, counted how much 
they spent, and what they were able or not able to buy.  
Major calculations were carried out about food. In villages many used to buy only the 
staples, such as bread, barley, sugar, salt, flour, and the like. Ona, a woman, in her late 70s, 
from the smallest village, commented that she always buys bananas because she likes them 
very much. According to her, the shop on wheels, which comes to the village several days 
per week, brings bananas or oranges just for her, because no one else buys them. She felt she 
was living quite well: 
I can live on my pension. I can live. Quite well. Even buy something for myself to eat. It is 
enough for me. I have food to eat… I don’t need a pig, I don’t need a cow… But when the 
children come, they usually bring something. But I have to have. They promised to buy a pig 
this year. I don’t know how it will be. I told them [her children] that I want to have it. Then I 
have something to put on the table. Today I have this cheese, I have butter, I have honey, 
cucumbers. It is fine for me. I made tea for myself, I have milk, I have something warm, 
something cold. I don’t have to buy anything… […] What do I buy? I don’t want meat, I 
don’t eat it. I buy, I buy, when they come [the shop on the wheels], they bring me bananas and 
oranges. I like these fruits. 
Calculations about food showed sensibilities about consumption and spending as well 
as the insecurity people who were surviving on small wages and pensions shared. Ramutė 
from the largest village claimed that she buys bananas only for her grandchildren, not for 
herself or the other grown-ups in the family. She also said she uses cooking oil rather than 
the animal fat that she produced at home, thinking that oil is healthier. It meant that they live 
in a “new way.” However, oil costs more. A former brick factory worker, in her 70s, argued 
that “now food is expensive. Well, but I am retired, I have gardens, I plant potatoes, and 
vegetables, that’s how I live. I don’t get dressed up. But I am not hungry [laughs].” A doctor 
from the largest village claimed that her acquaintance, a teacher from the largest village, does 
not buy sausages for her daughter. According to the doctor, even if her acquaintance’s salary 
was low, she had money to buy sausage. By not buying them the teacher saved some money.  
Buying and consuming food is an everyday process through which people experience 
post-Soviet changes. Some feel that “in the other times” they were fuller, because they had 
things to put on the table at parties, which seldom are given today. People were also able to 
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get their beloved hunter sausages (medžiotojų dešrelės) “from under the counter” (iš po stalo, i.e., 
using blat relations (see Ledeneva 1998)). It was the time, villagers reiterate, when “food was 
cheap and we had money.” At present people argue that food is more expensive. One can 
hear very often that “there are goods, but there is no money.” Villagers can rarely buy 
bananas or oranges, which only seldom were “thrown out” (išmesdavo, were set out for 
purchase) in Soviet times. Some would say (like one mainstream party ideologue, state 
council member and one of the mainstream party members) that now people can buy 
“sometimes” while earlier “they could not buy at all.” However, even if people do not 
experience physical hunger, even if they “sometimes” can buy bananas, subjectively they feel 
more “hungry” at present. The hunger they experience is socially constructed; the subject 
thinks of himself/herself not only what he/she actually consumes, but also what he or she 
could consume in a changing society with multiple venues and options.  
Even when complaining about high prices, many agree that now “it is better with 
food.” “Earlier you had to stand in queues, and wait, there was no food” (a Kaunas resident, 
a pensioner). There was a time “when you could buy only pig heads” (Vincas and Genė, a 
family of pensioners, former city residents). A former shop manager from the largest village 
remembered that in the Soviet period “there were pig’s feet, hooves and all. To get sausages 
you had to have blat.” A professor from Vilnius figuratively remembered that “Earlier in a 
shop you could see a loaf of bread, two eggs, herring, but there were no sausages. I 
remember those times. Empty shops. If you got a good salary, you could buy anything that 
was in the shop.” A day care center teacher from the largest village recalled that earlier kids 
got tangerines very rarely. Then, “they did not know what to do with them, how to eat 
them.” In her opinion, children stayed healthy in general, only there was no food which was 
in short supply. “Now they have to have a banana, an orange, or a tangerine.”  
Buying and consuming food in the Soviet period was translated by some into 
“denigration.” Vincas, a former city resident and a factory worker, argued that it was 
inhuman that “There was no choice—you took the bread you were given. Bread was not 
wrapped. In the last years there was not enough paper to wrap meat, so they tore apart boxes 
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which had contained meat and gave pieces of cardboard to people, if the customer had no 
bag of his own.”  
Criticism about buying food (which could be extended to buying other goods like 
shoes mentioned much more infrequently) and experienced denigration contrasted with 
heroic stories of getting goods. The professor from Vilnius knew a relative who always had 
meat on the table (of which she was proud). The relative worked every third day at the 
airport. In the two free days left she traveled from one shop to another, stood in queues, and 
was able to find and buy meat. Various blat relations secured food for others. Thus, some 
were able to get food “under the counter,” while others were able to track sites where food 
was “thrown out” (išmesdavo) for customers to buy. The vernacular “thrown out” (also in 
Russian выбрoсили) implied spontaneity and unpredictability (however, the unpredictability 
itself was regular). It also implied accumulation and circulation of goods outside the regular 
shop system, many people had no venues to control. In any case, many had some control 
over acquiring food in Soviet time shortage economy. At present they have to control their 
desires. For village people as well as the unemployed and pensioners in the city, their 
competence rests on how much they are able to save not buying particular goods or buying 
them at the lowest possible price. Thus, after the Soviet period, the ways created to find 
food that was “thrown out” were redirected towards ways to find the least expensive food. 
Some present-day shops were invoked as “museums,” where people were unable to buy 
anything because of the high prices. They could only look at the displays. 
The markets are responsive to people’s sensibilities about the past, consumption, and 
control of their desires. In the towns, one can observe shop names and advertisements 







Figure 4. A shop in Birštonas. Summer, 2004. The name of the shop “Pigiau grybo” refers to a 




Going to a shop one can buy “Trys kapeikos” rolls (“Three kopecks”). Three 
kopecks was the price for a roll in Soviet times. One can also buy “Tarybinės daktariška” 
(“Soviet daktariška”), “Tarybinės pieniškos” (“Soviet pieniškos”) and other kinds of “Soviet” 
sausages with a hammer and a sickle on the package.34 The “Samsonas” Closed Joint Stock 
Company which produces the “Soviet” sausages was recognized for its production in 1999, 
2001 and 2002. “Tarybinė daktariška” sausage won “The Product of Year 2001.” The 
company was also awarded diplomas for the wieners “Tarybinės pieniškos” recognized as 
                                                 
34 Not all sausages have a hammer and a sickle on packages. 
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“The Product of Year 2001” and the “Tarybinis saliamis” sausage as “The Product of Year 
2002.”35  
The name “Soviet” was important in the marketing of products. The name was 
defended in courts when another company the “Vilniaus mėsos kombinatas” (Vilnius Meat 
Packing plant) chose a similar sounding brand name “Tarnybinis” (“Official”).36 Rimgailė 
Vaitkienė,37 the director of marketing for the “Samsonas” company argued that the strategy 
for choosing the name “Soviet” rested on a “somewhat paradoxical characteristic.” She 
stated that in Soviet times sausages were made without meat substitutes (mėsos pakaitalai); 
therefore, they were more natural and more delicious. She also thought that this factor was 
much more important to the customers than the negative connotation of “Soviet.”  
Many informants also argued that Soviet-period sausages were “without meat 
substitutes” as well as more delicious. However, this connection is arbitrary because many 
did not consume sausages “without meat substitutes.” The Soviet food situation began to 
stagnate in the 1970s when Leonid Brezhnev was the leader of the Communist Party. Food 
production and per capita consumption deteriorated over the decade.38 All the Soviet 
republics were requested to economize on meat; therefore, various meat substitutes were 
used for sausages (Rimas Frizinskas, the Director for Commerce of “Samsonas,” personal 
communication) with the exception of the premium brand distributed in special stores for 
special citizens (like Communist Party officials, mothers with many children and other state 
favorites). Thus, only post-Soviet “Soviet” sausages are consumed without meat substitutes 
by many. By arguing for natural and delicious as a reason for choosing the name “Soviet,” 
the Director of Marketing, intentionally or not, depoliticized the name and appealed to those 
                                                 
35 See: http://www.tm-lt.lt/main.php?action=main::article.show&article_id=564. Accessed on 
02/17/2005. 
36 “Tarnybinis” (“Official”) is attractive as the name of a product because of its proximity to the 
name “Tarybinis” (“Soviet”). This proximity was the reason the company “Samsonas” sued the “Vilniaus 
mėsos kombinatas.” The Appeal Court of Lithuania forbade the “Vilniaus mėsos kombinatas” to use the 
name “Tarnybinis” (“Official”). “Vilniaus mėsos kombinatas” changed it to “Tradicinis” (“Traditional”).  
37 See: http://www.takas.lt/pr/archyvas/?st=1&msg_id=440 . Accessed on 02/21/2005. 
38 National Food Review, Oct-Dec. 1989 by Kenneth Gray 
http://ww.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3284/is_n4_v12/ai_8274317/pg_3 
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for whom the name was political. Building on the ambiguity of “Soviet,” the company is 
successfully exploiting multiple meanings and attracting various consumers. 
Entrepreneurs did not really choose something that is unambiguously “negative.” It is 
hard to believe that those who claim that Soviet times were “better,” would think of 
“Soviet” as a negative term. The company did not choose the name “sovietinis” (“Soviet”), a 
borrowing for “tarybinis.” “Sovietinis” has been often used to emphasize the foreignness of 
the past. The use of the borrowing “Soviet” has become popular and has coexisted with the 
widely prevalent strategy to purify the language from borrowings. During my fieldwork I 
heard people say that those who still use “tarybinis” show their allegiance to Soviet times. 
“Tarybinis” (“Soviet”) because of its ambiguity, polyvocality, the quality of being native, as 
well as a positive imagined connection to the past is a good symbol of a social text and 
prospective in economic markets.  
Buying “Three kopecks” rolls “Soviet” sausages as well as other “old taste” goods 
indicates reassertions of identities (see also Buechler and Buechler 1999). Many buy anything 
“Soviet” because it is delicious, others because it is “without meat substitutes.” Without 
these qualities the name “Soviet” would not have guaranteed success on the markets. For 
many consumers buying “Soviet” sausages is also a way to imagine continuity with the social 
self and social history. It is a way to experience coherence, comfort of the known as well as 
to resist the tastes of the present.39 However, to get a taste of the “new times” an individual 
can buy a bottle of “Euro” beer. “Euro” beer is the cheapest from the time of the 
referendum for Lithuania’s membership in the European Union (EU) in May, 2003. The 
fusion of low price, Europe, and alcohol shows the uneven ways “Europe” has to take to 
survive the symbolic markets of the new member states (see also chapter 7). 
4.2.2 Surviving economies of abundance 
Having or not having money invites many to reconsider their social standing and 
opportunities. An 80 year old inhabitant from the smallest village thinks that “Now, if you 
                                                 
39 See also Buechler and Buechler (1999) on resistance of taste in post-socialist East Germany. 
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have money, you can do anything. If you don’t—nothing. If you have money—you will be 
cured, stay in the hospital, see doctors. If not…” Similarly a doctor from Kaunas, whose 
father was hospitalized, figuratively argued that, if you do not pay to doctors and nurses 
directly, a patient is destined to rot.  
In Soviet times money was secondary to social relations (cf. Berdahl 1999), which 
were venues to acquire social services and goods in economies of shortage (Kornai 1992). At 
present money increasingly becomes the primary means to acquire goods and services, which 
in their turn indicate a person’s social status. A teacher from the largest village claimed that 
students put an emphasis on money as their primary value as well as a venue to become a 
valued member of society: “In the first to fourth grade, if you start to talk about life, they all 
shout in unison: ‘there is no money.’ They already know that there is no, no, no money… So 
they think I will be independent, rich, I will flee somewhere, I will dress, eat, entertain as a 
human… why should I care about the homeland? They don’t hesitate to say that.” 
In the Soviet period people invented a variety of methods to survive the economy of 
shortages. Paradoxically, some have to survive among an abundance of choices and 
possibilities in post-Soviet times. For many it is surviving money shortages where transition 
yields an ambiguous mix of possibility and powerlessness, of desire and despair, of mass 
joblessness and hunger amids the accumulation, by some, of great amounts of new wealth 
(cf. Sajo 1998, Comaroff and Comaroff 1998).  
 In socialism there was always a social realm wherein money circulated and 
corrupted—the sphere of the communist elites. The “little people” were excluded from, and 
in a sense protected from, this corrupting force by the fixed barriers of power and privilege 
(Ries 2001). In moving away from the logics of socialism where most people had few ways 
to amass capital or multiply their money without direct investment of labor, people must 
come to grips with the seemingly “magical” quality in the market system, where money 
begets money, goods accrue value through trade, familiar work practices have given way to 
mysterious forms of economic activity, and income discrepancies create utterly disparate, 
incommensurate worlds (Ries 2001). People experience the enrichment of others as well as 
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that they are pushed aside from the mysterious to them mechanisms of the market and the 
promise of prosperity (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1998). 
The new post-socialist methods for surviving economies of abundance are bound to 
control of desires and saving money.40 In villages some do not use electricity, bring water 
from the well (to lower their bills), and subside mainly on what is produced on the farm. 
Another post-Soviet invention is buying at so-called skudurynai (second-hand stores, the 
Lithuanian word skudurynai literally means a “place for rags” (low value, worn-out, torn 
clothing)). Many agree that “it is good that these skudurynai exist;” “if you could not buy 
there, you would have to wander around naked…;” “what would you wear?” (a family in 
their late 60s, the second large village). However, clothing bought at skudurynai stinks, “but 
you cannot buy at a store—it is so expensive” (a 40 year old farmer of a 100 ha farm, a 
woman from the largest village). 
Ideas about skudurynai infer a change of social status. According to the librarian from 
the largest village, “earlier it was shortages, blatas (blat (see Ledeneva 1998)), but people did 
not make the rounds of those skudurynai. Even the poorest did not buy there. And now 
intellectuals wear used underwear [laughs]. Look,… really and all those rags…” The word 
skudurynai has a negative meaning. The names given to second-hand stores, such as 
“Clothing from the West” (“Drabužiai iš Vakarų”) or “Ladies’ fortune” (“Ponių laimė”), sound 
ironic. In Lithuania the “West” for many has a positive value (see chapter 5 and 7). 
However, in the case of skudurynai, people feel neither “ladies” nor “gentlemen,” nor 
“fortunate” to buy at the second-hand stores. They experience this as inescapability. Thus, 
involved into market economy by buying at the second-hand stores village people and other 
customers of skudurynai tend to see themselves more as “second-hand citizens” rather than 
valued new consumers, as one would expect in a developing market economy. Marija, 
formerly a worker at a factory, remembers:  
I made good money. There were no skudurynai, well, there were these consignment stores 
[komisai]. But you didn’t even look in that direction. And now? Now it’s finished. Now you 
cannot buy a new item at a shop. […] Usually those skudurynai save us. Otherwise you would 
                                                 
40 See Bridger and Pine (1998) on surviving post-socialism and cultures of survival. 
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have nothing. And earlier you go to a store, from every salary you buy for yourself, for your 
children, and… and anything else. 
Aldona from the second largest village assured me that she had not bought clothing 
at a store for 13 years (Lithuania had been independent for 13 years during the interview). 
Even when she buys clothing at skudurynai she buys the inexpensive ones, for one litas. A 
more extreme case was a man, in his late 50s, from the smallest village, a known drunk, and a 
former engineer in Vilnius who showed me the clothing in his wardrobe to prove that he 
had not bought any clothing since independence. His statement that all his clothing comes 
from Soviet times was a note of praise for the Soviet past. 
Considerations about money emerge in other contexts. Some people cannot pay their 
bills on time. In Kaunas some of the informants had to sell larger apartments and buy 
smaller ones to be able to pay bills. In the villages people struggle with keeping the houses 
they have, which have to be heated during the long, about 7 month, cold period. Some live 
in cold, walking in their coats at home or heating only one room with electric stoves. 
Ramutė, an unemployed 50 year old woman from the largest village who takes seasonal jobs 
calculates: 
We [she and her husband] pay for water. My son lives with us, they [the son’s family] pay for 
electricity. […] Six people, it’s a lot of water. About four hundred litai [per year]. Last year I 
sold a pig, this year I will sell a bull, there will be money for water. […] I always have debts. 
But they [probably someone who collects bills] already know me. That I don’t have [money]. 
You get something, you earn… but you need everything. And bread, and sugar. The canning 
season will start [she makes preserves for home consumption]. […] The biggest animals 
[income from them] are for water. 
Arrival in the villages was often related to inability to pay bills in the city. Many 
newcomers to villages lost or sold their apartments and joined their relatives or bought a 
house in a village. Marija lived with her two small children and a husband in a small town. 
She remembered how it got harder and harder to pay their bills and to survive on the 
temporary jobs her husband used to take. The electricity was turned off. They started to use 
candles that the sexton, Marija’s mother’s husband made for them. “The ceiling was black. 
[…] The curtains were smoked up. In the summer—it dawns early, the sun sets late. Not 
bad. But in winter when you have to live with those candles. How can you be happy with 
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this free Lithuania, dear? In the dark. No TV.” Marija was happy that she decided to come to 
live with her mother and mother’s husband. Now they live in a small two room house. “The 
children get milk and eggs,” claimed Marija. It is easier for her family. “But to compare to 
those times [Soviet times], there’s no thing to say.” 
Like considerations of work, calculations of money reflect experiences of insecurity. 
Insecurity may be projected into the future and generate different thoughts, such as ideas 
about land, keeping up a farm or a house. For example, a woman, in her late 60s, from the 
largest village argued that she was afraid she would have to give up her land, if taxes for the 
land increase: 
My health does not allow working on the land. I rent it. I get grain for that. I bring grain 
home, you can count that only half of it [money for the grain] is left for me [because she pays 
for bringing the grain home]. You bring grain [said in the diminutive grūdelių], you cook it for 
the cow and pigs, and that’s it. I heard that land is going to be very expensive. What can we 
do, we will have to return it [to the state]. […] There is no hope. You can sell the land, but, 
can you imagine, you can get only two hundred litai per hectare. You give it away for free. 
 Some farmers are not sure whether they will be able to return loans they have from 
the banks, others complain to live in debt. A 100 ha farm owner, a woman, in her 40s, 
argues: 
I don’t know… We always live in debt. From the spring on you accumulate debts. In the fall 
you pay them off. And then again, in the spring you start with debts. […] You resign yourself 
to the idea—it’s fine as it is. But then, I don’t know, when you hear, how other people live, 
you know, I say, there are no words to describe this. I think, fine, we work from morning till 
night, we don’t drink, we don’t spend carelessly [neišlaidaujam]. There have been no terrible 
misfortunes. But we cannot make ends meet. We think everyday where to get money. […] If 
you go to the village to borrow 50 LTL—nobody has any to lend. Everybody lives… I don’t 
know how they live. 
The dreams invoked in conversations expressed a willingness to overcome present 
constraints by magically accumulating wealth, i.e., winning a million. Marija says: “I told my 
mom that, if I won a million [she laughs]… My mom said: ‘So what will you do with that 
million?’ I said I would buy a house somewhere close to the city. Closer to Kaunas, closer to 
a bigger city, where I could work. We all think about work, about finding a job. If we could 
find one in the nearby town [which was 7 km away from the village], maybe somehow we 
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could reach it by bicycle. But if it’s in Kaunas? How can we get there?” Another woman, in 
her early 70s, from the largest village, also joked about her willingness to win a million: “I 
laugh now. I say, if I won a million, I would build a house in my native village. Without a 
million you cannot do anything.” The ideas about winning a million were most probably 
inspired by the TV shows “Who will win a million?” or “Six zeros—one million” which 
generated imaginings about the possibility of rapid enrichment by amassing a fortune 
through a visible method of moving a magic wheel. 
4.2.3 Money in the past 
The past structured understanding of the present expressed in ideas about work as well as 
money. Many comparisons and calculations invoked the past when most informants had 
work and money. Some concluded that it was good under the Russians only because of 
money. The often repeated expression was a variation of “it was good under the Russians—
we had money, and jobs.”  
Woman: It was good under the Russians. We had a ruble… 
Man: We had jobs. We worked. 
Woman: I have nothing now. 
Man: We even earned well [a family in their early 50s from the second largest village]. 
Or: 
Before Sąjūdis everybody was full up, dressed, and had a ruble. Where did those savings come 
from? People had savings. Some even twenty thousand. Not litas. The other money [rubles] 
was worth more [Elena, in her 60s, from the smallest village]. 
Savings were often invoked as proof that people were well off “then.” The limited 
goods that people were able to exchange for money in the shortage economy were rarely 
remembered. Some claimed to save for their children, others for an apartment in a town or a 
city. The family in their 60s from the second largest village remembered selling two cows 
and depositing money in the bank. “We were sick, so we thought it is going to be for the 
funeral. That’s how. And this money has disappeared.” Savings, which for many informants 
was lost or devalued in the post-Soviet period, were remembered very often: 
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I still wait for that money, which should be returned. Rubles, I still wait. Maybe it will be 
returned. Maybe… We need it so much. Probably nobody will give them back. They [the state] 
wait and wait… Even if it is returned, it will have no value. In Russian times, for example, if 
you have three thousand, it was a lot [a woman, in her early 50s, from the second largest 
village]. 
It was argued that “earlier” money was different. For ten rubles one could buy 
something to eat: “a kilo of sausage. And oil, and sugar, and bread, and butter—anything 
you want. Just for ten rubles!” (a pensioner, in her 60s, from the smallest village). Now you 
can buy almost nothing for ten litai. “Just bread.” Comparisons of rubles to litai seemed 
meaningful to many informants, even if the value of currencies was different. Rubles, like 
many attributes of the past, acquired the symbolic value of the “better life:” 
You get 100 rubles, so you can buy matches, and bread, and meat. Well, there were no wieners 
[sosiskos]. There wasn’t much meat, but in the village, you always slaughter animals. We did not 
face hunger. Now everything is there, but there is no money. You get those 300 LTL and you 
don’t know what to do with them. I leave [money] for this and that and then you sit the whole 
month [without money].  
In the Soviet past many informants also claimed to earn more than at present. The 
brickyard workers earned from 200 to 300 rubles. The former excavator driver claimed to 
earn around 400 rubles. Tractor drivers’, forest workers’ wages were also high. The pensions 
were higher as well. A former brick yard factory worker remembers: 
My pension was 270–280 [rubles]. When there were rubles you felt that you have money. Now 
I get 415 [LTL]. But earlier I could buy much more for those 280. Well… it is better not to 
think. If you have to buy medicine, you spend your monthly pension. For medicine. Medicine 
is very expensive. Once I went [to a pharmacy],… you need this and that, and that… I paid 
100 LTL for medicine. And you have to pay for electricity, and for water… Then you buy 
firewood, so you have to pay for the firewood… Then you look what to eat, and finished—no 
more money. Almost nothing is left. Just like that. And earlier [in Soviet times] I used to get 
those 280… The ruble had its own value. 
Wages in some factories in the city might have been low, however, some were able to 
increase their income in other ways, working according to the “work ethics” popular at the 
time. Alina who has lived in the second largest village already for six years remembers her 
heroic work stories: 
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I went to work at a factory. It was impossible to get a job at that factory. It was only a 
husband, a wife, and children [who worked there]. Relatives. To get there from the street for a 
common person was almost unimaginable. Really. They carried out tons… [they stole from 
the factory]. 
They asked me how much I had earned in my previous job. I used to get 800 [rubles] during 
the season. […] My lowest salary was from 250 to 350 rubles, during winter 700–800. “Oh, 
well,” she [a woman who talked to Alina at the administration] said, “you are not going to earn 
that much here. The salary is about 70 or 80 rubles.” I said that I was not interested then. I 
won’t be able to provide for my family. She said: “Look at our women, their hairstyles”… [it 
was an indication about what kind of job it was]. […] The first time, I remember, I got 48 
rubles. That was my first salary. […] Then we worked. I had medals and honors [for work]. I 
was never late. I was never absent. […] I never saw what others did. […] Nobody ever told me 
“you carry out too much” [take with her, steal]. When a chair came to say that “today is going 
to be oблава [Russian oблава means an “ambush,” i.e., the control to check on stealing]. No 
one takes anything!”, so I never took anything, that’s out of the question for me [šventa]. And 
women [bobos] liked to take risks. […] It was in their blood. How will they come home and 
have nothing? And I did not need to. All my life [I did not take anything during oблава]. It was 
enough for me. 
Working at this job, Alina was able to travel to the Black Sea “every week, if I 
wished,” to buy good furniture, golden rings and chains [luxury items in Soviet times], and to 
eat good food. She lost her job during reconstruction of the factory, which was bought by 
foreign investors, seven years ago. Remembering her former job, Alina counted the wealth 
she had accumulated:  
I gave a golden chain to my granddaughter when she started school. When there were other 
occasions, I gave golden rings to my granddaughters. And to my daughter. The ring was 18 
grams. To everyone—to my daughter, to my daughter-in-law, to everyone, everyone. To a 
thirteen year old grandson I gave a fine chain. I still have another one with a golden cross… I 
thought I will give it to him for his sixteenth birthday, but then I decided to wait until the 
eighteenth. […] All my children are provided for. […] I say I lived very well. Even when the 
Russians were gone I lived well [she still had enough from those times]. I don’t complain. 
Like ideas about work, talk about money, as in Alina’s case, invoke sensibilities about the 
decline of the informants’ social status and opportunities. It is another way to articulate 
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changes and think of accommodations. Invoking the past and their higher social standing, 
people resist marginalization in the present. 
4.3 MILK 
The private sector in villages, which produced dairy products and meat, was important in the 
economy of Soviet times (see chapter 1). Currently private production does not yield similar 
benefits and is not supported to the same extent by the state as previously (cf. Misiunas and 
Taagepera 1983). Informants reflect upon this in frequent talks about milk. According to 
Jadvyga M., a 60 year old woman from the largest village, “it is said that we praise the other 
times. Oh, well, you remember, you sell a liter of milk; you buy a loaf of bread. And now you 
need ten liters of milk to buy a loaf of bread. That’s the difference. We don’t have enough 
money…” Another pensioner from the smallest village claimed that “agriculture is all wealth 
and money, I think. We used to feed the city. And now it is hard in the village because milk 
is very cheap.”  
Previously villagers were able to add to their salaries by raising cattle for milk and 
meat for home consumption and sale. Many notice that at present raising cattle either for 
milk or meat does not yield proper earnings. Jadvyga M. claimed: 
Last year I did not deliver milk already. I thought I will raise three pigs [give milk to the pigs]. 
There was a lot of milk. When I bought pigs it was 3.5–4 LTL per kilo [for piglets]. In the fall, 
when I have to sell them, it is just 2.5 LTL per kilo. I calculated how much milk I needed for 
feeding pigs, how much I paid for them when I bought them, so it was only manure, which 
was left to me. I don’t count the work. Well, yes. We did not throw them away, we ate them. 
But I thought this way: I will give away two pigs, I will get about eight hundred. I will have 
enough for a casket already. And there is nothing. Today they [those who buy pigs], run 
around. They already give 4 LTL per kilo, but nobody has [pigs]. My neighbor she always had 
two, three or four. Even she does not have any. It was not worth having them, they were 
cheap. 
Like work (in case of firing after restructuring of industries) or money (in case of lost 
savings), milk may stand for injustice, deception, humiliation and powerlessness of people at 
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present. Jadvyga M. remembered to bring milk to the delivery post in the spring of 2003. She 
took it there all the month, 350 liters. On the last day of the month at the delivery post she 
was informed that the milk she brought was third-rate. “Why did they say that on the last 
day? Maybe I would have sold the cow or I’d made it well. There was little money [she 
received little for the milk].” Jadvyga M. argued that the milk she delivered was poured into 
the same container with the best quality milk. Then she corrected herself that nobody in the 
village has the highest quality milk. The milk is either of a lower quality or of the lowest 
quality like hers. For lower quality milk people get 20 cents per liter, for the lowest, “it 
depends on their kindness… it is either fourteen, or sixteen cents. My daughter was paid one 
cent once.” The people who collect milk work together with those who determine the 
quality of the milk; “there isn’t a way to seek justice. Everybody needs money. So they 







Figure 5. Ona from the smallest village is milking a cow in summer, 2004. “The children are 
muttering against this cow. But me, well… I need that cow myself. So what… You know, I don’t want poor 




Expectation that delivery of milk has to be subsidized and/or properly paid is 
informed by experiences in the Soviet period. According the demands of the new economy, 
many abandon the tradition of raising cattle for meat or milk for sale. However, some still 
deliver milk to milk delivery posts every morning. The largest village subdistrict head tried to 
convince his mother for three years that it was not worth keeping a cow. He told her to write 
down all the money she spends during haying season (trying to collect hay for the cow). It 
was 800 LTL. You had to sell 2.5 tons of milk to return 800 LTL, which was impossible. 
Jadvyga M. calculated: 
You raise a calf. If it is less than 400 kilos, it is 90 ct per kilo. Can you imagine? Could you get 
meat for one litas [she rounds 90 ct to 1 LTL] at a store? 90 cents for keeping a calf one year. 
You pay 150 [LTL] when you buy, after a year you sell it for 300 LTL. Is it worth it? No, it is 
not. Nobody keeps calves. We slaughter them, eat them, and that is the end. There is no way 
out. I say, it is impossible to make money. 
Some villagers also sell milk themselves by taking it to a nearby town or a city early in 
the morning. Living in Kaunas in a Soviet-style apartment building, I saw elderly people line 
up with empty jars (usually one liter glass jars) in the yard every morning. Milk sold in the 
yard cost 1 LTL per liter, while the cheapest milk in a shop in a plastic bag was about 1.40 
LTL. One villager told me that he sells milk for 60 ct per liter in a nearby town. The milk 
buying price at milk delivery posts in villages was 29 ct per liter for the highest quality milk, 
which almost nobody was able to reach.  
Having some cattle, proper income, a house and savings in the Soviet period one 
could feel well off. At present, a village livelihood and the income one could earn on a small 
farm has a very limited value. Having the same or almost the same as in the Soviet period 
people feel poor. However, their work on a farm and outside a farm is the same or even 
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harder. In search of answers, their attention turns very often towards the state (see chapter 
6). 
 
Excerpts of social texts along the themes of work, money and milk convey 
experiences/knowledge of changing social history and imaginings about the self and others. 
Articulation of changes illustrate emerging habitual practices, new social “forms,” such as 
discontinuing delivering milk in an economy which no longer supports the private sector to 
the same extent, or taking a janitor’s job which becomes prestigious in the presence of 
unemployment. Many other practices which discursively are resisted, such as buying cheap 
food and clothing at the second-hand stores, may become habitual. However, at present they 
illustrate individuals’ passages through change as well as sensibilities and perceptions arising 
while experiencing these passages.  
The ideas about work, money, and milk are structured along the conceptual 
boundaries defined in the first chapter. Work, money, and milk in the past are related to 
security, prosperity, recognition, well-being, and higher social status. The present in terms of 
work, money, and milk points to accommodations, resistance to change, decrease of social 
status, and experiences of marginalization. The present experiences show diminished 
opportunities, restricted choices and other constraints. The present is articulated in different 
emotional discourse than the past, i.e., in idioms of deception, injustice, humiliation, 
powerlessness, insecurity and uncertainty. Reiterations of the past bring about reassertions of 
identity, a sense of comforting continuity, certainty, and coherence. Such experience and 
knowledge of social history and the self as “social” constitute social texts which reflect 
people’s political identities and are the basis for their political actions, namely, voting (see 
chapter 7). 
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5.0  CHAPTER 3: OPPRESSION AND FOREIGN SOCIAL HISTORY 
The liberation movements throughout Eastern Europe derived much of their inspiration and 
power from “hidden transcripts” (Scott 1990) of the “oppressed,” the “power of the 
powerless” (Havel 1985), and “people without history” (cf. Wolf 1982). At present the 
histories of the “oppressed” are well known (e.g., Michnik 1985, Havel 1985, Vladislav 
1986). They have been disseminated through school curricula, public events and discourses. 
A lot of scholarship is devoted to analysis of how people survived socialism (Hann 1993, 
Verdery 1996), some even laughing (Draculić 1992), and resisted/opposed socialist regimes 
(see, e.g., Watson 1994, Kubik 1994, Ash 1990). Fewer studies focus on answering the 
questions of who felt oppressed and why (but see, e.g., Berdahl 1999, Kligman 1998). 
In this chapter I pursue the idea that the Soviet period was experienced as foreign 
and oppressive by those who constituted the opposition to the Soviet regime because of 
their background and social location. In many cases these people employed nationalist ideas 
to justify their convictions, belonging, and disloyalty. Like villagers in the post-Soviet present 
who accommodate and resist their marginalization, the “oppressed” of the Soviet period, 
negotiated and resisted subjection to social otherness after the incorporation of Lithuania in 
the USSR (see chapter 4). The Soviet state negated social status and loyalties, the values and 
meanings constitutive of some social subjects. It also implemented policies of 
nationalization, taxation, and collectivization, depriving some individuals of wealth, power 
and privilege. Deportations to Siberia and imprisonments were part of the Soviet projects of 
reclassification of society and its discipline.  
The marginalized of the socialist and post-socialist periods were subjected to similar 
experiences of subalternity. However, they were different “cultural artifacts” and 
experienced different traditions of marginalization (the Soviet one being known especially 
  95
for its violent and totalitarian character, especially until Stalin’s death). The different 
experiences of marginalization I generalize in the overarching metaphors of “regression” (in 
post-Soviet times, see chapter 1) and “oppression” (in Soviet times).  
“Oppression” is a relative category, since individuals feel “oppressed” in different 
ways. I define it as an experience of foreignness of social history, which limits individual 
agency and which produces an individual as the other to publicly imagined society through 
various techniques of constraint and discipline. From such a perspective, there is no general 
oppression of society, only oppression in particular cases when the relationship between an 
individual and history is of perceived foreignness and constraint. An “oppressed” individual 
may report living in fear, pain, denigration, and duplicity, and feeling persecuted and 
controlled. The constraining “outside” may be presented in terms of absurdity, irrationality, 
destruction, and limits. Many of the “oppressed” in socialism did not constitute the open 
opposition, which allowed Havel to conclude that they “lived in the lie” (see Vladislav 1986). 
Their resistance was not “resistance” in the active, conscious, agentive sense of this word. 
Instead, it was “the resistance of crayons under tempera paint, or blobs of wax on dyed 
cloth: areas of negativity, of not-this-ness” (Dunn, forthcoming). Negativity was directed 
towards the emergent Soviet tradition of marginalization and developing regimes of 
common sense (cf. Gramsci 1985).  
In the Soviet period the “oppressed” (unless they entered open opposition) were 
interstitial categories and experienced ongoing liminality (cf. Turner 1967, Douglas 1966, 
Carnegie 1996). They were uncategorized and, thus, anomalous and dangerous elements of 
society (cf. Douglas 1966). They were also “strangers,” an element whose membership 
within the group involved both being outside it and confronting it (see Simmel 1971). The 
marking of the subjects from early childhood—making them wear October children pins 
with the picture of little Lenin in the middle of a red star or tying red pioneer scarves—was 
an endeavor in making social classification visible. The others were, as a woman called 
Juozapota to be introduced in this chapter claimed, pollutant elements of social order and 
subject to power and discipline of the Soviet state. 
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In this chapter I present articulations of Soviet-period social history as oppression by 
analyzing excerpts of the life histories of two women of different generations, social 
standing, and experience. These women’s presentations of Soviet and post-Soviet life were in 
many ways similar to the articulation of the past and present discussed in the previous 
chapters. The significant difference was in the way in which women articulate meanings of 
social history and assign values to the known, observed, and/or experienced. 
5.1 JUOZAPOTA 
When I interviewed Juozapota, she was an 82 year old pensioner, the mother of four grown 
children. She had been a housewife for many years. After the death of her husband she 
worked briefly in a factory, but had to leave after being injured at work. She can hardly 
survive on a small pension of 228 LTL. The woman who directed me to Juozapota, told me 
to bring Juozapota something to eat. In that woman’s words, even if you see crystal vases in 
Juozapota’s room, which may create an impression that Juozapota is doing well, she is very 
poor. My contact gave me a signed paper which I took to the interview reading “Dear 
Juozapota, please accept this girl.” The woman who told me about Juozapota also promised 
to mention to Juozapota that I was coming when she met her at the market. Juozapota could 
not afford a phone. 
Juozapota lived on the first floor of an old Soviet-style apartment building in one of 
the poorest areas of Kaunas. She unlocked the door and opened it a little. I introduced 
myself and handed her the piece of paper. She already knew who I was and was expecting 
me. After letting me inside, she told me a story that once a woman came to her house and 
introduced herself as a State Social Insurance Fund Board employee. They talked for a while, 
then the “employee” asked for a passport, later for a cup of tea. She only took several sips 
and said that she did not feel well and had to use the bathroom. Juozapota remembered that 
she got suspicious when the woman was locked in the bathroom for quite a while. After 
coming out of the bathroom the woman left abruptly. She did not say anything more about 
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the increase of her pension (the reason why the woman came to see Juozapota). After some 
time Juozapota realized that her money, which she had hidden in the bathroom, had 
disappeared. From that time on, she never opens the door to a stranger.  
So, I was in. In a small apartment. The room was dark because of many plants on the 
windowsill and on the floor by the window. As I had been told, there were crystal vases in a 
Soviet-style sideboard very popular in the 1980s, like the crystal vases themselves. Crystal 
vases were a sign of luxury in Soviet times, so the woman who directed me to Juozapota had 
been careful to draw my attention to those vases, indirectly asking me not to confuse the 
luxury of those times with the luxury of the present. However, the fact that Juozapota lived 
in a small one room and kitchen apartment (and she had raised her four children here) 
indicated the limited goods Juozapota had had in the Soviet period as well. 
 In the room there was a small table with chairs and a bed. A Lithuanian state 
emblem, a picture of one of the most known historical figures, the Grand Duke Vytautas, 
and several religious paintings decorated the walls. Juozapota was articulate and considerate 
in her talk. She did not hesitate to ask me forcefully and willingly what I thought about some 
topics. After talking about the Soviet period she was concerned why I asked about Soviet 
times, saying “so where were you during the Soviet period?” I wriggled out of this by saying 
that I was born in 1974 and I do not remember things well. “Didn’t your parents tell you?” 
she wondered. After the end of our talk, Juozapota wanted to listen to the tape—she was 
eager to hear whether she was talking comprehensibly enough. So, we listened to it. 
Juozapota was born in 1922 in a rich family, of a county agriculturalist and a 
housewife. According to Juozapota, family friends were well-known public figures, all 
intellectuals. They lived in one of the major streets in the downtown of Kaunas, the 
provisional capital of Lithuania at that time. Her parents used to dress well. They had an 
elegant apartment with a fashionable living room in which one could find Persian carpets, 
tulle curtains, and mahogany furniture, the luxury signs of those times. Children were 
allowed to be in the living room only when guests were present.  
There were times when you always took a hat off, if you met an old lady. Students always 
greeted people they met. Not like now. If an apple fell down, no one would pick it up, until 
the owner gave it to you. When farmers went to town, they put a broom on the door. No 
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keys… thefts never ever existed. People were decent and refined [kultūringi]. Until 1940. When 
Lithuania was occupied. Not only Lithuania, of course, Poland, and Germany, but we speak 
about ourselves. The Russians came. Oh my God, what started. There came a Russian. His last 
name was Goviertovas. He was very tall, with iron teeth [geležiniais dantimis] and glasses. An 
officer. The officer, unlike ours, looked like a beggar. He crossed our rooms and entered our 
living room. He said: “я здесь буду жить” [in Russian, “I will live here”]. In that room. My 
parents got scared: my God, such a charlatan, an occupant… now he will live in our best 
room. My mother started to cry… “Я завтра,” he said, “приду. Принесу и коечку любимую, 
железную” [in Russian, “I will come tomorrow. I will bring my good metal bed”]. There was no 
bed in that room. Only the armchairs and a sofa. Thus, принесёт он свою коечку [in Russian “he 
will bring his bed”]. My parents got worried, what can they do. Such a one, with well-worn 
boots, will come, will destroy our wooden floor. My parents agreed to take the furniture out at 
night, to save it. They removed paintings, carpets, and curtains, everything. When he came and 
saw that nothing was there, he started shooting. And swore, as we later learned, in Russian. He 
shouted. He took my father by his head and dragged him face down down the stairs. The 
stairs were wooden with metal corners. Like knives. He threw my father in the garden. My 
mother was screaming, and he did the same to her. Can you imagine, he beat him up [her 
father], tramped him with his feet [sudaužyti, sutrypti], because he took his own things. We fell 
at his feet [pulti po kojų] and begged him not to beat him. Those rags on his feet stank so 
terribly. We fell, all three children, my brother, my sister, and me, the youngest. We fell at his 
feet, we kissed his rags so that our parents would not be shot. Can you envision it? What for? 
That parents took their furniture out? They almost got killed. My mother started to suffer 
from nerves after that, she could not work, and she always moaned… she had headaches. A 
wet towel was always on her head out of fear. Well. What could we do? He came to live with 
us. He brought his Ниночка [Ninochka41]. And we lived. She did not know how to prepare 
food, nothing… he brought this Ниночка at night. After that event he still came to live. Can 
you imagine? His Ниночка wrapped in a quilt coat [vatinka], worn-out boots… he brought her 
in hay from the railway station. He said: “я накрыл её соломой. Чтобы литовцы невидeли. Вот 
какая девушка” [in Russian “I covered her with hay. So the Lithuanians would not see. That 
kind of girl”]. My mom taught her. He used to give a lot of money to my mom… and my 
mom used to take her to shops to buy her clothes. Because, I said, she looked terribly. After 
everything that happened. They lived for six months with us. Then they left. 
                                                 
41 A Russian girl’s name in a diminutive form. The full name is Нина. 
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After the war Juozapota had to hide to avoid deportation. Her father died in the late 
1940s. Many of her close relatives were killed or deported at that time. Her parents were on 
the list of deportees. Juozapota remembered that after Stalin’s death, which was a turning 
point in many biographies, they did not need to hide. However, the threat followed her 
through all the Soviet period. 
I lived with fear for fifty years. In the beginning, after my parents were hurt, I had dreams, I 
could not sleep, I jumped out of my bed. I had such hatred. […] We celebrated the 16th of 
February [the independence day of Lithuania]. We did not have a flag then. We could have 
had it, but if you tried… under the Russians, if they would have found a flag during the search, 
you could probably get twenty-five years of prison. The entire world knows that. There is 
nothing more to say. We had three pieces: red, green, and yellow [the colors of the flag of 
Lithuania]. The pieces of cloth. On the 16th of February we used to put those pieces together 
on a plate and celebrate. We sang an hymn, “Mary, Mary,” we knelt in this same apartment 
and celebrated the 16th of February. There were decent people with us. Now they all are dead. 
I am alone.  
I am happy for independence, that I am free now. I live very hard. I have to admit that. But I 
am happy that I am free and that I don’t have to be afraid to say a word. I am not afraid that 
someone will attack me outside, that they will take me, that they will search… I am not afraid 
of that anymore. Now I am very very happy. I got old. I have health problems. If I was 
younger, maybe I would work somewhere, maybe I would earn something, but now I cannot 
do anything. That’s how it is. 
Juozapota’s experience of hardships was invoked in her considerations about the 
presidential candidates. She had a small pension because she had not worked long. However, 
she expected the pension to increase.  
It increases little by little… Now it is two hundred twenty eight litas. Recently, twenty more 
litas were added. I pay twenty eight per week for medicine. […] In winter I pay up to two 
hundred litas for heating. I live on water, grain, tea, and the cheapest bread… because you can 
buy nothing for this money.  
Now I am happy, I voted for Adamkus [the President of Lithuania in 1998–2003, the 
presidential candidate at the time of the interview, an American Lithuanian]. He is a Western 
man, he won’t make any obstacles and shortages for Lithuania. I was trembling, worried, I did 
not sleep, I had a fever, I was afraid that Prunskienė [another presidential candidate] will be 
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elected. She is for Russia, not for the West.42 Everyone knows that. I also heard today how 
Adamkus said: “the poor get small pensions, I will try to help them.” I live very poorly. And 
he said, “I will add [to the pension] so they will feel it.” So do you understand? And now 
what? What kind of pension is it? It is funny. He said: “I will give not symbolically, but that 
people will feel it. For the people to feel that they got a pension.” How much? He didn’t say. 
Now I am waiting for that moment. 
The Soviet period was remembered as the time of injustice, immorality, destruction, 
atrocity, and oppression. It was a devastation on the people, the decent and innocent 
Lithuanian people for Juozapota: 
In Soviet times it was like this. If you got into the Party, you lived well. I knew the Minister for 
Light Industry. He was a bastard. I knew him personally. In rags [apiplyšęs, apskuręs], nothing 
good was expected of him. He used to catch pigeons and steal buns from the shop. I tell you 
how it was. When the Soviet Union came, he became the Minister for Light Industry. Those 
who got into the Party, they didn’t work. Those who were not in the Party, their salary was 
sixty, seventy rubles. Why did people start stealing? Because they couldn’t make ends meet. 
Those who stole, they had everything. Good apartments, good furniture, but they were party 
members and thieves. They had things. Common people who were neither party members, 
nor thieves they were poor. Everyone lived in poverty. Those who worked in factories, they 
lived in poverty… they stole. Women went without underwear and put underwear on at work. 
Those who worked with socks, went to work bare foot. They put socks on at work. 
Sometimes two pairs. The ones who were able to steal, they stole. They got cars, apartments. 
[…] And people, how to say… some felt comfortable… they stole, accumulated some 
wealth… Education was free. And they were happy, it was OK for them. And spirit? 
Thousands of innocent people died. All the intellectuals were taken to Russia. They were shot, 
destroyed… and those who stayed here, more decent people, those who somehow escaped 
deportation they were placed in psychiatric hospitals. Driven insane. […] The Soviet Union 
destroyed people. That’s how it was. There wasn’t anything good. People cried… with bloody 
tears. Cried terribly. Those who were clever, I would say on the right side [non-communists]. 
For many those on the left, it was OK. And look. Those milkmaids, they got high salaries, 
went to Moscow [as delegates for a Congress of the Communist Party]. A village woman, 
illiterate… They didn’t understand Russian. Snoozed during the sessions. And came back with 
                                                 
42 Prunskienė advocated good relations with Russia and the EU during the presidential campaign of 
2004. Her involvement in a KGB scandal inspired many to associate her with the East and Russia (see 
chapter 7). 
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a document that she had been at the session. The Party praised her. Can you imagine what 
deception, what atrocity? It’s terrible, terrible, terrible. So that’s the Soviet period. Fifty years 
of it. And children. If they went to church… if someone found out that a child had been at 
the church, it was a disaster—the parents went to Siberia. Children had to be October 
children, then pioneers, the Komsomol youth… I was invited to join the Party. How could I 
refuse? It was impossible to refuse. I managed. […] At the meeting at the Polytechnic Institute 
they were all party members except me. They spoke about promoting me,… you know, to 
increase the appetite. And I said: “I respect Lenin, respect Stalin, and the Party, however, I 
don’t understand these things and I don’t want to mislead people. […] Let me learn, 
understand, then I will come on my own.”  
My youngest daughter was at school… In the tenth grade teachers started to press her. How 
was it that all the children were in the Komsomol, only my daughter was not. What could I 
do? And she [her daughter] said that my mom did not allow it, but she wanted to belong [to 
the Komsomol]. The teacher came to me and said: “dear lady, how can you? In my class all 
students are members, your daughter pollutes our class.” […] She started to give her lower 
grades. Started to terrorize her. I was in pain. My daughter cried constantly. She cried because 
of her grades: those who were worse students had better grades. What could I do? 
There was a parent-teacher conference in the school hall which lasted for several 
hours. Parents and teachers were discussing various issues. Students performed a play. 
Juozapota created a poem while being there. 
I thought I will save my child. I stood up and spoke: 
  Lenin came through Lithuania,  
  He stayed in Vilnius for long,  
  He left footprints for children to follow… 
  His step on the earth will never be lost. 
  His words were carved in the marble 
  Never to be forgotten by us. 
  Lenin’s image so common, warm, and kind 
  He was loved by everyone for his truth. 
  He walked with an open coat, in a simple cap. 
  With grand ideas in his head,  
  And some wrinkles on his forehead. 
  He walked and created  
  For the Party to be free. 
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  He revealed love and friendship 
  For the world in the truth to be. 
The hall cheered. The class teacher came to me. She kissed me, gave me her hand, and held 
mine. Then my daughter got the grades she deserved. […] My heart trembled, these words 
were foreign to me… Can you imagine what I had to do to save my child? I came home and 
cried. You see… everywhere was coercion. Nowhere anything good. I say, those who were 
bad they lived well and they miss those times. There are many who support the right… but 
there are those who wish those times to come back. 
Juozapota welcomed Sąjūdis with deep support for the nationalist cause.  
I hated the Soviet Union, I am of strong Lithuanian convictions and I strongly believe in God. 
I believe in Lithuania… those occupiers, I had to hide, I was violently hurt, suffered with my 
nerves, I once was in the hospital. I was under such a threat. When I started to hear that 
Sąjūdis, Landsbergis… how we waited. I was in bed covered with newspapers all the time. I 
slept and read again. Sąjūdis, Sąjūdis… What will it bring? When I heard the [national] anthem 
for the first time, I was in tears, I cried aloud.  
 Juozapota was involved in her own way in the liberation movement. She starved 
three days for Lithuania to be free, for Lithuanians in Lithuania, and for the disappearance 
of communists. When Brazauskas, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania, 
was elected President in 1992, Juozapota said that she “almost died.” She wondered what 
crazy people had elected Brazauskas, when everyone knew who he was. He returned the 
Cathedral, the Catholic church at the historic center of Vilnius, to Lithuanians. Juozapota 
asked how much power he had to have to do that. “How could people not understand who 
he was?” She also wondered how people could vote for Kazimiera Prunskienė, the first 
Prime Minister of Lithuania, a candidate in the presidential elections of 2004, qualified in the 
first round (Prunskienė lost in the second round to Valdas Adamkus). “Prunskienė was a 
KGB member,” argued Juozapota. Juozapota also wondered how people could support a 
Russian Victor Uspaskich, the Minister for Economics at the time of the interview. “Look 
what he does? ‘You Lithuanians, you don’t understand anything, I, a Russian, know more.’ 
He said this on the TV. […] Why do we have to support him? We have many people of 
ours. If our people did something wrong—punish them. If someone does not know—
educate him. Why these Russians, if we have suffered from them so much? Why do we need 
this Russian here?” 
  103
Juozapota thought that “bad things” were happening in Lithuania:  
Now these elections to the Seimas. I think, I cannot confirm it, but according to my 
knowledge, the politics I follow, in the Seimas they are all thieves. Not Adamkus. Look. It is 
so quiet and peaceful, only castles are being built, the most expensive ones. Palanga [the resort 
of Lithuania by the Baltic Sea] is not enough [they go abroad for vacations]. They don’t like 
cars, they want planes. Where does that money come from? […] They are thieves. In my 
opinion, they are thieves. 
Juozapota started to list names from the Prime Minister to the mayor of the city of 
Vilnius who, according to her, received bribes of several million. She gave her source—the 
newspaper Laisvas laikraštis (which specializes in discreditable articles, not the mainstream 
media) and asserted that she had the newspaper and could show it to me. In that newspaper 
the leader of the liberation movement, Vytautas Landsbergis, was also included in the list of 
the “guilty.” He was said to be a KGB agent. The fact that the Prime Minister had been 
bribed did not surprise Juozapota, I think, because she did not like former “communists.” 
The fact that she named Landsbergis a KGB agent surprised me. I have heard similar stories 
from others. However, Juozapota seemed to support the “right,” the representative of which 
was Landsbergis, unconditionally. While Landsbergis was the leader of the independence 
movement, which brought joy, happiness, and relief from fear to Juozapota, associating him 
with the KGB had to conflict Juozapota’s view of social history. It actually did. After her talk 
about Landsbergis, I asked Juozapota “how is it with independence then?” She started to 
think out loud: 
Look, nobody could go to other countries in Russian times, Landsbergis could. […] He 
probably was forced to be in Saugumas [State Security]. It was hard to escape that. People were 
placed in prisons, in psychiatric hospitals. He is a musician. Maybe he thought that way: well, I 
will do this superficially, not from my heart. And when independence started, he opened his 
heart. How could he be a devoted and believing communist, an agent of State Security, and 
then join the movement for independence, go to church, go to confession, get absolution, 
wear a cross. How could it be? I think this way. What do you think? 
I responded: “I don’t know.” Juozapota said that she did not know as well, but she 
thought that way. While she did not change her opinion about Landsbergis completely, her 
confidence in him was shattered. She claimed that earlier she thought that he was a real 
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Lithuanian, a Catholic. His belonging to State Security made Landsbergis somehow less 
“real.” Juozapota also had written a poem to Landsbergis in the years of the liberation 
movement. Unlike the poem about Lenin, this one was written from her heart. After citing 
the poem praising Landsbergis, which ended in words, “Oh, Vytautai, the heart of the 
homeland,” Juozapota raised many questions: how could such things be published; what do 
those pictures with Landsbergis and the State Security Director mean; how can one speak 
about this, if it never took place; maybe he was forced; maybe he could not behave 
otherwise; maybe he converted now… She ended on a relaxed note: “he is gone now. He is 
not in Lithuania. He has a high position [Landsbergis was elected to the European 
Parliament in June, 2003]”. With Landsbergis gone there was no need to label him and place 
him in one category or another.  
Juozapota understood the present in terms similar to those of many other informants 
in villages. When asked why the present was the way she described, she responded that, in 
her opinion, it was primarily the lack of state control.  
In Lithuania bad things happen. Lithuania is set apart, deceived, lost, there is no order… There are 
so many misunderstandings, corruption. Many go unpunished. […] In Lithuania it is very bad now. 
Look, masses of the unemployed. They want to eat. Get benefits. People are spoiled. […] Villages are 
swept by alcoholism, I would not say everybody… there are some good villages. […] There is little 
discipline. […] I think the state is responsible. There is no discipline. No control. There is no state 
control. Nobody anywhere is controlled, everyone grabs for himself. Such bribes. Terrible frauds. 
High bills. People get those small pensions, they cannot pay utility bills. They were evicted because of 
debts. Why is one guilty, if one cannot pay bills? There were so many who worked all their lives, and 
saved… they worked all their lives. Where is control? In the police? In the medical care? There isn’t 
anything. Fraud, theft, lying, and briberies. Corruption. […] The state has to get involved in such 
events. […] People are lost. Russians destroyed all nations wherever they were. […] The Russian 
occupation lasted for 50 years. Now bellies naked, backs also… […] They say it comes from abroad. 
Isn’t there control abroad? What is happening in the world? Where is justice, who can show it, where 
is truth? Such things had to be controlled by the state and by the church. A person has to be afraid of 
God and control one’s conscience, and one has to be afraid of the state. And then the justice will 
come. There will be a feeling that this is just, and this is not. I think so. Am I not right? 
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5.2 EGLĖ 
Eglė is a 42 year old high school teacher. To add to her teacher’s salary she works at a 
publishing house and teaches at a college. In her free time she writes books. Eglė was 
recommended to me by one of my friends. She was younger than many other informants, 
which I appreciated in an attempt to add different perspectives to my research. We met on 
Sunday at the high school where she worked. The school was empty and we spent over three 
hours there.  
Eglė was divorced and had remarried. She lived in a two room and kitchen 
apartment. After remarrying she thought about setting a PhD, but then she had to choose 
“between another child and a PhD” Eglė had a master’s degree in education. She was born 
in Siberia, but returned with her parents to Lithuania when she was small. Siberia was 
essential to her identity and, understanding this, she began by talking about the Siberian 
experiences of her family and relatives. 
My parents were deportees. They were deported young. My mother was eighteen, after high 
school. She was taken alone, because others were not home. I cannot imagine what moral 
pressure it was. […] My grandmother stayed with the youngest daughter. She was a well-off 
farmer. My grandfather passed away when she was 36 years old. She brought up her children 
alone, and paid debts for the land. When the children were big… deportations. My 
grandmother with the youngest daughter had to hide. No place, no money, no pension—they 
had nothing.  
My father went with five brothers. He was the oldest. My grandmother was a teacher. She also 
was deported. My grandfather stayed behind because he was at work when others were taken. 
Later he went to State Security and asked to deport him to his family. And he was told that no 
one was going to organize an echelon for him. And he stayed. Later he sent them bacon 
(lašinius) for six years. Smoked bacon. It was a big support. Later he went there [to Siberia].  
So that’s my roots. Maybe because of that I’ve categorical opinions. When we were growing 
up we knew what can be discussed at home, and what outside the home. I was a pioneer, a 
member of the Komsomol, a pioneer council head, and the Komsomol secretary, but this 
was… there is such a good Russian word—показуха [“façade”]. You know that you have to do 
that way and that’s how it is. My father said: “join the Komsomol Youth without thinking.” 
He was not allowed to enter the PhD program two or three times. He finished extramural 
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studies. He defended his dissertation written in his free time. There were many obstacles. 
Thus, I say, my roots are of a Lithuanian nationalist. And then we knew that there is the 
anthem of Lithuania, that there is the flag, and that you cannot talk about that openly. My 
mother’s brother’s children, my uncle’s who spent fifteen years in a labor camp children, were 
forbidden to think about the Komsomol. He did not have anything to lose… His children 
were strong nationalists at school. On the 16th of February they wore white shirts and ties. 
That day you were not allowed to be at school in white shirts. It was in the mid 1970s. They 
[uncle’s family] had prohibited books. We knew that Lithuania, as a state, is the ultimate value. 
It was not likely that independence would come. I thought how it could be… At school you 
are told one thing, at home the other. I thought maybe they [parents, relatives] don’t 
understand something… there was doubt.  
We knew well how it was and that it couldn’t have been any worse. When these rebirths 
started [the liberation movement], I was not involved a lot, because my daughter was born in 
1988 and she was small at that time. But I followed events, wrote diaries, cut articles from 
newspapers, spent days and nights by the TV. I am not a common case, my girlfriends tease 
me about my fierceness. But this is my nature, and maybe experience as well. 
I was in Siberia twice. With my father in 1985. Then I went with my uncle who was in a labor 
camp to bring back bones [remains of the deceased in Siberia]. None of us died. Everyone was 
of such an age that they were neither small, nor old. Of great strength. Everybody came back. 
I went as a journalist. […] We, deportees’ children have different attitudes. Until this day we 
attend all kind of meetings. Deportee reburials, reburials of remains. Consecrations of crosses. 
I think there are not too many of us. I don’t know why. Maybe some parents, how to say… 
saving their children did not tell them much. 
The Soviet period was described in terms of resistance, duplicity, absurdity, 
masquerade, shortages, complicity and self-discipline. The different generations, according to 
Eglė, were characterized by different “belonging” to social history. Her generation was a lost 
one.  
I remember we celebrated St. John’s day [the 24th of June]. It was some… how to say… some 
kind of resistance. It does not appear that you resist, but you do something. Sometimes on 
family holidays we sang the Lithuanian anthem at home silently… “oh, it is just a song.” 
Nobody said otherwise. The words are so beautiful, so why not. […] And now how to say. 
You see, the major problem is that we saw a masquerade. Most of us were pioneers, October 
children, stood in all the lines, carried posters with Lenin, on the 1st of May, participated in 
demonstrations. But we knew that there was a double life. You pretend to be a pioneer, a 
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Komsomol member, October child, and at home you know that you will behave differently. I 
don’t know, we didn’t understand the scale of how people were constrained.  
To get toilet paper people waited for an hour in queues. There were more circuses. Before 
Easter there were no eggs. If you didn’t buy eggs two weeks ahead, you were not going to get 
them. In the market some old ladies had eggs. Intentionally. They used to say—the stupid 
state—it does that on purpose to arouse resistance. What will happen, if a candle is lit on All 
Saints Day? Will the state collapse? […] It was such an absurdity, that you have nothing to say 
there. Thus, the ones who remember, I think, they are different politically. The others are the 
ones who had an easier life, who didn’t have to start from zero or didn’t return with one piece 
of luggage from Siberia, who got a state-assigned apartment, a state salary, using which one 
went to Palanga every year. Or even to some kind of the Caucasus, on vacation paid by the 
employer. They thought that it was very well. Because they don’t have so much now.  
Now it is not good for the older generation, but for those who finish schools and have good 
heads on their shoulders. They can go abroad, come back… With a specialty, knowledge they 
can work and earn four to five thousand which is very good in our situation. To live, to live 
well. The generation in their 40s is a lost one. Or the like. It is lost in the sense that they 
cannot adapt to the new life. They don’t have any initiative. Earlier the state gave them 
everything. If a husband divorced his wife, the Party Committee settled everything. Showed 
the place to be. Because in that society there were no divorces. If someone had an affair, a 
wife could inform the Party Committee—all was set. Because a Soviet person could not get 
divorced [i.e., divorce was disapproved of].  
I have a friend. She is also from deportees. She was deported with her parents when she was 
two years old. She is a Lithuanian, a real nationalist [nacionalistė], but she says, “it was better” 
[in Soviet times]. Why? She came back from Siberia. What could she study? Russian. The 
salaries in Soviet times were not big, but because there were very small payments for heating, 
all other utilities, people were doing better financially. They lived from a pension and even 
helped their children, although the pension was sixty rubles. She didn’t complain until there 
were enough students. She welcomed the rebirth. Then the number of students decreased. 
The state offered an opportunity to change her specialization. To study to be an elementary 
school teacher or any other language teacher. She was an excellent teacher. With a pedagogical 
talent. And she said: “I am not going to change my specialty.” She didn’t use the opportunity. 
She could have had more lessons, would have earned more and lived better. Now she blames 
the state for not having enough lessons. […] She had a chance. But she is of a Soviet 
upbringing in the sense that she has no initiative. I would say that this is the major difference 
between the young and my generation or older. The people of the present know that they are 
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responsible for themselves. The current youth also has such an American quality—self-
presentation. I am the best, I know the best. They present themselves as very prized. And then 
[in the Soviet period] modesty was a virtue. […] If from childhood you are told, you can do 
anything, then, you think, you can do everything. But if you are told to keep silent, not to be 
assertive, to wait for others to say something. And that you also had no responsibility for your 
life. In my generation and the older one. Someone had to think for you, where you will work. 
Someone had to think for you how you will live. This probably hurt people most.  
My parents were professors, but we had nothing. If you wanted a bicycle, you saved three 
years. If you wanted shoes, there was no money. You went to the theater with your class; if 
you didn’t want to wear the uniform, you got a resewn mom’s dress. That’s my poor 
childhood. Earlier there were no skudurynai [the second-hand stores], which save everyone at 
present. […] We did not live badly. My father could get all kinds of shortage goods later. He 
even brought some oranges sometimes. When he went to Moscow, he brought all kinds of 
sweets… it seemed that we were close to the lords [ponai]. But you cannot compare this with 
the real lords.  
I was a happy child. I didn’t develop any anger [toward Soviet history]. I saw how much my 
parents and all my uncles, aunts, cousins were hurt. […] I moved in all kinds of circles, I could 
go wherever I wanted. We did not have abundance, but maybe we lived well because of our 
attitude. I don’t feel hurt [at present] because I felt well [in Soviet times]. 
Eglė described the present as the time of hardships for some, but the age of 
opportunities for others. The ones who are nostalgic about the Soviet past, according to 
Eglė, do not take into account the moral discomfort others experienced and felt in the 
Soviet period.  
Pensioners live in hardship now. The structure that was in place is destroyed, and you cannot 
create something overnight. […] My father was a Minister. Knowing his organizational 
abilities, he could have made order. My God, he talked so much about everything… How 
many resources are in Lithuania, how much money one could make developing business in 
Lithuania. They had created a Lithuanian tractor, which was several times cheaper than 
imported. Maybe someone put obstacles. I later asked him, he was a year or a year and a half 
in the office, how many ideas could he put in practice. His own, because he had many. 
Knowing that he creates homes and workshops on an empty ground. Without wheeling and 
dealing, without stealing, simply because of his organizational abilities. He said that maybe five 
percent, that it was impossible. People were very limited and laws ineffective. He said that the 
Conservatives had to be imprisoned only because they destroyed people’s trust. Concerning 
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the saying that it was better in Soviet times… I think… after fifty years of destruction, you can 
hardly say when it will come back to normal. Maybe after fifty years.  
My life has improved a lot. I worked about ten years before the liberation movement. Now 
the possibilities are very different. You can do more. Earlier it was convenient for the 
mediocrities. They could not think on their own, what they got, they had. They got a six 
square meter room in Šventoji [for vacations in the resort by the Baltic Sea] and then they 
thought that this is an apex, that everything is in place. Now they cannot go to Šventoji. So 
they are very unhappy. And the young are not informed how bad it was. Not financially, we 
were not hungry. And we had something to wear, all alike. Then it was not discernible that you 
were rich, or you were poor. There were some differences, but not so visible like now. And 
probably the biggest difference was that we had more or less everything, and now we cannot 
have this and this and that. However, many don’t evaluate the moral discomfort [in Soviet 
times]. 
Eglė remembered how once she was taken to the KGB headquarters.  
I was excited, I was eighteen years old, life lay before me [jūra iki kelių]… what will happen? 
Maybe I will have to identify a dead body, maybe?… They took me there and kept me for the 
whole day. Until 5 p.m. Until the end of the workday. I laughed for three hours… ha-ha-ha-
ha. I did not see any problems. They interrogated me about everything, from Adam and 
Eve—everything. I could not understand why. I knew nothing, nor had I done something. 
Illegal. I knew it is better not to do anything, because you will get in trouble. […] Parents were 
afraid enough [and were cautious]. And then… I sit there … they ask this, and that… how do 
I like my work in the company, how much I earn, whether I am happy… I could not 
understand what they wanted from me. What was happening. It was 1978 or 1979. They 
behaved well. They offered me to use the bathroom, asked whether I wanted anything… I did 
not want anything. Then they asked how my parents met each other, what they say about the 
Soviet regime. I answered smartly: they are very happy, if they were not deported, they would 
have not met each other. […] I understood where they were heading. After about three or 
four hours they showed me a piece of paper… from afar. It was a stencil… and sprayed on a 
glass with aerosol paint… a proclamation. I read only a part: “Brothers and sisters 
Lithuanians, the red dragon has his head up again…” And something else. […] 
Later we decided at home that they followed us. While the two other children [her uncle’s who 
was in a labor camp children] studied and lived with us… They said they found the 
proclamation in our stairwell behind the mailboxes. I said then: don’t be naïve; if I made it, 
why would I keep it in my stairwell, behind my mailbox? [laughs] I knew I was known. It was 
the additional reminder… be aware of where you live. […] They told me to come back in 
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three days. My cousin said: “dress in red.” We laughed. Red scarf, red shoes, I had a red 
purse… I was told to think who had done that. In other words, they suggested that I be an 
informant. […] It ended this way. In those seven or eight hours I got on their nerves… I 
laughed, giggled, didn’t go to the bathroom, didn’t eat or drink. Then he said: “you disturb 
us.” I said that they disturbed me, because I was paid by the hour. I was furious. Then he said 
that they have methods to make everybody sing. Maybe nothing would have happened, but 
for some maybe it is enough, that kind of pressure and they get scared.  
The descriptions of the political history of post-Soviet Lithuania were not very 
different from other portrayals of events. For example, Eglė claimed that “In regard to the 
kolkhozes. I remember how they were supposedly destroyed. Kolkhozes had the right to 
distribute goods. According to shares, contributions, and something else. Nobody controlled 
that. There was a policy, but no normal implementation. To put it roughly. Directors and 
party secretaries grabbed for themselves, there was nothing left for people. […] With regard 
to the kolkhozes, I remember very well that in kolkhozes life was good.” Political history 
was reflected discussing political images of prominent political figures, Eglė took into 
account their party membership, their past belonging to the CP; she was also aware of the 
corrupt dealings of politicians and discussed their commitment to a national cause. She also 
noticed that other people may think differently. 
Brazauskas… when he was a Soviet Union Communist Party secretary… he had to be at least 
a KGB colonel. According to the position he had. All the people from that past, they had to 
be KGB agents, they had to work with them because of their positions. […] If I think about 
foreign policy, Landsbergis is the wisest. I am a Conservative party member. I joined the party 
in 1992. […] 
Yesterday I bought a newspaper. It is called Laisvas laikraštis.43 The headlines were in big 
letters: “The President of mafia.” There was a portrait of Adamkus [the new elected President 
of Lithuania at the time of the interview], behind him—Zuokas [the mayor of Vilnius]. Of 
course everything is made up out of whole cloth. Brazauskas was also blamed for giving away 
energy [enterprises]. Everything is made up. […] 
People don’t like those who are smarter than themselves. That’s their nature. The grey mass… 
it is incapable… incapable of understanding Landsbergis’s intellect. And he is disliked. […] 
Landsbergis is such… of gentlemen’s pedigree [ponų padermės]. With a small beard, an 
                                                 
43 Among all other informants there were only few who also mentioned this newspaper. 
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aristocrat… they were always evil, because they oppressed working people, right? […] 
Brazauskas, my God, a handsome man, he shows how he scythes grass, a real farmer. With a 
Soviet-style маячка [in Russian, a “sleeveless undershirt”], an undershirt. The father of a 
family, a farmer, a real Lithuanian. Strong, tough. There is so much of this. I don’t now maybe 
three quarters. Why Paksas [the President in 2003–2004, ousted in 2004] is so good? For the 
elder ladies he is a child. He is a son; he is the one… who could save us. All his cruises with a 
motorcycle show energy. Well, Adamkus… for the villagers he is too intelligent… for those 
common villagers. […]  
The village now is swept by alcoholism, the word “villager” has a negative connotation. […] 
Now they are called “sugar beets” [runkeliai]. There are bright people, but there are many 
alcoholics, this is a tragedy. […] Adamkus is an old man for them, he does not know how to 
plant potatoes, and in general he is an American. […] I respect Česlovas Juršėnas [a Seimas 
chairman, a presidential candidate in 2004, a former Communist Party member]. He stayed the 
way he was. He was honest. He did not change his skin. Well, Brazauskas started to cross 
himself in church, well… well, why does he do this? If you are not a believer, that’s who you 
are. I always admire Juršėnas, because he never changed his skin. Let him be a fox, a red one, 
whatever, but he is honest. And this is nice. […] Uspaskichas [the Russian-born leader of the 
Labor Party]. […] It is nice that he learned Lithuanian. Maybe he is a smart businessman. 
However, I don’t believe that there is nobody behind him. I am afraid to say something… I 
don’t have competence there, but just a suspicion. What did he lack? Prestige? Money?  
When my father took such a position [he was a Minister], he did it out of patriotism. He was 
honest… he neither stole, nor built houses out of this… […] My father, he is very angry about 
the administering of Lithuanian economy. […] He says: “I am happy I will not live to see the 
breakdown, because laws are established to obstruct the development of the Lithuanian 
economy.” And we can draw conclusions why this is so. Really, intellect is destroyed. All those 
deportations, basically, intellectuals were deported. Teachers, engineers and the like… 
everybody was put down. When the new generation emerged it was put down again. Starting 
from the time of the rebellions [in the 19th century]. 
“Americanization” and Russian times were invoked again in defining the present in 
Eglė’s concluding thoughts: 
You could resist oppression. Now I have no doubts that we will become Americanized 
completely. After a hundred years or so. Maybe some exotics will stay. […] I think all those 
ethnic collectives [in Soviet times] were supported to show that there was freedom. That 
everything was possible as well as those Song festivals. Songs about the Party and homeland 
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[the USSR] inspired psychological revolt, of course. There was a sack on your head. But you 
could not say that nothing was happening. […] I remember I was working on my master’s 
thesis on vocation camp reconstruction in Palanga. […] I started my work without thinking. 
Without thinking that one could write otherwise [she remarked that she was 25 years old at 
that time]. That every individual has a right to recreation [the Soviet-style rhetoric]. Then I 
explained what a vocation camp is and so on. I remember how my opponent teased me… 
Well, not teased. He looked at it and said: “it is a poor [i.e., pitiable] Soviet product.” 
Maybe our young will be gratified with all those… soon. All that chewing gum and those 
things. My younger kid just watches cartoons, all they do is brainwash them. All that 
generation… their heads are washed with all those digimons, šmikimons [a made up word to 
generalize similar cartoon characters]. Sometimes you can see a nice cartoon… such as 
“Greyneck” [“Pilkakaklė”] [a Russian cartoon] who did not fly with others… He cried, he [her 
son] was small and sensitive. It was so beautiful, but sad. […] These [Soviet times] cartoons 
are not interesting now; nobody kills anybody, no blood, no shooting. I think pushing [kišti] 
those [post-Soviet] cartoons is one of the worst things.  
Sometimes it is asked when it was better: now or under the Russians. People say: of course 
under the Russians—we had all our teeth, and the girls were nicer to us [laughs]. It is nostalgia 
like the nostalgia for childhood or youth. Those who did not experience these terrible 
deportations… everything was quite good to them. You were young, you had enough to eat, 
you had a job, a state apartment… what else? Once my aunt came [from the United States]… 
well… when Americans started to arrive…[…] She said you are so happy that you don’t know 
how poor you are. My mother’s sister felt deadly insulted. She said: “how could she? Well… I 
couldn’t say that we lack anything—we have an apartment, a gas stove, a refrigerator, a 
washer, a TV, what else do we need?” She was insulted. She had not seen better vacations than 
ones in Šventoji recreational houses.  
People couldn’t imagine that there could be something better. Everybody had about the same. 
Why did people take pictures by the shops when they went abroad? Now we have the same 
shops here. Nobody faints. But if you know of a shop where there are only some packages of 
pasta and a bottle of milk butter [like in Soviet times]… I remember how we used to go 
abroad… and take pictures by the bananas [she laughs]. That’s how it is. When you don’t 
know about the “better.” […] Why did we need that iron curtain? I don’t know. […] I think it 
was closed so we wouldn’t know… wouldn’t move… Well, we couldn’t move. We could 
travel inside the Soviet Union… now I cannot go to a European country by plane… my 
pockets are not deep enough. […] I went [to Italy] alone without children, alone… With 
children, our family cannot afford this. On the other hand, if you travel to Italy by bus, it may 
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be cheaper than to Palanga. But my ankles swelled from sitting there. I could not do it one 
more time. 
Then again, the prices are such that, if you have several jobs, you can really allow 
yourself… […] I know many who are nostalgic about the Soviet past. There were paid 
vacations. My uncle’s, the one’s who was in a labor camp, wife was made a hero [pirmūnė] in 
the kolkhoz. Because the kolkhoz needed a milkmaid hero. They brought milk from all the 
villages, poured it into her cans and the kolkhoz had a hero. […] Then she used to get paid 
vacations. To Samarkands [sic], the Caucasuses [sic], all of Central Asia, she went 
everywhere. Free travels. But how many were like her? […] I think, it was an injustice, justice 
had to emerge. I think maybe after a hundred, two hundred years [there will be justice], that I 
will not live to see… 
5.3 SELF AND HISTORY 
5.3.1 Defining stories 
The defining moment of Juozapota’s story was her experience of meeting the Russian officer 
and her experience of violence. Interactions with the Russian officer in idioms of humiliation 
and violence were meaningful (cf. Blok 2000). Before the violent encounters, by taking out 
their furniture, her parents aimed to negotiate the anticipated situation and relations and to 
resist possible redefinition of their personal space and rights to it. Upon finding an empty 
room, the officer performed terror, which redefined the power relations and established his 
authority. His violence was an act of classification (cf. Leach 1965, cited in Herzfeld 
1992:29), since it produced the boundary between friends and enemies (see also Herzfeld 
1992). It was a means of transforming the social environment and dramatizing the 
importance of key social relations (cf. Riches 1986). It was a route of social advancement and 
a tactical pre-emption, i.e., securing practical advantage over one’s opponents in the short 
term through forestalling their activities (Riches 1986:5). Juozapota fell at the officer’s feet to 
  114
recognize his authority and power. What followed was resignation and suppression of 
Juozapota’s values and meanings as well as her selfhood. A sign of resignation in Juozapota’s 
story was her mother, suffering with her nerves, with “a wet towel always on her head out of 
fear.” Resignation and suppression of one’s possible actions entailed opposition, the position 
and emotion underlying the rest of Juozapota’s narrative. In the story on violence Juozapota 
emerges as a victim and a sufferer.  
Violence classified Juozapota and her family as social others. The identity of 
otherness was later reproduced and reified in situations like her daughter’s experience at 
school. Giving lower grades was an act of marking disloyal subjects of the Soviet state, 
forming the boundaries between the insiders and the outsiders. Juozapota experienced this 
as injustice, humiliation, and threat. Her religious identity, belonging to the community of 
believers, despite little reflection on it in her narrative, must also have reinforced her social 
otherness.  
Juozapota’s description of the Russian officer and his lover serves to dehumanize 
them, set them apart from ordinary people and remove them from the moral community. 
The encounter with the officer starts with his exotic image (very tall, with iron teeth and 
glasses, stinking) and emphasis on his foreignness (looked like a beggar not “like ours”). The 
six months of living together with a Russian couple is covered in a few lines: Juozapota’s 
mother taught the Russian girl, took her to shops and bought clothing for the money the 
officer gave her. The girl was a passive figure from the very beginning when Juozapota 
claimed that she was brought to her home covered in hay, wrapped in a quilt coat with 
worn-out boots. Like the officer, the girl is exotic and foreign. The Russian couple 
constitutes an opposition to the habitual and the familiar; in the narrative—to the refined 
relations, established gender roles (like knowing how to cook and most probably being 
married), a clean and luxurious apartment.  
A similar “self”-defining story, which underlies Eglė’s talk, is implicit in her discourse 
on deportations. Ideas about deportations are fragmented and variable and told more 
through the integrated voices of others which become essential in Eglė’s articulations of the 
self and her understanding of social history. In her genealogical projections, Eglė 
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remembered the appropriation of her grandmother’s with difficulty paid-off land during 
collectivization, her grandmother’s and aunt’s hiding from deportation, deportations of her 
kin, fear of deportation among others, and her family’s poverty after their return from 
Siberia. The suffering of her family and relatives was also her suffering and part of her 
selfhood. Like most deportees, including her parents and relatives, Eglė was a social other, a 
dangerous outsider to the Soviet publicly-imagined community and the Soviet state (see 
chapter 4). 
The social otherness to which both women were subjected meant that they 
were/could be deprived of some privileges as well as excluded from resources, such as 
wealth, knowledge, and power (see chapter 4). Juozapota experienced a decrease in social 
status. Being from a well-off family of intellectuals, in the Soviet period she had to live in a 
small apartment. After the death of her husband, she started to work at a factory. Juozapota 
recollects the hardships and poverty of her life in the Soviet period, which contrasts with the 
luxury of her pre-Soviet past. Eglė recollects the poverty of her childhood as part of her 
experience of a deportee identity. Others “who did not have to start from zero or did not 
return with one piece of luggage from Siberia, who got state assigned apartments, a state 
salary […] had an easier life.” 
Eglė’s otherness was also reified by the Soviet state in encounters with the KGB, 
when she was reminded where she lived and that her family, according to Eglė, was being 
observed. Self-discipline and control as well as restricted agency must have been signs of her 
social location. Unlike in Juozapota’s story where the Russian officer (and later Russians) 
represented power which structured the possible field of her actions (cf. Foucault 1984, 
Wolf 1990), Eglė experienced invisible, depersonalized, and diffused power and authority 
emerging in the form of KGB agents, in requests to sing songs about the Party and 
homeland (the USSR), or silencing her voice when singing the national anthem. However, 
her active involvement in the communist youth organizations allowed suppressing otherness, 
even if she never totally escaped it.  
Experiences of otherness enforced imagining social history as foreign. Foreignness 
was inherent in meanings, such as deception, coercion, destruction, the absurd, threat and 
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persecution, and control (both women). Juozapota emphasized the immoral character of the 
time, atrocities, and oppression. Eglė spoke of masquerade, constraint, and circus. She also 
invoked moral discomfort. For Eglė, Soviet times appeared less threatening and oppressive. 
Such relationship derives from her different experience. Unlike Juozapota, Eglė did not 
experience violence; she was born 9 years after Stalin’s death, the period of relaxation of 
totalitarian undertakings of the Soviet state. The less oppressive relationship between Eglė 
and Soviet-period history also stems from her more accommodating stances towards 
developments like pioneer or Komsomol organizations. Eglė saw her involvement as 
incompatible with her “deportee” identity. However, for her this was the only legitimate way 
to self-expression, allowing for some public recognition and social involvement. 
5.3.2 Political self 
Foreignness of social history very often was generalized to events, such as celebrations of the 
communist youth organizations, requirements to sing particular songs, standing in lines for 
food, absence of eggs before Easter, or milkmaids going to Moscow to participate in the 
Congress of the Communist Party. Social history of Soviet times was translated as “political” 
by approaching an event or interactions as expressions of power. Juozapota’s and Eglė’s 
recollections were about experiences of power and authority as well as resistance to it. For 
example, the celebration of St. John’s day was understood as an act of resistance. The festival 
is an old tradition, a pagan and, later, a Catholic festival. However, for many it is not a 
religious event. St. John’s day is popularly known for the longest day of the year (the 24th of 
June). Hardly anyone celebrating St. John’s day at present thinks about resistance to any 
power. There is no power conceived which might threaten the “national body” of society by 
preventing it from following its rituals of self-assertion and self-worship, such as celebration 
of old festivals in the Soviet period. However, in Eglė’s and Juozapota’s narratives, invisible 
powers, often in the form of the Soviet state, were behind celebrations of St. John’s day as 
well as the lines for food, empty eggs shelves, and “false” heroes like milkmaids. Imagining 
these powers was also an undertaking in redefining social bodies of individuals as political 
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ones. Thus, standing in line was an experience of oppression to be resisted. In the very 
similar notes the stories on buying at the second-hand clothing stores, skudurynai, (see 
chapter 2) are experiences of regression, which are also resisted invoking the post-socialist 
state (see chapter 6). The second-hand stores can be experienced as sites of production of 
political bodies (by covering them in often colorful “rags”) for the present. 
Socialist consumer appetites were stimulated by insisting that under socialism the 
standard of living would constantly improve and that consumption is a “right” (Verdery 
1996:28). Capitalism repeatedly renders desire concrete and specific, and offers specific—if 
ever-changing—goods to satisfy it, while socialism aroused desire without focalizing it, and 
kept it alive by deprivation (Borneman 1990:17–18, cited in Verdery 1996:28). However, 
while some experienced socialist consumerism as humiliation and destruction of dignity (see 
Verdery 1996:55–56), others built their social status and dignity in heroic scavenging and 
using blat (see Ledeneva 1998, Berdahl 1999). Eglė and Juozapota were among the former. 
The difference in memories of the past among Eglė, Juozapota and others discussed 
in the first two chapters emerge from selection of specific events to illustrate arguments 
about “oppression” or “better times.” Most informants remembered the past in terms of 
shortages, social benefits, paid vacations, travel within the USSR, and small utility bills. 
However, Zina, Marija, Povilas, Vitkai, Jadvyga N. and Jadvyga M. (chapter 1 and 2), 
invoked these facts as illustrations of their better economic situation in the Soviet period and 
as examples of regression of the social and personal present. Conversely, Juozapota and Eglė 
invoked the same ideas to illustrate oppression in the past and their experiences of foreign 
social history. 
The same facts like the improvement of one’s everyday life acquire different 
meanings because of different structuring frameworks to which interpretations of the facts 
are subordinated. Saving for a bicycle for three years, having no money for shoes, wearing a 
mother’s altered dress when going to the theater with classmates, communicated childhood 
poverty. However, arguments about some later time indicated that compared to others, 
Eglė’s family lived well. They even had scarce goods like oranges. The poor childhood was 
about Soviet times and deportations. Life’s improvements resulted from her family’s successful 
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accommodation, not from any kind of socialist progress. For some people, whom I 
mentioned in chapter 1, improvement of everyday life was translated into a narrative of 
progress. They did not invoke poverty speaking about Soviet times. Genealogy of events, 
such as graduation from school, getting a job, an apartment, etc. or saving money and later 
buying a house or a car, illustrated progress in the “better times.” 
Eglė’s narrative represents seeming contradictions. She speaks about psychological 
revolt, moral discomfort, and self-discipline and had already arrived in the beginning of her 
narrative at the conclusion that it could not have been worse. Nevertheless, Eglė also claims 
not to feel hurt because she was well-adjusted in Soviet times. The presence of different 
registers like being resistant and being adjusted/not being hurt, derives from Eglė being well-
versed in versions of Soviet social history, experienced as complying, accommodating, and 
negotiating practices of the time. From one perspective, different registers stem from 
ideological multivocality embodied in Eglė’s experience (duplicitous, according to her) and 
her failure, as the author and as the social subject, to produce a coherent narrative of 
opposition. Actually, the assertion that she “felt well” emerges (which in the beginning 
seems to contradict the previous claims about the Soviet period) when the “political self” is 
suppressed and the history embodied in Eglė’s experience is preempted of political readings 
of the “social.” Furthermore, the “political” is also suppressed, when thinking of “political” 
as in Komsomol meetings, which become simply social engagements, a form of self-
expression rather than participation in political organization, representing the Soviet state 
ideology. Imagining Komsomol meetings as social undertakings, Eglė most probably wished 
to disassociate herself from the political meanings of that organization. Thus, paradoxically, 
to a reader of her story, Komsomol meetings become an apolitical site of involvement, while 
food lines or St. John’s day are spaces for political expression. 
Conversely, Juozapota does produce a coherent narrative of the political past and the 
self. Considering that some people felt comfortable and happy in Soviet times, Juozapota 
asks aloud could they not think of the thousands of people who died, all the intellectuals 
who were taken to Russia, the deportations, destruction, psychiatric hospitals, people crying 
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with bloody tears? However, probably most of the so-called “happy” ones44 disapproved of 
deportation and similar practices and did not refer to them in their arguments about “better 
times.” Their “immorality” was a “failure” to translate Soviet social history into political 
idioms, such as narratives of oppression, embedded in Juozapota’s life story. 
5.3.3 Duplicious self 
Eglė’s experience of different selves, such as a deportee and an active Komsomol member, 
were experienced as duplicity and doubt. Eglė claimed to be divided between the home and 
the public sphere. Like many she probably was perfect in the “bilingualism” of social 
experience in many cases. The fact that she had doubts about discourse in private family 
space illustrated her perception of incommensurability of the two idioms (presented at home 
and at school) as well as her longing for commensurable “worlds.”  
Eglė and others like her who subscribed to a more accommodating stance toward 
Soviet-period history experienced duplicity. Duplicity meant that several social texts 
contradictory to the informant interconnect in the informant’s knowledge. The privileging of 
the one, articulated at home, underlying her deportee identity was notable. However, Eglė 
reproduced the other social texts, heard at school and at Komsomol meetings. She 
supported official social history as her own involuntary masterplan (cf. Havel 1985). 
Insiderness to Soviet history was sometimes a new encounter for Eglė herself as in the case 
of writing her master’s degree thesis in Soviet-style rhetoric (“every individual has a right to 
recreation”). The following excerpt about Eglė’s deportee uncle shows how different social 
texts informed Eglė’s understanding. One assertion stems from perceptions and experiences 
of self as an outsider to Soviet-period history. It led Eglė to agree with her uncle about 
stealing from the kolkhoz. The other statement derives from insiderness to the Soviet-period 
everyday and approval of pioneer values instigating disagreement about stealing: 
                                                 
44 Only one person of all the informants approved of the deportations. While there were people who 
did not mention deportations, there were many who mentioned them in various registers of disapproval. 
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He [Eglė’s uncle] worked on a dairy farm. His wife was a dairymaid. They used to feed their 
own livestock with forage from the farm. They used to go to the kolkhoz gardens to pick 
apples for themselves. I was a pioneer and we were taught that stealing is wrong. I was very 
honest; I used to tell him that this is not right. I objected and told him that one cannot steal 
because it is against God’s testimony [I said it this way because I knew he was religious]. He 
said: “The Soviet state has stolen much more from me. I am just returning its debt to myself.” 
Formally, he was right.45
Juozapota did not experience duplicity; her narrative was full of negation and clear 
opposition. Juozapota never joined the Party herself, even if she was indirectly promised 
some recognition (and, thus, escape of some otherness). She did not let her children join the 
Komsomol organization. When her daughter was “terrorized” at school because she was not 
a member of the Komsomol, Juozapota created a poem about Lenin and “saved” her child. 
After reciting the poem, Juozapota cried because of the tension that emerged from her 
experience of duplicity. However, she was successful in refusing to follow the imposed rules 
of the Soviet-period school order (her daughter did not join the Komsomol). Nevertheless, 
by citing a poem about Lenin, she replicated that order. Unlike Eglė’s narrative, such 
replications never became part of her formulation of a self, which could have led to 
experiencing of a self as duplicitous. 
Duplicity is a quality of various social/political interactions and is not unique to 
socialist subjectivities. It is relational (as emerging in Eglė’s interactions with younger 
generations in the post-Soviet spaces) and situational (like Juozapota’s citing a poem about 
Lenin at school). At present Eglė does not have to hide her subjectivity of a deportee and to 
control social texts associated with it. However, there are not many spaces where she can 
assert herself as a deportee (see also chapter 5). According to her, a deportee identity makes 
her different. In post-Soviet spaces Eglė might have been suppressing her deportee identity 
(and, possibly, experience duplicity) on some occasions and could have searched for other 
communication patterns. Among such patterns was her new way of explaining to her 
                                                 
45 Eglė’s statement “He said: ‘The Soviet state has stolen much more from me. I am just returning 
myself its debt.’ Formally, he was right” does not make opposition to the Soviet state explicit. I interpret it as 
opposition to the Soviet state, relying on the broader context of her ideas in the conversation, especially on 
her tendency to imagine similar social events as “political.”  
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girlfriends why she likes Landsbergis, the leader of the liberation movement. While many of 
her friends dislike him, she persuades her friends that she is in love with him and likes him as 
a man. There is, she joked, nothing else she can do. Her friends nod their heads, some 
respond “a strange taste,” but accept her argument. Actually, Eglė is fond, in her words, of 
his intellect, of him, in my opinion, being an embodiment, a symbol of a social text she also 
inhabits. The social text is also constitutive of his charisma for Eglė despite her friends’ 
presentations of him as uncharismatic. Similar situations support an idea that charisma is a 
predominantly cultural artifact rather than simply “a special magnetic charm or appeal” or “a 
personal magic of leadership arousing special popular loyalty or enthusiasm for a public 
figure.”46
Post-Soviet outsiderness, as experienced by Eglė, is bound to Soviet-era experience, 
which makes her feel different from younger generations. Eglė considers herself dissimilar 
from her students because she is of “the Soviet upbringing,”47 a socialist subject foreign in 
some present contexts. She is, to her mind, a lost generation in the sense that she cannot 
adapt to the new life which requires qualities like entrepreneurship, assertiveness, initiative, 
mobility, confidence and responsibility. According to Eglė, in Soviet times modesty was a 
virtue. Initiative and responsibility were suppressed under ideological frames for action as 
well as there was dependence on “someone’s decisions.” Thus, the post-Soviet period 
provided spaces to “resolve” some duplicities while creating others. 
As in the Soviet period, in post-Soviet times some events and developments become 
“political” because of their arbitrary association with the Soviet past and one of the major 
actors of that past—Russia and Russians. For example, the fondness for Russian pop music 
is interpreted as the victim’s love for their torturers (see also chapter 5).48 Thus, many 
subjectivities linked to the past, unless they are about oppression, have to be negated to feel 
oneself a legitimate subject and an insider in post-Soviet history. 
                                                 
46 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. Tenth Editon. 2000. Springfield, Massachusetts, U.S.A.: 
Merrian-Webster, Incorporated.  
47 In Eglė’s narrative the words “the Soviet upbringing” were directed towards her friend, not herself.  
48 See L. Donskis “Aukos meilė budeliui, arba už ką lietuviai taip myli Rusiją?” (“Victim’s love for the 
torturer or why Lithuanians love Russia so much”). Klaipėda. 02/28/2005. Cited from DELFI, 
http://www.delfi.lt/archive/index.php?id=6138259. Accessed on 03/12/2005. 
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Eglė’s experience of outsiderness, embodied in some relations and practices, was an 
experience of change (see also chapter 1). In case of disliked cartoons, the change was 
articulated as “Americanization.” Foreignness attached to “Americanization” shows one’s 
distance from particular developments in the present and Eglė’s disapproval of new values. 
The feelings of estrangement brought by change were similar to the ones experienced by 
many other informants. The difference was in Eglė’s interpretation of a changing 
environment (“Americanization” rather than “regression”). Her interpretation shows her 
different location in changing social history, her different political subjectivity as well as her 
belonging to the community of the other social text. 
5.3.4 National self 
The liberation movement derived much of its legitimacy from memories of oppression (cf. 
Kubik 1994). Nationalist discourse, promoted during the liberation movement, connected 
Soviet-period social lives of the “oppressed” to the sagas about the nation. The disloyal 
subject of the socialist past officially became a hero for/of the post-socialist present. The 
former “home”-bounded identities were assigned significance, recognition, and respect. For 
many, the independence of Lithuania was an escape from marginality, duplicity, otherness, 
and life in interstitial spaces.
Memories, like Eglė’s or Juozapota’s, were given public and homogenizing form in 
official discourses. Multivocality of experiences was suppressed by including experiences of 
terror, suffering, loss and victimization and excluding contradictory discourses. Eglė claimed 
that Siberia was “like a paradise. Nature was beautiful, parents were young and in love. 
Winters cold, but not humid. People cured their lung diseases. There was food, forests were 
full of mushrooms. Black and red currents were the size of a cherry.” In Siberia Eglė’s 
mother had a relatively easy life. She was deported after graduation from high school, thus, 
she worked as an accountant. Her father was deported after World War II, the time known 
as “milder” in respect to deportations (Grunskis 1996). Eglė acknowledged that nobody died 
in her family. Her immediate family seems not to have shared the suffering described in 
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stories of deportations (see, e.g., Grinkevičiūtė 1997). However, Eglė connected herself to 
the saga of suffering as a deportee. This connection was important in including herself 
within the community of the “oppressed” and within the official history.  
The present for both women is bound to reassertion of a national self in public 
idioms of post-socialist nationalist ideology. Nationalist ideology informs their memories and 
readings of post/socialist developments. Eglė and Juozapota approach the Soviet period as 
occupation by a foreign power; the people as subjected to oppression and resisting it. The 
difficulties of post-socialist transition are bound to 50 years of life “under the Soviets.” The 
West, Lithuania, Lithuanians and Russians, Russia, the KGB, communists are construed as 
oppositions. In many spaces, like at home reading newspapers, writing diaries, collecting 
articles or going to Siberia, women engaged in self-nationalization (Jean-Klein 2001) by 
fashioning themselves into nationalized subjects, using distinctive narrative actions and 
embodied practices woven into everyday life. Nationalist ideology determined their voting. 
Both Eglė and Juozapota favored candidates who represented the “West,” resistance, and 
liberation.  
The “nation” is a compelling formulation of the self even in the dramatic and 
extraordinary sites like the graveyards of the dead in Siberia where Eglė went as a journalist. 
According to Verdery (1999), the dead are good political symbols because they cannot speak 
for themselves; they are ambiguous, multivocal and polysemic and, therefore, open to 
different readings (Verdery 1999). The dead come with curriculum vitae and lend themselves 
to analogy with one’s own biography (cf. Verdery 1999). Thus, the dead are part of the 
community to which people, like Eglė, felt themselves belonging because of their experience 
and knowledge. The political life of the dead, i.e., moving across new borders and signifying 
the new social, moral, political and economic order of post-Soviet Lithuania, rearrangement 
of history, space and identity (see Verdery 1999, Gal 1991), were integral to rituals of re-
identification and production of a political self in terms of new ideologies of the post-Soviet 
present.  
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5.3.5 Post-socialist present 
Eglė and Juozapota cannot enjoy many of the privileges of the post-Soviet present. Eglė 
claims not to be able to go abroad with her family; Juozapota does not always have food on 
her table. Eglė had to struggle in several jobs to make ends meet. Her mention of skudurynai 
(second-hand clothing stores) meant that probably she also had to readjust her lifestyle and 
experience some change in social standing in post-Soviet times (see chapter 2 on skudurynai).  
Money, like for other people (chapter 2), signaled Juozapota’s and Eglė’s similar 
experiences of invisible powers of neoliberal capitalism (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1998). 
Juozapota calculated how much she gets and spends (for medicine, utilities), what is her 
pension, and repeated several times that the presidential candidate promised to increase it. 
She wondered about the expensive houses of others and the bribing of state officials. Eglė 
remembered shortages of money in the past and the invisible differences between the poor 
and the rich. She reflected on changes in a similar note as many others: “We had pretty 
much everything, now we cannot have this and that.”  
The experiences and perceptions mentioned invite the women to criticize the present. 
The present Juozapota described in words, such as “bad things are happening,” there is no 
order, Lithuania is set apart, lost and deceived. Juozapota also mentioned poverty, 
criminality, unemployment, alcoholism, debt, corruption, and fraud. Eglė spoke about 
destroyed kolkhozes, hardships, alcoholism, irrational governance, and corruption. 
Juozapota also approached the present as regression. Whatever the criticism, discontent 
towards the present is not carried out in terms of the “better” past. Moreover, the foreign 
past explains developments (and regressions) of the present. Juozapota considers the present 
to be regression from pre-Soviet Lithuania. She spoke of young people not taking their hats 
off in front of an old lady, of people not decent and refined. Criminality was also a 
regression from the pre-Soviet past. Juozapota claimed that in the pre-Soviet period people 
did not need keys and there “never ever were thefts.” The year of 1940 was a symbolic 
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turning point, which, according to Juozapota, changed everything.49 Eglė remarked that the 
present situation was an outcome of “fifty years of destruction.” 
For Eglė and Juozapota the value of freedom came before any hardships of present 
life. The women could have been susceptible to the rhetoric of those who spoke the 
language of power, order, and control in political fields only if it did not invalidate their 
understanding of freedom and social history told largely in nationalist idioms. Therefore, in 
electoral campaigns associating some candidates with Russia, KGB or communists will 
invoke the frame (see Lakoff 2004) of the oppression in the past and will tend to divert the 
attention of individuals who employ social texts like those used by Juozapota and Eglė, to 
other candidates. 
 
Experience of violence and deportations defined women’s relationship with Soviet 
history as social others. Dialectically, social otherness enforced the imagining of social 
history as foreign. Foreignness was attached to many social events and developments (like 
standing in food lines) by considering them “political,” i.e. expressions of power and 
authority of (very often) the Soviet state. “Political” events were sites of resistance and, thus, 
expressions of the political self. On the other hand, some “political” engagements like 
Komsomol meetings became purely “social” allowing a subject (Eglė) to see it as a site for 
self-expression.  
The foreignness of the social history of the Soviet period and the experience of social 
otherness were articulated in the social text of oppression. In Soviet times this text was 
suppressed in official spaces like school, where other texts were common, and reiterated at 
home. Production of several, self-contradictory social texts was an experience of duplicity, a 
consciousness of a doubled and divided self. One self which was the embodiment of the 
social text of oppression was definitive of one’s identity, while the other self was approached 
as an accommodation to Soviet history and often denied.  
                                                 
49 Many villagers and some urban residents introduced in chapter 1, claimed not to need keys and not 
to experience theft in Soviet times. The symbolic turning point was the years of the liberation movement. 
  126
The social text of oppression that united both women and that was used to present 
their autobiographical accounts was integral to post-socialist history. It provided the 
“oppressed” of the past with leveling interpretations of their social otherness by resolving 






6.0  CHAPTER 4: SYMBOLIC IDENTITIES, SOCIAL OTHERNESS, AND TEXTS 
OF OPPOSITION50 
All the time a tiny thread of curse winds around you. I did not 
do anything to be born in Siberia. I was not guilty, I was not a 
hero. […] Then someone tries to convince you that you are 
either damned or a winner or somehow different. I am not 
different. There is no difference. The difference is imposed on 
me. […] My home in Siberia is a myth. I can not have it. I have 
always to fight through my memory to be there. Through all 
the ideologies. And to say to myself: it is not what the state 
claims, not what communities claim, not what my relatives 
disagree about. It is the way I experienced it [Vytautas].  
 
For the other remains to be discovered (Tzvetan Todorov The 
Conquest of America 1999:247). 
 
 
                                                 
 50 This chapter primarily derives from interviews with former Communist Party members and 
deportees. Among the Communist Party members there were: 13 politicians (most of them from Vilnius, 
former Parliament members as well as those in office), 7 people from Kaunas, and 10 people from villages. 
Among the deportees there were: 2 politicians (the Parliament members from Vilnius), 8 people from Kaunas 
and 6 people from villages. Discussion in this chapter is also informed by other interviews with people who 
talked about former Communist Party members (or communists) and deportees. In regard to knowledge 
about deportees, many, even if they were not deported, knew a deported relative or spoke about a deported 
family member, and could connect in one way or another to texts about deportations and deportees. The 
knowledge about the former Communist Party members by non-Communist Party members is also presented 
in this chapter. Unlike discourse on deportees, considerations about communists were more fragmented and 
less frequent. The other sources of data include deportees’ and Party members’ memoirs, some literary books, 
media coverage and observations of public events. 
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Social otherness (see, e.g., Todorov 1999) manifests categories of difference to which an 
individual becomes subjected because of his/her ethnicity, class, race, and national 
belonging, or, as argued in this chapter, biography. Spaces of difference emerge due to the 
unequal distribution of privileges and the exclusion of some individuals from resources, such 
as wealth, knowledge, and power. Experiences of spaces of difference are negative; they are 
encounters of intolerance, feelings of estrangement, or powerlessness. Repeated experiences 
of social otherness in a society or community inform the subjectivities of those who are 
othered. Social otherness is a symbolic construction of difference, and an ascribed identity 
which an individual may contest, as exemplified in the epigraph to this chapter. 
This chapter analyzes devising of biographic social others and spaces of difference in 
Soviet constitution of “class” and late Soviet and post-Soviet “nation”-building projects. I 
argue that the primary ground for social classification and exclusion in the Soviet and post-
Soviet state supported projects of social otherness was biographic differences, i.e., embodied 
dispositions which were congruent or conflicting with ideologically supported styles of 
conduct and modes of personhood. By excluding and not tolerating people with biographic 
differences the post/Soviet state through its agents was variously involved in biographic 
cleansing, i.e., discipline and punishment of biographic social others. 
This chapter looks at the production and experience of difference associated with the 
categories of “deportee” and “communist.” The essential biographic fact that allowed an 
individual to be classified as a “deportee” was that a person was deported by administrative 
order of the USSR from his/her place of residence in Lithuania, and under coercion 
resettled and employed in special settlements elsewhere, most often Siberia, as determined 
by the Soviet state (see Grunskis 1996), or else had been born into a family of deportees. In 
the case of a “communist,” the essential biographic facts were membership in the 
Communist Party and participation in production of communist ideology, leadership in CP 
organizations or belonging to the CP political elite. The Soviet state used the ideology of 
“class enemies” to define the “deportee” as a disloyal and socially dangerous subject. A 
“communist” as the “social other” was a disloyal and dangerous subject in a late Soviet and 
post-Soviet society. A “communist” emerged as opposed and threatening to the nation, the 
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independence of the state and the projects of liberal democracy. Labeling someone a 
“deportee” in the Soviet period or a “communist” in the post-Soviet period was an act of 
negative classification, of subalternization as well as of defining and (re)enforcing social 
boundaries. State supported discourses (actions) on social otherness and social others were 
recirculated in communities, personal interactions and articulations/inactions of the 
stigmatized person. 
In this chapter I further develop the idea that experiences of social otherness are translated 
into social texts of opposition, such as texts of “oppression” (see chapter 3) or texts of 
“better times” (see chapter 1). In social texts of opposition informants communicate 
negativity towards society, state or nation. This negativity is communicated in themes of 
foreignness to social history and society. It is expressed in overlapping feelings of 
estrangement, insecurity, discontent, uncertainty, anxiety, sadness, ambiguity and concern. 
The negativity is a backbone of a narrated genealogy of social history and the self as a 
stigmatized social subject (social other). It is a structuring feeling built into various stories 
people tell about themselves and to themselves. The semantic difference of social texts of 
opposition depends on people’s experience of different regimes of social otherness and 
available ideologies of interpretation, like post-Soviet nationalism in the case of deportees. 
6.1 ASCRIBING DIFFERENCE IN THE SOVIET STATE 
The Soviet-period projects of “class” constitution were undertakings in social classification. 
They marked differences and rationalized the hierarchies of power, knowledge, privilege and 
wealth. Like racism in colonial settings (see Stoler 2000), Soviet “classism,” i.e., the ideology 
and technology of exclusion along imagined “class” boundaries, justified engagements in 
“normalization” of society which had to be defended against itself, against the dangers that 
were born it its own body (see Foucault 1990:142, cited in Stoler 2000:79). This classification 
often led to physical segregation.  
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Undertakings in social classification were explicit in many government orders. For 
example, Order No. 0012231, signed on October 11, 1939, by the USSR Internal Affairs 
Commissioner L. Beria, introduced the doctrine for regulating populations of annexed 
countries. The Order specified which group of people, based on their social origin and 
situation, had to be eliminated: members of non-communist organizations, prison officers, 
policemen, landlords, industrialists, employees of governmental institutions, army officers, 
immigrants from Poland, repatriates of Germany, and their families.51 These were the 
internal enemies and social others to the new imagined Soviet state and society (cf. 
Anušauskas et al. 2005).  
Social distance from/foreignness to the Soviet society of individuals to be deported 
was explicit in many decisions regulating deportations. For example, the decision of the 
Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) (VKP(b) CK) and the 
USSR Council of People’s Commissars (LKT), Absolutely Secret Order No. 1299–526, dated 
May 16, 1941, was called “On socially foreign element eviction from Baltic republics, West 
Ukraine, West Belarus and Moldova.” The directive of May 19, 1941, was called “On 
dangerous anti-Soviet and criminal and socially dangerous element eviction” (Grunskis 1996:27, 
emphasis added). People arrested for deportation were informed that, by a decision of the 
USSR government, their families, because they were “socially dangerous,” will be deported to 
other regions of the USSR (Grunskis 1996:32, emphasis added). 
                                                 
51 According to the Center for Research of Genocide and Resistance of Citizens of Lithuania, in 
1940–1958 every third citizen became a victim of Soviet terror. There were 131,000 deported (44,000 families 
(Grunskis 1996)), 200,100 imprisoned, 20,000 (partisans) killed, 5,000 (civilians) killed, over 1,000 were 
sentenced to death. 490,000 people were repatriated because of terror and possible repressions. Together with 
Nazi occupation and victims of the war (245,000), Lithuania lost more than 1,091,000 citizens. See: 
http://www.genocid.lt. See also Anušauskas, Arvydas Sovietinis Genocidas ir jo Padariniai. 
http://www.genocid.lt/GRTD/Tremtis/arvydas1.htm. Page renewed on 01/06/2002. Accessed on 
10/03/2004. 
Several Lithuanian scholars conclude that destruction of the political, academic, cultural, military, and 
economic elite in Lithuania was “genocide of the nation” (see, e.g., Tyla 2002). Grunskis (1996) claims that 
deportations were also part of a strategy to change the ethnic constitution of Lithuania. Grunskis (1996) also 
notes that, in addition to ideological and political reasons for deportations, there were economic reasons, as 
well. The USSR economy needed a labor force, especially in the remote, uninhabited or scarcely inhabited 
regions like Siberia, the Far East and North. The deportees from the USSR and the occupied territories had 
to become a cheap, labor force without rights and were expected to populate and reclaim distant regions of 
the USSR (see also Introduction part “Historical contexts”). In this chapter I argue that deportations were 
intrinsic to “class” projects without employing the category of “nation.”  
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Foreignness to the imagined Soviet socialist society was indicated in many categories 
designed to rationalize purification of society—such as “enemies of people” (liaudies priešai), 
“betrayers of the homeland [i.e., USSR]” (Tėvynės išdavikai), “bourgeois nationalists” 
(buržuaziniai nacionalistai), “kulaks” (buožės), “terrorists” (teroristai), “saboteurs” (diversantai), 
“socially dangerous elements because of their past” (socialiai pavojingi elementai dėl savo praeities), 
and “anti-Soviet element” (antisovietinis elementas). Non-political deportees were simply called 
“deportees” (tremtiniai) (Šerėnas 1997, Kuprytė 1999), a category later generalized to many 
others who were deported. 
The major deportations were carried out in 1941, 1948, 1949, and 1951. The last 
deportations took place in 1952–1953. Dependent on the year, the social strata being 
deported were different. For example, by 1947, many district, subdistrict or municipality 
officers (“people’s enemies”) as well as many partisans (“bandits”) had already been 
deported. In that year, the list of potential deportees was extended to include farmers 
(“kulaks”) who were accused of supporting partisans. Actually, the deportations were related 
to the founding of the kolkhozes (Grunskis 1996, Anušauskas et al. 2005).  
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the state of independent Lithuania 
disregarded the ideological sensitivities of the Soviet state. In order to identify survivors of 
deportations and purges, most of the categories mentioned were subsumed under 
“deportees” and/or “political prisoners.” New categories simplified political and social 
communication about the past in new ideological paradigms and left the variation of Soviet 
times to scholarly books and research centers. Thus, some who may have been defined as 
“kulaks” in the 1940s and 1950s emerge as “deportees” in this chapter following people 
identifications as well as post-Soviet official discourses. 
After Stalin’s death in 1953, many deportees were allowed to return to Lithuania. 
Permission to return did not mean that ideology directed towards “deportees” had changed. 
What changed were the technologies of control and discipline. In places of deportation like 
Siberia discipline increased the forces of bodies in economic terms of utility and diminished 
these same forces in political terms of obedience (cf. Foucault 1995). Upon the return of 
deportees to Lithuania, their economic potential was often disregarded, while obedience was 
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strictly enforced, exploiting more nuanced discipline and control technologies than the ones 
used in labor camps and places of deportation. Deportees were controlled and disciplined by 
redirecting them to the periphery—by preventing them from residing in major cities. They 
were also prohibited from participation in ideologically informed fields where they could 
influence knowledge production (such as culture, education, etc.). Most deportees were 
denied legal status of residence and full citizenship (see Senn 2002). As a result, they faced 
problems with housing, employment, and education. There were limited possibilities of 
regaining their former social status, of getting a job according to the qualifications they had 
before deportation (see Kuprytė 1999). Furthermore, the Soviet state, although not 
recognizing hereditary wealth, applied hereditary criteria of guilt (see Misiunas and Taagepera 
1983). Some children of deportees were not allowed to study at universities, to start a career, 
and to go abroad. The data suggest that children of deportees were less controlled and did 
not experience the same exclusions as their parents did. 
It was hard to transgress the ascribed subjectivity of the “other,” as encompassed in 
the category of “deportee.” One could negotiate “otherness” by cooperating with the 
“regime.” However, even in the case of high officials of the Soviet state, the fact that an 
individual had a deportee relative was a “mark” on the person’s biography and subjected him 
(usually “him”) to repeated re-examination of his actions and to reminders of a possibly 
divided belonging. An individual constantly had to prove his loyalty and commitment to the 
Soviet state in order to maintain his position (see memoirs in, e.g., Kazakevičius and 
Mališauskas 2003). 
Control and discipline were effective in excluding deportees from knowledge and 
power, and in depriving them of visibility, mobility, recognition, and privilege. In the late 
Soviet period docile bodies of deportees were often ignored as not dangerous. They were 
living signs of the effectiveness of state power and successful imposition of constraints, 
prohibitions and obligations. Resistant bodies were continuously controlled, disciplined, and 
punished. Soviet state classism was intrinsic to the reproduction of spaces of difference and 
deportees as social others. It reinforced/ascribed difference to individuals who did not 
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necessarily share the subjectivity of the “other” and opposition towards the society and the 
Soviet state at the beginning of the Soviet period. 
6.2 DEPORTEE STORIES OF RETURN AND THEIR EXPERIENCE OF 
DIFFERENCE 
The stories of return from sites of deportation articulate experiences of displacement, 
estrangement, and difference. Vilkaitis [the son of the pre-war Rector of the Agricultural 
Academy of Lithuania, a writer and a forestry official], in his speech on June 8, 1989 at the 
Agricultural Academy of Lithuania, noted that the official authorities did not meet deportees 
with flowers. According to Vilkaitis, many Stalinists were happy when a former citizen, 
unable to register and find a job, had to return to Siberia (Vilkaitis 1999). Kreivėnas writes 
that after his return home, neighbors were reluctant to talk to him “because they were afraid 
of the KGB” (Kreivėnas 1981). Kazimieras Skebėra (1990), in his collection of memoirs of 
deportation, recalls that Juozas Večkys, returned home like “a foreigner, like a thief” at night. 
Similarly, Vieda Skultans (1998), in The Testimony of Lives in post-Soviet Latvia, provides the 
story of Solveiga, a young musician who fled from Kalpashevo without a passport or 
documents. In Riga “Everyone was scared of Solveiga. It was difficult to find anyone to [give 
her a place to] stay. […] Solveiga could not stay more than a couple of nights in any place” 
(Skultans 1998:64).  
Deportees encountered their subalternity and even “criminality” in moving across the 
changed social landscape, now informed by different values and meanings. In a Soviet 
socialist state known for its relative absence of homelessness and by the benefits of full 
employment and free education, deportees after their return often were denied residential 
registration, jobs and education because of their past. Absence of registration at a permanent 
address was a criminal act which could lead to a couple of years in prison camps 
(Hojdestrand 2000). Thus, some deportees lived in hiding, illegally. Being unregistered, they 
could not get a job. In Skultans’s (1998) book on Latvia, Jānis tells that he was promised 
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work. However, because he was not registered, he could not work. So he waited for the 
work and the registration.52 In Jānis’ words, “It turned to be very peculiar. One could be 
registered if one had work and one was taken on to work if one was registered. It was 
neither one thing nor the other.” 
And so I said there is a vacancy and I would like the job. Would he be willing to accept me. 
And I said, I said that, that that—I have a past, that I’ve been in the legion and so on. But then 
he said quite sensibly that they needed educated people in the country too. […] And he 
accepted me at that time. […] I worked there for four years. And then there were all sorts of 
troubles. The so-called attestation took place. And then anyone who had any sort of past was 
sifted out. And then my brother and I, we were both sacked [cited in Skultans 1998:77, 
emphasis added]. 
Deportees were often not allowed to study at the university, such a privilege being 
reserved for loyal citizens of the Soviet state (see Skebėra 1990). Eglė (see chapter 3) 
remembered that her father, because he was a deportee, was not allowed to start a PhD 
program. Similarly, her mother was not accepted to the Institute of Medicine until she met 
“a rector who defended deportees. He accepted her to his Institute,” but only to the night 
school (į vakarinį).  
Informants recollect intolerance in the community to which they had belonged or 
hoped to belong to after their return. According to a doctor, in his early 60s, “most of 
deportees suffered after their return to Lithuania. They came back home and were 
discriminated against even more than in Siberia. They were told to disappear even by 
neighbors who were beneficiaries of their requisitioned property.” Eglė remembers that her 
grandfather was forced to rent a small room in the estate that he had earlier owned and was 
constantly insulted by the new inhabitants: 
I don’t understand how my grandfather could bear seeing how lazy and poor people lived in 
his house. He felt so dishonored. These people who were allowed to live in his house after he 
was deported used to tell him after his return: ‘you see, you worked and worked, we did 
nothing, and we have the same.’ My grandfather used to go to his former garden to cut trees 
                                                 
52 People who were not born in a city could not easily get registered in that city also, even if they were 
not deportees.  
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[because the new inhabitants did not take care of them]. Those people insulted him: ‘it’s not 
yours, go away.’ 
Experience of intolerance extended to spaces outside one’s community. Kreivėnas 
(1981), a deportee, in his memoir writes that he was willing to depart to the United States 
where his family lived. To get birth and wedding certificates he went to the regional office 
where such certificates could be issued. He listed the reason why the documents were 
needed—to travel to the United States. The woman employee took the old book in search of 
the entry about his marriage. There it was stated that he, Jonas Kreivėnas, a police chief of a 
precinct, married O. Jankauskaite. She dropped the book and started yelling: “You are 
Smetona’s bloodthirsty hound [Smetonos šuo ir kraugerys] [Smetona was the President of 
Independent Lithuania]! Leave my office! I will show you America in Siberia!” (Kreivėnas 
1981:255). Later Kreivėnas learned that the brothers of the woman from the office were 
истребители (stribai) (“destroyers,” NKVD53 groups of armed supporters called “defenders 
of the people” (liaudies gynėjai) against the resistance movement in the 1940s) and died in a 
fight against partisans; her family was killed as well. Thus, socially, because of their 
experiences Kreivėnas and the woman were antithetical subjects of history. They produced 
themselves as such in excerpts of different texts, one of deportations (Kreivėnas, see also 
below), the other in official versions of Soviet-period history (see Introduction part 
“Historical contexts”), which were acted out in the regional office. 
The stories of return questioned and reified Soviet authorities’ imaginings of “social 
others.” When asked why his family was deported, Aloyzas from the smallest village 
responded: “we were enemies. We opposed the Soviet authorities, we were against the 
kolkhozes, and we disregarded the orders of these authorities…” Aloyzas did not join the 
Soviet army. According to him, this was a minor crime—10 years of labor camp in Siberia. 
“Those who fought against the Soviets got twenty-five years.” His wife joined the 
conversation by juxtaposing two grammars of sociality—Polish and Soviet—and articulating 
the arbitrariness of the ascribed identities that villagers lived with: “under the Poles [Polish 
rule] nobody punished you for living well. People were rich. If you were poor, you were 
                                                 
53 The National Commissariat for Internal Affairs. 
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considered stupid by the Polish. They appreciated everyone who lived well. The Soviets 
placed those who were rich in prisons, deported them to Siberia. If you lived well—you were 
an enemy. Everyone had to be poor. Then you were an insider. A Soviet.”  
One’s identity as a “deportee” was easier to hide in the city than in village 
communities where everyone knew each other. Kreivėnas writes that upon his return to 
Lithuania, he was willing to stay in the cities of Kaunas and Vilnius, because “in larger cities 
you can more easily hide your past of Siberia and deportation” (Kreivėnas 1981:217). Elena 
returned to her native village and faced confrontations with neighbors. According to the 
villagers, Elena was a former informant for partisans in the forest. Elena herself never 
admitted her role in the resistance movement during the 1940s. She said that when she was 
sixteen, she used to go to visit her relatives—partisans who hid in the forest. She denied that 
she had anything to do with the killing of a neighbor, a supporter of Soviet authorities. The 
neighbor had been killed by the partisans for collaborating with the Soviet authorities. Elena, 
according to her neighbors, had informed the partisans about his presence. As a result, at 
sixteen she was imprisoned, tortured, sent to labor camps in Siberia and released after ten 
years, only to find out that in 1948, the year she was sent to Siberia, she had been 
pronounced innocent because of lack of evidence. After her return to her native village she 
was called a thug by some neighbors:  
When we came back there were people who called us thugs. Even now some call us bandits 
[Soviet authorities also called partisans “bandits”]. There are clever people, but there are also 
some bastards. […] Those who do the talking, they were thugs themselves [supported the 
Soviet state forces]. […] So even now we have to suffer. But they don’t know what they do… 
You cannot do anything about this. People think this way. I was in prison, in a labor camp, I 
didn’t steal anything, and I starved. I didn’t do anything wrong to anyone. I try to forgive 
people. 
Many of those who returned after some time accommodated themselves by getting a 
job in a city, joining kolkhozes or working at the state farms in villages. Elena’s story 
illustrates a compromised accommodation to Soviet social history. She lived according to 
some conventions of Soviet society; however, she did not believe in anything like 
“communism:” 
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Then I was young. I worked in the kolkhoz. I was not afraid to work hard. It was good in the 
kolkhoz. I could earn a lot. They gave us land. As people say, I had bread and everything else. 
But there wasn’t such freedom like now. If you had said a word, something wrong, you could 
have been forced to leave [the kolkhoz]. Now you are free… if you don’t like something, you 
can say so. Now you are more free…and… I could go to church [in Soviet times], nobody 
said anything, nobody… then I went, and I go now. But children. They had to join the 
Komsomol, if they wanted to go to college. In their hearts they didn’t believe in anything like 
communism. I don’t see anything wrong that they joined. It was a necessity. Nobody was 
deported for that anywhere. 
As Elena’s example shows, different accommodations did not mean dissolution of 
earlier deportation-bound subjectivities. Conversely, alternative subjectivities were 
incorporated into various hierarchies of selves. 
Accommodation yielded recognition, confidence and some access, especially in the 
late Soviet times, to privileges (such as permission to buy a car or a subsidized vacation 
[kelialapis] to a resort or a health spa). However, Communist Party membership, which 
would have provided venues for career, mobility, and wealth, most often was inaccessible to 
former deportees. Some deportees were able to become “insiders” by collaborating with the 
KGB (see, e.g., Grinkevičiūtė 1997:186) or by going through purification rituals, such as 
serving in the Soviet army. Vytautas, cited in the epigraph, who was born in Siberia and 
returned to Lithuania when he was 6 year old remembered that after having served in the 
Soviet Army, he was no longer questioned about having been born in Siberia. The military 
passport that he acquired meant that he was, in his words, “absolutely loyal to the Soviet 
state;” his “existent and non-existent sins were forgiven.” 
6.3 OTHER SPACES OF DIFFERENCE 
In addition to deportees, there were other individuals, such as religious believers, who 
experienced social otherness in the Soviet-period society. Albertas, an active Catholic, 
remembers that he was invited to join the CP several times. One time he agreed but, after 
discussing it with his family, he changed his mind. He reasoned that, if he joined the Party, 
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then he could not even be buried by a priest. His director was angry. The director said to 
Albertas that, if he survives the pressure at work, then he can stay. That year, Albertas got 21 
warnings: “They threatened to fire me. If there was any problem, I was always to blame. 
They did not fire me because I was a good specialist.” The pressure created fear and 
conformity. It was subjection to difference which Albertas acknowledged himself by not 
joining the Party. Albertas recollects that in the army he voluntarily joined the Komsomol 
because he could not stand the denigrating experience of difference: “I was out of 
patience—everyone went to meetings; I had to go to sweep the street. When I came back, I 
destroyed the membership card.” Not allowed to seek higher education because of his 
Catholicism, Albertas would teach docility and discipline to his children. His children were 
not to be/appear “different.” He used to tell them “join the Komsomol, join it. It’s 
important that there be no obstacles to your future.”  
Difference stemming from religious identity was perceived in interactions with 
communist ideologues who were well-versed in various techniques of discipline. Julija, a 
retired teacher, in her 70s, from the largest village, remembered that after her graduation in 
the 1950s she worked in Lapės, a small town near Kaunas. There was another teacher, in 
Julija’s words, a “fanatical communist.” This teacher used to fight for atheism. Dressed in a 
red coat she followed children to church. During the sermon she used to stand in the middle 
of the church and take notes. Julija laughed: “After several visits like that, those zealous 
biddies [davatkos] rose up. They shoved her around in the women’s part of the church. And 
hit her with their rosaries.” Later, the communist teacher falsified lists of students. She was 
afraid that the school would be closed, if authorities found out that there were not enough 
students. Julija recalls: “I was afraid to tell anyone. She was a communist, I was not. […] 
When authorities from the Board of Education [Švietimo skyrius] found out [about the false 
lists], she accused me of falsifying documents. She got a strict documented reprimand, and I 
got a reprimand, too.”  
Depending on contexts, situations and people spaces varied in regard to difference 
religious people experienced. When Julija moved to the largest village, in her opinion, she did 
not experience any confrontations because of religion. Her students went to church. 
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According to Julija, the director of the school was a good woman. None of the teachers 
informed the authorities about church attendance of students or teachers. Stanislova, a CP 
member and the director of the school where Julija worked, remembered that even at the 
courses, where teachers were taught atheism, teachers were told “not to hurt the feelings of 
the believers.” Stanislova claimed that nobody instructed her to go to church and observe 
the students. She remembered that teachers were instructed to include atheist education in 
their classes and to organize atheistic events and celebrations in order to attract believers to 
their side. The director argued: “nobody clearly demanded that anyone worship [Soviet, 
communist] leaders. Some people wanted to please the authorities; therefore, they competed 
over who had more portraits of the communist leaders on the walls.” When Stanislova 
became director of the school, she did not get any special secret instructions, which she 
expected, such as “how to watch emotions and reactions of co-workers, what to do, what to 
observe… Actually nobody talked to me about that…. Nobody asked for a report on those 
issues.”  
Presence of conflict in Julija’s experience at the beginning of her career with the 
“fanatical communist” reified boundaries between believers and communists. Absence of 
conflict in the second example from the largest village did not mean that the boundaries 
between the believers and communists or others were non-existent and that believers were 
tolerated. Ignorance and non-interference signaled accommodation of, usually, the believers, 
such as an effective production of one’s self as a docile body redirecting it from the church 
of a village to other sites of worship. Julija did not go to church in any of the places she 
worked. She went to Kaunas or elsewhere where nobody knew her. “You had to hide,” 
remembered Julija.  
The believers had to suppress their religious identity in official spaces, experience 
duplicity and anxiety. Albina, a librarian, remembered how a young man used to come to the 
library and observe her. She was in her 50s then. She thought that he was a KGB officer. 
Once he unexpectedly asked: “Are you a Catholic?” Taken by surprise, she responded: 
“Yes.” Albina remembered that fear overwhelmed her. She thought that it was a terrible 
thing to be a Catholic and to work in the Children’s Library. She reasoned that probably 
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after that she was put on the “list” as a “Catholic.” The encounter with a probably real KGB 
officer shows awareness of difference she experienced because of her Catholicism. 
Consequent self-exclusion and self-discipline, such as never talking to unfamiliar people, 
such as that KGB officer, reified her difference. Her suspicion of others produced a negative 
emotional relation to the “social.” This relation implied insecurity, anxiety, uncertainty, and 
concern. Organizing atheistic exhibitions was an exercise in forgetting her religious self 
and/or experience of duplicity. Albina recollects: “I was a Catholic, but I never told that to 
anyone. Nobody can destroy faith very simply. If you have it, you have it.”  
Unlike deportees, whose passports showed their birth place and, their “citizenship of 
otherness,” believers like Albina could conceal their religious subjectivities by employing 
techniques of self-control and self-discipline. However, deportees in some cases were also 
successful in concealing their deportee identities. Some of the families never told their 
descendants about the deportations, trying to protect them from social and political 
stigmatization as well as self-identification as “other.” It was something to be forgotten and 
to be negated in order to survive Soviet-period history, a conscious self-exclusion from 
dangerous belonging and knowledge.  
Spaces of difference involved not only deportees and believers, but also other 
(potential) others. Intellectuals were forced to resign their imaginations, if they conflicted 
with the imaginations supported by the Soviet state and communist ideology, or had to 
accommodate by developing strategies like writing in the Aesopian language. Social personae 
like homeless people, homosexuals, criminals, and people with physical or mental disabilities 
were also subjected to social otherness. Lina’s husband, a talented actor, stayed at a 
psychiatric hospital (psichiatrinė) to avoid serving in the Soviet Army. He studied all the 
symptoms of schizophrenia, acted them out and was accepted in the hospital. Lina argued: 
He suffered in the hospital more than others suffered in the Army. […] It’s not so much that 
he himself suffered… […] he saw what was going on there. In the Soviet psychiatric hospital 
[durnynas]. He doesn’t want to talk about that even today, he never talks about that. He just 
says that what he saw there was horrible. […] He left the psychiatric hospital with a diagnosis 
that he was crazy [jis gavo durniaus bilietą] [emphasis in original].  
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Lina’s husband’s decision to play a psychiatric case was a miscalculation in the sense 
that it did not prevent him from the experience of “Soviet state racism.”54 Like the Nazi 
state, the Soviet state depended on the medical police that “assure[d] the silent hygiene of an 
ordered society” (Foucault 1990:66, cited in Stoler 2000:72). Like deportees and believers, 
the sick, the mad, and the deviant were designated as “class enemies” and targeted for 
elimination or re-education. However, a certified insane person, an achievement worth the 
Oscar for the best actor in the Soviet movie of reality, did not miss recognition by the Soviet 
producers. Lina’s husband after “healing” was invited to play at the Communist Party as its 
honored member.  
Experiences of social otherness are bound to displacement, estrangement, exclusion, 
intolerance, and foreignness. They are signs of embodied humiliation, threat, conformity, 
closure, discontent, uncertainty, and insecurity. Experiences of difference generate negative 
emotional relations to social history, community, state, and even self. This is reflected in 
texts of opposition produced in relation to dominant versions of history. The “better times” 
discourse (chapter 1) is subjugated knowledge of the “social others” of post-Soviet social 
history; the discourse on “oppression” (chapter 3) is oppositional history to the Soviet 
dominant knowledge regimes.55 These texts coexist with other texts of opposition; they are 
never complete and always changing. The texts are always situated in relation to other texts, 
they inhabit multiple voices and emerge in particularized forms. Narrating opposition, 
“social others” resist their marginalization, negotiate and negate their subjection to social 
otherness. 
                                                 
54 See A. Stoler’s discussion of Foucault in Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality 
and the Colonial Order of Things. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 2000:71–72.
55 See Stoler’s discussion of Foucault and use of concepts like “subjugated knowledge” and 
“oppositional history” in postcolonial contexts in Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality 
and the Colonial Order of Things. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 2000:62–63. 
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6.4 CLASSISM AND BIOGRAPHIC CLEANSING 
In the Soviet period social stratification conceptualized in “class” terms was not entirely a 
product of inequalities (though it entailed them), such as the economic, according to Marx’s 
notion of “class,” or status, according to Weber’s “class” concept. The primary ground for 
social classification and exclusion was biographic differences, i.e., embodied dispositions 
which were congruent or conflicting with dominant styles of conduct and modes of 
personhood. The categories mentioned above which labeled “enemies,” such as “betrayers 
of the homeland,” “bourgeois nationalists,” “saboteurs,” “socially dangerous elements 
because of their past” refer first of all to a biographic fact like sabotaging, betraying, 
believing in different ideals, having a past, incompatible with the vision of new history, etc. 
Even a category like “kulaks,” which implied a different economic status and different 
relations to means of production in Marx’s terms, in many cases was applied to small holding 
or even poor peasants (see Grunskis 1996). A “deportee” may have signified all the 
biographic facts mentioned. Very often a “deportee” like other “enemies” was imagined as 
opposed to the Soviet state. Thus, by excluding and not tolerating various “enemies,” the 
Soviet state was primarily involved in biographic cleansing rather than the genocide of a 
nation56 or class racism (see Foucault (1990), cited in Stoler 2000:71). In many cases 
biographic cleansing intersected with “class” or “nation” lines, but was not primarily defined 
by them. 
 The Soviet state through its various agents like school teachers or CP Committee 
secretaries engaged in controlling and producing biographies. These undertakings reached 
into the details of everyone’s lives. At schools teachers had the power to educate students 
how to live their lives by evaluating their behavior every month57 and writing 
characterizations (charakteristikos), i.e., biographies of the students from a perspective of 
ideologically versed inscribers. These characterizations were an opening or a closure for a 
                                                 
56 See, e.g., Tyla, A. 2002 Lietuvos Išlikimo Kelias. 
http://www.genocid.lt/GRTD/Tremtis/antanas.htm. Page renewed on 01/16/2002. Accessed on 
10/03/2004. 
57 Some informants report that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, behavior was evaluated every term. 
In the mid and late 1980s it was evaluated every month. I have no data for the 1960s and earlier periods. 
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student’s career. Unlike educational practices like monitoring behavior by rewards like candy 
from a “treasure chest,”58 in Soviet Lithuania disliked behavior at most schools was 
controlled by punishment. Rather than getting or not getting candy, it was being or not being 
punished. Punishments varied from physical discipline (officially disapproved of, but, 
nevertheless, practiced) like twisting a student’s ear to moral training like lecturing about 
one’s wrong deeds in front of the class.  
Biographical disciplining and punishments continued into individuals’ adult lives. 
Some like Albertas, mentioned above, were classified as “others” and punished with 
warnings and threats of firing. Becoming an “other” was a threatening opportunity explicit in 
Albina’s concern about being placed on a “list” as a “Catholic” or in former communists’ 
claims that they joined the Party because, otherwise, they would be “marked” forever (see 
the discussion below). Hiding a deportee or a Catholic identity was conscious biographical 
self-disciplining which made part of one’s biography invisible. Invisibility was often 
rewarded with authorities’ disinterest in a subject’s social life.  
People who inherited specific biographic facts like birth in Siberia were subjected to 
special observations and discipline. Grinkevičiūtė (1997), a former deportee, in her memoirs 
written in the Soviet period remembered various “punishments” for her “delinquent” 
behavior. As a doctor in a small town she was not assigned a car to go to see patients while 
veterinarians and animal husbandry specialists (zootechnikai) used kolkhoz motorcycles “to 
see animals.” Awards for good work for which she was recommended were declined by the 
party committee. Disrespectful articles in a local newspaper were directed at discrediting and 
insulting her. Finally, she was instructed to resign from her work. Grinkevičiūtė writes that 
officials from the Party Committee disliked the fact that she took a day off because of the 
reburial of her mother. Grinkevičiūtė’s mother was buried in a cellar in her aunt’s house. She 
died in 1950 in Lithuania after escaping from the place of deportation and hiding for several 
months.59  
                                                 
58 I observed this in the United States. 
59 Grinkevičiūtė was afraid to bury her mother in a cemetery in 1950 because this would have drawn 
authority attention and exposed her and others who hid and helped her to danger. Shortly after the death of 
her mother, Grinkevičiūtė was discovered, retried, sent to prison, and then back into exile. 
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Reburial was a public and offensive act. It was living one’s life not according to Party 
scenarios. Grinkevičiūtė writes: “The Party indicated clearly that, if I want to live and work 
in Lithuania, I have to forget everything, don’t risk talking about the past, and that I have to 
forget my own parents, as if I had never had them.” In response to reburial the Party 
reproduced its own interpretations published in the local newspaper. It was also involved in 
a campaign of firing Grinkevičiūtė, even if there were no administrative violations for which 
they could have fired her officially. That was a struggle over the interpretation of social 
history. It was an act of reclassification of social subjects into those acceptable and those 
delinquent. It was also the authorities’ attempt to rewrite Grinkevičiūtė’s biography in terms 
of Party ideology; an endeavor to make the visible invisible, the known unknown and 
marginal by translating the act of reburial as strange, criminal, and dangerous. It was the 
drama of an individual whose conduct brought risk to the body social. An individual had to 
be disciplined and punished by the official history acknowledging biographers to restore the 
imagined moral order of things.  
Why did party members, communists and others resort to classism and become 
technicians of discipline in the instances mentioned? One answer could be that their actions 
were informed by an ideology of difference which relied on a biographical conception of 
“class.” The “class” of social others were embodiments of difference, habituses of 
alternative dispositions which threatened the boundaries of the imagined Soviet society. It is 
likely that many former communists and some others did not believe in communist ideals. 
Observation of dangerous moods and devious biographies among people was not a 
conscious intention to control communist ideology, but to preserve one’s well-being secured 
by that ideology. Technicians of discipline did believe in the rules according to which Soviet 
society and the state developed. To restore the rules in case of threat they resorted to the 
language of class warfare and invoked communist ideology to establish grounds for 
legitimacy and authority of their actions. Violence or discipline towards the deviant others 
was a way to reestablish the world spinning around Soviet moral values, property and work 
relations, notions of justice and rights. Similarly, in colonial contexts like the 19th century 
Indies (see Stoler 2000), it was through technologies of control that some claimed their 
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hegemony, their privileged position, their certified knowledge and jurisdiction over the 
manner of living, over the civilities, conduct and competencies that prescribe “how to live” 
(cf. Stoler 2000:83). 
In the Soviet period biography-bound punishments and disciplines were not irrational 
totalitarian exercises of power. They were meaningful and subtle crafting of a state and 
society. Furthermore, reproductions of ideological idioms and grammars of difference was 
not empty sloganeering. Alexei Yurchak (2003) asserts that a unanimous raising of hands in 
an affirmative gesture at a Soviet Komsomol meeting was to its participants usually an act of 
recognition of how one must behave in a given ritualistic context in order to reproduce one’s 
status as social actor rather than as an act conveying a “literal” meaning. In this sense, 
Yurchak interprets, the raised hand was a positive response to the question, “are you the 
kind of social actor who understands and acts according to the rules of the current ritual, 
with its connection to the larger system of power relations and previous contexts of this 
type?” (Yurchak 2003:485–486). Thus, to analyze this act only for its truth conditions—as 
“real” support or “dissimulation” of support is to miss the point (Yurchak 2003:486). Party 
meetings, unanimous voting, demonstrations and public acts of denunciation like denigrating 
articles in local newspapers were not simply for show. They were performances in the 
strictest sense; i.e. ways in which social beings were constituted and visions of social history 
reproduced.  
Social others also provided explanations of various “wrongs” in society. As Lampland 
(forthcoming) shows in case of sabotage in village communities in the 1950s in Hungary, 
social explanations in terms of class warfare bore a close resemblance to what 
anthropologists would call “magical thinking.” Magical thinking, as Evans-Pritchard made 
clear in his study of the Azande (1937), provides a theory of causation for existential 
questions: why does something happen at this time to this person in this way? In many 
places, the only reasonable explanation for otherwise unexplainable events is social: someone 
must be responsible (Lampland, forthcoming). In this view, Lampland argues, people can 
cause things to happen, even though the degree of conscious manipulation or active 
intention is an open question. One need not be committed to causing harm to inflict harm. 
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“Magical thinking is founded on the proposition that justice is a social product. If events are 
out of kilter, skewed by the untoward influence of suspicious motives, society must restore 
their proper balance to maintain its own legitimacy and the smooth functioning of a moral 
world” (Lampland, forthcoming). Deportees, like witches, were meaningful “others.” They 
could have been brought onto the stage of social interaction when the balance of power was 
threatened. Accusations of witchcraft made causes of anomalous situations visible. 
Punishments were restorations of imagined order, of righting wrongs, and restoring justice 
to the truly righteous. They targeted sensibilities of people and taught them proper ways of 
thinking and behaving (cf. Lampland, forthcoming).  
Soviet classism was an act of colonizing which enforced hierarchical relations 
between a colony and a metropole. A colony in Soviet colonialism was not a territorial unit 
of an interwar state of Lithuania, or the imagined nation as implied in the studies on 
postcolonialism in the former USSR (Carey and Raciborski 2004, cf. Moore, forthcoming), 
but rather a community of marginals or social others. Ideological management of conduct 
and biographic disciplining was fundamental to the Soviet type colonial order of things. By 
identifying marginal members of the body politic, “colonists” mapped the boundaries of the 
Soviet state and society. Like racism in Western colonies (see, e.g., Stoler 2000), classism 
prescribed suitable behavior and located how identity has to be tied to notions of being. 
Prescriptions of behavior served to secure and delineate the authentic, first-class citizens of 
the Soviet empire. 
6.5 THE FIRST-CLASS CITIZENS OF THE SOVIET STATE 
Different privileges, resources and knowledge were restricted to the authentic and first-class 
citizens of the Soviet state; in some cases, exclusively to members of the Communist Party. 
The former CP members, especially the ones who had higher official standing, are presented 
by non-communists as a stratum of the “privileged.” A 40 year old artist argued that “the 
elite, communists, lived in luxury, they had saunas, yachts, cars, mansions in resorts, caviar, 
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could go to special shops, and so on. It wasn’t so visible. There were fences with dogs 
around their houses.” According to a professor, in her late 30s, “if you were a party 
secretary, you were like a god. If you chose to be a party member, you selected a life which is 
safer and more acceptable. It meant you were not going to have any problems.” 
The privileges of party members ranged from easier access to free apartments, a good 
job, perhaps a car or a promotion at work, to the liberties and rights that the Soviet state 
never bestowed on its “common citizens.” Juozas, a former state farm director, remembered 
that when he applied for a job in a village, the administrator asked him if he was a party 
member. His party membership had secured him the position of a chief agriculturalist.  
Mobility outside the USSR was also a privilege of the first-class citizens. Mykolas, 
vice-president of a large factory in Soviet times, a former sailor in the USSR army, 
remembered:  
I never had any problems. Never. I was in the capitalist countries. Trips were not a problem. I 
did not work with state secrets, therefore, I knew that I would be able to go abroad anytime. I 
had a sailor’s passport and I could go. 
Juozas’s wife also recalled her trips and argued that in post-Soviet times she does not 
live much differently from the Soviet period. At the time of interview, she had a very high 
standing as chief accountant in a large private company. However, she claimed that “it was 
better in Soviet times,” because she had enjoyed “the same with little effort:” 
We lived well. Egypt, Turkey, the Dominican Republic, Sri Lanka. So what. Now I can travel 
as well, but I am so tired that I do not see anything, if I go. Not like in Soviet times. In Soviet 
times I was not concerned about anything. I used to get everything I needed. You know 
people and you get what you want. It did not cost much. Food… now you have a variety. 
Fruits all year around. So what? We had our own apples almost the whole year. What else do 
you need? 
There were special shops and special hospitals for higher officials in the CP and for 
KGB members. Different clothing marked the bodies of the “privileged,” identifying the 
“communists” or, most probably in exceptional cases,60 the “KGB.” Rita, an engineer, in her 
early 60s, remembered that at her work place there was a Russian from Leningrad. 
                                                 
60 KGB agents could not disclose their identities. 
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According to Rita, she was a “real KGB.” The head of the division indirectly informed Rita 
not to talk about some issues when the woman was present. This woman had a mirror on a 
windowsill and could see everyone who came in and who talked on the phone. Rita recalled 
that: 
she could not even keep her mouth shut about dresses or a coat she bought in special stores. 
Dresses we could never buy [because the access to the special shops was restricted]. In an 
Internal Affairs Ministry shop. She wanted to boast about that. From the way how our head of 
the division behaved with her it was clear that she had a high standing. She could even do 
nothing, she could just chat with others, and she got a good salary. We knew who she was. 
[…] When Sąjūdis started, I came one day from a meeting and said that Sąjūdis has a list of all 
KGB members of our Institute. The next day she was absent. She was hospitalized in an 
Internal Affairs Ministry hospital. For a check up. She had believed what I said. There weren’t 
any such lists. 
Rita also remembered that the “privileged’ were able to shop in the special food 
stores: “They ate chicken and chocolate. At some point in time for common people there 
were only tails and hooves left.” In a popular rhymed saying of Soviet times: there was “no 
bread, no meat, just red flags” (nei duonytės, nei mėsytės, tik raudonos vėliavytės; nouns are in 
diminutive). However, the first-class citizens apparently did not have to survive the same 
economies of shortages (cf. Kornai 1992) others were subjected to. 
None of the former CP members with whom I talked or whose memoirs I read 
admitted that they belonged to the class of the privileged. When asked what he thinks about 
“castles” people invoke in association with the former communists, Mykolas responded that 
“Nobody had castles. A vice-president of the Executive Committee had an apartment […] a 
four or five room apartment. And now? They build houses. […] I don’t know about the 
bureaucrats of the republic, but city [bureaucrats]… nobody had houses [in Soviet times].” 
Mykolas’s wife added: “Trips were something we strived for. And we did not acquire any 
property. Like others who build houses… Nothing like that. Well, we have a house in a 
dacha61 … a poor one.” In the eyes of some neighbors, their dacha house was neither 
“poor,” nor “lavish.” Mykolas’s wife probably measured their property by the imagined 
                                                 
61 She used a Lithuanian term “sodo namelis.”  
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horizons of wealth which could be accumulated at present. On the other hand, her emphasis 
on “having little” was a leveling rhetoric very popular in the present memories on the Soviet-
period “equalities” (see chapter 2). People employ such rhetoric to refer to society in the 
Soviet past, when “everyone had about the same.” However, for many the stratum of the 
first-class citizens, not recognized by Mykolas and his wife, is an often omitted exception. 
6.6 BELONGING TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
Joining the Communist Party was often perceived as a pragmatic choice by non-communists 
as well as many communists. Rolandas, an art expert and former physicist, in his mid 40s, 
joined the Party because he wanted never to have any problems. According to him, “if you 
refused after you were invited to join the Party you were marked forever.” Rolandas argued 
that the communist gatherings and committees had been a theater, a lie. He had even been 
considered for a secretary position in the labor union party, but the position was not offered 
to him. He thinks that they found out that one of his uncles was a deportee. A 32 year old 
doctor remembered that his grandfather joined the Party at the age of 60 for only one 
reason—he wanted to establish a health research center. One had to have resources and 
power in order to accomplish that. The doctor himself joined the Komsomol because at 
high school the military teacher had told him and his male classmates that, if they did not 
join, they “would have to serve the army in the Polar bear country [in the North of Russia].” 
Similarly, Linas asserted that “in Soviet times you could not accomplish anything unless you 
were a Communist Party member.” His father, a “Moscow News” correspondent in New 
York, would have never achieved his position, if he had not been in the Communist Party. 
Even if his father was a communist, he, a child at the time, had to stay in Lithuania with his 
aunt as a guarantee, in Linas’s mind, “that their family would not emigrate.” Later Linas 
visited his family in the United States and went on a trip to Chicago, Washington and other 
cities. He recalled that they were followed by CIA officers and were subject to other regimes 
of discipline. They had to travel only according to approved maps. For everything else a 
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special permit was needed. Another informant, an engineer, in his early 50s, who had joined 
the communists “because of money” and his desire to make a career, remembered some 
other pragmatic choices: 
One of our directors was forced to retire, but no one wanted a different director. So we 
decided to make him a communist. He filled out an application. Then there were some old 
communists who used to give questions. The major question was ‘why do you want to join the 
Party?’ Our director said straightforwardly that because it is required to stay at work. He had 
either to join or retire. ‘I want to be a director, the salary is 60 rubles higher.’ […] They wrote 
in the protocol the answer which had to be given according to party ideology [not the 
director’s actual response]. 
Some people joined the Communist Party because they believed in communism. 
When I asked Jadvyga N., a former kolkhoz party secretary of the largest village, whether she 
believed in communism, she responded that she had been young and her employers had 
insisted that she join the Party. She joined at 18. However, later she believed in communism 
“because it was an order for the working class.” She hated those who “had turned their coats 
upside down” in the post-Soviet period and had accommodated to the new order while she 
respected those who had not done so. Jadvyga N. acknowledged that she was a “real 
communist.” She expressed her commitment to the communist ideals by citing Lenin and 
comparing Lenin’s ideas to the Bible. Her citing of the Bible was an attempt to speak in the 
post-Soviet vocabulary, to make communication possible in the environment no longer 
informed by communist ideas: 
Everything had to be for the common people. According to Lenin’s orders, according to the 
Bible—everything was for the people. Lenin taught that, even if you are hungry, you have to 
give something to a neighbor. That was his politics. Like in the Bible. God’s testimony says 
that you cannot steal, same as in the Communist Party orders.  
Juozas, the former state farm director cited above, also presented himself as a “real 
communist.” He used to work for low salaries, inspired by communist ideals. However, 
joining the Party had been more of a pragmatic calculation than an idealistic undertaking. He 
needed an apartment that was available only to party members at the Institute where he 
worked. His wife joined the Communist Party because she believed in communism. Nobody 
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invited or pressed her in any way. She did not think about her career, but liked the social 
engagements that party membership provided.  
Unlike Jadvyga N., Juozas or Juozas’s wife, some younger informants presented their 
belief in communism as a delusion. Ginta, a 38 year old high school teacher of Lithuanian 
language and literature, remembered that in Soviet times Soviet Lithuania was the only 
known version of “reality” until told otherwise by her friend, a religious person. Ginta 
argued: 
I had a naïve belief [in Soviet ideology]. I was an idealist. I really was an idealist. I was a 
Komsomol secretary at school. Later, when I worked in a publishing office, I was at the 
Komsomol Committee of the Lenin district. It was common sense [to be there] […] My father 
was a party member, a high official. […] I’ve never heard in my family that we were occupied. 
I did not hear such a word [“occupation”]. Later my classmate. She was from a religious 
family. We always argued. She tried to prove that I was wrong and that Lithuania was 
occupied. […] The fact of the independence of Lithuania, of statehood, was a surprise to me 
[emphasis added]. 
Many informants claimed that the “real communists” constituted a very small 
minority in Soviet society. A retired doctor, a vice-president of the Medical Academy, later a 
member of the Supreme Council (Aukščiausia Taryba) of independent Lithuania, corrected his 
wife during the interview when she named them “communists:” “we were party members. 
There were very few communists and many party members.” However, his wife, a doctor 
herself, did not hesitate to identify herself with the communists who, according to her, also 
were ”Lithuanians and patriots.”  
Former CP members constituted a “hierarchical community” of the “privileged,” 
ranging from the nomenclature and State Security officials sharing all kinds of privileges to 
workers in a factory who had to “stand in line” (be on a list), for 10 years or more, to get a 
car and an apartment and who could be promoted with an increase in their salaries. Zigmas, 
a Kaunas resident, in his late 40s, remembered his discussion about the privileges with the 
head of his laboratory. The possibility to stay on the bottom of the party hierarchy (because 
he did not have the college education needed to get to the top) was not enticing. Zigmas 
viewed the Party as a domain of other class interests. He was willing to avoid the visibility 
that party membership guaranteed:  
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I knew that there had to be two workers and one white-collar employee. Because it was a 
workers’ party. […] I asked then what will the Party give to me. What? I told him [the head of 
the laboratory] you have one white-collar employee for the Party and you need two workers. 
That’s the case [that is the reason for inviting him to join the Party]. […] What will you give 
me? An apartment? I have it without the Party. They even wanted to take it away, but didn’t 
succeed. I got an apartment. A car? I have no money. And I don’t need it. What else will you 
give me? What will be my benefits? “We will make you a supervisor” [Zigmas paraphrased the 
head of the laboratory]. What supervisor? Why do I need that? “Your salary will increase by 
twenty rubles” [Zigmas cited the head of the laboratory]. I don’t need those twenty rubles. For 
getting in trouble with people. I am quiet, in the corner, like a mouse. I spend my time happily 
there. […] What career will I make? A supervisor? I was OK the way I was. I do my work and 
that’s it. […] I am not a careerist.  
Even if one’s belonging to the Communist Party derived from pragmatic calculations, 
participation in CP networks assured privileging recognition (cf. Glaeser, forthcoming). 
According to Glaeser (forthcoming), recognition well used is, thus, like money well 
invested—it can feed on itself, creating a self-amplifying belief-consolidating effect (Glaeser, 
forthcoming). It is likely that recognition enforced accommodating stances and positive 
associations with Soviet social history. Alignments with history were strengthened by 
liberties and rights, social and physical mobility, privileged consumption, knowledge, and 
wealth. These were signs of different experience from social others of Soviet times as well as 
of alternative subjectivities articulated in different social texts. 
6.7 LATE SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET INVERSIONS 
Theories of nationalism tend to emphasize homogenizing effects, such as transcendence of 
individual and local differences, uniting all citizens in a single unitary identity (see Herzfeld 
1992). Homogenization produces an imagined community (Anderson 1982) conceived along 
ethnic (see Smooha 1990) or national lines (see Borneman 1993). The liberation movement 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s in Lithuania not only fashioned individuals into one 
“nation,” but also produced differences within the imagined “nation.” In the liberation 
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movement, “nation” tended to exclude the social stratum of former CP members (especially 
the former KGB and the nomenclature) who shared citizenship as well as ethnicity, i.e., 
relations to a “nation” (see Hobsbawm 1990), with protagonists of nationalism.  
Like Soviet classism, liberation movement nationalism was a class act (cf. Williams 
1989). Post-Soviet social classifications, like the Soviet ones, were also undertakings in 
biographic cleansing, exclusion of a biographic class of ideologically disloyal and dangerous 
members of the post-Soviet state and society. In the late 1980s and early 1990s Soviet-period 
boundaries between social strata were recreated by rearticulating spaces of difference and 
inverting images of “communists” and social others. The resulting co-existence in a “nation” 
was a matter of competition between different social groups, manifesting the negative 
definition of tolerance as passive non-interference, and premissed more on the lack of ability 
of either group to completely overcome the other than on valorization of pluralism that 
democracy is expected to entail (see Hayden 2000).  
In the liberation movement, the moral sanctity, integrity, and innocence of particular 
collectives and individuals, including deportees, was declared. The disloyal subject of the 
Soviet state, a “deportee” was elevated to the status of a sufferer for the “nation.” Memories 
of the deported were given symbolic importance and national relevance. These memories 
were recorded in the narratives on suffering, oppression, victimization, and resistance. 
Suffering under the “communists” became a major claim, entitling one to the right to be 
heard in social and political spheres. “Nation” was to be revived through the memory of the 
silenced, the ones who had moral power to speak for it.62  
The liberation movement produced texts for identification (see chapter 5). The 
“Party,” the “Soviet state,” the “Soviets,” and even the “Russians” were constituted as the 
“others” of new history. They were “occupiers,” guilty and responsible for “historical 
injustice.” There were “pure Lithuanians” who were not associated with the CP and 
“others,” to be rejected in the new time. Such differentiation yielded a continuous dialogue 
about individuals’ relations with the CP and the KGB, carried out until the present.  
                                                 
62 I discussed those issues in “Ethnographic Note on Nation: Narratives and Symbols of the Early 
Post-socialist Nationalism in Lithuania.” Dialectical Anthropology. 2003. Vol.27. No.3–4. P.279–295.  
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During the liberation movement and later there were multiple public/official 
initiatives to reinforce the new visions and divisions of history. For example, according to 
Tiesa of September 11, “whereas in 1987 just 80 deportees had been rehabilitated, in the first 
half of 1988, 208 had been restored to full citizenship. On September 22nd, the government 
made a major concession: the Council of Ministers annulled the 1949 and 1951 decrees of 
deportation, ruling that the deportations carried out in conformity with those decrees were 
illegal and baseless” (Senn 2002:157–158). All the victims of the mass deportations of 1949 
and 1951 were accordingly rehabilitated and restored to the full rights of Soviet citizens. 
They also became eligible for possible compensation for their losses (Senn 2002:158).  
The post-Soviet state assigned some privileges to the new legitimate subjects. 
“Deportees” (together with political prisoners, resistance movement participants and 
volunteer soldiers) get a state pension as “individuals who had suffered,” they have full 
health care and enjoy reduced fares for public transportation. There is a program for the 
return of political prisoners and deportees to Lithuania (2002–2007). According to this 
program, the people and their families who were deported during the years of occupation 
have to be given resident status and helped to socially integrate in Lithuania. They can 
acquire housing on easy terms.63  
Compared to the privileges for “communists,” especially for the nomenclature in the 
Soviet period, the distribution of privileges to deportees are minor. However, according to 
Vytautas, a professor, in his early 40s, “in Lithuania there exists a discourse that deportees 
are privileged; and that we can have some kind of privileges like higher retirement benefits, 
exceptional rights to study and seek a career.” The privileges have symbolic significance by 
excluding some and recognizing others. In poor village communities, these privileges were 
interpreted as unjust, because some villagers felt unfairly eliminated from the community of 
the visible and respected: 
Now only deportees and [political] prisoners… they have good pensions, they can travel for 
free, get medical care for free… How about us? Are we dog’s children? Are we not martyrs? 
We were tortured as well, like them [deportees]. They suffered in Russia, we here. Did we 
                                                 
63 See Čekutis, Ričardas “Kelionė Atgal Virsta Nežinia” (“A trip back turns into uncertainty”). 
Atgimimas 09/3–9/2004. No.31 (808). 
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suffer less? Who gave food to those who came here? To those who were in forests and those 
who were searching for the ones in forest. They did not have their own [food]. They never 
asked for it. They came and you had to give. You could starve, but you had to give them [the 
oldest inhabitant of a village, in her late 80s]. 
Some informants negotiate or oppose the inverted identities they are expected to 
embody. Vytautas claims that he refrained from applying for any privileges available to 
deportees. He did not join any political or social movement uniting deportees. He also aims 
to avoid all possible talks about his birth place so as not to be categorized as one or the 
other. Whenever he says that he was born in Siberia, he feels that others, in his words, 
“totally reidentify him.” To some, it means that he is among those “who ask for money, cry, 
or assert their political rights to state governance;” to others, he is “an insider, but then they 
start wondering why he is not a member of their party, that maybe he is a traitor or some 
kind of a villain.” Vytautas, emphasizing the different associations attached to the category 
of “deportees” in Soviet (“guilty,” “damned”) and post-Soviet Lithuania (a “hero,” a 
“winner”), argued that his experience cannot be generalized in either way (see the epigraph).  
For many others, a “deportee” is a compelling formulation of self, and “nation” is a 
looking glass where informants see themselves, the past, and the present (see also chapter 3). 
The genealogies and biographies of deportees even become inscribed in the physical 
environment. Uršulė, a former deportee from the second largest village, organized the 
erection of a monument where the following rhymed words were engraved:  
People were killed and homes were destroyed without mercy here. The nest of the cozy family 
was broken. This monument will witness the sorrowful fate of the Jonaičiai [her family name], 
and of all Lithuania.64  
Proliferation of discourse on deportations and on deportees is notable in many 
spaces. Unlike in Soviet times when many tried to hide their “deportee” identity, people 
identify as “deportees,” even if they are not deportees according to official definitions. In a 
conversation in the second largest village, a man, in his early 60s, argued that his wife could 
have applied for status as a “deportee” because she suffered from the Soviet authorities who 
                                                 
64 In Lithuanian: “Čia be gailesčio žmones, sodybas kapojo, išdraskė lizdelį šeimynos jaukios. Paliudys 
smūtkelė mus skaudžią dalią Jonaičių, visos Lietuvos.” The names are changed. 
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had destroyed her parents’ house in search of partisans. The man addressed his wife: “you 
could have gotten something [some benefits], but you didn’t apply. They [the Soviet 
authorities] assumed that you were helping bandits [i.e., resistance forces]… But this was not 
true.” Ramūnas, a former CP member, claimed that practically all his relatives were deported 
to Siberia. His father somehow avoided deportations by hiding. He named himself a 
“deportee” because, even if he was not in Siberia, he had to grow up outside their home. 
Giving assurances of his family’s foreignness to “communists,” the informant claimed that 
his father always swore at the communists “in terrible words.”  
Many deportees experienced social and political change of the late 1980s and early 
1990s as restoration of justice; they expressed support for the nationalist movement, did not 
question the value of freedom, and were much less critical of the post-Soviet developments 
of the state than many others. A former deportee, a teacher and parliament member of the 
first Parliament of Lithuania, asserted that during the movement for independence, she had 
the feeling that now everything is “right.” She remembered how she used to go to Sąjūdis 
meetings, where the party members were also present; how they, deportees, political 
prisoners and others, had come with well-worn shoes and that the party members had been 
shining in their suits and polished shoes. This was the point in my research where the idea of 
this chapter about social otherness came to mind. 
6.8 POST-SOVIET SPACES OF DIFFERENCE 
The process of institutionalization of difference bound to the “communist” past has been 
marked by various, often unfinished, initiatives and lacked the totalitarian commitment of 
the Soviet state. In 1992 the bill unofficially called the Desovietization Law65 considered the 
CP as a structure of the occupational state which organized repressions.66 According to this 
bill, communist organizations and the KGB embodied the occupational totalitarian regime 
                                                 
65 The law was not passed. 
66 “Desovietizacija: Lietuvos Respublikos Aukščiausiajai Tarybai.” Lietuvos aidas. 02/04/1992. 
No.23.P.3. 
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and were dangerous to restoration of the state. KGB officials, agents and various other 
cooperators as well as the highest officials of the communist organizations had to be 
restricted from holding office in state institutions and enterprises, educational institutions, 
Lithuanian Radio and Television, the State Bank, transportation and other enterprises.67  
There were some other attempts to label the CP as foreign and criminal as well as to 
exclude the specific strata of the CP members from power. In December, 1998, the 
Chairman of the Parliament, V. Landsbergis, registered the project of the law,68 according to 
which all former Lithuanian CP Central Committee employees, from directors to 
instructors, had to be forbidden to work in the Seimas, President’s office, the government, 
courts, army and educational institutions (see Lapeikis et al. 1999:254). According to this 
Declaration the “communist totalitarian regime of the USSR […] was criminal [nusikalstamas] 
in its executants’ actions and aims including spiritual and physical destruction, genocide and 
war crimes.”69 The major political actor of the Soviet Lithuania “USSR CP—Lithuanian CP 
Central Committee, used special privileges and is morally and politically responsible for the 
losses, grievances and wrongs experienced by people and the nation in Lithuania occupied 
by the USSR.”70  
Some considerations in the Parliament of the laws emphasized relatedness and the 
common responsibility of the CP and the Soviet State Security organizations. For example, 
on June 18, 1998, considering the bill on Evaluation of the USSR State Security and 
Intelligence as well as on the activities of Soviet Union CP organization secretaries, 
university lecturers of Marxism-Leninism and USSR judges and persecutors, V. Čepas 
claimed that the CP ideologically produced repressions and terror while the KGB 
implemented Communist ideologies.71
                                                 
67 See “Projektas. Lietuvos Respublikos laikinasis įstatymas. Dėl kai kurių apribojimų užimti pareigas 
valstybinėje tarnyboje.” Lietuvos aidas. 03/06/1992. No.46. P.8. 
68 See “Declaration on the assessment of communism and former structures of the communist 




71 See, e.g., talk by V. Čepas at the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania considering the bill No.P-
1212(2)A on June 18, 1998. www.lrs.lt.  
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Soviet State Security Committee employees, such as the KGB members who 
deliberately and secretly collaborated with the KGB or other State Security organs72 were 
addressed in the so-called Lustration bills and laws in the early 1990s73 as well as in 1998, 
1999, and 2005. Membership in the KGB was described as participation in a criminal 
institution loyal to the USSR. For example, “Law on the assessment of the USSR State 
Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) and the current activities of the staff 
members of this organization” of July 16, 1998 (No. VIII-858) defined the USSR State 
Security Committee as “a criminal organization which has committed war crimes, genocide, 
acts of repression, terror and political persecution in the Republic of Lithuania occupied by 
the USSR.” Like the Desovietization Law, the law “On assessment of the USSR State 
Security Committee…” limited activities of the staff members of the State Security 
Committee.74  
Like Soviet-period undertakings, post-Soviet projects targeted a specific class of 
individuals with similar biographies. The essential biographic fact was an individual’s 
membership in the CP and participation in production of communist ideology, leadership in 
                                                 
72 See, e.g., “Law on the assessment of the USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, 
KGB) and the current activities of the staff members of this organization.” July, 16, 1998, No. VIII-858.; 
“Law on registering, confession, entry into records and protection of persons who have admitted to secret 
collaboration with special services of the former USSR.” November 23, 1999. No. VIII-1436.; The 
Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania. http://www.lrs.lt.  
73 As early as June 13, 1988 the Social Commission of Sąjūdis,73 headed by Bronius Genzelis, a 
philosopher at Vilnius University, targeted specific strata of the CP members—the nomenclature and 
proposed to end the privileges of the Soviet bureaucratic elite (Senn 2002:77). In 1991 the law on revision of 
parliamentarian mandates stated that parliamentarians who deliberately cooperated with foreign secret 
services had to resign from office if more than half of voters at the electoral district expressed their distrust. 
According to this law, parliamentarian V. Čepaitis, a close co-worker of V. Landsbergis and an active member 
of Sąjūdis, was accused of being a KGB agent and lost his mandate. Parliamentarians K. Prunskienė, V. 
Beriozovas and J. Minkevičius were also charged with cooperation with the KGB.  
74 The staff members “may not work as state officers or employees in institutions of state authority 
and administration, local government and national security, at the Department of State Security, the police, 
the prosecutor’s office, courts, in the diplomatic service, at the Customs, the State Control and other state 
institutions exercising control and supervision, as lawyers and notaries, at banks and other credit institutions, 
at strategic economic objects, security agencies (structures), other agencies (structures) providing detective 
services, in the communications sector, as teachers and tutors at educational institutions, also as heads of said 
institutions, nor may they be engaged in work (hold a post) involving possession of fire arms.” Article 3 listed 
“Exemptions from the Application of the Limitations.” See “Law on the assessment of the USSR State 
Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) and the current activities of the staff members of this 
organization” of July 16, 1998 (No. VIII-858). The Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania, 
http://www.lrs.lt. 
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CP organizations or belonging to the CP political elite. Membership in the Soviet State 
Security was also a basis for exclusion. According to some bills/laws individuals who could 
be described by the mentioned biographic facts had to be excluded from fields of 
knowledge production and, in all bills, laws, decrees, or declarations, deprived of power. 
Social reclassification was intrinsic to articulations of new boundaries of society, nation, and 
the state as well as to building new power and authority networks.  
Except the laws concerning the USSR State Security employees, other initiatives were 
not institutionalized. Unlike in the case of “deportees” (see Anušauskas et al. 2005), there 
was no institutional grounds to exclude individuals from power and knowledge and to 
deprive them of privileges or recognition based on their membership in the CP. In respect 
to former CP members technologies of control and discipline were also undeveloped or 
were fragmentary, situational, and particular. A “communist” as a meaningful symbol 
prevailed in popular communication usually about political elites and among those who 
consider an individuals’ past in the Communist Party meaningful. 
Like in the case of “deportees,” the laws, bills and regulations which targeted strata 
of former CP members and the KGB assumed the disloyalty of certain individuals to the 
post-Soviet state. Unlike the Soviet state fashioning of its disloyal citizens, the government 
of independent Lithuania secured some privileges for the CP members and the KGB. The 
government committed to secure social, political and civil rights of employed and retired 
USSR State Security officers, soldiers as well as other employees and their family members 
living in Lithuania.75 The post-Soviet state agents also engaged in communication with its 
imagined unruly citizens carried out in public spaces, the Parliament as well as in various 
Courts including the European Court of Human Rights.76 Similar negotiations of identity 
were unimaginable in the Soviet period. Furthermore, unlike the Soviet projects of ascribed 
                                                 
75 See the report “On mutual obligations of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the 
KGB of the USSR.” Vilnius, August 23, 1991. In: Lietuvos aidas, August 27, 1991. No.172. P.2. 
76 Lithuania lost a lawsuit where two lawyers argued that they were wrongly fired from jobs in the 
private sector under the law regulating rights of former KGB employees. The European Court of Human 
Rights established a violation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. See ELTA report “Įstatymuose nebeliks buvusių KGB darbuotojų teises varžančių 
nuostatų.” April 8, 2005. Source: www.delfi.lt. Accessed on 04/08/2005. See also The European Court of 
Human Rights, Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int. 
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identities which left little space for transgression of otherness, the post-Soviet Lustration 
laws were directed at purifying (Latin “lustratio” means “purification, sacrifice of something 
to resolve one’s guilt”) individuals and limiting the activities of the KGB or others for only a 
specific period of time (five or ten years).  
The state agents promulgating Desovietization and Lustration laws articulated the 
laws in the language of democratization. According to proponents of related bills revision of 
eligibility of former active “collaborators” with the Communist regime was “a necessity for 
democratic renewal.”77 Some reviewers of Lustration laws concluded that “democratization 
first of all meant de-communi[st]ization.”78 The appreciated political subject who emerged 
in post-Soviet political regimes of personhood was free from KGB connections and willfully 
resigned his communist past (see the discussion below) as well as loyal to the post-Soviet 
nation-state. 
6.9 MEMORIES AND EXPERIENCES OF OTHERNESS IN THE LATE SOVIET 
AND POST-SOVIET PERIOD 
Most of the stories about experiences of otherness primarily invoke the late 1980s and early 
1990s. A former CP member, a parliamentarian, remembers that at meetings held during the 
electoral campaign to the Parliament in 1992, many people were very angry at her and her 
colleagues: “They looked at us with such hatred; it looked like, if they had a gun, they would 
have shot us. […] Just because we were communists.” She also recalled that in 1992 when 
the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDDP) won elections, they had not known 
whether they would be allowed to enter the Parliament. There were even people who had 
                                                 
77 See “Declaration on the assessment of communism and former structures of the communist 
occupation regime” by V. Landsbergis. The Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania. December 10, 1998. 
http://www.lrs.lt. 
78 See A. Umbrasaitė “Ar rekalinga liustracijos revizija?” XXI amžiaus supplement Atodangos. 
02/25/2005. No.21. 
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refused to sit at the same table with her. “Before the elections some promised to kill us. It 
was stressful.”  
The LDDP Council Chronicle (Lapeikis et al. 1999) reports many insults, violence, 
and difficulties LDDP members faced in the early 1990s. In the entry for the 18th of April, 
1991 Brazauskas, the leader of the LDDP, presented his opinion on “personnel clearing” 
(kadrų valymo) politics. He named examples, when competent employees had been dismissed, 
in his opinion, without any reason. According to Brazauskas, this happens when judgments 
are based not on an employee’s competence, objective recommendations, or ability to work, 
but when one has political goals—that are to persecute former CP members (Lapeikis et al. 
1999:63–64). Petras Navikas, a long-term Chair of the Soviet Industry Department and later 
a post-Soviet state finance Vice-Minister and Director of the State Revenue Department, 
writes in his memoirs that they [the Soviet state officials] had bad luck in the years of the 
Rebirth of Lithuania. “The critique was harsh, people were inspired to hate us. We had to go 
to meetings to explain our decisions to people, but no one was willing to listen to us” 
(Navikas 2003:84–85). Navikas remembers that the people employed at the Industry 
Department were forced to leave. The only reason he names was the new authorities. He 
reflects, “I closed that page of my life with pain. It seems that we worked honestly. In the 
country we had achieved a lot of good things. And we were told to leave because we had 
worked” (Navikas 2003:86).  
Former party members opposed the “magical thinking” of the leaders who emerged 
during the liberation movement. On the 4th of May, 1991, the Left Faction of the Supreme 
Council, which included many former CP members, accepted a petition: “We think, that 
“witch hunting,” the constant search for enemies of the nation are unbearable and can not 
be tolerated any longer. Recently even Radio Free Europe noticed that soon in Lithuania 
there are going to be more enemies than inhabitants. We also protest against the use of force 
against the deputy Česlovas Juršėnas. Force was used at an official event—a Sąjūdis meeting 
on the 27th of April. [Signed by] V. Beriozovas, B. Genzelis, A. Ražauskas, P. Papovas, J. 
Minkevičius” (Lapeikis et al. 1999:66). Similar arguments were attempts to expose and object 
to intolerance. “Witch hunting” redefined endeavors of purifying a society as violent and 
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unreasonable. The former communists emerged in this rhetoric as innocent objects of 
malevolent forces.  
A former party member has even become a subject of literary consideration, 
appearing as a tragicomic persona in the Jonas Avyžius’s novel, “Everything passes” (“Viskas 
praeina”). A well-known Lithuanian writer and winner of the most prestigious (in the Soviet 
period) Lenin prize, J. Avyžius writes about an imagined member of the communist 
nomenclature, Medardas Kalnaitis who had not refused his past identity as many had to 
accommodate himself within new history, but had silently locked himself in his inner 
considerations of the present. The narrator begins the story with a description of how 
Kalnaitis meets his former chief who was dressed in high-class special clothing and shoes; 
how Kalnaitis observes candidates from Sąjūdis at a meeting, how he remembers the words 
of the Communist Internationale. According to the narrator, the words of the Communist 
Internationale were wiped out by the new epoch. However, they fit the present well: “[he] 
who was nothing, will be everything…” (Avyžius 2003:8). Dishonored by his son and wife 
because of his past, Kalnaitis experiences fear, isolation, and denigration. His son, a former 
KGB agent, passionately involved in Sąjūdis, thinks of himself as a real victim crucified by 
the Soviet epoch. The son is afraid that his KGB past will not let him seek a new career. The 
drama of social identities is unfinished because the author passed away. However, it is clear 
that all personae, whatever the role they play, because of their Soviet biographies are deemed 
to fail after the triumph of post-Soviet history. 
The post-Soviet or post-socialist biographic cleansing was carried out in other 
Eastern European states. Glaeser in his forthcoming book “Political Epistemologies” argues 
that a decade after the fall of socialism, unmasking somebody’s Stasi connections is still the 
most sensationalist aspect of working through the socialist past. Employers have the right to 
check East German job candidates for Stasi connections; they also have the right to refuse 
employment, if such a connection is established. Schuster, one of the informants, a former 
Stasi officer and a Berliner, reflected on how former Stasi officers and former secret 
informants were treated: as pariahs, as criminals. His son-in-law, a radio officer working for 
Stasi, had been dismissed for his Stasi past. He himself felt cheated out of his rightful 
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pension because Stasi officers do in fact receive less than other former GDR state employees 
(Glaeser, forthcoming).  
“Biographies” of buildings and public spaces have been rewritten with the same 
fervor as biographies of people. In East Germany, the public sector, including city services, 
such as parks, streets and sanitation, have made it a point to present themselves as “Stasi-
free” (Glaeser, forthcoming). The tourist signs pointing to the Rotes Rathaus, the “Red City 
Hall,” were replaced with signs pointing to the “Berlin City Hall.” Schuster, cited above, 
pointed out that the building was not nicknamed “red” because it was East Berlin’s 
communist town hall, but because it is made of bricks and has been known as “Red City 
Hall” from well before the war. Glaeser commented that “All of this is for him just a sign of 
rabid anticommunism, a hatred for anything associated with the GDR” (Glaeser, 
forthcoming). 
6.10 OUTLIVING “COMMUNIST” OTHERNESS 
The CP of Lithuania was redefined within new ideologies of the late 1980s and the early 
1990s. In 1989 it separated from the Soviet Union CP. In 1990 it was renamed the 
Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDDP). Consequently, in the entry of August 31, 1991 
of the LDDP Council Chronicle, it was possible to argue that “Our Party in 1989 assessed 
and condemned the past of the Soviet Union Communist Party (TSKP), broke from it, and 
went together with the nation” (Lapeikis et al. 1999:77). In the entry for the 4th of January, 
1992, “About guilt and regrets, pharisees and betrayals,” it was argued that the LDDP 
cannot be responsible for the former Lithuanian division of the Soviet Union Communist 
Party. Correspondingly, in the media it was claimed that “The communists of today cannot 
be blamed for mistakes of that time and those communists from whose actions and ideology 
they have dissociated themselves” (Tiesa, July, 1990 in Lapeikis et al. 1999:37). In the late 
1980s and early 1990s, many CP members abandoned their party membership through 
various purification rituals, such as public burning of party membership cards. It was the 
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correct strategy for surviving post-Soviet spaces of difference bound to “communist” 
identity. 
The difference to which so-called communists were subjected was negotiated by 
inventing various strategies of re-identification. The two prominent strategies were: 
reinterpretation of the “communist” past in nationalist idioms; and, association with the 
moral communities of the post-Soviet period. Both strategies aimed to (re)produce an 
individual’s past as compatible with the legitimate narratives of post-Soviet times. For 
example, it was claimed that communists, even the First Secretary Antanas Sniečkus, a long-
term leader of Soviet Lithuania (1941–1974), were patriots and worked for Lithuania 
(Kazakevičius, Mališauskas 2003). As a result, it was argued, one could observe a well-
developed economy and industry (or one of the best developed in the USSR) in Lithuania 
and survival of the Lithuanian nation with over 80% ethnic Lithuanians (as opposed to 
Latvia and Estonia with huge Russian minorities) (see Kazakevičius, Mališauskas 2003). 
Another common way to speak about one’s own and former communists’ past was to 
emphasize that former communists were joining the Party only for a career, that they also 
suffered from the regime and had to make compromises for their own, their family’s, and in 
some cases the nation’s benefit. Such claims underlined belonging to a community of the 
same social text of “oppression” and, thus, moral togetherness with social others of the past.  
Many other rearticulations of identities were variations of communication about one’s 
relation to the newly imagined nation as well as about belonging to moral communities. For 
example, a school teacher and professor claimed that she joined the Communist Party in 
response to another professor’s invitation that Lithuanian intellectuals were needed to lead 
Lithuania. Otherwise, the Russians would be the party members and take leadership 
positions. The informant asserted that she had lived in the Soviet absurdity, disagreed with 
communist ideology, but joined the Party out of concern for the well-being of the nation. In 
this case joining the Communist Party was an act of patriotism, directed towards a common, 
i.e., the nation’s, good, which was consistent with the ideals of the post-Soviet period.  
Despite different strategies of re-identification and association, in political and public 
spaces of communication, a “communist” has been imagined as “foreign” to post-socialist 
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history.79 Like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, “communist” is dissociated from “national” 
and “nation” (cf. Urban 1994:733). To be a “communist” is to be a harm-inflicting alien to 
national developments and the national state. In such contexts, the ultimate responsibility for 
the crimes and the damage done belongs not to the nation itself but to those who had 
forcibly imposed it: another nation, Russia (Urban 1994:733), and those who cooperated 
with the alien power and, thus, became alienated from the nation. Construction of a 
“Lithuanian communist” has never found its solid ground in post-socialist public spaces of 
Lithuania. The two terms actually continue to be antithetical in political imaginations, 
“Lithuania” is associated with the “West,” “democracy,” “future,” “civilization,” while 
“communists” with the “East,” “totalitarianism,” “barbarism,” and the “past.” As a result 
many former communists who assert purity and belonging to a nation as “communists” are 
deemed to fail.  
Rearticulations of identities integrated contestations of post-Soviet reclassifications 
and biographic cleansing. A professor and parliamentarian disagreed that communists can be 
classified as impure social strata of a “nation” and, thus, dangerous (cf. Douglas 1966): 
How could they say that all communists have bloody hands and they [individuals who did not 
belong to the Communist Party] are clean? […] Some people thought that communist 
ideology was criminal. […] I remember how American Lithuanians used to teach us. I was 
very angry because they accused us of collaborating with the Soviets. Once I understood. They 
[American Lithuanians] fled. My mother stayed. She worked there, I studied Lithuanian 
language and literature at the university, and I learned Lithuanian being a Samogitian [the 
Samogitian is a dialect and a name of a historic ethnic group in Lithuania]. […] Here comes 
someone who speaks broken Lithuanian, humiliates me, calls me a collaborator. It is comic. 
[…] Once I told everything to a Lithuanian American Community vice-president. He knew 
that I was in the LDDP, a former communist, that my father was in a labor camp, that he died 
after he got back because he lost his health there. He was very surprised to hear what I said. 
He never thought about communists from such a perspective. 
Rearticulations of self coexist with subjectivities informed by Soviet-period values 
and ideas. The former CP members who did not hold power in the post-Soviet period were 
                                                 
79 Many villagers from the second largest and largest village and some urban residents do not think 
that the “foreignness” of “communists” matters. 
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often critical of post-socialist developments. In their arguments about post-socialist 
mismanagement, incompetence and the irresponsibility of political leaders, selfishness and 
poor work ethics of bureaucrats, the past repeatedly was called upon to illustrate moral 
order, sensible social relations, work for the common good, and commitment to collective 
values. Mykolas, a former communist and a vice-president of a large enterprise in Soviet 
times, identified himself at the beginning of the interview as an “unredeemable red” (raudonas 
stagnatorius) and argued:  
If compared with the present bureaucrats, […] our people were wonderful [auksiniai]. There 
were higher requirements. […] And they worked. […] Nobody observed Lenin’s principles, we 
started to use them [in independent Lithuania]. When independent Lithuania was being 
founded, one of Lenin’s major principles was fulfilled. [Now] the state could be governed by a 
janitor. […] It is a shame that those who came [to power] made the state go down [dėl kurių 
mūsų valstybei prasčiau]. Those who felt disadvantaged came [to power]. They had no abilities for 
leadership. Inexperience and ignorance. Such fools [balamutai]… All they know is how to talk 
[kaip liežuviu malti] [emphasis in original].  
According to Mykolas, the “unredeemable reds” worked for Lithuania which was the 
wealthiest republic of the USSR. At present he saw many mistakes made in economics that 
he considered to be a “crime against the state:” 
Did you come here through Šančiai [a neighborhood of Kaunas]? Isn’t it a crime what you see 
there? Destroyed barracks. Nobody is guilty. […] Where is that wealth? Such wealth. Billions. 
Destroyed. From an economist perspective, they are criminals and must go to jail. People lived 
normally [žmoniškai gyveno], so they were expelled. People could live there, you could let them 
in for free. So I say. Maybe the [Soviet] state did not observe Leninist principles. We do now. 
In this independent [state]. God forbid, if an individual gets anything for free [emphasis in 
original]. 
Mykolas argued that the present can be defined by a poor work ethics. You cannot 
find people in their work places. According to him, there is no discipline, no responsibility. 
Conversely, in the socialist past “many were idealists in their blood.” They were committed 
to the institution they worked for. By bribing, “carrying things, blankets in bags [to bribe 
others],” he was able to provide all supplies for the enterprise he worked for. In Mykolas’s 
opinion, this was not much different from the present, when big money is used for bribing, 
and certainly, not less patriotic. 
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Former CP members themselves and/or those who have been subjected to social 
otherness in post-Soviet history apply the same strategy of othering to their opponents. 
Thus, in political competition the language of “social others” has become a common idiom 
used by different parties. Juozas’s wife who joined the Party because of a belief in 
communism argued that Landsbergis, the most prominent leader of Sąjūdis and one of the 
major designers of the post-Soviet social otherness himself, had been a KGB member. She 
supported her arguments by using nationalist rhetoric: 
Agricultural politics… it’s a crime against Lithuania. OK, independence is independence. […] 
For example, they did not want to trade with Russia. It [not trading with Russia] was the ruin 
of Lithuania. Deliberate destruction. At this point I believe that Landsbergis was a KGB 
member. 
In strategies of othering, the guilt of a “communist past” may be constructed as 
inheritable. Regina, a parliamentarian, actively involved in the movement for the 
independence of Lithuania and a member of the Lithuanian Conservatives (Homeland 
Union), never was a CP member. However, she said that she has been repeatedly discredited 
because of her father who was a high CP official in Soviet Lithuania. Her mother left her 
father before Regina was born when she realized that he was in the Communist Party. 
Regina’s mother lived in poverty with four children. According to Regina, she even refused 
her father’s support for the children in order to avoid political revenge and to save her 
children. Regina’s father, whom Regina saw twice, lived in luxury in the center of the capital 
city. His friends were the highest Soviet state officials; he was honored with a national 
funeral when he passed away. Regina remembered: 
I made a statement that despite who is in power my position will always depend on ideals my 
mother taught me to follow. This was in 1991. […] Because of my father they [former CP 
members] kept persecuting me. Even in the Parliament they used to give me questions. The 
right politicians did not question. They had the moral power to question. Questioned those in 
the left [the ex-communists]. The right had the moral right to discredit me, but deportees and 
political prisoners were always on my side. I was being discredited for my father’s communist 
ideas… discredited by the communist side. I even had to go to Strasbourg to defend myself. 
Because of a father whom I did not know even when I was born. 
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In spring 2005, the judge of the Constitutional Law Toma Birmontienė was entrusted 
this position only after a second voting in the Parliament. Among the reasons for distrust 
were also T. Birmontienė’s father who served in the NKVD.80 Moreover, consideration was 
given to the glorification of the Soviet militia in Birmontienė’s dissertation, defended in 
1989. The Liberal Democrat Party accused Birmontienė of loyalty to the USSR and Soviet 
ideology. According to Petras Gražulis, a parliamentarian, the candidacy of Birmontienė was 
a slap at Lithuania and its freedom fighters.81
In Lithuania recent history continues to be informed by various rituals of naming 
“communists” and the “KGB.” At the opening of the memorial for victims of the KGB at 
Tuskulėnai, Vilnius, in November, 2004, Brazauskas could not deliver his speech of 
commemoration undisturbed because of denigrating remarks from the crowd. The shouts 
were inspired by Brazauskas’s biography of Soviet times. They were meant to make explicit 
the incongruence (to some) of the meanings—a former “communist” was not expected to 
deliver a speech of commemoration of KGB victims, because “communists” were 
“victimizers.” It was the wrong role Brazauskas played on the political field according to the 
political imaginations of his critics. In an interview with Lithuanian Television82 Brazauskas 
argued that the role he played was correct: “All my life I have been followed by these kinds 
of shouts. It is just not clear why, why am I a scoundrel and a criminal. My family were also 
sitting on their bags, ready and waiting to be deported.” Brazauskas aimed to associate 
himself with the moral community of deportees and to reclaim power and authority. He was 
speaking about his family past in the vocabulary of the present. As in the cases of 
unanimous voting at the CP meetings discussed above, what was important in this situation 
was not the semantics of his argument, but the position that he understands and respects 
present rituals of signification like the commemoration of KGB victims and is willing to 
play according to the rules of the present political games.  
                                                 
80 The National Commissariat for Internal Affairs. Groups of armed supporters called “defenders of 
people” (liaudies gynėjai) against the resistance movement in the 1940s. 
81 See Aleknaitė, Kristina “Libdemai pakišo koją T. Birmontienei tapti KT teisėja.” 03/15/2005. 
14:44. www.delfi.lt. Accessed on 03/14/2005. 
82 The reportage on Tuskulėnų kapavietė on the Lithuanian Television, “Panorama,” November 2, 
2004. 
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In public political spaces “KGB” has been a more visible symbolic identity than 
“communist.” In 2004–2005 several political leaders and parliament members were accused 
of relations with the KGB among which the most notable were Antanas Valionis, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Arvydas Pocius, the Director of the State Security 
Department (both were KGB reserve officers). Many, including Artūras Paulauskas, the 
Chairman of the Parliament, and Mečys Laurinkus, the former State Security Director, 
acknowledged that Valionis and Pocius have been loyal to the Republic of Lithuania. The 
Parliamentary Commission, after revising of Valionis and Pocius case, concluded that the 
former positions related to the KGB do not constitute a threat to national security. 
However, some doubted whether the Foreign Affairs Minister and the State Security 
Director can stay in office. The Congress of the Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees 
in spring, 2005 accepted the declaration which requested the former KGB reserve officers 
and agents to resign their positions and to apologize publicly for hiding their relations with 
the KGB. At the Congress R. Kupčinskas argued that “patriotic powers have to resist the 
running reoccupation by the Kremlin. We were too forgiving to communists and the KGB 
reserve. Resistance, resistance, and once more resistance.”83 At the Parliament the member 
of Parliament Gražulis started a hunger strike requesting the KGB reserve officers to resign 
their positions as well as insisting to make KGB member lists public. Some journalists also 
warned about the threat and invoked disrespect to those who “died in the forests, rotted in 
labor camps and were tortured to death in KGB cellars.”84 The Liberal Democrat Party 
asked the President of Lithuania to recall Valionis and Pocius and to restore belief in moral 
politics.85 Others pointed out that the KGB reserve officers were considered loyal citizens 
by the USSR.86 According to Bronius Genzelis, the KGB reserve included the trusted and 
the “reliable.” Genzelis interpreted Valionis’ and Pocius’ membership in the KGB reserve in 
                                                 
83 Cited in Karaliūnas, Arūnas “Tremtiniai regi likusių valstybės priešų.” Lietuvos rytas. 04/11/2005. 
No.82. P.3. 
84 See Dabašinskas, Ginas “Negera nuojauta.” Weekly Laikas. 03/29/2005. 09:05. www.delfi.lt. 
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85 See Barkauskaitė, Orinta “E. Klumbys prisijungė prie badaujančio P. Gražulio.” 03/29/2005. 
10:24. www.delfi.lt. Accessed on 03/29/2005. 
86 See interview with historian A. Anušauskas in www.delfi.lt. Aleknaitė, Kristina “A. Valionio ir A. 
Pociaus praeitis kai kuriems šalies vadovams buvo naujiena.” 01/07/2005. 10:33. Accessed on 01/07/2005. 
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1988 and 1989 as evidence of their “unreliability to Lithuania.” According to Genzelis “the 
biographies of both politicians makes one worry.”87 Solitary voices, such as Juršėnas’s, the 
Vice Chairman of the Parliament, suggested appreciating people based on their input in 
strengthening the independence of Lithuania without considerations of their pasts.88
The KGB case reproduced meanings of loyalty, danger, threat and respect. In 
considerations mentioned there were rearticulated social and political boundaries, moral 
modes of conduct and selfhood, and imaginary symbolic histories—a foreign Soviet past 
and a national post-Soviet present—as well as geographies—Russia and the former USSR 
and Lithuania. The case showed that an acceptable and tolerably individual has to have a 
particular political persona and to “carry” a specific biography congruent with political 
imaginations of post-Soviet spaces. 
The production of social otherness in post-Soviet history did not reach the scope of 
the projects of the Soviet period. Furthermore, it affected mainly the former nomenclature, 
especially those who aimed to gain or retain political power in post-Soviet times. Like 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the successor parties of the Lithuanian Communist Party 
secured the majority in the Parliament in several elections (in 1992 and 2000). The secretary 
of the Central Committee of the CP of the Soviet Republic of Lithuania, Brazauskas became 
the first President of Lithuania. The communication about otherness of “communists” to 
society by political opponents of the reformed Communist Party was not appealing to most 
voters. However, throughout post-socialist history, one’s past as a CP member, Party or 
State Security official has always been a mark or a “tail” (šleifas, uodega) in the post-Soviet 
jargon, that follows one and is remembered in case of political competition (see chapter 7). 
The symbol “communist” still informs some political imaginations. In Kaunas, during the 
presidential campaign of 2004, some posters for Juršėnas, a former CP member and the 
presidential candidate from the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, were marked in black: a 
“Communist.” The “KGB” prevails as a more “viable” symbolic identity than “communist” 
because it refers to unseen forces, hidden powers, and secret undertakings. The 
                                                 
87 Aleknaitė, Kristina “A. Valionio ir A. Pociaus praeitis kai kuriems šalies vadovams buvo naujiena.” 
www.delfi.lt. 01/07/2005. 10:33. Accessed on 01/07/2005. 
88 “KGB šmėklos vėl audrina šalies politikų protus.” Lietuvos rytas. 01/11/2005. No.8. P.4. 
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“communists” and the “KGB” are usually produced in opposition to the Soviet-period 
others, usually “deportees.” 
The post-socialist discourse about “communists” or “KGB” include meanings of 
criminality, distrust, and foreignness. The social others of post-Soviet history were in some 
cases deprived of status, employment, some rights, and privileges. Especially in the late 
1980s and early 1990s they were subjected to spaces of difference and experienced 
humiliation, threat, uncertainty, discontent, and insecurity. Many former CP members or 
KGB members lost their authority and power. However, many were able to outlive 
otherness as well as to preserve power and influence over institutional crafting of symbolic 
identities and, thus, their own social selves. 
6.11 TRANSLATIONS: EXPERIENCE AND TEXTS 
Social texts of opposition communicate experiences of social otherness and reflect upon 
subjectivities of social others. These texts convey different registers of negativity directed at 
social history, community, nation, state and even self. Deportees and other others of the 
Soviet past (see also chapter 3) tend to connect to and reproduce in their individualized 
stories the text of “oppression.” Their dialogues in most cases express the experience of 
difference and withdrawal from foreign sociality and history. The former CP members, 
depending on whether they identify as social others in post-Soviet history, develop a text of 
opposition which expresses foreignness to post-Soviet social history. In a few of the excerpts 
of texts of opposition quoted in this chapter, the former CP members tend to speak of the 
failures of the state, nation, and society and to present the socialist past in the idioms of 
moral order, sensible social relations, and work directed towards common goals and 
informed by collective values. 
The social text which makes meanings of social lives of difference in the past or 
present will be performed in voting for a candidate or a party, who/which is not constructed 
negatively in the text. Thus, deportees tend not to vote for candidates who symbolize the 
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past of “oppression,” someone connected to ideas of “communism,” “KGB,” “Russia” and 
“Russians.” Ex-communist parties and former “communists” will not be rewarded in voting 
decisions of deportees. Former CP members, again, depending on their position in the 
Communist Party in the past and identification with party ideology as well as their 
non/existing identity of social others (the higher position, the closer identification, the most 
likely), will vote (or not) against candidates/parties, engaging in their othering and producing 
negative spaces of otherness and negative symbols of “communists.”  
Another example of a text of opposition was a text of “better times” discussed in 
chapter 1. This social text gives meaning to many villagers and some urban residents’ lives of 
difference at present. The experience of difference which is translated into texts of “better 
times” is an outcome of post-Soviet social classification carried out through privatization, 
property restitution, and liberalization rather than more direct engagement with “political” 
and “biographical” like in Soviet “class” and post-Soviet “nation”-building endeavors 
discussed in this chapter. The text of “better times” will be performed in voting for a 
candidate or a party, who/which would provide a vision of resolving subjectivities and 
present experiences of otherness and, certainly, who will not engage in further othering (see 
chapter 7). 
Knowing the stories people tell about themselves, community, and social history 
allows for a discussion of voting as a meaningful action or an enactment of a social text and 
meanings built into that text. In the following two chapters I inquire into how different 
social texts embody divergent ideals about nation and liberation (chapter 5) and the state 
(chapter 6). Chapter 7 will discuss social texts and voting in presidential electoral campaigns 
of 2002 and 2004. 
6.12 CONCLUSIONS 
The Soviet state informed by “class” ideology produced social otherness: spaces of 
difference to which individuals were subjected because of their particular biographies. The 
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“deportee,” an example of a “social other” in the Soviet period, was constituted as a socially 
dangerous and disloyal subject of a Soviet state and society. People, assigned “deportee” 
identity were excluded from participation in ideologically informed fields of knowledge, such 
as education and culture. They were deprived of visibility, social and physical mobility, and 
privilege. Employing classism, i.e., technology and ideology of exclusion along imagined 
“class” boundaries, the Soviet state engaged in biographic cleansing, i.e., discipline and 
punishment of those who lived their lives not according to Soviet-period scenarios. 
Individuals who were subjected to social otherness and ascribed identities of social others 
compromised, accommodated, resisted, openly supported or negated Soviet history and 
experience. In communities social others experienced support as well as ignorance, 
intolerance and exclusion. Experience of social otherness was articulated in a text of 
opposition, usually one of “oppression.” 
Post-Soviet state projects of social classification, informed by nationalism, engaged in 
reordering the social classification of the Soviet period and reproduced new insiders and 
outsiders/others for post-Soviet-period history. The identities of “deportees” and 
“communists” were inverted. The social others of Soviet times were redefined as a moral 
community. They gained visibility, respect, and recognition by the restoration of their rights, 
assignment of privileges and elevation to the status of “heroes.” On the other hand, 
“communists,” CP members and the first-class citizens of the Soviet state were deprived of 
their privileged status and were reproduced as enemies of the “nation,” disloyal and socially 
dangerous subjects of the new projects of a democratic state. Boundaries between social 
strata were reproduced into the post-Soviet period. The resulting co-existence in a “nation” 
was a matter of competition between different social groups, manifesting a negative 
definition of tolerance as passive non-interference.  
Post-Soviet-period otherness was a porous construction, while the major engineers of 
post-Soviet history lacked political power and social support to enforce their visions, such as 
the passing of “Desovietization” laws. The new state also did not appropriate technologies 
with the totalitarian fervor of the Soviet state. Furthermore, the former CP members, 
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potential “social others,” abandoned/renegotiated their identity as “communists” by 
connecting to legitimacy narratives of post-socialism, gaining power and social support. 
The Communist Party has been banned in Lithuania since 1991. “Communists” 
cannot be defined anymore as members of the Communist Party. None of the former CP 
members refers to himself/herself as a “communist” now. However, as a cultural form 
having symbolic significance, “communist” and its offspring “KGB” exist in present social 
and, especially, political communication; it is continually appropriated in social conflicts and 
political campaigns.  
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7.0  CHAPTER 5: NATION AND LIBERATION 
You are beautiful, my dear homeland,  
A country, where heroes sleep in graves: 
You are beautiful in the blueness of your sky! 
Dear: you went through so many hardships and 
sufferings.89
(A national song, “Dear Lithuania” (1920) by 
Maironis).  
 
Tie, Homeland, me inside you,  
Like a song is tied in a throat by death, 
The way, a night ties an evening,  
And you answer me: “I am your freedom!”90
(“Freedom,” performer Eurika Masytė, a popular song 
of the liberation movement). 
 
 
Unlike studies that explore how nations are imagined (see Anderson 1983) or invented 
where they do not exist (see Hroch 1990), I ask why nations do not exist, if they were 
                                                 
89 Graži tu, mano brangi tėvyne, 
 Šalis, kur miega kapuos didvyriai: 
 Graži tu savo dangaus mėlyne! 
 Brangi: tiek vargo, kančių patyrei. (“Lietuva brangi,” Maironis, 1920). 
My translation. 
90 Tai uždaryk mane, Tėvyne, savyje, 
        Kaip giesmę gerklėje mirtis uždaro, 
        Taip, kaip uždaro vakarą naktis, 
        O tu man atsakai: “Aš—tavo laisvė!” (Atlikėja Eurika Masytė, “Laisvė”). My translation. 
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already imagined. I explore this question by discussing memories of the liberation period of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s and people’s ideas about “liberation” and “nation.”  
During the liberation period a specific cultural artifact—“nation-state” was produced 
redefining “nation” in the context of the Western tradition, i.e., binding it to the values of 
statehood, sovereignty, and national citizenship prohibited in Soviet times. According to 
John Kelly and Martha Kaplan (2001) such nations have to be seen as properties of 
humanity, but “like land tenures, properties made by contracts, properties constituted not by 
nature but in histories of culture, and renewed in the rituals and routines of actual 
institutions of representation” (Kelly and Kaplan 2001:200). In 1990 many people 
presumably supported the contract of a “nation-state” by extensively voting for Sąjūdis’ 
candidates whose major aim in the electoral campaign was the independence of Lithuania.91 
The contract was apparently also supported during the referendum for the independence of 
the Republic of Lithuania on February 9th, 1991. At the referendum 90.24% of all 
participants voted “for” independence (6.54% voted “against,” the voter turnout was 
84.74%), which was 76.46% of all voters.92 As the liberation period rhetoric indicates, the 
reimagined “nation” was even a value people were willing to die for. However, at present in 
intellectual discourse, the media and other spaces there is a sense of looming indifference 
towards the major values of the liberation period including the nation’s liberation, popularly 
referred to as “freedom.” Addressing this “indifference,” I argue that the present challenging 
of “liberation”/ “freedom,” which questions the necessity of a nation having a sovereign 
state as important, is expressive of dissatisfactions with post-socialist social and moral 
orders, and also of sensibilities about subjectivities, values and authority that are 
marginalized in post-socialist history. Problematizing “liberation” and “nation” documents 
experiences of change and the continued prevalence of socialist period identifications, such 
as belonging in a “nation” conceived as horizontal solidarity, ethnic relationship, 
disconnected from values of statehood and sovereignty. I also claim that the questioning of 
                                                 
91 See the Sąjūdis electoral program in Atgimimas. 02/02–09/1990. No.5. P.4–5. See also Atgimimas. 
02/02–09/1990. No.5. P.6. 
92 See the European Committee pages at 
http://www.euro.lt/showtopitems.php?TopMenuID=98&LangID=6. Accessed on 07/11/2005. 
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“liberation” is a dispute over representation, i.e., over recognition of people with particular 
visions of social/political history and senses of personhood precluded by the post-socialist 
official histories and mainstream politics.  
Support to the “nation-state” during the liberation period derived from specific 
interests and expectations and depended on the individual’s experiences of socialist history. 
Retrospectively, I cannot answer how national subjects were produced during the liberation 
movement and how/why these national subjects failed to fashion themselves in terms of 
liberation period ideals later. The data suggest that in the late 1980s and early 1990s the 
liberation movement was successful in making disparate social and cultural worlds 
commensurate with the social ideas and economic imaginations and created discourse with 
which different people could identify (cf. Povinelli 2001).  
In this chapter I discuss “nation” and “liberation” as primarily revealed in the spaces 
of social interaction, identification and feeling rather than aspects of the political and 
symbolic/ideological order. I am interested in individual relationships to nationalist ideals 
which are produced in dialectical/dialogical process of incorporating knowledge about 
“nation” and “liberation” and reproducing it in terms of personal experience. Invoking 
nationalism in the discussion of liberation movement texts I follow Verdery’s understanding 
of nationalism as “the political utilization of the symbol nation through discourse and 
political activity, as well as the sentiment that draws people into responding to this symbol’s 
use” (Verdery 1993:38).93 “Liberation” refers to the values of statehood, sovereignty and 
independence from the USSR.  
                                                 
93 This understanding of nationalism differs from studies in political science, which focus more on 
mass mobilization (e.g., Burg 1996), nationalism and the state (e.g., Gellner 1983), nationalism as a form of 
politics, as a political doctrine or political ideology (e.g., Breuilly 1982, Griffin 1999). 
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7.1 SOCIAL TEXTS OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT94 
In Lithuania the fall of socialism started in the late 1980s and was epitomized in the Sąjūdis 
movement and the proclamation of independence in 1990. The liberation movement 
produced new symbolic regimes of identification which justified the politics of that time and 
legitimated new relations of power and authority. The new post-socialist elites delegitimated 
the socialist period and socialist identities in order to establish themselves as rightful players 
in the new post-socialist states as well as to further economic and political reforms (cf. 
Tismaneanu 1998). 
The master symbols of the liberation movement were “nation” and “liberation.”95 
Ideologies which employed the symbol “nation” differed from the Soviet-period utilizations 
of “nation” in attempts to link “nation” to “state” using the supposed norm of European 
democracy of self-determination. “Liberation” marked the process through which the 
“nation-state” had to emerge. The rebirth of the nation was envisioned to go along with the 
economic, political and cultural reorganization of the state and had to follow “Western” 
ideals (e.g., constitutional democracy, civil society, and Christian values). “Nation” in 
Lithuania was redefined in the context of the Western tradition of “nation-states.”  
The leaders of the liberation movement promoted a new history which negated 
Soviet-period official versions that emphasized the “nation’s” or “people’s” brotherly 
coexistence within the USSR. It denied Lithuania’s voluntary integration into the USSR in 
1940 and defined the period of the Soviet Republic of Lithuania as an occupation. The new 
version of history derived its power from unofficial pasts and the memories of the silenced. 
These pasts and memories reproduced history of the Soviet period in terms of oppression 
                                                 
94 This section, “Social texts of the liberation movement,” interprets discourses of the leading 
newspapers of the liberation period (1988–1991): Komjaunimo tiesa, Lietuvos rytas, Atgimimas, Lietuvos aidas, and 
Respublika. In this part I also use the data from my article “Ethnographic Note on Nation: Narratives and 
Symbols of the Early Post-Socialist Nationalism in Lithuania.” Dialectical Anthropology. 2003. Vol.27. No.3–4. 
P.279–295.  
95 “Nation” and “liberation” were differently promoted by various actors. The idea of the 
independence of Lithuania was first publicly voiced by the Lithuanian Freedom Union on August 23rd, 1987 
at the meeting by Adomas Mickevičius’s statue in Vilnius. Sąjūdis and LCP members had different opinions 
about independence as the liberation movement progressed (see Senn 2002). 
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and resistance. As in other post-socialist (see Verdery 1996) and postcolonial contexts (see 
Kelly and Kaplan 2001), suffering and victimhood were the popular rhetorical figures of the 
new tradition in imagining “nation.”96  
The liberation movement accumulated and recirculated new moral capital, i.e., a 
capital rooted in defining certain values as correct and upholding them (Verdery 1996:106), 
which had special currency in all of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Actions of 
Sąjūdis’ representatives were the moral ones in defense of a nation as a moral community. 
As in Russia the innocence of the relatively powerless was a form of moral power (cf. Ries 
1997). The language of morality produced a moral “us” and a morally inferior “them” (see 
Herzfeld 1997, Moore 1993) and located “them” within an inferior spatial and historical 
order, such as the symbolic space of the “East” (cf. Bakić-Hayden and Hayden 1992, Said 
1995, Todorova 1994, Wolff 1994). “They” were thought of in association with tyranny and 
uncivilized actions that did not manifest Christian moral or human values. Attributing moral 
significance to political ideas was a way to sacralize them and remove from the category of 
the debatable (see Moore 1993). 
“Soviets” and “Soviet state” became “others” who exercised illegitimate authority and 
power, damaging national consciousness, destroying the nation in the economical, political, 
cultural and spiritual sense.97 The “Soviets” were shown to be “occupiers,” guilty for the 
suffering and misfortunes of the Lithuanians.98 The “Soviet state” was narrated as an evil, 
totalitarian, uncivilized, immoral and inhuman empire.99 The attribute of “Soviet” was also 
associated with injustice, demoralization, dehumanization, conformity, disorder, toadyism, 
                                                 
96 Victimization and suffering narratives are popular across Eastern Europe. Poland appears in Polish 
historical works as the “Christ of nations,” whom the nations around it unjustly crucified; generations of 
Czechs have been raised with the image of their nation as martyr. Hungary’s and Romania’s historians have 
presented their nations as suffering for the salvation of Western civilization (see Verdery 1996). Kelly and 
Kaplan (2001) argue that in postcolonial contexts (in Fiji or Hawaii) mobilization of suffering and victimhood 
was grounds for political and social rights in the post-World War II nation-building era. 
97 See, e.g., Pečeliūnienė, L. “Iš tikrųjų, kodėl puolame komunistus?” (“Why do we attack 
communists?”). Lietuvos aidas. 06/06/1990. No.11. P.3.; Lankauskas, R. “Kartūs sovietinio palikimo vaisiai” 
(“The bitter taste of the Soviet heritage”). Lietuvos aidas. 09/28/1991. No.196. P.4.  
98 According to popular narratives of that time, the history of Lithuanian economic and political 
development would have paralleled that of the Scandinavian countries, if not for the Soviet annexation. 
99 See, for example, Juozaitis, A. “Laisvė arba ideologijos mirtis” (“Freedom or the death of 
ideology”). Komjaunimo tiesa. 12/19/1989. No.240. P.2. 
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bureaucracy, lying, hatred, power, violence, vandalism, coercion, misinformation, 
provocation, brutality, and insidiousness.100 Even the same categories that were thought to 
be properties of the “West” and the “Soviet state” like “bureaucracy” were presented 
differently. Soviet bureaucracy was ideological, unqualified, undeveloped, and brutal, while 
Western bureaucracy was civilized; it was progressive, qualified, and effective.101 Most 
failures of national politics after the establishment of independence were seen as due to a 
“Soviet consciousness,” “the damaging impact of Soviet rule” and impossible to transcend in 
less than ten years, until a new generation will mature.  
Like elsewhere in Eastern Europe the “West” became one of the most significant 
symbolic spaces of identity (cf. Schöpflin and Wood 1989). The “West” and “Europe,” 
where the “nation” was imaginatively relocated, were linked to democracy, freedom, 
civilization, morality and spirituality, legitimacy, Christianity, humaneness, and truth.102 
“Europe” and the “West” were something to be achieved. It was claimed that Lithuanians 
have to “develop an understanding that Lithuania is a European state and Lithuanians are 
Europeans.”103 On the other hand, many discourses included Lithuania in Europe. The 
comparison of Vilnius with Athens (there is still a newspaper titled “Northern Athens,” 
(“Šiaurės Atėnai”)), searching for the center of Europe in the geography of Lithuania can be 
considered to be the strategies that defined Lithuania as a European state.104  
                                                 
100 See Klumbytė, Neringa “Ethnographic Note on Nation: Narratives and Symbols of the Early Post-
Socialist Nationalism in Lithuania.” Dialectical Anthropology. 2003. Vol.27. No.3–4. P.279–295.  
101 Juozaitis, A. “Sąjūdis po rinkimų” (“Sąjūdis after elections”). Komjaunimo tiesa. 12/06/1989. 
No.231. P.1–2. 
102 See, for example, Juozaitis, A. “Laisvė arba ideologijos mirtis” (“Freedom or the death of 
ideology”). Komjaunimo tiesa. 12/19/1989. No.240. P.2.; Pavilionis, R. “Europos Forumo Lietuvoje gairės” 
(“The marks of the European Forum in Lithuania”). Komjaunimo tiesa. 12/09/1989. No.234. P.1–2. 
103 Pavilionis, R.. Interview by S. Urbonavičiūtė “Lietuvos—Europoje: yra ir bus” (“Lithuania in 
Europe: in present and in future”). Komjaunimo tiesa. 12/09/1989. No.234. P.1. 
104 The appropriation of the “East” and the “West” varies in different nationalisms. In Romania, 
Hungary, Russia the “West” was associated with material and technological advancement, civilization, liberal 
democracy (see Gal 1991). In Georgia history embodied resistance to alien tyranny as the “East” and situating 
the nation as the “West” (Jones 1994). The symbolic geography expressed by the “East” and the “West” was 
part of Yugoslav cultural politics in the early 1990s (see Bakić-Hayden and Hayden 1992). Later discourses 
about the “East” and the “West” were included in the rhetoric of nationalist conflicts. In nihonjinron, the 
Japanese ideology of Japanese culture and identity (see, e.g., Yoshino 1992), the “West” appears as a cultural 
category defined by such characteristics as rationality, individualism, materialism, heterogeneity, etc. In Japan 
the “West” is opposed as well as absorbed by domesticating the “foreign” (see Ivy 1995, Befu 1993). 
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Most Lithuanian narratives presented the liberation period as a state of transition. 
The prevailing discourses on transition corresponded to conventional transitology 
paradigms, which presume passing from one stage to another (see Burawoy and Verdery 
1998). Lithuania was to pass from the Soviet system to the Western or European one, from 
totalitarianism to democracy, and from despotism to civilization. The new stage was thought 
of as a new epoch, the transition itself was seen as the way (the hard way, the way to 
freedom, to Europe). There was a tendency to see Soviet times as a historical parenthesis, 
i.e., a deviation from the “normal” historical period as revealed, for example, by the rhetoric 
of the “lost years.” In 1990, Vytautas Kubilius, the well-known intellectual, stated that “it 
must be remembered that in Lithuania there was no political life for 50 years.”105 Acting for 
independence and establishment of the state were viewed as the only possible ways out of 
such non-existence as well as contemporary problems.  
Like other nationalisms, nationalism of the liberation movement in Lithuania 
communicated “nation” and “national identity” through the symbols related to kinship terms 
which helped to introduce national discourses in the more familiar terms of local experience 
and forced one to act in defense of what is familiar and natural (see Herzfeld 1997, 
Anderson 1983). For example, it was claimed that “Lithuania is not going to forget its 
sons,”106 that “the earth gave shelter to the most faithful children of Lithuania,”107 that the 
memorial is dedicated to those who died, for “all our sisters’ and brothers’ freedom and 
independence,”108 or that collaborators with the Soviets (kolaborantai) know the taste of the 
“blood of Lithuania.”109 Many discourses referring to “nation” or “Lithuania” attributed 
                                                 
105 Kubilius, V. Interview by Žemaitytė, A. “Nepriklausomybės šviesos pakerėti” (“Fascinated by the 
light of independence”). Atgimimas. 02/21–28/1990. No.8. P.12. 
106 Editorial. Atgimimas. 01/1991. No.2. P.1. 
107 The editorial by Liutkevičiūtė, I. “Atsisveikinimas—kaip priesaika” (“Farewell like an oath”). 
Lietuvos rytas. 01/17/1991. No.8. P.1. 
108 Zaikauskas, V. Commentary on the February 16th meeting in Kaunas. Atgimimas. 02/21–28/1990. 
No.8. P.2. 
109 Ganusauskas, E. “Koks Lietuvos kraujo skonis?” (“What is the taste of Lithuania’s blood”). 
Lietuvos rytas. 01/17/1991. No.8. P.2. 
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human qualities to them. For example, N. Michailovas writes: “personally, I have never seen 
Lithuania so calm, healthy, persistent and resolute in its attempts to achieve its aims.”110  
Nationalism develops a particular political aesthetics which is essential to imagining a 
nation as well as to developing political love for it. As the first quote of the epigraph 
illustrates, “homeland,” one of the major nationalist symbols, can be beautiful, beautiful like 
the blueness of the sky. The cited song “Dear Lithuania” is a national song, often sung 
together (or instead of) the national anthem. In the verses not included in the epigraph the 
poet Maironis, an important national figure himself, writes about pretty valleys of streaming 
rivers, hills green with forests, the thinking dark river Nevėžis, wonderful white mansions in 
green gardens, churches shining with the strength of love and prayer, as well as the joy one 
feels on hearing the familiar sounds of singing birds, seeing the setting sun, and feeling the 
calmness of the evening. In these lines, the homeland communicates sensual information 
and is physically bound to the individual. Physicality becomes a means for aesthetic 
contemplation and it is an emotional detour of imagination in producing the “self” in terms 
of the “homeland.” Such imagination, introduced in political contexts, acquires political 
meanings. Political love as expressed in a willingness to die for one’s homeland (or nation) 
can be understood as action in terms of what is familiar and natural (cf. Helzfeld 1997) as 
well as of what is physically related, identifiable and aesthetic.  
The nationalism of the liberation movement aimed to transcend individual and local 
differences, uniting all people in a single unitary identity (cf. Herzfeld 1992). It aimed to 
transform fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning, since nations “loom out of an 
immemorial past” and “glide into a limitless future” (cf. Anderson 1983). Nationalism was 
an ontology, a doctrine about the essence of reality (see Kapferer 1988), and ideology of 
social identities. It produced the imagined community of a “nation-state,” defined in terms 
of the Western tradition of “nation-states” (see Hobsbawm 1990, Anderson 1983, Kelly and 
Kaplan 2001). While popular support of the liberation movement in the late 1980s and early 
1990s in most Eastern European and former Soviet Union states cannot be questioned, 
                                                 
110 Michailovas, N. “Nacionalinis klausimas ir… nacionalizmo kvapas” (“The national question 
and… the breath of nationalism”). Komjaunimo tiesa. 09/12/1989. No.175. P.2. 
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among most of the informants interviewed in 2003–2004 “nation” was not imagined in the 
liberation movement social texts, which invited me to ask how they experienced the liberation 
period, what they think about it as well as about the values of “freedom” (“liberation”) and 
“nation.” 
7.2 (DIS)CONNECTIONS: LIBERATION, NATION, AND SELF 
Right after the deadly confrontation between the Soviet Army forces and unarmed citizens 
in Vilnius on the 13th of January, 1991, I was visiting a family in a town near the largest 
village which became the object of my study 12 years later. A mother of three small children 
preparing lunch told me that her husband was in Vilnius by the TV station the night when 
the Soviet forces attacked the station. He returned home safely. She said she would have 
been proud (būtų didžiavusis), if her husband had died for the homeland (už Tėvynę), not 
meaninglessly.111 Being a teenager at the time, I reacted first with surprise, and later with 
admiration. My admiration was indicative of an emerging belief about a meaningful death for 
the homeland. Like many others at that time I was being produced as a national subject with 
particular ideas about homeland, nation, state, and self.  
Post-socialist history can hardly be interpreted to have produced subjectivities that 
were in the making in the early 1990s in the sites I researched. 12 years later, during my 
research, nobody talked about meaningful death for the homeland, nation or freedom. 
People questioned the leaders’ commitment to liberation period ideals, expressed 
disappointment, speculated what went wrong and rearticulated “nation” and “liberation.” 
                                                 
111 Some pictures in the newspapers of 1990–1991 and books covering the liberation period invoke 
death for freedom. For example, the picture by R. Šuika records the protest action of July 31st, 1991. The 
woman has a poster stating “Freedom, you [enemies] will not be able to shoot us down! LCP bandits!” 
Source: Lietuvos aidas. 08/01/1991. No.150. P.1. The picture by Z. Nekrošius records one of the meetings of 
the liberation period. Some people hold the poster: “Freedom, you are more precious than life.” Source: 
Atgimimas. 03/21–28/1990. No.12. P.1. In the picture by A. Žižiūnas people address international audiences 
by holding posters in English and Russian during M. Gorbachev’s visit on 01/11/1990. One poster states: 
“Freedom, you are more precious than life.” Source: Šlekys, J. 1991 Atgimimo Balsai. Vilnius: Vyturys. The 
picture which records a meeting after the deadly events of January 13, 1991 documents the statement: “We 
will die, but we will become free.” Source: Lietuvos Aidas. 01/19/1991. No.13. P.2. 
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Moreover, very recently different questions, antithetical to the rhetoric of the liberation 
movement, such as “Is independence still a value?”112 or “Why do many Lithuanians think 
that the Soviet period was the best in history of Lithuania”113 or even “Why do Lithuanians 
love Russia?”114 were being asked in the mainstream and leading media sites.  
Alfred Erich Senn argues that the “hard realities of life—inflation, corruption, 
economic crises—have dampened spirits, but there is still an underlying consensus that 
independence was essential” (Senn 2002:18). Senn’s impression is not confirmed by multiple 
surveys, media presentations, and discussions of voting which express concerns that 
independence may not be essential for many people. For example, in the Lithuanian 
Television program “Spaudos klubas” (“Press club”) edition “Is independence still a value?” 
moderator Audrius Siaurusevičius presented the data of the “Omni laikas” survey, according 
to which more than one third of the population of Lithuania (34%) thought that the worst 
period in history of Lithuania was the previous 15 years of independence. The answer to the 
question posed during the survey—“Which period of history of Lithuania was the least 
successful to Lithuania?”115—was understood by the program moderator and by most 
participants as the answer about the independence of Lithuania.116 The moderator asked 
whether the results should be viewed as a misunderstanding of history and as a dangerous 
tendency. The program was an examination of a part of the national body which was the 
“other:” the sick (alcoholics in villages were mentioned), the poor, the non-educated, the 
                                                 
112 See LTV program “Spaudos klubas,” 12/29/2004, “Ar nepriklausomybė dar yra vertybė?” 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/www_misc.spaudos_klubas. Accessed on 05/05/2005. 
113 Ibid. 
114 See L. Donskis “Aukos meilė budeliui, arba už ką lietuviai taip myli Rusiją?” (“The victim’s love 
for his torturer, or why do Lithuanians love Russia so much?”). Klaipėda. 02/28/2005. Cited from DELFI, 
http://www.delfi.lt/archive/index.php?id=6138259. Accessed on 03/12/2005. 
115 In Lithuanian the question is: “Kaip manote, kuris Lietuvos istorijos laikotarpis buvo 
nesėkmingiausias Lietuvai?” During the program the participant of the program, the well-known philosopher 
A. Šliogeris, questioned the survey and said that the results of the survey do not represent the opinions of the 
majority in Lithuania. V. Savukynas, the editor of “Omni laikas” responded that the survey was representative 
and people who think that the period of independence was the worst in the history of Lithuania were 
between 40–60 year old, little educated, living in rural areas or a town, which is a center of a district, and 
relatively poor. See LTV program “Spaudos klubas,” 12/29/2004, “Ar nepriklausomybė dar yra vertybė?” 
(“Is independence still a value?”). http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/www_misc.spaudos_klubas. Accessed on 
05/05/2005.  
116 Lionginas Šepetys decisively argued that people, answering the question, responded about their 
concerns, rather than independence. 
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elderly, voting populist (thus, dangerous) and having a false consciousness about history of 
the “nation.” These people were thought not to value independence. In a sense the program 
was an attempt to articulate the anomie of [the other part of] society and to create a language 
to speak about it. In the end, the program left a feeling that an individual saying that the 
independence period was the worst for Lithuania, was even more exotic, anomalous, and 
illegible than he/she was at the beginning of the discussion.  
Some other explorations of the body national were more successful in articulating the 
anomie of a part of society. For instance, addressing nostalgia for Russian culture, popularly 
assumed to be indicative of opposition to the post-socialist nation-state of Lithuania, 
Leonidas Donskis, a well-known philosopher, argued that nostalgia indicates Lithuanians’ 
love for Russia which is a victim’s love for the torturer. “Culture,” which Lithuanians were 
nostalgic about, meant so-called Russian pop music and films117 and even Russian swear 
words.  
The investigations of the national body in these examples relied on special data. In 
the program on independence, the 30% who thought that the Soviet period was the worst in 
the history of Lithuania as well as the 26% who thought that the other periods were the 
worst are mentioned only in introducing the survey. In the second example, the multiple 
presence of American and European music, films, and swear words as well as very popular 
Latin American soap operas seem not to distort the picture of love for Russia. Those who 
listen to the present Russian pop music, i.e., the younger generation, hardly experienced any 
“torture” from the metaphorical torturer “Russia” in Soviet times, as they were too young to 
experience it.118 However, they stand for the “collective experience” of some others as well 
as for collective “love.” In the first example, answers about history are translated into an 
objection to independence.119 My data suggest that dislike of the post-socialist period, the 15 
years of independence, does not directly translate into objection to independence, but rather 
it is dissatisfaction with post-socialist developments and the social locations people inhabit 
                                                 
117 Donskis talks about the special type of films—“černuchos,” i.e., particular action, often violent, 
movies. 
118 I argue to the contrary that those who experienced “torture,” to use Donskis’s vocabulary, are 
least likely to “love Russia” (see chapter 3). 
119 L. Šepetys, one of the participants in the program, made a similar point. 
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(see the discussion below). In both examples contingent and dynamic “social” is translated 
into definite “political.” Unintentionally, intellectuals create spaces of their own conceived 
“danger” by producing “political” where it (in most cases) does not exist,120 as well as 
creating ideas that they then aim to negate. By voicing such questions publicly and providing 
metaphors, like “victim’s love,” intellectuals articulate images and make them available for 
public consumption.  
Such questions in the media or intellectual thought genealogically are traceable to 
liberation period social texts which established the essentiality of independence and the 
foreignness of Russia. The issues covered articulate (dis)connections among liberation, 
statehood, nation, and people. Such (dis)connections emerging from the memories of the 
liberation period are the object of the two following sections. 
7.3 REMEMBERING THE LIBERATION PERIOD: FROM SUPPORT TO 
DISAPPOINTMENT 
Recalling the liberation period, many informants did not remember details of events. People 
often remembered the return of the Cathedral in the center of Vilnius (a museum during 
socialist times) to the religious community, which was sometimes phrased “Brazauskas [the 
First Secretary of the CP of Lithuania in 1988] returned the Cathedral to the people.121” 
They also remembered the historic event Baltijos kelias (the Baltic Way122), guarding the TV, 
radio stations or the Parliament. Some informants invoked solidarity among people at that 
time, when many shared food with others, or prepared food for those who were on 
                                                 
120 I mean it does not exist as “political” for people whose actions and beliefs were addressed in the 
examples analyzed. 
121 Senn (2002) discusses the return of the Cathedral as the decision of a coterie of the party and the 
government—A. Brazauskas, V. Sakalauskas, V. Astrauskas, and L. Šepetys. A. Brazauskas was the one who 
delivered the message about returning the Cathedral to people publicly (see Senn 2002:232–233). 
122 On August 23rd, 1989 a human chain of about 2 million people called Baltijos kelias (the Baltic 
Way) linked hands in one continuous chain and connected all capitals of the Baltic countries of the USSR 
(Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia). The “Baltic Way” was a protest action against the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact 
of 1939 according to which the Baltic states became part of the USSR. 
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voluntary duty at a strategic object. Others said that they watched TV or listened to the radio 
all the time. Several informants remembered reading newspapers almost the whole day. 
Those who did not get involved in any events of 1988–1991 explained why they were absent 
from the stage of changing history: they were sick or had to take care of their sick parents, 
several remembered that their child was born at that time. Only a few stated that they were 
intimidated, and, therefore, did not participate. A fifty year old seasonal worker from the 
largest village recalled: “I did not participate anywhere. We were home. Oh my God, we 
listened to the radio, [we wondered] what is going to happen. They said such things! You 
could have gone to prison for that…” Certainly, there were others who were not interested 
in the liberation movement and did not get involved in it in any sense.  
 For most informants the period of the liberation movement was an emotionally 
intense experience. It was a time of unrestrained enthusiasm, euphoria, hope, danger, unity, 
happiness, and joy. Albina, a Catholic and a librarian, a Kaunas resident, in her early 70s, 
described it this way: 
I was like crazy. They all were like crazy. We ran around with those flags… Not me so 
much… well, it was very important to get back the flag [to get permission to use the tricolor 
flag of the interwar Lithuania publicly], but we were sick with independence as well [wished 
for independence]. It was a great event [the liberation movement]. The only such event in our 
lifetime… hard to understand. Like a river overflowed. Everything rose to the surface. It was 
incredible. For some it was like a war. All those meetings. […] I was so interested in the 
media. Freedom to know. I read newspapers probably six hours a day. […] They all wrote 
about astonishing events. It is hard to tell everything, you have to experience it.  
Memories of enthusiasm reflect understanding of the liberation movement in terms 
of the nationalist ideology of that time. In the testimonies of the events of January 13, 1991 
in “Lietuva 1991.01.13: dokumentai, liudijimai, atgarsiai,” collected after the January events, 
it is claimed that people were chanting (skanduoti) “Lithuania” and “freedom” at the time 
when tanks moved on people and even when they saw people dying and being injured by 
bullets. When asked during interviews why people went to guard the TV towers and radio 
stations, several villagers responded (however, without present enthusiasm for the liberation 
period) that they “wanted Lithuania”, “free Lithuania” (Pijus, the village head (visuomeninis 
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seniūnas)). Then, in the early 1990s, nationalist rhetorical figures like “free Lithuania” must 
have signified a particular understanding of what free Lithuania might be.  
Understanding of the liberation movement ideals can partly be reconstructed from 
ideas about past expectations among which the most popular was the hope for a “better 
life.” In most cases a “better life” meant economic and social well-being. Vitkai from the 
second largest village remembered that everyone was expecting a “better life,” a “very good 
life.” Marija’s husband Žygimantas, in his late 30s, the father of two small children who had 
come to the village with his family two years ago because of hardships they experienced in 
town claimed that he “expected a better life. Better than it was. It was good, we wanted 
more…” When asked what a better life would be like, he pointed out that freedom was the 
only advantage of the post-Soviet period, however, he did not see any other “good.” Povilas 
from the second largest village remembered that people were willing to tighten their belts 
and mow with scythes for a better life. However, Povilas sighed “we mow with scythes for 
thirteen years already… and nothing got better.” Julija, a retired teacher, remembered that 
during the liberation movement people cried from happiness. She also thought that it was 
going to be better and easier: 
I thought it was going to be different. Earlier [in Soviet times] I used to get 63 rubles. And had 
to live [a meager life]. I thought it was going to be easier. But it did not become easier… We 
all expected, expected a lot, well, it turned out the other way. And now it’s painful somehow… 
some get higher pensions, but mine was always small. 
Expectations of the “better life” invoked “economic imaginations” (cf. Williamson 
2002) which possibly absorbed people into a Lithuanian type “DM-Nationalismus123” during 
the liberation period (Habermas 1990, see also Borneman 1993, Habermas 2001). Such 
imaginations were articulated and recirculated in political fields. For example, in Sąjūdis’ 
electoral program of 1990 the major slogan declared: 
 
“NORMAL LIFE TO INDEPENDENT LITHUANIA! 
                                                 
123 “Deutschmark Nationalismus.” 
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DEMOCRACY, INDEPENDENCE AND WELL-BEING ARE 
INSEPARABLE!” 
 
Explanations why expectations were not met and the liberation movement promises 
were not fulfilled derived from various social texts. Some maintained that independence 
period promises were not fulfilled because the former communists came to power, others 
pointed out the incompetence of the new political leaders. In congruence with liberation 
movement rhetoric some claimed that it was 50 years of Soviet rule which had destroyed 
existing potential, work ethics, and good habits. Some informants argued that people’s 
selfishness, stealing, and appropriation ruined all hope for the future. The doctor, in his late 
50s, reasoned that thievery was the major problem: 
The most important problem—I don’t know whether our elites understand this or not. 
Whether our major leader—Landsbergis, understands this or not. You cannot disappoint 
people like that. […] We did not overcome the Soviet system. No, we cannot overcome it. 
Not yet. […] Greed and thievery [gobšumas ir vagystės] govern Lithuania.  
Invoking globally circulating discourses on “terrorism,” the doctor continued: 
Neither Russian… nor American… or some kind of Arab intelligence, well, you know… 
terrorists. Only one problem… which every Lithuanian has… [it is] thievery. If you get rid of 
that, everything is going to be in order. Lithuania will be like America [the United States]. 
More often greediness and thievery were attributed to the political elites than to 
people or “Lithuanians.” The state in its various personalized forms, such as “mafia,” “clan,” 
or “lords” (see chapter 6), was thought to inflict harm on Lithuania, to deceive the nation or 
the people, and to corrupt independence. Invoking reasons unavailable in the discursive 
market in Lithuania in 1988–1991 (thus, explicitly present-informed readings of the 
liberation movement) one seventy-year-old woman argued that she did not go to events 
organized by Sąjūdis because “the ones who were wiling to make millions joined the 
movement. […] They deceived people and now they are pleased.” Elvyra, a doctor from 
Kaunas, argued that the political elites betrayed people and the common cause:  
They [political elites] close their eyes before the common people. […] They see only 
themselves. Now those who organized Sąjūdis, the signatories [of the Act for the 
Independence of Lithuania] require high pensions. On TV one said that they were there at the 
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most dangerous moment. They were not alone [the people were with them]. They were in 
warm rooms, while thousands were outside [in the winter time]. Thousands surrounded the 
building [the Parliament building], no one [the enemy] could get through the mass of people. 
Another woman, in her late 40s, claimed that she used to run to collect signatures to 
promote Sąjūdis, but now she was disappointed. She objectified her disappointment by 
talking about the elites who want to profit from serving in the Seimas: 
Everything seemed so beautiful, so… almost like communism in the other times. And now… 
I am disappointed. Totally disappointed. I don’t even go voting. I know that nothing good will 
happen. What is going on in the Seimas? What is going on? They watch only themselves. They 
stay in the Seimas to secure good pensions for themselves. […] Unbelievable… 
Some argued that the state was recaptured by other elites and that “nothing has 
changed:” 
We did not go anywhere [to meetings, etc.], but we celebrated with everyone. Something had 
to happen, something had to happen… You know… Something. The Russians were forced to 
leave, the army was gone… Well… Now everyone is disappointed. The same ones who were 
in power earlier, they are in power now. Nothing is changed [a 73 year old pensioner from the 
largest village, a woman]. 
Memories of the liberation movement variously reiterated the differences between 
the political elites and the people and reproduced existing hierarchies. Valius, a village 
sexton, in his 50s, claimed that he helped them, i.e., the political authorities, when he guarded 
the radio station: “You know when we had to be, we were there, to protect the radio station. 
I was two nights there. When those Russians wanted to take it over. Well, when it was 
necessary, I helped them. I have nothing against it. If it was needed now, I would help them 
again.” On another occasion Valius claimed that he helped Landsbergis, but he would have 
to think, if Brazauskas [former President and the Prime Minister] asked for help. Valius’s 
reluctance indicated distrust of the current leaders and their political endeavors resonating in 
other informants’ discourse. 
As in the examples cited above, other recollections of the liberation period were 
mediated by the experiences of post-socialism. Adolfina remembered how she was standing 
by the TV tower and the Parliament. She started to cry when she remembered the deadly 
night of the 13th of January, 1991. “Well,” the woman said, “it is better now, I think so…” In 
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a regretful tone, she said that she “waited for Lithuania… but for a little bit different 
[Lithuania]. I expected it to be different.” When I asked what she had expected, the woman 
responded: “A more just one. More just.” A family from Kaunas in their early 60s expressed 
their disappointment with liberation period ideals by articulating disapproval of changed 
social and moral orders: 
Anelė [Albertas’s wife]: Everyone believed strongly [in liberation movement ideals]. [People 
thought] that it was going to be better. That it will be beautiful and clean… Later bad things 
started to appear. How to say… If that selfishness had not emerged… The ideas were very 
good. We loved our homeland [Tėvynę]. Later the homeland sort of degenerated… 
Albertas: People were unified. Before independence. Later sores opened [labai daug negerovių 
atsirado]. Earlier you loved to meet a person at night. Now, if you meet one, you don’t know 
what to do. To hide or what. You don’t know how [one will behave]… 
Anelė: Once he was almost beaten up.  
Albertas: Three young guys. Recently, maybe half a year ago. I saw them coming straight at 
me… I moved to the other side. I heard one saying: “if that old geezer [senis] had not moved, I 
would have beaten him up [nuskynęs]. […] Lithuanians were united, no differences. And then it 
started… that materialism. Some emerged as rich. Others as poor. It is so painful that most 
people live poorly… even those who work… common people, they work honestly. They can 
hardly make ends meet. 
Memories of the liberation period reveal that many people supported liberation, even 
if they did not participate directly in events of the liberation movement. Most people also 
connected to its values like freedom, Lithuania, and nation(-state). Values and symbols 
apparently were the means to think, as illustrated in recollections of expectations of better 
times rather than a means to think certain things. At present “liberation” is a means to 
discuss post-socialist changes, like changes in moral and social orders which in some cases 
resulted in marginalization. Knowledge about nation and liberation is incorporated into 
various post-socialist texts which reflect particular subjectivities and social locations. 
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7.4 MEMORY AND EXPERIENCE OF SOCIALISM 
The informants’ relation to the liberation period depended on their individual experience 
and identity in the Soviet period. Genadijus, a Russian-born militiaman who lost his job in 
the early 1990s as, according to him, a “non-national cadre,” said that liberation period 
events were a “circus.” Unlike others, he refused to accommodate to the newly framed 
history and claimed that everything was staged. Genadijus argued against the discourse of 
mass patriotism, devotion, and voluntary defense of strategic objects, thus, against people’s 
commitment to “liberation:” 
We saw that circus. […] When they talk on the TV, everything seems beautiful and interesting. 
[…] However, those [who guarded the telephone company, which he could observe from his 
apartment balcony] were drinking all the time. They got alcohol and money [to guard the 
telephone company]. 124
Milda, Genadijus’s wife, a Lithuanian herself, agreed with her husband’s opinion that 
it was a “circus.” She claimed that she was scared to death during that turbulent time of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. She asserted that at rallies people used to call on the Russians to 
“go home,” to leave for Russia. Her son who carried a Russian last name, was asked at the 
beginning of the school year why he did not “go home,” i.e., to Russia.  
The freedom of Lithuania, or any other nationalist ideals promoted by Sąjūdis were 
also irrelevant to Jadvyga N., the party secretary from the largest village, in her late 50s. By 
speaking about social injustice, social and economic insecurity at present she reiterated the 
“better times” (the better Soviet times) discourse: 
Jadvyga N.: O.K. Russians were occupiers, but which occupier built factories and roads for us? 
[…] The occupier wasn’t so threatening as many say now. I always used to say, it is not going 
to be good under the Lithuanians, then [in Soviet times] we had jobs. […] I was responsible as 
a party secretary if a worker [darbo žmogus] had any concerns. I had to offer subsidized trips to 
resorts or health spas, there had to be everything for the working class. […] We used to go to 
the Caucasus, Crimea, etc. […] In Soviet times people lived very well. […] Now you can live 
                                                 
124 Several of the informants in the second largest village remembered being paid for guarding the 
radio station close to the village. Pijus, a village head, remembered that he used to get five rubles for a 24 
hour stay. However, those who were paid did not think that pay for their service compromised their 
patriotism. 
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the way you want. Now young girls are hookers. Can you imagine that? We were young, I was 
young, we used to study, we graduated, got jobs. And now? […] What does this system give to 
the young? Can a poor village kid ever finish college [like in Soviet times]? […] The Soviet 
system had many advantages. You can say what you want. Many advantages.  
Neringa: How about the freedom of Lithuania? 
Jadvyga N.: What is the difference, if it is free or not. 
Membership in the Communist Party did not mean that an individual developed 
opposition to nationalist values. Some former CP members’ claims provide evidence that in 
the Soviet-period subjectivities were produced in terms of both communist and nationalist 
ideologies (cf. Verdery 1991), whose co-existence is negated in post-socialist public 
discourse. Nationalist ideology helped former CP members to relate to liberation period 
nationalism. Mykolas, the vice-president of a large enterprise in Soviet times and a CP 
member, argued: 
I think 90% of us, Lithuanians, welcomed the declaration of independence. Whatever we 
were, but we were Lithuanians in our souls [kokie ten bebuvom, bet visi dūšioj buvo lietuviai]. It is 
wrong that now some are called sugar beets [runkeliai] and others not. […] Freedom is one of 
the major individual needs. There is national identity, a national state…[…] You want to be 
yourself. In your own state. It does not matter how it was, but we thought that we were 
Lithuanians, that there is a Lithuania. 
Many informants who were former CP members were actively involved in the 
liberation movement.125 Egidijus, a former chief engineer in the largest village, in his early 
50s, participated in many events. He also thought that it was going to be “better.” Like many 
others he remembered how people were united, shared food and clothing. According to him, 
a short time changed everything dramatically. “We became materialists, we started to 
measure everything by money. This is not good. This is wrong.” Rolandas, an art expert and 
former physicist, in his mid 40s, also participated in many liberation movement events. 
When asked why he did, he responded that because of herd mentality (bandos instinkto), 
patriotism, which “was important then.” 
Many deportees, political prisoners, dissidents, and others who experienced the 
Soviet period as oppression (see chapters 3 and 4) were the most enthusiastic about the 
                                                 
125 See Senn (2002) for discussion of involvement of the former CP members in Sąjūdis.  
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liberation movement. They were also least likely to express disappointment with the present. 
Even if expressed, disappointment was not articulated in nationalist rhetoric; the ideals of 
independence, nation, Lithuania were not questioned (see chapter 3). The liberation 
movement gave a social cause and historical significance to their biographies of, in many 
cases, imprisonment, persecutions and/or deportation as well as experiences of social 
otherness in Soviet times. As argued in chapter 4, liberation also granted them visibility, 
recognition, and respect. A woman, a deportee, in her early 70s, argued: 
How could one not wait for Lithuania, oh my God [said in a diminutive form dievulėliau]… it 
looks like everything terrible has passed. […] During Sąjūdis it was terrible. My son… I could 
not keep him home. We all went to Kaunas to defend [the strategic objects, such as the 
Parliament, the TV and radio stations, etc.]… 
In the villages the older inhabitants’ memories of the first independence instigated 
indifference and skepticism towards the liberation movement events. Memories of the 
hardships of childhood and remembered poverty in the interwar period prevented them 
from expecting “anything good of Lithuania.” Pranė asserted that she “was not happy about 
Lithuania, because I knew it is wrong. I grew up under that Lithuania. I knew that then 
children could not go to school, nothing…” Vitkus from the second largest village, in his 
early 60s, recalled that his mother used to say that then also (like in his opinion now) “lice bit 
(utėlės graužė). Then people wore bast shoes (vyžas). Now it is the same in the village. Well. 
Now we have shoes, but one cannot always get those foreign shoes [he referred to the shoes 
people get at the second-hand stores].” Aldona remembered that when she was going to 
vote for a “free Lithuania,” she was warned against it by her older neighbor. The neighbor 
said that “you don’t know what Lithuania was like. We know… It was very hard then. If a 
farmer had a forest, horses, land, he had to pay high taxes. Under Smetona [the President of 
interwar Lithuania in 1919–1920 and 1926–1940] nobody lived well. One could earn five 
litas harvesting hay the whole day. That’s all. We lived well [said ironically]. It is a fairy tale 
that they lived well.”  
Pranė, the oldest inhabitant from the second largest village, rendered her vision of the 
past of the interwar Lithuania: 
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There wasn’t anything good, dear. It is only that it was Lithuania, that the name was precious. 
For common people there wasn’t anything good. We worked, we experienced hardships [mes 
vargom]. My father passed away, there were a bunch of us [children] left. I was eight years old 
when I started to earn my bread [išėjau sau duonelės užsidirbti]. I herded pigs at farmers’ with my 
feet cracked and bleeding [Pas ūkininkus ganiau kiaules, vargau… kojelėm sutrūkusiom, kruvinom]. 
Like other children. There were no social benefits [niekas tų pašalpų nedavė], nobody could get 
education [niekas į tuos mokslus nėjo]… We are uneducated. I don’t remember any good deeds 
under Smetona, nothing was better. Those who had, they had. Those who had land, they were 
farmers. […] You have to know what a shepherd’s bed was like. There was a wide bench by 
the door, by the wall. If you got a poor quality [prastą] pillow, that was it. You had to sleep 
huddled up [susirietęs]. That’s your bed. You did not have a better one. Nobody made you 
delicious pancakes nor delicious porridges. […] The sun was rising and you were in the field 
already with the herd. 
Pranė’s sad and poetic story is very reminiscent of literary works which were part of 
the school curriculum in Soviet times, such as Juozas Baltušis’s “Sold summers” (“Parduotos 
vasaros”). Depictions of childhood poverty and serving at others’ farms were part of Soviet 
times ideological narratives about exploitation of the poor by the rich in interwar Lithuania. 
Pranė’s like some others’ experience resonated with the Soviet time texts of exploitation and 
drew to them for ideas and images by reproducing them into the present. 
Voices questioning “liberation” and liberation period ideals emerge from post-
socialist spaces of social otherness and from resistance to post-socialist history which 
delegitimates socialist identities and lived experiences. Connections to the liberation 
movement depend on Soviet-period subjectivities reproduced into post-socialist history. 
Various social others of the Soviet period, like the deportees, were among the most 
enthusiastic about the liberation period. Even if their social status decreased in post-Soviet 
times, they rarely questioned nationalist values. Most former CP members also welcomed the 
liberation movement. However, as the following discussion shows, some of them could not 
imagine a “nation” which denied them social status, power, and authority. There were also 
others who were indifferent or opposed to the liberation either because of memories and 
experiences of poverty in pre-war World War II independent Lithuania or because of 
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dispositions connected to being a Russian militiaman, negatively addressed by the symbolic 
regimes of the liberation period.  
Many who were enthusiastically involved in liberation period events disassociate from 
liberation period ideals in various registers of disappointment. Social texts, such as the ones 
promoted during the liberation period, may successfully integrate people into an imagined 
community, but later cease to provide ideas for articulations of social history and self as a 
social subject. The disappointed and those opposed to independence in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s emerge as a community of common discourse. However, they are not necessarily 
a community of common values. The disappointed may still think that liberation was 
essential (à la Senn [2002]), while those opposed to liberation may not share such 
essentialism. The latter constituted the minority among informants. 
 (Dis)connections between liberation, nation(-state), and people emerge not only in 
memories of the liberation period, but also in discussions of post-socialist official history of 
past oppression and present freedom. In the following section I argue that conceptions 
about present freedom and past oppression are dependent on subjectivities and lived social 
histories. 
7.5 REARTICULATIONS: LIBERATION, NATION, AND SELF 
7.5.1 Particular freedom 
In chapter 3 I argued that Soviet-period social history was experienced as foreign and 
oppressive by those who constituted the opposition to the Soviet regime because of their 
background and social location. In many cases these people employed nationalist ideas to 
justify their stances. They rarely challenged or negotiated ideals including “liberation” and 
“nation.” I defined “oppression” as a relative category as individuals felt “oppressed” in 
different ways. It was the experience of foreignness of social history which limited individual 
agency and which produced an individual as the other through various agents employing 
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techniques of constraint and discipline. From my perspective, there is no general oppression 
of a society, only oppression in particular cases, when the relationship between an individual 
and history is perceived as being one of foreignness and constraint.  
Informants who did not perceive Soviet-period social history as foreign and 
oppressive usually presented it in common sense idioms. Common sense is not a neutral 
body of knowledge (Geertz 1983). According to Gramsci, common sense is the sedimented 
body of knowledge and beliefs about the world and how to act in it (Gramsci 1971:503 cited 
in Linger 1993, Woost 1993). In the case of the informants to be cited, it was a belief in 
particular rules according to which the Soviet-period society developed and articulated itself. 
Like in Wolfgang Becker’s film “Good Bye Lenin!” (2003) these rules were a basis for 
people’s meaningful existence. 
In “Good Bye Lenin!” the protagonist Christiane Kerner suffers a heart attack and 
falls into an eight-month coma. During her unconscious period, the Berlin Wall falls. The 
doctor puts Alex, Christiane’s son, under strict orders not to cause her any excitement 
whatsoever. Alex understands that the fall of socialism may be threatening to his mother 
since she was a dedicated communist. Alex engages in the restoration of socialism by 
collecting old jars from garbage to satisfy his mother’s craving for pickles, producing TV 
reports about the socialist GDR, furnishing the apartment with things from GDR times, and 
wearing old clothes. Inconsistencies are explained in socialist idioms—“Coca Cola” becomes 
the “sozialistisches Getränk” (socialist drink), since the original flavor of Coca Cola, as 
confirmed by the “international scientists” in the fictive news, was developed in the 1950s in 
laboratories of the GDR. This explains the Coca Cola advertising Christiane observes 
outside her window. To justify foreign cars, things, and people, Alex and his friend produce 
a TV report on West Germans striving to live in East Germany in search of the good life 
they did not have in their capitalist country. At the end of the film the narrator Alex claims 
to have produced a country that never existed. The GDR he created for his mother was the 
GDR he would have liked to have lived in.  
The film is a parody of socialism and socialist subjectivity. However, Christiane is the 
only one who is happy and peaceful while others are exiles in their own country. The former 
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first German astronaut Sigmund Jähn, the idol of Alex’s youth, is a taxi driver. His neighbor 
Ganske complains that “they betrayed us and sold us out,” “for that we worked for 40 
years.” The doctor remembers that in socialism they all were valued people. The narrator 
Alex comments that “heroes of work became unemployed” and “everything she [his mother] 
believed dissolved into air in a few months.” Life was deprived of meaning and value. Being 
able to prolong the socialist common sense, Alex saves his mother’s recognition as an 
honored socialist society member, the value of her interests, the significance of everyday life 
and work. Christiane’s commitment and passion for society’s progress remain meaningful. 
Alex’s actions are guided by existentialist reasoning (see Frankl 1984)—the failure to find 
meaning and a sense of responsibility in existence may deprive his mother of existence.  
During the interviews invocations of less fully conscious, transparent realms of 
thought—the experientially insistent world of common sense—were claims for power, 
authority and legitimacy as well as for the recognition of past-informed selfhood, values, 
entitlements, and moral dispositions which were challenged and even denied by a post-
socialist society of common sense and post-socialist national history. During my research, 
informants who invoked socialism as common sense history claimed not to have 
experienced any oppression in the Soviet period.126 Violeta, in her early 50s, from a town 
near the largest village, a former CP member with a high standing in Soviet times (and at 
present), disputed others’ notions of oppression: 
I didn’t feel any opposition… I don’t know, nothing embarrassed me. Maybe because there 
weren’t some kind of deportees in my family who were against… my grandmother was, for 
example, a sharecropper’s daughter [kumečio duktė]. A sharecropper’s daughter, illiterate. She 
couldn’t read or write. My mother, she had four diplomas, she had a PhD, was an associate 
professor [docentė]. How could an illiterate person who used to do the laundry for Jewish 
                                                 
126 In some cases informants who invoked the Soviet past as common sense relations used 
metaphors of “lie,” “absurdity,” and “constraint” speaking about particular events or processes. However, 
these events or processes were not selected to speak about their relation to social history and they were not 
indicative of generalized negativity towards it. For example, Mykolas, the former vice-president of a large 
enterprise in Kaunas and a former CP member, now the manager of an insurance company, a Kaunas 
resident in his early 70s, claimed that he did not feel any constraints in the Soviet times. He asserted that “you 
did not have to talk things which you were not expected to talk about,” but he did not interpret this as a fact 
of oppression.  
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people, worked at the mill… […] And she could let her children go to college. If not for the 
Soviet government [tarybų valdžia]… who would my mother be today, or I? 
Violeta did not even think that there was an occupation. As evidence Violeta, like 
Jadvyga N. cited above, invoked cracks in the roads, which only now have started to be filled 
(pradėjo kelių duobes užglaistyti). In an ironic tone she pointed out that these roads were made 
by “occupiers.”
Virtually any commodity, event, or process can function as evidence for oppression 
or the absence of it and can serve as a medium for objectifying the oppressed nation or for 
rendering any other images of society. Thus, the cracks in the roads indicate the lack of 
concern of the present “state” or the elites, while the building of roads is a sign of care, 
concern, interest, and thoughtfulness which are the opposite to what “occupation” popularly 
implies. Similarly, learning Russian at school, writing dissertations in Russian, Russian as the 
language of administration, officials and neighbors from Russia, Russian taxi drivers in 
Vilnius, Russian movies at the cinemas and Russian programs on the TV could become signs 
of russification or, on the other hand, simply designate common sense relations and 
occurrences. When asked to respond to ideas about russification, Juozas, a former director 
of an Institute and a CP member, argued that there was “neither russification, nor the 
KGB.”127 He remembered a phone call in the late 1980s when somebody called and said 
that Juozas had to know that the person on the phone, a KGB officer, was responsible for 
him. This was only once in his lifetime and he did not pay any attention. Juozas told me: 
“You know. I have not seen him. Well, I said. It’s fine. Be responsible for me. So what?” 
Violeta, Juozas’s wife, argued:  
Russification… You had to write your dissertation in Russian. There were more textbooks in 
Russian, well, for more serious work. Well, but wait. Compare Lithuania and Russia. It is no 
doubt, they had a great pool of scholars, all the potential, I think. Well, not all, but much 
greater. What’s the difference—now English is everywhere. 
Egidijus, a former chief engineer of the kolkhoz of the largest village, also disputed 
ideas of russification. He argued that one had to know Russian. “There were Russians; 
                                                 
127 The KGB was invoked not accidentally. In post-Soviet history russification and the KGB belong 
to the same “species” by classifying them together as, usually, evidence of oppression. 
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Russian was the language of communication between Lithuanians and Russians in Lithuania 
and outside it.” According to Egidijus, now “we learn English. You can also question that. 
Artificially [dirbtinai] you can speak whatever you want, but… Certainly it is good to know 
several languages.” Egidijus, like Juozas and Violeta, articulated Soviet-period interactions as 
common sense relations. 
The socialist society of common sense tends not to share other subtexts of 
oppression, such as oppression of religion, prohibitions to celebrate national holidays or 
cultural events like Christmas, Easter, or St. John’s day. Violeta and Juozas argued that in the 
Soviet period people could celebrate Christmas and Easter. Furthermore, they questioned 
the ideas about religious oppression: 
Juozas: Now they say that people were not allowed to celebrate Christmas and Easter.  
Violeta: Everyone celebrated. 
Juozas: Nonsense. Why do they talk that way? Everybody… dyed … eggs … 
Violeta: And took to work, with all the directors… listen, they used to drink, celebrate… 
Juozas: Why say that you had to hide… nonsense.  
Violeta: Nobody hid anything.  
Juozas: My mother was a teacher. Nobody hid away, always, you know, celebrations were not 
special, because there was not much to put on the table. Well.. you sit and have a Christmas 
Eve dinner, some herring… neighbors come, you know. Or alone… but nobody hid away. 
[…] Only if someone of ours [like coworkers] informed, if they were angry at someone, they 
could… you know, Lithuanians are like that… informed… 
Violeta: Intrigues… If there was a complaint that a director celebrates something or the like… 
You had to respond. All [people] were the same, but you had to respond. There were cases 
when you were called… on the carpet [pakviestas ant kilimo]. […] And in regard to religion, I, 
for example, how to say it, my grandmother also was a free thinker [laisvamanė]. Me too… 
nobody insisted [that she go to church], and I did not miss [religion]. 
Juozas: We gathered on the second day of Christmas or the second day of Easter. I never 
punished anyone [employees] for not coming to work on that day. No-one. I didn’t even give 
it a thought… We used to celebrate on those days at work. There wasn’t any serious work on 
those days. You had to answer phone calls. It wasn’t that you could leave. You [just had to] 
listen, listen [if the telephone rings]… […] 
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Juozas: Now they say that the practice of religion was restricted. God knows.128 I cannot say 
anything—I have not experienced that. I remember in my village there used to come old ladies 
[bobikės], and they used to say: “Director, we have to go to church.” I used to give them a van, 
and they went to church… The church [in “his” village] was closed. A small village. Now it is 
open. On the other hand, we rebuilt that church.  
The district authorities helped us… […] There was an inspector. He wrote that the church is 
an unrelated object [to the construction work carried out in the village]. I told him, it’s for our 
people. He hid his notebook then. 
Juozas’s words about having to answer phone calls on the second day of Christmas 
or Easter as well as dissuading the inspector from recording the church as a “foreign” object 
confirm that rules constraining behavior (from others’ point of view) were present. 
However, Juozas approached the rules differently from the others who invoked the same 
rules to prove their arguments about oppression. For Juozas these rules were the habitual 
ways of communication over which he had authority because of his position as the director 
of an Institute and as a member of the CP. Furthermore, contrary to what Juozas seems to 
indicate, it is likely that religious events, conflicting with officially supported ideology, were 
not celebrated openly because they challenged official ideology and state authority. As 
representatives of the state and as interested sides in the continuity of official articulations 
and rules of social history on which their social standing rested, people like Juozas could 
hardly celebrate Christmas as a religious ritual or, for example, go to church. It might have 
been a cultural event deprived of its religious and nationalist readings and still celebrated 
behind closed doors. Juozas’s assertions about the possibility to celebrate Christmas in 
Soviet times is a way to reclaim authority at present, to produce his subjectivity congruent 
with official versions of present history as well as to restore legitimacy for the Soviet-period 
past and for socialist identities. 
For others, the celebration of Christmas was a collision of different moral worlds, 
defined by conflicting knowledge and power relations. Unlike Juozas, for Algirdas, an 
engineer from Kaunas, in his 40s, born outside Lithuania in a deportee family, religious 
celebrations were acts of disloyalty. It was disloyalty (or opposition) first of all which was a 
                                                 
128 The words used were “Perkūnas žino.” Perkūnas is the Thunder god, one of the three most 
important gods in Lithuanian mythology. “Perkūnas žino” like “God knows” is an idiom. 
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basis for cognitive dissonance, i.e., the experience of contradiction between official ideology 
and practice, such as was embedded in Algirdas’s experience: 
Christmas was celebrated, but nobody had to know about that. Because my father was a 
professor, my mother also worked at the Institute, if somebody found out, you can be fired 
immediately… You had to be cautious. I remember, if there was a party… at home… if 
someone tried to tell a political anecdote, my father changed the topic in order not to talk 
politics at home when there were many people. You never know who may hear… 
The independence period did not produce the understanding that there exists a 
general liberation of society. As in the case of oppression, freedom was always particular and 
individually imagined. Some informants questioned freedom by presenting discrepancies 
between official texts on liberation and their personal experiences. Stanislova, the former 
director of the school in the largest village and a teacher at present argued that she felt free 
in Soviet times, when she could go to the theater as many times as she wanted, go to a 
restaurant with her friends, exchange visits, and travel: 
How to understand freedom?… If you hang a national emblem and a flag, are you free? Do 
you live in free Lithuania then? I wasn’t persecuted… maybe some were… persecuted and 
repressed. They may have a different opinion. I didn’t see any kind of oppression. Now if you 
go to a shop, you have to leave [because you cannot afford to buy anything]. There is no 
freedom for me now… 
Similarly, Daiva, a school janitor from the largest village, argued that independence 
did not bring liberation from anything. According to her, Lithuania is not free. She reasoned 
that one cannot say anything freely. “It is as it was. For example, at work… you cannot say 
anything that can be disliked… […] You cannot express all your opinions. You have to 
behave as you are told… Earlier? All the time it was like that. Earlier we were even less 
afraid to say what we think…”  
Marija, a former city resident, an unemployed young mother of four children doubted 
the value of freedom because of the economic difficulties her family experienced: 
I do not care whether Lithuania is free or not, if it is so difficult to make a living. […] It is free 
and there is nothing to eat, no money, no jobs. […] I did not experience any harm or injustice 
under the Russians. Nothing. I lived much better then and I would be happy, if that time came 
back. 
  203
For others the period of independence brought freedom and the possibility to author 
their own lives and inventions. Unlike Marija from the second largest village who claimed 
that she does not care about freedom, “if it is so difficult to make a living,” Saulius, a well-
known historian, in his late 40s, argued in response to people like Marija that for him 
“freedom of speech is much more important than the quality of food.” Talking about the 
Soviet period he remembered that he had lived in a hermetic structure with several other 
intellectuals whom he trusted. He recalled that he had suffered from feelings of 
hopelessness, impossibility, nihilism, and desperation. In Soviet times, Saulius was critical of 
Soviet-period history in his lectures at the university until the KGB found out. Later, with 
several other historians and students he created an affinity group where members could talk 
as they wished. Saulius argued that studying history had been compensation, because he 
could “live” in another century.  
Thinking about liberation, I asked Rytis, my acquaintance, a historian, in his mid 40s, 
from Vilnius, what independence gave to him. Taking my question as a joke (it has to be 
treated as a joke for subscribers to post-socialist common sense), he send me a list of twelve 
items. The first four were: (1) “I can speak and write freely what I want;” (2) “I can do that 
in the language I choose;” (3) “I don’t feel denigrated by the physical presence of foreigners 
[svetimųjų] as well as by their psychological violence: in the streets there are no foreign 
soldiers, there also are no militiamen in foreign uniforms;” (4) “I regained dignity as an 
individual [kaip žmogus] and as a professional, because Russian language specialists as well as 
lecturers of the Soviet Union Communist Party history are not being paid more for the same 
work than others.”129 For historians Rytis and Saulius liberation gave freedom of speech and 
recognition of them as authors owning intellectual property. In Soviet times an author was a 
link between a product and the socialist state, which controlled an author’s production (see 
Grama 2005). There was a focus on the product and its social(ist) function at the expense of 
the author (see Grama 2005). Post-socialist (intellectual) property regimes provided 
                                                 
129 He also spoke about freedom to travel, awareness that no one can persecute him, that nobody 
tries to force him to join any party or any other political organization, also about the absence of “Soviet 
propaganda” on the TV, etc., that the state of Lithuania is a reality, that he can drink good coffee in a café as 
opposed to coffee mixed with laundry detergent in the Soviet times, and that taxi drivers try to speak in 
Lithuanian in Vilnius.  
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recognition of an author and authorship, and gave venues to accumulate various kinds of 
symbolic, economic, or political capital, circulation of which in socialism was owned, 
hoarded, and controlled by the state (cf. Grama 2005). Thus, for historians Rytis and Saulius 
the post-socialist period was liberating and empowering, while for people like Marija, 
Stanislova, and Daiva it was constraining and marginalizing. For historians or women, 
freedom was conceived in the context of their experiences of post/socialist histories. 
Socialist common sense tended to question the liberation movement and post-
socialist period interpretations of the Soviet period as oppression. Consequently, those 
holding such views negotiated the post-socialist notions of liberation/freedom in an attempt 
to reclaim power and authority and to reassert legitimacy for the social and moral orders of 
the Soviet period. Like oppression, freedom was always particular, ranging from regaining 
power and recognition based on intellectual property to negative experience of liberation as 
constraints of everyday life. Liberation is individually imagined at present—some reject 
“freedom” because it contradicts or is meaningless in respect to their experience of, in many 
cases, post-socialist marginalization. Informants by invoking liberation in terms of a 
particular text position themselves within the meaningful universe of the “social” and 
reproduce themselves as particular social subjects of post-socialist history. 
 
Spaces of negative relationships to “liberation” cover the disappointment with post-
socialist developments of those who supported the liberation movement, continuing 
opposition to “liberation” by those who did not support liberation, and questioning of 
“freedom” by people who think of socialism as common sense history and who in most 
cases also supported liberation. The negativity may be articulated by strong supporters of 
national ideals, as the following section shows; or by people indifferent to “nation” and 
“liberation,” like many of the villagers discussed in the last section. The negative relation to 
“liberation” is the site of plural voices and multiple dialogues with agents of post-socialist 
political history. What is common among these various “communities” is the non-existent 
imagination of a “nation-state.” Absence of such an imagination partly accounts for 
negativity to “liberation,” because, as I claimed earlier, “liberation” was constitutive of the 
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new imagination of the “nation(-state).” To imagine a community of a “nation(-state)” 
would mean to share a specific historic consciousness (including support for liberation, 
which is part of the master narratives of post-socialist history) and to have a particular sense 
of a national self, congruent with liberation period modes of selfhood (like fashioning 
oneself in terms of post-socialist national ideals not shared by most informants130). Most of 
the people I mentioned in this chapter belong to the community of the other imagination—a 
“nation” without a “state.” 
7.5.2 Nation-ness (tautiškumas) 
“Nation” among its multiple meanings is also a relation known as ethnicity, in which the 
nation supposedly comprises all those of common language, history, or broader cultural 
identity (cf. Hobsbawm 1990). Such a relation was conceptualized by German nationalists 
(see Brubaker 1992) who spearheaded by a literary middle class defined the nation in cultural 
terms around the conception of the Volk developed by Herder and the German 
romanticists. Since German nationalist sentiment developed before political unification of 
the nation in 1871, the nation was not conceived in political terms nor tied to the abstract 
idea of citizenship. Instead, nationalists conceived the prepolitical nation as an organic, 
cultural, linguistic, and racial community, as a Volksgemeinschaft131 (see Brubaker 1992). 
Similar conceptions of a “nation” have prevailed in Lithuania where historical opportunities 
to develop “nation” as a political symbol inseparable from the “state” and the values of 
“sovereignty” and “citizenship” have been variously interrupted.132
Understanding of “nation” not linked to the “state” underlies claims in previously 
cited ideas, such as that during post-socialism “Lithuania” or the “nation” was captured by 
the political elites, or social interactions, such as helping the political elites during the 
                                                 
130 For alternative examples see chapter 3. 
131 On the other hand, Brubaker approaches nationality as grounded in political and cultural 
geography (see Brubaker 1992). 
132 But see, e.g., Aleksandravičius, Egidijus and Antanas Kulakauskas 1996 Carų Valdžioje: XIX 
amžiaus Lietuva. Vilnius: Baltos Lankos; Lopata, Raimundas 1996 Lietuvos valstybingumo raida 1914–1918 metais. 
Lietuvių atgimimo istorijos studijos. Vilnius: Mintis. 
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liberation movement to further the elites’ project of independence. In these claims, “nation” 
tends to be associated with “people” while the “state” and the political elites emerge as the 
opposition to “nation.” The conception of “nation” not linked to the state does not explain 
all the range of social interaction, feeling and identification. However, it helps to understand 
a very visible tendency to dissociate “nation” from “state,” and gives grounds to claim that 
questioning of liberation is not problematizing common national (horizontal) belonging. 
Nation is disconnected from the state in conceptualizations of tautiškumas 
(nationness).133 Tautiškumas is usually a relation of a subject to a nation without a state and 
one of the major ideologies about a “nation” in Lithuania. Tautiškumas tends to be defined as 
dispositions of a particular “nation,” as an ethos, a specific culture, a language, and 
traditions, or even genetic information of a particular community. Jūratė, a professor from 
Kaunas, in her early 50s, described tautiškumas as a deep knowledge of a “nation,” of our 
origins, and spirit, also as visible and invisible codes expressed in communication. 
Tautiškumas is also often perceived as preservation of traditions and the cultural/historical 
heritage. Thinking about tautiškumas Saulė, the teacher from the largest village, argued that 
she has established a museum. Together with her students she preserves old things, collects 
examples of folklore, visits the graves of insurgents of 1863, of book carriers (smugglers)134 
(knygnešiai), and of secret teachers135 (daraktoriai), and plans to write a history of the village. 
The major ideology of the nation, tautiškumas, is defined continuously with Soviet-
period ideologies of nation. In the Soviet-period political notions of a “nation,” i.e., notions 
which linked nation to statehood, sovereignty, and national citizenship, were prohibited. 
                                                 
133 There is abundant literature on tautiškumas in Lithuania (e.g., Subačius 1999, Grigas 2001, 
Dumčius 2000). In this part of the chapter I reconstruct tautiškumas from collected interviews from 
predominantly the city of Kaunas (on the villages and “nation” see the last section of the chapter). During the 
interviews I did not ask about tautiškumas. Ideas about tautiškumas usually emerged remembering the liberation 
movement or invoking “nation” in general. Ideas about tautiškumas may coexist with belonging to a 
community of a “nation-state.”  
134 Book carriers, who smuggled the forbidden Lithuanian books in Latin alphabet into Lithuania, are 
considered to be national heroes in Lithuania. They smuggled books printed outside Lithuania to Lithuania 
during the ban of print in Latin characters in 1864–1904. Russian authorities perceived the ban of print in 
Latin as the ban of the Polish alphabet and aimed to distract people of Lithuania from Polish influence (see 
Subačius 2005). They introduced the Cyrillic and legally printed ca. 60 Lithuanian books in the Cyrillic 
alphabet in forty years of prohibition (see Subačius 2005). 
135 Teachers of secret schools during the ban of Lithuanian print in 1864–1904.  
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However, imagination of a “nation” as a realm of cultural traditions, such as folklore, was 
allowed and even reinforced (cf. Creed 2004, see also Verdery 1991, Rausing 2004). 
Independence brought freedom to re/invent all kinds of traditions associated with “nation.” 
Paradoxically, many people conceive the post-socialist period as one of regression from 
patriotism and tautiškumas. Soviet times are approached as the period of deeper tautiškumas 
and more prominent patriotism. Some informants even refuse to share post-socialist 
“nation” as inauthentic. Authenticity is, thus, equated with the transmission through time of 
known traditions, familiar ways to worship and imagine the nation as well as habitual 
objectifications of “culture” and usual associations of “culture” with “nation.” Thus, new 
holidays, which emerged on the social landscape during post-socialism, are interpreted as 
violations of common ways to imagine and celebrate “nation.” Saulė, a teacher, presented 
herself as a patriot, unlike her students who celebrate Halloween and Valentine’s Day. She 
mentioned that on Valentine’s Day the students even stick hearts on the gravestones of 
partisans of Lithuania. Interestingly, both practices—visiting partisan gravestones and 
celebrating Valentine’s Day—are post-socialist. However, the former is based on sign 
substitution (visiting gravestones of heroes is a known practice), while the latter could count 
as an invention which departs considerably from the habitual practices related to sites under 
consideration (cf. Hanson 1989). Thus, while visiting gravestones of partisans was 
interpreted as an act of patriotism and an exercise in tautiškumas, sticking hearts on the 
gravestones on Valentine’s Day was not only an unpatriotic action, but also an illegitimate 
action (defined outside the realm of tradition) in a sacred site of commemorating (and 
re/producing) “nation.”  
Ideas about degeneration of the “nation” or disappearance of tautiškumas are usually 
signs that people find hard to accommodate to various changes. Irena, a Kaunas resident, 
was among those who strongly supported the liberation movement. She regretted that 
liberation brought degradation of tautiškumas. To her mind, in Soviet times people were 
more nationalistic (tautiškesni), especially teachers who used to take children to historic sites. 
Now, according to her, they take students to the circus. Similarly, a Lithuanian language and 
literature teacher from the largest village argued that tautiškumas is disappearing. “Authors 
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[who were part of the school curriculum] are changed […] the classics [Lithuanian] are not 
taught anymore.” She argued that “our patriotism is disappearing as well as knowledge about 
our nation […] how can a child be a patriot, if he does not know his writers?” Thus, 
domestication of the foreign (see Ivy 1995, Befu 1993) or localization of the global (see 
Friedman 1992), like sticking hearts on the partisan graves, coexist with resistance to new 
ideas and practices expressive of “nation” and interpretation of these ideas and practices in 
various registers of regression from “authentic.”  
Informants observed regression of tautiškumas and threat to the “nation” invoking 
language and migration. Irena regretted that in “free Lithuania” people will speak English 
and that the young people will disappear. Signs in English on the shops, supermarkets, also 
advertisements in the newspapers, some use of English words by the young as well as 
English songs on the radio make social space for some disorienting and foreign. For many 
informants, to be a Lithuanian is to speak Lithuanian. Aloyzas, a man, in his early 70s, from 
a town nearby the smallest village, a native of the village himself, argued: 
I agree you have to know [different] languages. The more you know, the better. It’s a 
compliment. But it is a shame not to know your own language. […] Now they don’t know 
their own language, but teach English to small children. Why such subservience [pataikavimas] 
and showing off. On the TV there is too much English. They sing in English. Why? Many 
people don’t understand it. It is the same as swearing.  
Aesthetics of “nation” and patriotism was articulated in the context of Aloyzas’s 
experience: 
There are so many Lithuanian songs. Beautiful songs. Especially the older ones. Post-war 
songs. Pre-war songs. These songs are so beautiful. I think everyone should have an 
understanding about the roots of the nation, about the past, and to think about the present. 
Not like now. […] The nation may die out quickly this way. 
Under the Russians, they thought [about Russian] that it is the enemy language. Looked 
suspiciously. And this… earlier [in Soviet times] people were more patriotic. […] If you are a 
Lithuanian, you have to speak Lithuanian. 
Some considerations about “nation” and tautiškumas express sensibilities about the 
“state.” For example, Aloyzas argued that in interwar Lithuania there were many patriots, 
which is why so many joined the resistance forces when the Soviet Union occupied 
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Lithuania. Aloyzas also thought that present developments—criminality, prostitution, 
disrespect of parents—are signs of degeneration of the nation. He also remembered how 
people used to sing patriotic songs in Vilnius in 1945 by the Gate of Dawn (prie Aušros 
Vartų); how one of his acquaintances who grew up in an orphanage used to say “my 
homeland—my mother Lithuania.” Then, according to Aloyzas, there was “real patriotism. 
People were against the Poles136… strongly. There were real Lithuanians in our village. Not 
like Lithuanians now.” 
The examples indicate that “nation” among its multiple meanings is also a horizontal 
solidarity, a positive interrelationship between people, and a symbol usually dissociated from 
the “state.” During the liberation movement “nation” as an ethnic community was among 
the shared meanings which helped many people to connect to nationalist discourses and, 
likely, to imagine this community as a “nation-state” through liberation. Imagination of the 
“nation” as an ethnic community and horizontal solidarity may have helped to dissociate 
from nationalist ideologies when they ceased to provide meaningful interpretations of the 
lived social history and appealing images for the future, as well as to see “liberation” as 
threatening to embodied subjectivities and everyday lives. It is revealing that questioning of 
“liberation” is not problematizing national belonging and the “nation.” Unlike discussions in 
literature on nationalism where “nation” has fulfillment in a sovereign state (see, e.g., 
Anderson 1983, cf. Borneman 1993), the data from villages and the city of Kaunas suggest 
that statehood, sovereignty, and citizenship, the values of liberal democracies, are not the 
necessary disposition for coexistence in a “nation” (see also Hobsbawm 1992).  
“Nation” no longer mediates the relation between subjects and the state as it did 
during the period of liberation. In this context the liberation movement did not produce a 
new sense of belonging to a “nation-state” and a new “national subject.” Thus, disregard of 
the 15 years of history of independence discussed in intellectuals’ discussions at the 
beginning of this chapter are primarily expressive of individuals’ “false consciousness” about 
the “nation-state” to which liberation (sovereignty) is essential and intellectuals’ “false 
consciousness” about “nation-state” as an omnipresent imagination.  
                                                 
136 The village was part of Poland in 1920–1939. 
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7.5.3 Village spaces 
In village communities positive memories about socialism in most cases did not become 
translated into political support of the “Soviet state” (chapter 1). They were instead 
expressive of critiques of post-socialist developments. However, absence of political support 
of the “Soviet state” did not indicate present support of the post-socialist nation-state. 
Among many who spoke positively about the socialist period there was a significant 
indifference toward the nationalist values and the “nationality” of the state (see chapter 6). 
Furthermore, there was a remarkable disregard and distrust of the imagined “state” (see 
chapter 6).  
In villages, “nation” as in the ideology of tautiškumas tended to be imagined as an 
ethnic community. However, unlike in urban spaces, in ethnically homogeneous village 
communities “nation” was a very indistinct subject of knowledge. “Nation” and “liberation” 
were rarely invoked unless informants were deportees or dissidents or unless I asked 
informants directly to respond to question like “is it important that Lithuania is free” or 
“how to describe what Lithuanians are.” My second question, which was the first that I 
started asking in order to arrive at some knowledge about “nation,” was met with great 
uneasiness to the extent that one woman suggested to me to consult the history books. To 
give the question about freedom of Lithuania was a better strategy and seemed to be more 
compatible with villagers’ ways of thinking and, thus, more congruent with my approach to 
how the research had to be conducted. However, it also yielded little knowledge about 
villagers’ perceptions of “nation” and “liberation.” When asked whether it is important that 
Lithuania is free,137 many villagers answered my question speaking about personal problems 
and reiterating social regressions. For example, Ona said that “We waited for Lithuania so 
much. Everyone waited. But when it came, we did not become happier. Because pensions 
got lower.” Ona argued that she does not live as badly as some others. Unlike some others 
who claimed that they “want the Russians back,” she did not question “independence.” 
                                                 
137 I asked this question when it was not clear what an informant thinks about “freedom,” 
“independence,” and “nation.” This question was most frequently given to people who spoke in terms of 
better socialist times and post-socialism as regression.  
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Another woman, in her late 70s, responded that she does not like present-day Lithuania, 
because “there are no middle class people. Either you are rich, or poor.” Julija, a teacher 
from the largest village, thought that “maybe it would be OK, if the elites would bring order. 
[…] For Lithuania it is worse, and worse and worse. If not this, then that…” Julija also was 
disappointed because the kolkhozes were destroyed, many people lost their jobs and 
“became like serfs.” A man, in his early 80s, responded to the question about free Lithuania: 
“you do what you want, you steal, you beat up others…” Marijona, the wife of the village 
head, argued that people wanted freedom, however, one has to know how to use freedom. 
She asserted that “On the other hand, under the Soviets the youth had to work; they had to 
finish school. It was different. Now there is freedom, but it takes people in the wrong 
direction. Especially the young: there are so many crimes…” 
“Nation” was rarely invoked in memories of other periods, such as World War II or 
the post-war resistance movement and collectivization. In villages of Lithuania people most 
often recall that in the postwar period “some came at night, the others during the day” 
[partisans and the NKVD]. In the old cemetery of one village the graves of the “ones” and 
the “others” are side by side. The difference is in the inscription on the gravestones. Those 
gravestones which are on the graves of supporters of the Soviet forces have the note “died 
at the hand of bourgeois nationalists” (Žuvusiam nuo buržuazinių nacionalistų rankos). The 
gravestones on the graves of partisans who joined resistance forces are marked with the 
words “died tragically” (Tragiškai žuvęs). Both notes address the non-existing Soviet state and 
are congruent with the portrayals of official history in the Soviet period. 
Frances Pine argues that the narratives about the war in villages of Poland were 
different from the war stories of the cities and that the stories of villagers were notable by 
the relative absence of political grand narratives (Pine 2002:165). Similarly to villagers in 
Lithuania, in Poland people remembered that “The Germans came during the day, and when 
we heard that they were coming we hurried to the forest with the cow and hid till it was safe. 
Then we’d go home, and someone would come and say ‘the partisans are coming’, so we’d 
take the cow back to the forest, and hide again through the night.” The most vivid account 
of this which Pine has recounted for one village ended poignantly “We never knew what was 
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happening, and we were always afraid” (Pine 2002:164). Pine argues that village stories “are 
all in different ways about insiders and outsiders, us and them, ourselves and strangers” 
(Pine 2002:165). In Podhale village, the dangerous stranger is a constantly looming and 
encroaching presence. An enemy presence is rarely clearly identified, nor is a situation read 
as a meeting with an enemy, or placed within the context of a wider political, national or 
international conflict. Pine argues that “the situations are understood from a totally local 
perspective, and outside places and political events are remapped so that local place becomes 
the centre of the story, and the stranger/outsider take their identity only from their lack of 
relation to that place and those people” (Pine 2002:166). As in villages of Lithuania, in 
Podhale there is little or no sense of nation, of the nation in Europe, or of Europe as an 
entity, spatial, historical, political, or cultural. Furthermore, in villages in Lithuania there is 
little sense of liberation and of global political and symbolic spaces like the Soviet Union, 
Russia, or the European Union.138
Ideas of “nation,” “Lithuania,” and “liberation” had more currency in the smallest 
village community in the eastern part of Lithuania which during the years of the first 
independence of Lithuania in 1918–1939 was part of Poland. Thus, while people in other 
villages share memories about their poor childhood in interwar Lithuania, villagers in the 
smallest village read their poverty as an outcome of being under Polish rule. Pre-World War 
II Lithuania is remembered as a prosperous country from which people used to smuggle 
white salt and lighters. Purity, taste, light and technology stand for the imagined “reality” 
people experienced as children, tasting white salt and trying lighters. This reality is contrasted 
with their present experience “under Lithuania.” While many think that it was “better to live 
under the Russians,” they think of the present Lithuania as “unreal,” “corrupted by the 
elites” or “communists” (see chapter 6). Lithuania is continuously reproduced as a fantasy in 
the way it was produced “under the Poles,” “under the Germans,” and “under the 
Russians.” It is reproduced in the textual idioms which emerged because of the different 
                                                 
138 Some recent anthropological analysis of ideological multiplicity in Polynesian nation imagining 
expresses concern that the idea of the nation itself is only weakly developed, particularly in rural areas of these 
countries (Philips 2004:244). However, as some studies show in ethnically heterogeneous contexts and in 
response to state sponsored nationalism like in socialist Romania awareness about “nation” was present in 
villages (see Verdery 1983, Kideckel 1993). 
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socio-political context of the village as well as because of perceptions of the boundaries 
between ethnic groups. 
 
The liberation period did not produce the lasting “imagined community” (Anderson 
1983) of a “nation-state” among many informants mentioned in this chapter. Rather, it 
produced “represented communities” (absent from this chapter) in which the legal, ritual, 
and electoral processes of post-socialism appeal to particular parts of the population (cf. 
Kelly and Kaplan 2001). These “represented communities” share consistent visions with the 
liberation movement texts about “nation,” state,” and “liberation.” A “national citizen” with 
a definite sort of historical consciousness and sense of a self belongs to a “represented 
community.” However, there are multiple “unrepresented communities” which also have a 
particular sense of historical consciousness and of a self. Like many villagers, or advocates of 
socialist common sense, these people negotiate and question official versions of history by 
rearticulating them in idioms congruent with their own experience of the past and by 
claiming recognition, authority, and legitimacy. While these people can be identified as an 
anomalous part of a national body because they question liberation, they often claim 
legitimacy employing the logic of the same symbols, i.e., ideas about nation, state, and 
liberation. Such ongoing and plural articulations of “nation” and “liberation,” the continuing 
struggle for meanings, are definitive of many post-socialist nationalisms and post-nationalist 
contexts and is common in times of historical changes (cf. Strathern and Steward 2001). 
They document the ongoing renegotiations of the social contract on the “nation-state” of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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8.0  CHAPTER 6: AUTHORITY, POWER AND THE POST-SOCIALIST STATE 
Though Ioan was politically irrelevant, it was politics that 
sealed his fate. As rationing took hold in the early 1980s and 
work requirements and consumption regulations became more 
stringent, Ioan again took to acting out his drunken rage. One 
night he railed at length at state, party, and Ceauşescu without 
realizing that two security officials were in the bar. When 
someone warned him of their presence, he ran out in panic. 
Though repercussions were hardly likely, he hanged himself 
that night (David Kideckel The Solitude of Collectivism 1993:162) 
 
Menenius: … you slander 
The helms o’th’state, who care for you like fathers,  
When you curse them as enemies. 
First citizen: Care for us? True indeed! They ne’er 
cared for us yet. Suffer us to famish, and their store- 
houses crammed with grain; make edicts for usury,  
to support usurers; repeal daily any wholesome act 
established against the rich, and provide more piercing 
statutes daily to chain up and retrain the poor. If the 
wars eat us not up, they will; and there’s all the love 




                                                 
139 Cited in Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall 1994 “After the Nation-State: Citizens, 
Tribalism and the New World Disorder.” London: HarperCollinsPublishers.  
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However one labels the state—a “mask” by Abrams, an “abstraction” invoking Marx, a 
“fetish” by Taussig, or a “fantasy” following Lacan (see Navaro-Yashin 2002:186), the state 
appears to be an insurmountable presence in individuals’ lives.140 I explore the state’s 
presence by looking at people’s understanding/experience of authority and power. I argue 
that “cynicism” is the common structure of feeling embedded in perceptions and 
experiences of the state (cf. Žižek 1995, Navaro-Yashin 2002). It entails negativity, distance, 
and irony, rather than resistance towards the state. Cynicism has an effect on the lives people 
live and the communication they carry out with the “state” whether in everyday 
conversations or at elections (see chapter 7). Cynicism encapsulates criticism of the state 
officials, seeing them as self-interested, immoral, and unjust. It also manifests distrust of 
authorities and difference between the people and the power elites. Cynicism derives from 
various contexts: the experience of power as omnipresent, immutable, and threatening 
prevalent in the socialist period, beliefs in equality and loyalty to a collective which no longer 
inform social relations, mysterious post-socialist circulations of wealth from which people 
feel completely or partly excluded, experience of destatization (Verdery 1996) and 
subalternity (see chapter 1).  
In this chapter the “state” (valdžia141) refers to the political authorities. In several 
instances the “state” (valstybė142) refers to a country governed by a political community. The 
term “political imagination” is borrowed from C. Humphrey to refer to “the swirling 
diversity of other, more open, multi-sited and creative opinions and ideas [in addition to 
discourses of leaders] produced by all sorts of people” (Humphrey 2002:259–260). “Power” 
is the ability “to structure the possible field of action of others” (Foucault 1984:428) and to 
                                                 
140 See Gupta (1995) for the state’s presence in everyday life in India and Navaro-Yashin (2002) in  
Turkey.  
141Valdžia is a Lithuanian term used by many informants. It means: (1) right or power to subject to 
one’s will; political rule; (2) the state, government (colloquial); (3) agency with a higher power; (4) a ruling 
person/people (figuratively). Modern Dictionary of the Lithuanian Language. 2000. Keinys, S. et al., ed. Vilnius: 
Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidybos institutas. (Dabartinis Lietuvių kalbos žodynas. 2000. Vyr. Red. St. Keinys. 
Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidybos institutas). 
142 Valstybė means: (1) an organized political community having the highest power; (2) a country 
governed by such a community. See Modern Dictionary of the Lithuanian Language. 2000. Keinys, S. et. al., ed. 
Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidybos institutas. (Dabartinis Lietuvių kalbos žodynas. 2000. Vyr. Red. St. 
Keinys. Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidybos institutas). 
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carve out significance (Wolf 1990, Mintz 1985). “Authority” is an individual or a group of 
individuals, as in the term “elites” or “state officials,” having the power to structure the 
possible field of action of others. “Authority” stands for power itself.  
8.1 POWER, AUTHORITY, AND MORAL DISCIPLINING 
Drawing on the vignettes from my fieldnotes, I present several personal experiences of 
power and authority in post-socialist contexts. Two of these vignettes are primarily 
explorations of myself as a subject involved in production and consumption of post-socialist 
power and authority. 
8.1.1 May, 2004. Kaunas. On a bus. 
I was on a bus deep in my own thoughts. The bus was going down Vydūno Avenue, it 
passed “Telekomas,” the phone company. Suddenly my attention was grabbed by an ad on 
the back of another bus in front of me. On one side of the ad there was a smiling policeman 
with his arms crossed. Below the image was a question, “are you afraid of anything?..” I 
couldn’t understand the other side of the ad well. The bus turned and disappeared from my 
sight. It seemed that they were advertising the Internet, but I was not sure. I regretted that I 
did not have my camera with me and that I had looked too long at the policeman trying to 
figure out why he was in the ad. Everything lasted about a minute. I hoped that I would see 
the ad again, but I didn’t, and I never met anybody else who had seen it.  
 
Advertisements provide good data because advertisers appeal to common knowledge. 
In this case, I think, the common knowledge was the experience/understanding of authority 
which could be invoked by the image of a policeman and the question “are you afraid of 
anything?” A smiling policeman, not a very common image, was a means to attract the 
observer’s attention and astonishment. Thus, an individual would notice the advertisement, 
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would be surprised by the juxtaposition of a smiling policeman and the question about one’s 
anxieties, and then probably learn how to overcome his/her anxieties by studying the second 
part of the advertisement. However, at least in my case my attention was fixed on the 
policeman and I even failed to understand what was being advertised. Seeing the policeman 
and the question “are you afraid of anything?” created all kinds of associations. I thought it 
was absurd to place an image with a policeman and such a question on an advertisement 
because, my thoughts flew ahead, one should not be afraid of a policeman. In post-socialist 
public spaces, presumably informed by the rule of law, a policeman should not be staring at 
you with the question whether you are afraid of anything. His smile was friendly, but it also 
could be understood as ironic because of the question about anxieties and because a “smile” 
is “privatized” in post-socialist times—it is primarily observable in private spaces, such as 
private restaurants. I understood the question as an attempt to invoke anxieties of authority 
that were prevalent in Soviet times. Then anxieties were fostered by a specific understanding 
of power as immutable, unpredictable, and threatening. It was reinforced by the official 
state-sponsored culture of seriousness, to borrow Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1981) terminology. A 
monopoly on power belonged to the party-state, “all-powerful, pervasive, and coercive, with 
violence against the citizen always a possibility” (Verdery 1996:219). As humorist Jaroslav 
Hašek wrote in the essay “Mister Inflexible” about a traveler on a train to Prague and a tax 
collector, people may have felt guilty, even if they had not done anything wrong: “This 
glance [of a tax collector] pierced the soul in such a way that even a person who had nothing 
to declare felt guilty somehow.”143 Reinterpreting Kideckel’s (1993) example cited in the 
epigraph, understanding/experience of power as threatening may have sealed an individual’s 
fate, as it did in the case of Ioan who hanged himself, even if repercussions were hardly 
likely. Similar power may have been invested in authorities, such as policemen. Therefore, 
the advertisement appeared to me as an example of an improper way to construct a public 
and post-socialist space.  
                                                 
143 See Hašek, Jaroslav “Ponas Nepalenkiamasis.” Šluota. 12/23/1983. P.12. 
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8.1.2 August, 2004. Kaunas. At Elena’s. 
Today I visited Elena. We talked about this and that. And then she started to tell me how 
she got the apartment she lived in.  
After her marriage Elena and Andrius, her husband, lived in Švėkšna. Later they 
moved to Tauragė because Andrius got a job there—after the war [World War II] engineers 
were employed to rebuild cities. Then they lived in Šilutė and looked for a possibility to 
move to Kaunas. Fortunately, in Kaunas construction of a hydroelectric power station was 
started and Andrius got a job there. They moved to a very small apartment near Kaunas. 
Elena tried to get an apartment in Kaunas, but, as she remembered, no one was willing to 
deal with her. As I understood it, she appealed to the Executive Committee (Vykdomasis 
Komitetas144). Then she went to Vilnius several times. At first, in Vilnius, nobody was willing 
to deal with her. But one day at the reception desk she was connected over the phone to, 
according to Elena, some kind of a responsible secretary. She told the secretary over the 
phone that she could not go home and tell her four children that she “had been to Rome 
and did not see the Pope.” This helped. Elena was received.  
Elena put all kinds of documents on the secretary’s table. She also had a document 
saying that Andrius had tuberculosis. She thought it might help her somehow. The secretary 
did not raise her head and kept writing until Elena finished explaining her situation. When 
the secretary raised her head, Elena asked her what she was supposed to tell her students 
[Elena was a school teacher], if asked, where she lives. It is said, she recalled telling the 
secretary, that the Soviet state provides for teachers, and that students can ask how the state 
provides for me. What will I have to tell to my students?… Elena said that before her visits 
there were some kind of ideologues at school and they spoke about provisions for teachers. 
They were the source of her ideas. After these words the secretary dropped her pen and 
asked where Elena had worked under the Germans [Lithuania was occupied by Nazi 
Germany during World War II]. Elena responded that she did not work at that time. The 
secretary asked then where her husband had worked. She told her. Apparently, they were 
                                                 
144 The major state executive institution of a city. 
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“clean” since both did not work for the Germans, the “enemies” of the Soviet state. Then 
the secretary called the Executive Committee in Kaunas and asked why Elena’s family had 
not been assigned an apartment. She was told that they had to stand in line, that Andrius has 
been working in Kaunas for a short period of time, that he needed to work there for five 
years or so before he could get in line. They got the apartment with two small rooms and a 
very small kitchen close to the center of Kaunas. Elena lives there now. 
 
Elena’s story about multiple attempts to reach authority has a ritual significance. She 
was engaged in a formal and non-daily routine behavior and believed in a power which had 
to change her life. She compared going to Vilnius and meeting the secretary to going to 
Rome and meeting the Pope. It was a “big moment” (see Turner 1967) of her life. The 
analogy with Rome and the Pope might have come to her mind because she was a Catholic. 
Telling the secretary that she wanted to see her as the “Pope” might have meant recognition 
of the secretary’s authority, but might also have carried possible danger because it was a 
religious analogy disapproved of by the Soviet state. The comparison certainly attracted the 
secretary’s attention because it was unexpected and unusual, like the smile on the 
policeman’s face and the question about anxieties in the previous example. The significance 
of Elena’s appeal was also accumulated in multiple and persistent attempts to reach 
authority, about which the secretary was aware. 
The ritual significance of actions derives from Elena’s understanding of the 
complicatedness of her endeavor, or in the framework of my interpretation—her encounter 
with power (personified in the authority of the secretary) which Elena had to outwit, 
manipulate, please and make benevolent. Her bringing all kinds of documents shows that the 
situation was not predictable and clearly articulated and that it was not clear how/whether 
the authority can be influenced. Immutability of power was reinforced by the multiple 
refusals to accept her in Kaunas and later in Vilnius. These refusals reaffirmed Elena’s 
powerlessness. They might have discouraged Elena from trying to reach the authority, and 
influenced her to internalize passivity and submissiveness. 
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Power differences were reaffirmed in several situations in the story. Traveling many 
times to Vilnius can be interpreted as extraction of time (Verdery 1996) with those in power 
being able to control and devalue the time of the others. The secretary’s indifference to 
Elena’s situation also communicated the powerlessness and insignificance of her as a subject. 
The power of authority was also reaffirmed when the secretary called the Executive 
Committee in Kaunas. The call secured the apartment; it was the manifestation of 
personalized power.145
Elena was able to influence the power which was the secretary’s ability to “structure 
the possible field of action of others” (Foucault 1984:428) and to hinder the immutability of 
power. The turning point was her questioning of the state’s authority by referring to the 
state’s role to provide for its citizens as well as her inquiry about the social contract between 
the state and its people. By invoking her students Elena reminded the secretary about the 
ideological role she was supposed to play in society, while the state’s role was to provide for 
teachers. It was an appeal to the ideology of a relationship between the state and its citizens 
as well as to the morality intrinsic to this relationship.  
In this example I chose to emphasize unequal power relations in order to illustrate 
how power may have been experienced by an individual, consequently producing 
submissiveness, passivity, and even anxiety. Elena’s story could be interpreted as one of 
successful resistance and heroic subversion of power and authority. However, in Elena’s eyes 
her experience was neither a case of resistance, nor a case of heroism against malevolent 
power and authority. It was situational, relational, and individual dialogue in the Bakhtinian 
sense (1981) with the subject informed by belief and disbelief in state ideology, 
manipulation/outwitting and sincerity, rebelliousness and submissiveness. In the context of 
the social theory which relies on distinctions between dominant and dominated classes (see, 
e.g., Scott 1990, Willis 1977) or intellectual thought which divides the powerful and 
powerless (e.g., Havel 1985), Elena was a hybrid subject. 
                                                 
145 On personalized power see Humphrey (2002).  
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8.1.3 Summer, 2003. Vilnius. The Embassy of Romania. 
I had to get a visa to go to a conference on post-socialist Eastern Europe in Romania. 
Outside of the Embassy I had to ring a bell. Somebody responded in Russian and told me to 
wait. So I waited. There came another person, a businessman who was going to Romania, 
and not the first time. The two of us waited together. I was getting uneasy about being 
outside the door for about 20 minutes and started to wonder whether I had understood the 
message about waiting in the right way. The businessman said that probably I understood it 
well. Finally, the door opened and I got in, leaving the businessman behind.  
A woman employee gave me forms to be filled out. After filling out the forms, I 
returned them to the same woman who passed them to a counselor sitting by another table. 
The counselor invited me to sit in front of him. He spoke perfect Russian. He was strict and 
somehow reminded me of Soviet time bureaucrats. I relaxed, observing and wondering 
about their behavior, serious faces, and attentiveness to their work, as the counselor went 
over my application form. He stopped at the line that stated “FATHER,” which was empty. 
He asked why I did not write my father’s name. I responded that he was deceased a long 
time ago (actually I was not sure whether I had to put the name or not, so I left the space 
blank). Here his voice unexpectedly rose up and he started to tell me that despite the fact 
that he is deceased I have a father. The “lecture,” in a strict educating tone, lasted a few 
minutes, and like Hašek’s traveler mentioned above, I started to feel guilty. I got anxious, 
tried to justify my behavior, but was constantly interrupted until I was finally allowed to 
write down my father’s name. I was constrained for the rest of the time until the counselor 
finished checking my application form and I was told to leave the room. Now I waited for 
15 or more minutes not knowing whether I would get a visa or not. The businessman was in 
by this time, filling out an application form. Relaxed and carefree. He probably knew that no 
spaces are to be left blank. I was observing him when the woman came and handed me my 
passport. With a visa. I smiled to myself: “I have already experienced a piece of Romania!”  
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Research fieldwork is always fieldwork of one’s self (cf. Rabinow 1977). In the 
Embassy of Romania, the strict, reprimanding and moralizing counselor’s tone reminded me 
of similar styles of communication at schools, shops and other spaces in my childhood and 
adolescence in Lithuania. While in Soviet Lithuania it was the prevalent tone in many spaces 
signaling authority and power defining those spaces, in respect to this particular speaking 
tone, post-socialist spaces are much more fragmented and constantly challenged and 
redefined by alternative modes of communication. During my fieldwork I did encounter 
similar ways of talking as the one at the Embassy at Martynas Mažvydas National Library of 
Lithuania in Vilnius (the person who checks ID cards “gave me a lecture” about my 
improper behavior of taking a computer to the library without declaring it in advance), 
Vilnius University (where the coat room attendant told people reprovingly to hurry because 
it was 5 o’clock while actually it was 4:53, there were 7 minutes left until closing), Lithuanian 
Airlines (where a flight attendant asked to bring another [the second] bun again responded 
reprovingly and in a moralizing tone [however, smiling like the policeman on the 
advertisement] she stated that “this is not a restaurant”). I also remember a story told by my 
friend how in the early 1990s an Italian linguist ordered a meal at a pizzeria and waited about 
half an hour to get an almost cold dish. When he asked the waitress in Lithuanian why she 
did not bring it earlier when it was still hot, she responded that “this is not America!” For a 
short moment the Italian was confused, then spontaneously reacted: “of course it is not 
America, it’s Europe!” In these examples authority can be tracked in the slightest 
modulations of tone. Thus, the reprimanding, moralizing and strict tone signifies authority, 
even if accompanied by a “post-socialist” smile. In case of state employees it is also state 
authority and state power invested in an individual.  
As in the example with Elena, the performance of authority at the Embassy of 
Romania structured interaction there. Interaction was informed by codes of conduct, such as 
recognition of hierarchy, the unquestioned power of the state official, the moralizing and 
strict tone of the state official and the subject’s submissiveness. My apologetic and 
submissive response was an expected behavior unlike probably my attempt to explain why I 
left the space blank which was a pretension towards a dialogue and towards equality in 
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power relations. The counselor interrupted me not because he did not pay respect to me as a 
client, as the situation did not require respect, and the relation of a professional and client in 
his codes of conduct. He interrupted me because I did not pay him respect by, most likely, 
not finding out in the beginning what to do about the unclear parts of the application as well 
as rationalizing my behavior. The counselor was an agent of a Parent-state, usually associated 
with socialism (see Verdery 1996), whose moral obligation was to educate its children. Such 
a state posits moral ties linking subjects to the state (Verdery 1994) which are the basis for 
moralizing tone in the spaces discussed. As in socialism, post-socialist subjects in these 
examples, are not presumed to be politically active, they are presumed to be grateful 
recipients—like small children in a family—of benefits (in my case a visa) that their rulers 
decide upon for them (see Verdery on socialism, 1994:228). This produces dependency, 
rather than the agency cultivated by citizenship or the solidarity of ethno-nationalism (see 
Verdery 1994:228). 
Dependency, gratefulness, respect, and submissiveness were key to the above 
mentioned encounters in the library, at the university, on the plane and at a restaurant. In 
general the behavior of the waitress and others was a request to recognize authority by 
submissively agreeing to be disciplined. However, it was probably not that the owner of a 
private restaurant expected waitresses to discipline clients by reproducing power relations of 
a dominant—a restaurant employee and a dominated—a client and by expecting clients to 
eat almost cold dishes without complaining. It is more likely that the waitress enacted other 
understandings of power and authority, parallel to the counselor’s understanding. Post-
socialist rearticulations of authority also produced other hybrid forms like the smiling flight 
attendant moralizing about the subject’s proper conduct and place in a hierarchy.  
 
Perceptions of power as immutable, unpredictable, omnipresent, threatening and 
invested in authority who could personally interpret it and use it partly explains the 
overarching pessimism and complaining recorded in the chapters. This pessimism is 
exemplified in the anecdote about a Soviet pessimist and a Soviet optimist in the epigraph to 
Yurchak’s article on power, pretense, and the anecdote (1997): 
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What is the difference between a Soviet pessimist and a Soviet optimist? 
A Soviet pessimist thinks that things can’t possibly get any worse, but a Soviet optimist thinks 
that they will. 
Post-socialist anecdotes also record similar pessimism and also fatalism: 
Here come G. W. Bush, the Queen of England and Adamkus [the President of Lithuania] to 
God, and they each ask how long they have to wait until their countries have no problems. 
Bush is told—40 years, the Queen of England—50 years, Adamkus—I will not live to see it 
[God will not live to see it]. 
Anthropologist Romas Vaštokas146 remarked that in the United States or Canada 
there prevails a mechanistic approach according to which individuals have power to manage 
their lives and social world. In Lithuania, however, the explanation for everything is likimas 
(“destiny”). “Destiny” entails the powerlessness of the subject and the power of the 
authority. In this context authority can influence an individual’s life and it is expected, 
imagined, assumed to exert various influences, not the contrary. Thus, the well-known words 
by John F. Kennedy—“ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for 
your country,” which, according to Landsbergis, one of the major political figures of post-
Soviet history of Lithuania, are “a genial phrase very appropriate to present-day 
Lithuanians”147 can be rendered meaningless for many who seek, as Humphrey remarked, 
order not in themselves, but for themselves, that is, “from powers [власти148] conceived as 
above; and, therefore, if the local polity does not provide order, they seek it from higher 
levels, culminating in the symbolic reification of an ultimate power” (Humphrey 2002:29).  
Under socialism, submissiveness, passivity and acknowledgement of authority 
coexisted within other relations to power. According to Yurchak (1997) the relation of a 
normal subject to authority was pretense and misrecognition. A normal subject was the one 
“who had learned from experience that he or she could lead a “normal” enough life—safe, 
self-manageable, enjoyable—away from the official sphere, provided he/she took no active 
interest in it, i.e., did not get too involved in it either as a supporter or a critic” (Yurchak 
                                                 
146 Personal communication, summer, 2005, Vilnius. 
147 See Landsbergis, Vytautas “Lietuva—serganti mama.” www.delfi.lt. 09/13/2005. 10:39. 
148 In the plural власти refers to the “authorities,” and with the epithet Soviet (советская власть) it 
refers to the Soviet regime (see Humphrey 2002:28). 
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1997:164). A “normal” subject experienced “official ideological representation of social 
reality as largely false and at the same time as immutable and omnipresent” (Yurchak 
1997:162). He simulated support while not being interested in power and manipulating it to 
lead their “normal” lives (see Yurchak 1997).149  
8.2 IMAGINING THE POST-SOCIALIST “STATE” 
8.2.1 Wealth, collective, and equality 
In post-socialism wealth has made power visible. By addressing wealth, informants 
attempted to understand the circulation of power, re/emergence of hierarchies and authority 
regimes, and changes in social relations. Wealth was indexical of the transgression of the 
values of equality and loyalty to the collective which informed social relations in socialism. It 
was also a sign of corruption, immorality, unaccountability and self-interest of authorities. 
Perceptions and experiences of authority and power were embedded in cynicism, which was 
the prevailing emotional relation of a subject to the “state.” Cynicism penetrated criticism of 
authorities, portrayals and images of the “state,” and understandings of power and politics. 
Among the largely invisible methods of accumulating wealth and amassing a fortune 
in post-socialism, taking a state office is an acknowledged venue to prosperity. Expressed in 
the popular idiom as “getting to the trough,” a state position means that one gets connected 
to the various venues of wealth, power, and prestige. According to most people, “state 
officials do nothing” and observe only their own and their family interests. Daiva, a former 
accountant now employed as a janitor at a village school, claimed that parliamentarians: 
created a very good life for themselves. They have cars, apartments… They do not have to pay 
for anything. They live well. Plus they have much property and land. Up to the chin. That’s 
                                                 
149 There were also other strategies such as blat relations (see Ledeneva 1998) aimed at influencing 
authorities, ridicule (see, e.g., Kideckel (1993:99)), multiple collaborations (cf. Havel 1985), open resistance 
(see, e.g., Anušauskas et al. 2005), etc.  
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why they go to the Parliament. They know that they will live well and their children will 
benefit from that.  
In considering giving their vote to a politician, people may think of the size of a 
politician’s family, with the attitude that the whole family is going to benefit from the office. 
During the presidential elections of 2004, several people remarked that they were not going 
to vote for Prunskienė, leader of the Union of Farmers’ Party and New Democratic Party 
(VNDP), because she has three children and seven grandchildren. When I was confused 
about what such responses meant, Ona from the smallest village explained that Adamkus 
will cost less to the state (valstybei) because he already has all privileges as a former President, 
and because he has no children who could benefit from his position. In several other 
conversations the fact that Adamkus was an “American” (Adamkus emigrated from 
Lithuania in 1944, from 1949 he lived in the U.S.A.) was also important because 
“Americans,” in general, are considered to be rich, and having no need to line their pockets 
in Lithuania.  
Knowledge about the prosperity of the elites derives to a large extent from the media. 
People respond to newspaper articles and radio/TV news. During the period of my research, 
news about increasing rents for the Independence Act signatories or coverage about the 
“Rambynas” cheese factory and the salary of the director there were very often commented 
upon. Motiejus from the largest village suggested that “The director of the “Rambynas” 
cheese factory gets 300,000 [litai]. Look, in my opinion, he should get 10,000 per month. 
And the other would go to people who deliver milk.” Stasė from the same village also 
remembered hearing on TV about the “Rambynas” cheese factory director’s salary. She 
asked why, then, they give people only 20–30 cents for a liter of milk. “Where is their 
conscience? Wouldn’t 100,000 be enough? Why it is 300,000? People say God will punish 
him.”  
Responding to media accounts, people speculated about the private businesses the 
former Parliament or government members have, about politicians’ houses (popularly called 
“castles”), about any other property they obtain, about restitution of their rights to land, 
other exclusive rights, such as rights to big loans, also the vacations the politicians take, 
restaurants they visit, and parties they attend. Expressing sensibilities about consumption 
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and spending (chapter 2), informants often wondered how much it costs for politicians to 
live their “expensive” lives. Nijolė, a history teacher of a high school in Kaunas who claimed 
to belong to the “middle class” gave a portrait of one party member who was accused of 
corruption, with some other politicians, by the Special Investigation Service of the Republic 
of Lithuania (Specialiųjų Tyrimų Tarnyba): 
Nobody believes him. I will tell you one thing. He was a teaching fellow at Vilnius University. 
Then he was writing a dissertation and lived in a dormitory. […] And then we hear that he has 
a house. […] You cannot build a house from the salary of a teaching fellow in Lithuania. Even 
if you have a PhD and even if you are an associate professor. My husband’s coworker worked 
in Africa, the other was in the United States for several years. When they came back, they 
bought unfinished houses. Parents have to support you or you have to get money from 
somewhere, not from the salary of a teaching fellow. It’s an absurdity. His parents are villagers. 
They didn’t earn anything to build him a house in Vilnius. You also have to have in mind where 
the house was built [in Vilnius houses are more expensive than elsewhere in Lithuania]. […] 
So, how then?… That’s how these big houses are built around Vilnius. From tainted money. 
Claims about dishonesty and corruption usually imply a general moral condemnation 
rather than an accusation of illegality (cf. Humphrey 2002:177). However, considerations of 
various “illegalities” as well as criminality (see discussion below) also occur. For example, 
Ruzgys, a large-holding farmer and a businessman, argued that in the early 1990s “the state 
provided conditions for illegal privatization.” By illegal he meant that many people were 
excluded from the process, they “privatized among themselves and shared the money they 
got.” The popular saying is that there was not privatizacija (privatizing), but prichvatizacija 
(appropriation), where prichvat—is the stem of the Russian прихватить “take, capture, 
appropriate.” The farmer argued that “those who are rich now… they started with 
privatization. It was not fair. There is a reason why people say prichvatizacija.”150  
Informants speak of accumulation of “millions” during privatization, and about 
deception and stealing. People invoked the dissolution of kolkhozes, when ordinary people 
were assigned “crippled cows,” while kolkhoz leaders appropriated everything else. They also 
                                                 
150 See, e.g., Verdery (1996, 2003), Wedel (2001, 2002), Stark (1992), Humphrey (2002), Stark and 
Bruszt (1998) for discussions of privatization in the former USSR and Eastern Europe. 
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often remembered the distribution of vouchers. Many argued that they did not know how to 
use vouchers and sold their vouchers at a low price.  
Unequal distribution of rights was stressed in assertions about land privatization. 
Nijolė claimed that the political elites cannot complete the reform of land restitution. “It is 
because they share land among themselves. They keep searching in archives, maybe it does 
not belong to you, maybe to somebody else, maybe some kind of a gentleman (ponas) can 
appropriate it. Especially by the sea, or by the lakes, in beautiful places. That’s the situation.” 
Zita, a housewife, in her late 40s, from Kaunas, argued that her family situation was special 
and that they were told that only a separate law would solve the case. Zita disappointedly 
asserted that, if a law was needed for a Parliament member, it would certainly be passed and 
he would receive compensation [for the property which could not be restituted in her case]. 
[…] My grandparents bought that land, it was their property and they paid off loans for it. It 
was theirs. It is so painful. Others take what they want and as much as they want,” claimed 
Zita, having in mind the Parliament members. According to her, “during privatization there 
was extensive corruption. […] There was no justice. No justice… in free Lithuania.” Other 
informants also thought that the elites promote and establish laws which guarantee their 
rights and exclude other people: 
Yesterday on TV they showed an interview with a Parliament member. He said: “As a 
Parliament member I can help myself, how could it be different?” However, we [people] 
cannot establish the rights to our land. […] We do not have all the documents. But the 
political elites can [in any case] [a retired woman]. 
People consider wealth to be limited, possibly drawing on the Soviet period 
experience of accumulating scarce goods and of usually their rationed distribution because of 
which they were being able to buy only 1 kilogram of oranges when oranges emerged in the 
stores. During the research period the enrichment of some was believed to produce the 
poverty of others. Pranė, the eldest woman of the second largest village, claimed that “they 
[the political elites] have millions. […] They can raise their salaries so much because they 
take from the people. Nobody else gives them anything. And it is still not enough. They take 
money from beggars.” Zigmas, a power plant worker from Kaunas, wondered about the 
income declaration of Landsbergis, the Sąjūdis leader and a long-term Conservative Party 
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leader and currently a EU Parliament member. Zigmas wondered how Landsbergis could 
have made 19 million litai in five years. He assumed that decently one cannot accumulate 
such money and concluded with the rhetorical question “how can people live well, if every 
politician makes ten million?” 
Understanding wealth as limited, people greet various spending actions of the state 
officials with cynicism and suspicion. The new cars for government officials, new furniture 
for the President’s office, renovation of the Parliament halls, hiring of new security usually 
are noted and reprovingly commented. In conversations informants (mostly women) 
criticized the renovation of the President’s residence kitchen. According to a housewife from 
Kaunas, in her late 40s, “it should be strict. Ready [for every President’s family to live]. 
Another woman shouldn’t come and redo the kitchen again. You come and go. It’s not for 
your whole life. For several years. I hated when she [President Paksas’s wife] started to redo 
the kitchen.” On the other hand, saving is always popular. President Adamkus was praised 
by several people for his decision to spend less money than was initially planned for the 
inaugural ceremony.  
In dialogues about the state officials people touch upon visible stratification and 
usually also the invisible powers which led to it. Making judgments and assigning values they 
give supremacy to equality and collective solidarity. According to Humphrey (2002), the 
preeminence of equality as a value in Russia derives from Soviet-period values and 
ideologies. In Soviet Russia “equality” was symbolically transformed and fed into the 
communitarian morality (Humphrey 2001:342). Furthermore, there was equality of many in 
poverty which included the quality of sacredness (Shcherbinins 1996, discussed in 
Humphrey 2001:342). The value of equality was co-opted by the early Soviet elite and had 
resonance in multiple spaces of the Soviet Union, including Lithuania in mid as well as late 
Soviet times.  
In Lithuania, beliefs that people are equally entitled to the rights, privileges, and 
resources of society most likely also derive from nationalism of the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Nationalist leaders advanced economic arguments resonating in informants’ 
memories for expectations of a “better life” (see chapter 5). As an ideology about a collective 
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(in which it parallels socialism) comparable to kinship and religion (see Anderson 1983, 
Schneider 1968, Herzfeld 1997), nationalism was used by the liberation movement leaders to 
promise well-being for the newly imagined nation and nationals (see chapter 5). Ideas about 
equality in postcolonial contexts give beliefs of equality wider resonance. For example, 
Verkaaik (2001) reports that in Pakistan Muhajirs, a term used in Pakistan for those whose 
families migrated from India in the years after independence in 1947, believe that the 
Pakistani state is a creation for all South Asian Muslims, however, it is captured by one 
ethnic group—the Punjabis. Thus, equality is a “commodity” of global flows of political 
discourse. 
The value of loyalty to the collective also informs ideas about the state officials. 
According to Humphrey in the Soviet Union by the 1930s the word коллектив (collective) 
was used to “express the character of the whole USSR and whole Party” (Humphrey 
2001:343). The collective was a stable group of colleagues, united by labor and a common 
goal. According to Kharkhordin (1999), the Soviet version of the idea went beyond that of 
any old co-operative. It nurtured the meaning that by joining together the members gain a 
kind of immortality. Each member was to feel responsible for the whole, and purges were 
the means to create a collective revolutionary body. In the Soviet period this vision of the 
collective was established in relation to working collectivities in Russia (Kharkhordin 1999). 
In Soviet Lithuania an individual also had meaning primarily in terms of a collective 
or social group, such as a kolkhoz community, factory work groups, or kindergarten 
collectives. In the early 1990s people clung to the collective not only for immediate 
economic benefits, but also because it was the only site for organizing the local economy as a 
whole, it was “somewhere to go to,” and membership still implied rights, even if these were 
hazy and disputed (see also Humphrey 2001:348). The vice-director of the interior 
decoration enterprise in the largest village remembered how people used to come every 
morning for several months and stand by the closed doors of the kolkhoz expecting work. 
While for the vice-director it was a meaningless undertaking, for the workers it was a 
meaningful action; accomplishing it they could connect to social life in terms of work, 
security, and rights. 
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As Hannah Arendt (2004) notes growing equality can give rise to opposite processes, 
such as social discrimination and exclusion. In Soviet contexts, ideologically promulgated 
egalitarianism and “state-dictated homogeneity” (Humphrey 2002:188) coexisted with 
hierarchically articulated inequality. A collective internal inequality was accepted, for the 
collective engendered certain characteristic ranking practices simultaneously proclaiming a 
certain equality (Humphrey 2001:344). Ranking within the collective was “reinforced 
throughout the Soviet period by education policies emphasizing modernization and technical 
knowledge, such that the individual who recognized her own progress by virtue of her 
training simultaneously acknowledged the rightfulness of benefit distinctions on this basis in 
social groups” (Humphrey 2001:344). As a result parallel “political emotions” could be 
identified: disapproval of those who undermined the collective, on which people’s lives 
rested, and admiration of those who exposed the repressive character of collective, of 
required loyalty and restrictive commitment (see Humphrey 2001). 
In post-socialist spaces, undermining the collective is commonly disapproved of; 
many people long for dependence on the collective and loyalty which was the underlying 
criterion of inclusion in the collective. Thus, the new practices of exclusion (such as non-
usefulness at work) are not understood well (see Humphrey 2001:347). The retreat of loyalty 
and collective dependence are observed as disintegration of sociability, emergence of 
materialism (sumaterialėjimas) and, in general, decay of social relations.151  
8.2.2 Reclaiming dependence 
Informants claimed that the elites are alienated from the “people;” they do not represent and 
understand the “people” and do not recognize the problems “common people” have. 
Juozas, a former director of an Institute and a CP member, argued that “the state does not 
know people’s concerns. They don’t want to know.” Petras, a large-holding farmer, in his 
50s, pointed out that “the elites live a different life, they have different benefits, higher 
salaries, exclusive privileges… transport, apartments, hotels.” According to Albertas, a 
                                                 
151 See ethnographic examples in chapter 4. 
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Kaunas resident, the state officials should “pay more attention to the common worker [darbo 
žmogui]. Not to themselves, but to others… They have enough already. They should let 
common people earn money.” Nijolė, a high school teacher, maintained that “the elites care 
about their wealth, their salaries, their vacations… I tell you, if a doctor earns six hundred 
[litas], if a teacher earns six hundred [litas], this is not normal in the state. That’s why all 
intellectuals leave [the country]. They don’t see any other way out. They have to live and 
raise their children.”  
Sensibilities about representation emerge in protest actions. Kotryna, a retired factory 
worker, in her early 60s, from Kaunas, remembered how she participated in the action the 
“The Beggars’ Ball” (“Ubagų152 balius”) organized by Vytautas Šustauskas, the leader of the 
Lithuanian Freedom Union, Kaunas mayor in 2000 and a Parliament member in 2000–2004, 
often titled the “King of the Beggars” and/or a windbag politician (bačkos politikas). Kotryna 
and Šustauskas traveled with other people to Vilnius where they joined the “Ball of Vienna 
in Vilnius” (“Vienos pokylis Vilniuje”),153 the annual charity ball of the elites. Šustauskas’s 
action was a protest against the rich, fetishization of wealth and conspicuous spending that 
the “Ball of Vienna in Vilnius” symbolized for him and his followers. The fact that it was a 
charity action was downplayed. Kotryna recalled: 
He [Šustauskas] organized the ball of the poor. […] When we came to Vilnius… it was a 
tragedy. We saw how nicely dressed Adamkus and Adamkienė [the presidential couple] walked 
onto the stage, Landsbergis, everybody. And we, our delegation… [was not allowed] There 
were three lines of policemen. Poor Šustauskas was not allowed in. 
Kotryna was not going to Vilnius to protest. She thought that she could participate in 
the “Ball of Vienna in Vilnius” and remembered to take a dress, a hat and shoes for the ball. 
Kotryna recollected: 
We went to the ball, but found ourselves at a demonstration. Later a musician came, we 
danced on the street, and nobody [the police] intimidated us. […] After that his authority 
[Šustauskas] rose in our eyes. When the police stopped us coming from Vilnius […] and 
                                                 
152 The term “ubagas” means: 1) a beggar; 2) a cripple; 3) a poor person; 4) a helper of a priest. See: 
The Dictionary for the Lithuanian Language. www.lkz.lt. 
153 “The Ball of Vienna in Vilnius” is a charity action started in 1999. See: http://www.vienos-
pokylis.com/index.php.  
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wanted to arrest Šustauskas, people from all the buses, there were seven buses, pushed the 
police cars into a ditch. 
Kotryna continued with pathos and, I think, with an attempt to impress me with her 
knowledge of how “things should be.” She reasoned: 
They [the political elites] do not represent our nation as they should. They should represent a 
lower stratum, a poor stratum… […] Take, for example, heating. They don’t give a damn. It is 
important that they live well and have warm houses. People are suffering in hospitals, day care 
centers, unheated homes… that load of care is not lifted. They watch only their interests. 
Integrating to the European Union they should represent a lower stratum, the retired, and a 
higher stratum, scholars, doctors… They should think of all the people of Lithuania. 
Asking for recognition and representation is reaching out for the familiar state of 
before which provided security and benefits for people like Kotryna. In so doing people re-
create the role for the state (see also Verdery 1996). Reaching out for restatization (Verdery 
1996) materializes in protests against reforms and against the circulation of wealth. In 
addition to cynicism directed at the state officials, protests also express desires for well-
articulated authority and rules as well as expectations of state intervention and regulation.  
Appeals to authority are often delivered in moralizing rhetoric which links state and 
subject with ties of mutual dependency, responsibility, respect, and loyalty. Thus, socialism 
produced not only a moralizing state in the form of various authorities, like the counselor at 
the Embassy mentioned above, but also moralizing subjects, dependent, powerless and 
simulating respect and recognition as well as capitalizing on the ideology of provision or 
welfare. A moralizing subject very often addresses the state through the media. For example, 
in the article “Why does the government [valdžia] of Lithuania denigrate [tyčiojasi] its 
citizens?”154 a single mother of two students complained about her salary, which was not 
enough for the major needs of a family. She wrote that she bought a computer a year ago 
and later the required programs. According to the knowledge she had from different state 
institutions, such as the Tax Inspectorate (Mokesčių inspekcija), she had to be compensated for 
the computer and the programs. However, she complained, recently she found out that part 
of the expenses were not going to be covered because the Ministry for Finance and the Tax 
                                                 
154 See Mendelienė, Daiva “Kodėl Lietuvos valdžia tyčiojasi iš savo piliečių?” Lietuvos rytas. 
02/04/2005. No.29. P.4. 
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Inspectorate changed the regulations. The woman claimed to have borrowed the money she 
expected to receive back as compensation. Moreover, she stated that, even if she sold the 
already used computer, she would get only part of the money back. Her sons “because of the 
painful denigration by the state officials (valdžios) will suffer great moral harm.” The woman 
writes: “My sons, when they learned about this slap [in the face], were very disappointed. 
They will have to give away the computer which they need for their studies so much. They 
stated that they are not going to live in a state where citizens are deceived so impudently 
[akiplėšiškai], and will leave it when they have the chance.” In a similar way, the other article 
“The habit of government [valdžios įprotis]—to promise, and then to poke fun at people 
[išsityčioti]”155 wrote about the government’s promise to raise pensions of the people who 
became disabled on January 13th, 1991 when Soviet troops attacked the TV tower, as well of 
families of the deceased. However, pensions were not increased. One of the participants of 
the January 13th events argued that the decision of the Parliament not to raise the pensions 
was very disappointing. He argued that people need money for medicine, not for anything 
else.  
Articulated in the vocabulary of “major needs,” such as a computer for studies, the 
moralizing subject in the first example promised to punish the state by leaving it, to break 
the existing loyalty and solidarity. The subject also fashioned herself as a victim who was 
tortured by state officials by variously humiliating her and even “physically” (the slap of the 
state) abusing her sons. People who address the state in this way make their powerlessness 
and dependence on the “state” and authority explicit. As argued above, they seek order for 
themselves, not in themselves, from authority invested with power above them. They also 
aim to reclaim their dependence and the “state’s” role guaranteeing this dependence. 
Among the multiple other ways of becoming visible in the eyes of the “state” 
prominent are struggles to reconstitute the gaze over their own bodies (cf. Dunn, 
forthcoming, Petryna 2002). People aim to get diseases attached to their names in order to 
qualify for state subsidies. A certified sick body becomes a way to communicate individual 
concerns as well as a medium to interact with the “state.” One informant, in his 40s, told the 
                                                 
155 See “Valdžios įprotis—pažadėti, o po to išsityčioti.” Lietuvos rytas. 12/20/2004. No.295. P.2. 
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story how he was able to make his mother “unable to take care of herself” by using his 
connections and money to get false diagnoses for her ills. As “unable to take care of herself,” 
his mother qualified for hospital care and sanatoriums (for acceptance to which he also had 
to use connections and money) and became eligible for benefits which allowed the son to 
cope with the burdens of care.  
Reclaiming “dependency” on the state coexists with alternative accommodations. 
Some explore new possibilities by establishing small enterprises, engaging in agriculture or 
vocational training. Saulė, a 40 year old teacher from the largest village, got enrolled in a new 
program at the university to make herself more competitive in the job market. Unlike many 
others, she felt that “her life does not depend on the state [the term used was valstybė, not 
valdžia]. We choose our way and know well where we go, what we do, the state has nothing 
to do with that. If I am here [a teacher at school], it means that I am not good for anything 
else. If I was able to, I could go somewhere else.” 
8.2.3 The relationship of difference and distrust 
Some pollution beliefs illustrate that the political elites and people exist as separate 
categories. To cross from one group to another is to become dehumanized, exposed to 
power and danger, to get polluted (cf. Douglas 1984): 
There was one man. He used to arrive here when the movement for independence started. He 
was such a poor guy, in cheap clothes, very sincere. He promised to do everything. Now he 
works for the state. He has a castle, a huge house. His brother works for him, a sister also… 
He has a lot. And village people? We do not see them, they don’t come. Nobody cares 
[Jadvyga M., a retired woman, a former kolkhoz worker]. 
Corresponding to others’ ideas, Egidijus, in his 50s, from the largest village, claimed 
that the state (valdžia) is something dirty. Egidijus, a CP member in Soviet times, argued that 
he will never join any party because they drag out all the muck and because politics is dirty. 
Similar attitudes towards the state were also recorded by a Kaunas resident, in his mid 70s, in 
an ironic letter complimenting his son on the son’s habilitation. The letter said that, if he 
were alive, the grandfather would be happy for his grandson who was awarded a habilitation 
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PhD degree (Habilituoto daktaro laipsnį) and who brought honor to the family, and had not 
done something stupid like joining the Seimas. Ona, a retired pensioner from the smallest 
village, said she would never wish that her son become a Parliament member. She reasoned 
that “in a state office you cannot be a human being [žmogus].” Similar cynical attitudes have 
been recorded in Turkey (see Navaro-Yashin 2002). Navaro-Yashin’s informant Saniye 
thought that “Being a statesman is for the liars, for the tricksters, for those who are out for 
self-interest, for money, for fame. That’s not for me!” (Navaro-Yashin 2002:170). For 
Saniye, power was about looting resources that were meant for the people, or about striking 
it rich after occupying a seat in a state office for some time (Navaro-Yashin 2002:170). 
Saulius, a historian and a professor from Kaunas, claimed that hatred and spite for 
the state (valdžiai) are omnipresent. However, according to him, they coexist with high 
popularity among students of the law school and the disciplines directly related to power and 
state positions. Saulius’s view was reaffirmed by Raminta who was a recent graduate from 
high school. Raminta applied to various departments at several universities to study law or 
“anything else to earn good money.” According to Saulius, valdžia is evil and strange, but one 
of the best ways to live well.  
The relationship of difference between the state and the subject is circulated by the 
media, intellectuals and politicians. Headlines, editorials and leading articles of the 
mainstream newspapers, such as Lietuvos rytas, often structure the state in a similar way as the 
people mentioned above. Vytautas Radžvilas, an associate professor at Vilnius University 
and a visible public figure in his essay “Feast by the trough” invoked Plato’s state and its 
opposition—the pig state. Radžvilas commented that “Obviously such a [pig] state exists not 
only in the imagination of this theorist. We have at least one real example. It is Lithuania.” 
He critiqued parliamentarians for moral and intellectual decay, illiteracy in “all senses of the 
term,” and incompetence. Radžvilas argued that for Parliament members “The Parliament is 
the place where they come not to work, but to stuff their pockets by taking advantage of 
their position.”156
                                                 
156 See V. Radžvilas “Šėlsmas prie lovio.” www.delfi.lt. Elta news. 01/21/2005. 12:25. 
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In a recent “bestseller157” on the state “The Ship of Fools” Vytautas Petkevičius, a 
well-known writer, active Sąjūdis participant and a Parliament member in 1992–1996, writes 
that the major aim has been achieved—there is no state (valstybės) which could defend people 
and everyone struggles only for oneself (Petkevičius 2003:9). The state (valdžia) betrayed its 
people one more time: at various points in time it has been Polonized, Russified, 
Americanized, and now Europeanized (Petkevičius 2003:13). He calls Prime Minister 
Brazauskas corrupt and discusses politicians’ relations with the KGB, thus, defining them as 
betrayers of the nation-state. According to the author, Lithuania is under the rule of one 
party—the Party of the Crooks (sukčių partija)—with many names (Petkevičius 2003:299). 
Petkevičius, like other politicians, intellectuals or villagers, in his cynical commentaries about 
the “state” does not compromise about statism (cf. Navaro-Yashin 2002). Even if he does 
not take it seriously and keep an ironic distance, he is still worshiping the state (cf. Žižek 
1995). 
Most post-socialist and postcolonial societies are noteworth for citizens’ distrust, and, 
thus, lack part of the social capital which is the key to making democracy, at least as 
perceived by Putnam (1993), work. Giordano and Kostova (2002) claim that in Bulgaria 
“Negative opinions of the power elite, depicted as a distant and alien clique run by string-
pulling lawyers, are widespread.” As in Lithuania, in Bulgaria one can hear that “politicians 
are all alike; you can’t trust them” (Giordano and Kostova 2002). Verkaaik (2001) claims that 
in Pakistan “Muhajirs have grown deeply disappointed with and distrustful of the state. […] 
The state has been captured by social groups who, through secret and invisible means, hold 
on their particularistic sense of loyalty and use state power to enhance their self-interests” 
(Verkaaik 2001:364).  
                                                 
157 The book was called a “bestseller” in the media. See, e.g., Aldona Svirbutavičiūtė “ “Durnių laivo” 
autoriui gresia dar dvi bylos” (“The author of “Durnių Laivas” will face two more lawsuits”). Lietuvos žinios. 
05/21/2004. No.116. P.1. http://www.press.lt/cgi-bin/Article.asp?Lang=L&ID=568707. I bought the book 
at the library of the Parliament and was told by the sales clerk I was lucky to get one of the last copies because 
the book was popular. One parliamentarian assured me that 50% of what was written was true. During the 
research several informants mentioned the book as an authoritative source. The book also became known 
because of several lawsuits for libel including libel against V. Landsbergis-Žemkalnis, the father of V. 
Landsbergis.  
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Distrust as part of cynicism towards the state underlies commentaries on all kind of 
projects of the elites. During my research the most prominent project was joining the EU. 
Many people approached joining the EU as an elite project which was expected to primarily 
benefit the elites themselves. A recently retired pensioner, a 63 year old man, was afraid that 
because of the corrupt elites, the promises bound to the EU will not be delivered. He 
claimed that “there is no honesty among the elites. Maybe just among some… On the other 
hand, there are a lot of honest people [not the elites]. […] On the radio they announced that 
someone was willing to seize funds from the EU… Well, you see, it is hard to accept this. I 
don’t want much from the state. I get a pension, it is enough for me what I have…” Others 
also thought that money flows which were discussed during the referendum campaign will 
not reach people. A woman, in her late 60s, thought that “nothing good will happen… 
nothing. You can see that they all have their mouth open like ravens. They already have 
appropriated a lot. There was some money for agriculture allocated, it has disappeared 
somewhere.”  
Algimantas, in his 50s, a funeral home employee, similarly distrusted the political 
elites and argued that “The referendum [for joining the EU] was throwing dust in everyone’s 
eyes. Everything was agreed upon, decided and ordered in advance [he was referring to the 
signing of the Accession Treaty in Athens on 16 April 2003 by Prime Minister A. Brazauskas 
and the Minister for Foreign Affairs A. Valionis]. Everything was settled and signed.”  
Juozas and Violeta, a family from a town near the largest village, former CP members 
with high standing, compared Moscow and Brussels: 
Violeta: Well, is it free [Lithuania]? Well, they used to take hams to Moscow, now they gratify 
Brussels.  
Juozas: Well, but if you take ham… 
Violeta: You got everything. We got houses… five room houses… [Juozas as an Institute 
director was able to successfully bargain with “Moscow” over building of houses for 
employees]. 
Juozas: They used to build a house [alytnamį] and invite people to work: “Come to work—you 
will get a house in a year.” And they did. […] Moscow respected Lithuanians. If they get—
they will not make it disappear. 
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Violeta: And that dependence. I don’t know… But now, when you see, all this, Jesus Christ! 
Now… I say I think of the EU as a swear-word. Because bureaucrats cover their crimes or 
plans, or fraud [aferas] under the “EU” [She meant that they cover their plans by arguing that 
these are the EU requirements].  
In their cynical commentaries about the “state” and state officials people express 
concerns about the new circulations of wealth and power from which they usually feel 
excluded. Cynicism derives from the informants’ experience of poverty, marginalization, and 
insecurity (see chapter 1, 2). It is also motivated by beliefs in values, such as equality and 
solidarity to the collective, which no longer inform social relations as they did in Soviet 
times. In dialogue with the “state” informants try to restore the role of the state as the 
provider and the moral relationship between state and subject. Their commentaries illustrate 
their passivity and the suppression of their agency which is indicative of beliefs in the 
omnipresence and the immutability of “post-socialist” power.  
8.3 THE GRAMMAR OF DIFFERENCE AND METAPHORICAL PORTRAITS OF 
STATE AUTHORITIES 
The difference between the state officials and the people is articulated in the symbols of the 
“lords,” the “mafia,” the “clan,” and the “communists.”158 These symbols have no stable 
boundaries, they invoke the same field of ideas about state, community and self. Symbols 
may be alternatively used, referring to different issues, such as class differences between the 
political elites and the people, the arbitrariness of political actions, and the immorality and 
impunity of the authorities. However, the “lords” tend to underline perceived class 
differences. By invoking the “mafia” and the “clan,” people stress the arbitrariness of 
political actions as well as the impunity of the authorities. Social networks that connect the 
                                                 
158 The negative images of the post-socialist political elites prevail in theoretical accounts on the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Ilya Prizel (2002), following Alexander Motyl, speaks about a 
corrupt elite which cannibalizes society in Ukraine. Katherine Verdery (1996) and Caroline Humphrey (2002) 
invoke feudalism and a class of entrepratchiks, i.e., political capitalists (Verdery 1996:33) who took advantage 
of the transition to solidify their role as new capitalists. Images of swindlers, pyramid schemes, mafia-states, 
elites-clans also are used in other discussions (Sampson 1998, Verdery 1996, Wedel 2001, 2000, Ries 2002). 
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elites are most often articulated in “clan” symbolism, non-commitment to the national cause 
in notions of the “communists.” The symbols are bound to arguments about wealth, power 
and morality. They are expressions of cynicism toward state officials. Use of these symbols is 
not restricted to the communicative space of the villages and the city of Kaunas, but they are 
also used in political and academic discourse, media coverage, and the internet.  
8.3.1 The “lords” 
The images of the “lords” (ponas,159 plural ponai), very popular in post-socialist political 
imaginations, were common in socialism and in pre-socialist times. “Lord” signified 
hierarchical differences whether it was differences between peasants and Russian state 
officials, peasants and the gentry of 19th century Lithuania, “class” differences among 
peasants themselves, or ideological and often economic differences between people and the 
party elites in the Soviet period.  
In the 19th century the term “lord” can be found in proclamations or various reports. 
A “lord” was either the landlord of an estate in Lithuania or a Russian state employee160 (see 
Aleksandravičius and Kulakauskas 1996:134). In Soviet times the images of the “lords” 
(ponai) were part of the literature on relations of exploitation. Literary images of the “lords”/ 
“masters”/”gentlemen” (ponai) resonated with images of the “kulaks.” For example, Juozas 
Baltušis in “Sold Summers” (“Parduotos vasaros”) (1977), a novel about prewar Lithuania, 
writes about a boy taken to serve other people. Sitting in the sled of his new master, the boy 
thought that “thank God, I will have a nice master at least this time; he will not count my 
                                                 
159 According to The Dictionary for the Lithuanian Language “ponas” means: 1) a person of a privileged 
estate, a rich person, a nobleman, an owner; a master; someone who does not do physical work, an officer; 2) 
the God; 3) a word for addressing men [such as “Sir”]; 4) a slacker, lazy-bone, loafer (dykūnas, lengvaduonis, 
išlepėlis). See www.lkz.lt. 
160 For example, historians E. Aleksandravičius and A. Kulakauskas in their account of the 19th 
century include a proclamation (atsišaukimas) by the leaders of the revolt of 1831. The proclamation promises 
peasants freedom from serfdom and invites them not to obey the Russian lords, but to help the Poles to get 
rid of the Russians; to help the homeland and the lords (Aleksandravičius and Kulakauskas 1996:134, emphasis 
added). According to historians, Russian authorities also claimed to be willing to improve the situation of 
peasants, only, as it is argued in General Dembinskis’s report to Gelgaudas: “part of the demands for the lords, 
the lords redirect to the peasants, therefore, the peasants are unsupportive towards our cause” 
(Aleksandravičius and Kulakauskas 1996:134, emphasis added).  
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food, there will be no yelling and pressure like last year” (Baltušis 1977:131). However, upon 
arrival at the master’s home, the master realizes that another person has been hired and 
orders the boy to go home at night in the wintertime, which suggests that the “good master” 
the boy imagined does not exist.  
The history books written in the socialist period also described pre-socialist social 
relations in terms of class warfare and used the image of “lords.” For example, Jučas et al. 
(1988) claim that in the second half of the 18th century a nobleman could not beat, kill, sell 
or exchange a free person. “Being cruel with free people, he lost them because they went to 
other estates, to “better” lords [išeidavo pas “geresnį” poną]” (Jučas et al. 1988:88).  
 Romualdas Granauskas’s (1988) book “Life under the Maple” illustrates that 
community leaders, like a kolkhoz director, or party leaders,161 like the party secretary, were 
also called the “lords.” Grandmother Kairienė asks her grandson Darius: 
Kairienė: Dareli [the diminutive of Darius], I look at you, I look… Well, will I understand 
before I die why you drink?… 
He took a second shot [of vodka] and responded: 
Darius: I feel happier! 
Kairienė: Oh, why do you need this kind of happiness? You have a young wife, the building of 
your house is nearing its end, and you can start a garden,—a good job, you earn a lot… You 
have so much happiness from all of this! 
Darius: What kind of happiness is it to work? You come back tired as a dog… Day after day it 
is the same and the same! Like a serf! 
Kairienė: Everybody who works the earth is a serf. But if you serve it [the earth], you will be a 
master [ponas]! 
Darius: A master!… The kolkhoz director, the agronomist, the party secretary—they are the 
lords [ponai]! And me?” [Granauskas 1988:77, my translation]. 
Some Soviet-period literary views of the state officials are very similar to post-socialist 
reflections on state officials as the “lords.” For example, Baltušis (1977) imagines three 
men’s discussion of the government of pre-Soviet times: 
Where did you see a government [valdžią] which did not want your skin?! It does not matter 
what you elect—they all want your skin! 
                                                 
161 See also Grinkevičiūtė (1997) for usage of the “lords” to name CP leaders and members. 
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[…] 
- The government [valdžia] wants to live, but I want to live, too. And what have you now? […] 
Don’t praise those priests. If they stay in power, they will want your last pair of pants! 
I’ll tell you,—intervened the third person.—The priests were in power already, they are sated, 
maybe they will appropriate less? If you let the other party to the trough, everything will start 
from the beginning [Baltušis 1977:170, my translation]. 
In post-socialist discourse the “lords” used for authorities is a negative image which 
underlines class/hierarchical differences between the people and the elites, as in pre-Soviet 
and Soviet times. Jadvyga N., a former party secretary, gave a description of privatization in 
the early 1990s by naming the wealthy elites—the “lords:” 
During the transition those who were smart they made business. Privatization was a good 
business. The lords emerged out of nowhere. They bought vouchers from the elderly for a low 
price. The elderly got nothing. And they privatized factories. So they bought those vouchers 
from the poor people. […] They used the opportunity that the government officials were 
changing. They used privatization and appropriated capital. Now they are the lords, the upper 
class. And those who were used to working honestly, they did not know how to steal and 
appropriate, so they stayed… poor.  
The body is an important part of political imaginations about the “lords.” The visibly 
shrinking post-socialist bodies of many people, a process influenced by changed 
consumption and physical self-imagining as well as by poverty, are contrasted with the full 
bodies of the political elites. The bodies of politicians are signs of the full life they are 
thought to enjoy as a result of being in office. According to Ona, a retired woman from the 
smallest village: “their snouts get larger and larger after they get into Parliament.” Ramunė, a 
large-holding farmer, a woman, in her early 40s, also noted: “Do you see how politicians 
look? […] They sweat, their faces are fat.” Eglė from Kaunas remarked that Paksas [the 
President in 2003–2004] is young and handsome. She thought that it was very important that 
he was slim, because “all the lords have to be [fat]… and then they are approached with 
suspicion.” Eglė invoked the genealogy of the socialist period “lords” by classifying their 
stout bodies: “Sakalauskas, the Prime Minister, Brazauskas, the CP secretary, who else… 
Then you know that this is a lord. And a lord is automatically bad. If he is slim, handsome, 
slender, skinny, it looks as if everything is all right.”  
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Ideas about the stout bodies of politicians as signs of prosperity and abundance in the 
context of sensibilities about consumption and spending, insecurity surviving on small 
amounts of money and relative hunger (see chapter 2) circulate elsewhere in Eastern Europe. 
Kideckel (forthcoming) writes that one unemployed truck driver, linking Ceauşescu, 
Romania’s globalized strictures, the current government, and perceptions of famine and 
death said:  
Ceauşescu brought people closer to God. We miss him. Then we had bread, fat back [slănină], 
meat. Now… the word hope does not even exist anymore. […] We believed him 
[Constantinescu] when he came here and said that we should economize with our household 
budgets, but what good did that do us? Look at Constantinescu and you can see what has 
happened in the country. Before he came into office he was thin, but his face is fat now and 
shows how he eats from our suffering. If we had enough money, we would take [him] to court 
and charge him with genocide… Those with large stomachs, with salaries of 50–60 million lei 
a month, should try for just a bit to live like we do. They should be three days without food, 
or raise their children the way we are forced to. 
8.3.2 The “mafia” and the “clan” 
The term “mafia” conjures up the arbitrariness of political action and the impunity of the 
ruling class. Verdery argues that mafia is a symbol to label new power. It is like the party-
state, all-powerful, pervasive, and coercive (Verdery 1996:219). “Mafia” refers to those who 
are seen as invisibly, conspiratorially, and effectively mastering social resources and power to 
the detriment of the people (see Ries 1997). Verdery (1996) points out that, “Talk of mafia is 
like talk of witchcraft. [It is] a way of attributing difficult social problems to malevolent and 
unseen forces” (Verdery 1996:220). With the label "mafia," one pronounces guilt and 
suggests that they are under the spell of sinister powers.  
In theory, the “mafia” is commonly perceived as ethno-centric, conspiratorial, 
monolithic organized crime (cf. Rawlinson 1998).162 The meaning of the “mafia” as 
                                                 
162 Yakov Gilinskiy (1998) claims that in a broad sense the term “mafia” serves as a synonym for any 
kind of structural association dedicated to the pursuit of crime in an organized, professional and full-time 
capacity. In a narrower sense, the term refers to criminal organizations akin to the originating example in 
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organized crime was rare in informants’ discussions of state officials. Only in some cases 
were political elites thought to work together with criminals. A former deportee, a pensioner 
thought that “they work together [with criminals].” The man remembered that one 
Parliament member who was elected in a nearby electoral district tried to fight against illegal 
trade and smuggling. Because of that his father was stabbed almost to death. Ruzgys, a large-
holding farmer and a businessman, in his late 50s, from the largest village, thought that in 
the early and mid 1990s “The government was together with the bandits. There is no other 
explanation. They allowed the robbery of common decent citizen. […] Millionaires and 
multimillionaires emerged with the help of the elites—those who were in the oil business, 
they could not get in there, if they had no connections to the state.” To support similar ideas 
informants could draw on facts like the conclusion by the Central Electoral Committee of 
the Republic of Lithuania according to which 77 politicians were prohibited from 
participation in the municipal elections of 2003 because of previous convictions.163  
Ries (1997) reports that during Perestroika people in Russia tended to invoke 
different “mafias,” such as criminals, indecent businessmen, and racketeers.164 However, the 
state, government or politicians were the “real mafia.” In Lithuania ideas of the “state” as 
the “real mafia” were not very common and were used predominantly by men. Rolandas, a 
Kaunas resident, in his early 40s, named Prime Minister Brazauskas as the “real mafia” and 
“Corleone” invoking the main mafia character of Mario Puzo’s (1970) “The Godfather.” 
Rolandas used the image talking about the increase of prices after joining the EU. In May, 
2004, right after joining the EU, many including the media speculated that prices rose 
because of cartel agreements. Prime Minister Brazauskas discussed the price increase with 
the representatives of the enterprise “Vilniaus Prekyba” who agreed to lower prices; 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sicily, characterized by a high degree of organization and hierarchy and by a regular resort to the use of force 
for attaining its goals. In ordinary Russian usage, the word “mafia” remains synonymous with political power 
rather than with traditional organized crime in the Western sense (cf. Coulloudon 1997).  
163 The politicians mentioned were convicted for various crimes and tried to conceal this fact. 22 
previously convicted politicians were in the Liberal Democratic Party whose leader was Rolandas Paksas, the 
President of Lithuania in 2003. See “Conviction destroys political career” (“Politinę karjerą griauna teistumas”). 
Kauno diena 12/04/2002. No.281. P.1. 
164 On the image of the “mafia” in Eastern Europe see also Sampson (1998), Humphrey (2002), 
Verdery (1996); on the “clan” and the “mafia” in Russia see Wedel (1998). 
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representatives of some other enterprises responded that they would follow “Vilniaus 
Prekyba’s” actions to match the competition. In this action Brazauskas was asserting his and 
the state’s control, power, and authority. By addressing prices he was reaching into the daily 
lives and dinner tables of many people. Rolandas claimed that it is unbelievable that any 
business could refuse profit. According to him, Brazauskas probably had an agreement with 
the businessmen to increase prices and then made an agreement to “lower” them. To 
Rolandas’s mind, it was all an advertising campaign for Brazauskas and his party.  
Similarly, in the mainstream daily Lietuvos rytas, readers commented that the “Prime 
Minister is the real mafia of Lithuania.” An anonymous commentator thought that “Being in 
power is promoting one’s corrupt interests, giving criminal orders and privileging one’s 
business.”165 In the weekly Veidas Dalia Juzukevičiūtė (2003) cited some young people who 
think that there are no different mafias. Money and glory unite different people into the 
mafia. They know each other, their children study at the same schools. According to the 
people cited, that is why you see the daughter of the President [the former President 
Rolandas Paksas] celebrating her birthday with the daughter of one of the major powers of 
the criminal world; “It is natural and common” (Juzukevičiūtė 2003).  
Like the “mafia,” the “clan” refers to corrupt dealings, injustice and unaccountability. 
By invoking the “clan” one tends to emphasize networks that bind people together and to 
multiply the “state” into hierarchical groups of common interests. Martinkonis, a professor 
of economics temporarily residing in the largest village, thought: 
Look, there are three or four lawsuits, right? Against judges, land developers and diplomats. 
Do you know how it ends? This is the end. I guarantee it. They will find some clerks, punish 
them. That will be it. […] The new President needs to put his own people in some places to 
write off some of his corrupt deals. Maybe it is wrong, but that’s my opinion.166
Voldemaras, an engineer from the city of Kaunas, in his early 50s, asserted: 
                                                 
165 See Lietuvos rytas. 07/24/2003. The commentaries for “Laiko ženklai.” Jo (212.122.68.140)- 
2003/07/24. 12:03:10. At: http://www.lrytas.lt. 
166 The symbol of “clan” also extends to professional groups, usually to lawyers and doctors. See, e.g., 
“Pagrindinis reformos stabdys—medikų klanas” (“The major reform barrier—the health care clan”). Lietuvos 
rytas. 11/07/2002. No.258. P.4. Kairys, Stanislovas “Ar tikrai Lietuva—visiška ašarų pakalnė” (“Is Lithuania 
really a complete vale of tears”). Atgimimas. 09/29/2004. 10:46. www.delfi.lt. 
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There are clans. Courts, commissions for privatization, enterprise managers… they are all 
involved. The commissions don’t see that the price of an enterprise became lower after the 
reconstruction. That’s how a state-owned company is being prepared for privatization… 
Nothing has changed. There are clans as before [in the Soviet period]. The state officials bless 
such privatization because they have their stake in it. 
Ideas about the “state” as the “clan” are used by politicians themselves. The Liberal 
Democrats, the party of ousted President Paksas, in a campaign commercial on the radio 
announced that the corrupt clan denied the nation’s will;167 the invitation to vote for the 
Liberal Democrats in the elections for the EU Parliament was directed at gaining support 
from the voters for President Paksas.  
In Lithuania, Russia or even South Africa historical conditions yield an ambiguous 
mix of possibility and powerlessness, of desire and despair, of mass joblessness and hunger 
amidst the accumulation, by some, of great amounts of new wealth (cf. Sajo 1998). On the 
one hand, people experience the enrichment of others, on the other, they are left aside from 
the mysterious to them mechanisms of the market and the promise of prosperity. In South 
Africa these mechanisms of the market have become the object of jealousy and envy and evil 
dealings; it is thought that arcane forces are intervening in the production of value, diverting 
its flow for selfish purposes (Comaroff and Comaroff 1998). Among the people the “mafia” 
explains the enrichment of some, the corruption of the state, ambiguous transitions, and 
personal deprivation. Symbolic mafias, like witches, may be said to transform political/social 
processes into comprehensible human motives, tie translocal processes to local events, 
translate translocal discourses into local vocabularies of cause and effect (cf. Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1998).  
                                                 
167 The argument that President was elected by the nation was used to discredit initiatives for 
impeachment. The Parliament, the Constitutional Court, and other institutions were blamed for not following 
the nation’s will. The Radio of Lithuania. The 1st Program. June, 2004. 
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8.3.3 The “communists” 
The image of the “communists” was another symbol used to label the authorities cynically. It 
invoked parallels with the past “communists” and often embedded opposition between the 
nation, people, and officials or the state. “Communists,” like other symbols, engendered 
opinions about social order, the state, the nation, justice, and morality. 
The symbol of the “communists”168 was most often invoked to name ex-communist 
party members. Kęstas, a doctor from Kaunas claimed that socialdemocrats are the offspring 
of the Soviet communist nomenclature, “only the name is different. The same faces. Instead 
of the communist “International” they sing the national anthem. Their politics is also the 
same.” Similarly, Bronė, a villager, in her early 70s, a former dressmaker, argued that “there 
are the same communists in power. As earlier. They are the lords [ponai].” Invoking the 
popular “foreignness” of the “communists” to the nation and Lithuania, Bronė said not to 
vote for the “communists,” but “for the parties which are for Lithuania” (see also chapter 5). 
Another doctor from Kaunas, in his early 60s, felt ashamed for propagating Sąjūdis ideals, 
because it brought communism to the post-socialist elites: 
I am betrayed, I can’t do anything anymore. I feel bad. It’s like the Soviet way. We made a 
circle and returned to the same system. The parties can do everything. The Parliament can do 
everything. They are not accountable and not punishable. They live well. They have all the 
capital… earlier we used to say about the nomenclature—they live in communism. They could 
have done anything. It’s about the same now. I lost my patriotism. 
The former CP members are thought to act in a particular way because of their past. 
A CP member may be thought to care about people, but very rarely about Lithuania. 
Conversely, to be corrupt, self-serving, and unjust is compatible with the image of a 
“communist:” 
Everyone dislikes the Prime Minister [Brazauskas]. I do not know why he is still in power. It’s 
not enough for him. He was a communist, always working for himself. As people say, you 
cannot change your skin [a retired woman]. 
                                                 
168 The image of the “communists” was most popular in the smallest village community in the 
eastern part of Lithuania which during the years of the first independence of Lithuania was part of Poland.  
  248
The statements that “Lithuania is ruled by the communists” or that “there is no real 
Lithuania yet because people in the government are the same ones [i.e., the communists]” 
delegitimate the political present. When asked how it would be, if Lithuania was “real,” one 
villager gave a commentary based on expectations of more equality and well-being for poor 
people. The symbols of the “communists” and the “lords” were invoked to talk about the 
same issues: 
If it was Lithuanian [lietuviška], everything should be different. The poor people should be 
more valued. There are the lords who drive cars followed by the other cars. And a poor 
person has nothing. Why doesn’t anybody pay any attention to him? If it is Lithuania, it should 
be Lithuanian [Pranė, the oldest inhabitant of the second largest village]. 
Another woman from the smallest village pointed out that “it is going to be joyful 
and good when there is a real Lithuania.” Such statements emphasize the otherness of the 
elites not only to the people, but also to the national body of “Lithuania.”  
 “Communists” and the “clan” may have a similar meaning, of a distinct group of 
people engaging in certain wrong actions and related in certain ways. For example, Bronė 
argued that the “communists” do not let anyone work. They want to control everything. She 
voted for Paksas during the presidential elections of 2003 because he looked so decisive and 
knowing. However, she had doubts whether they [the communists] would let him work.169 
The woman claimed that: 
there are people who are educated and bright, but probably they are not allowed to get in the 
way. […] These parties torture people. They steal and deceive… Even in the village—there are 
the same people, the ones who held an office under the Russians, they have it now. They help 
each other to stay in power, these communists.  
The “communist” like the “mafia” or the “lords” may denote everyone associated 
with the “state.” Landsbergis, the leader of Sąjūdis, a person who very often is a symbol for 
the independence movement as well as for the opposition to communism, was also linked to 
“communists” during the research. A 52 year old unemployed woman claimed that 
“Landsbergis taught communism. At the university or a technical school. […] He was not 
allowed to join the Party [the CP] because his father was a deportee.” 
                                                 
169 The interview was conducted before the impeachment of President Paksas, in July, 2003. 
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8.4 CONCLUSIONS 
As in socialism, in post-socialist spaces people experience the omnipresence and 
immutability of power, which is reflected in their ideas and feelings of exclusion from the 
circulation of wealth, distribution of rights, privileges, and resources. In socialism an 
individual may have felt cynical towards the “state” because of its manifold presence in 
everyday life through the organization of work, regulation of collective life, or distribution of 
entitlements. The retreat of the state (or what Verdery (1996) called “destatization”) from 
individual life is the dissolution of the former presence. It is not, however, the dissolution of 
the state. The “state” is present in the circulation of wealth and policies of privatization, 
agriculture, education, medical care which affect individual lives. Imaginings of the post-
socialist “state” are articulations of this presence. They are attempts to understand power 
and strategizing to influence the state by joining protest actions or becoming “sick” to get 
benefits. The rhetoric of these strategies is grounded in moral arguments about welfare and 
accountability. Reclaiming dependence on the state is not only informed by socialist 
subjectivities. It is a post-socialist hybrid practice which derives its rationale from different 
times and spaces. The cynical and strategizing subject in a small village of Lithuania is also a 
global citizen while he or she participates in globally circulating discourse on the state, 
authority and power. Like Chileans (see Paley 2001), Pakistanis (see Verkaaik 2001), Turks 
(see Navaro-Yashin 2002), or Russians (see Ries 1997) an informant in Lithuania will express 
his/her cynicism by criticizing the state officials as self-interested, immoral, unjust, thus, not 
to be trusted, and by articulating the “state” as a polluting and malevolent realm of power. 
Like Russians or Turks he/she may label this power residing in the authorities as “mafia” 
and, thus, exploit the “transnational” image of the “mafia-state” uncommon in socialist 
Lithuania. He will also think of the officials as the “lords,” invoking a pre-Soviet image 
existing within national boundaries, but giving it a specific post-socialist tinge by naming the 
wealthy and the powerful.  
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9.0  CHAPTER 7: VOTING AS MEANINGFUL ACTION 
Why G.W. Bush? 
Because of three Gs: God, gays, and guns. 
(A worker, in his late 40s, 2004, Chicago). 
 
Well, dear people, I was here not so long ago. I would like to 
ask you: has anything changed? 
People: Noooo… 
Maybe you started to live better? 
People: Worsee… 
(From a meeting of V. Uspaskich, a leader of the Labor Party, 
with residents of Alytus, during the electoral campaign for the 
EU parliament, June 8, 2004). 
 
A Journalist: It means that for 40 years Moses guided the Jews 
in the desert with a purpose, he waited for the generation 
which remembered serfdom to die out so the new state could 
be created by children of those born in freedom. 
Adamkus: Absolutely right. I regret that few people 
understood and understand this truth of the Holy Scripture. It 
says what we are living through today. 
(From Audrius Bačiulis’s interview with President V. Adamkus, 
March, 11, 2004).170
 
                                                 
170 See “V. Adamkus neabejoja, kad teisingumas ir demokratija nugalės” (“V. Adamkus is confident 
that justice and democracy will win”). Veidas. 03/11/2004. In the interview Adamkus was speaking about the 
younger generation. He argued that “the integration of this [young] generation into state life will solve many 
present day problems.” Then, Audrius Bačiulis, a journalist, asked him the question about Moses. 
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 To understand voting I explored how people perceive themselves as social subjects, how 
they relate to social and political history, what values and meanings inform social interactions 
and are reflected in personal experiences. The discussion of memory, social history and 
experience in chapters 1 and 2 described communities of meaning or communities of 
particular social texts which remembered the present as a “regression” from the “better” 
Soviet past. The social text on “regression” and “better times” in the Soviet period 
embedded experiences of change and in many cases of marginalization. In these texts people 
reflected upon changing regimes of personhood, social, economic and political 
developments. They produced themselves as the dispossessed and turned towards an 
imagined past of socialist well-being to reclaim values and personal dignity.  
The social texts on “regression” and the “better” Soviet past may coexist with the 
texts on “oppression” in the Soviet period. Understanding of the Soviet period as “better” 
and “oppressive” was not conflicting to some informants. If they thought about the Soviet 
period as “oppressive,” by “better” times they meant social guarantees, their higher personal 
economic and social status than in the post-Soviet period as well as everyday predictability 
and stability. “Oppression” was an experience of foreignness of social history, which limited 
an individual’s agency and which produced an individual as the “other” to the officially 
imagined community (chapter 3). Therefore, some people who claimed to experience 
oppression never agreed that there can be anything “better” about Soviet times. The 
particular relation to the past reflected different political subjectivities. 
Negative relations to social history expressed in the texts of Soviet “oppression” and 
post-Soviet “regression” derive from experiences of social otherness. In chapter 4 I argued 
that the social others of Soviet times, such as the deportees and Catholics, more often 
invoked socialist history as “oppression” than former CP members (especially self-identified 
communists) who were the major protagonists of socialism. In post-socialism in many cases 
identities were inverted producing “communists” as the “others” of post-socialist social and 
political history while elevating “deportees” and other Soviet “others” to the status of moral 
subjects and heroes. The former communists despite their endurance in power structures in 
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post-socialism are subject to symbolic marginalization for their “communist” (in recent years 
more often “KGB”-related) identities. The former communists often invoke “common 
sense” to speak about Soviet times. In the ideology of “common sense” they embed the 
authority, power, and status that they had under socialism. Their longing for the past is 
different from that of the villagers. Villagers often attempt to reclaim dependence on the 
state which guaranteed their entitlements, benefits, and security. The former CP members 
are nostalgic about the state which guaranteed their power and rights, including power to 
fashion values and meanings.  
I also explored political subjectivities by analyzing a subject’s relation to nation and 
state (chapters 5 and 6). In chapter 5 on “Nation and Liberation” I argued that the text of 
discontent with “independence” and “liberation” derives from dissatisfaction with post-
socialist changes and social as well as personal histories. In post-socialism the “nation-state” 
as a political community which was in the making in the late 1980s and early 1990s was not 
produced as a primary imagination, uniting many people. Congruently with Soviet-period 
identifications, many people feel they belong to the “nation” as an ethnic community.  
I explored the subject’s relation to the state by looking at people’s understanding/ 
experience of authority and power. I argued that “cynicism” is the common structure of 
feeling embedded in perceptions and experiences of the “state.” It entails negativity, 
distance, and irony rather than resistance towards the state. Cynicism encapsulates criticism 
of state officials, seeing them as self-interested, immoral, and unjust. It also manifests 
distrust of authorities and underscores the difference between the people and the power 
elites. Cynicism has an effect on the lives people live and the communication they carry out 
with the “state” whether in everyday conversations or at elections.  
Voting enacts meanings and values embedded in people’s experience and 
subjectivities. It is a projection of subjectivities and selves, passions and knowledge. People 
were consistent in their voting preferences. Their votes for the independence of Lithuania 
during the referendum in 1991, and their later votes for the ex-communist parties in 1992, 
which were reapproached in public spaces, intellectual thought and social theory as a threat 
to sovereignty and democracy. In both cases people voted for their imagined well-being and 
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a better future. For them “independence” was meaningful in the beginning, to imagine new 
lives, and became irrelevant later (see chapter 5). Abrupt changes, like voting for different 
ideas and candidates which people did not vote for previously, usually are lived and narrated 
as important life turning points. In this the world of politics resembles “the worlds of 
religion, of folk myth, and perhaps of dreams” (Edelman 1975:3). 
It is the interplay of social history, perception, and experience embodied in 
individuals which makes politics discernible and votes legible. Studies of voting behavior 
usually do not explain why people vote in a particular way. Even if studies provide socio-
economic (see, e.g., Braun 1997, Ramet 1999), socio-cultural (e.g., Minkenberg 2001, Betz 
1993, Inglehart 1990), and psychological explanations (see, e.g., McLaughlin 1996, Howard 
2000, Jackman and Volpert 1996) they usually do not answer how particular socio-economic, 
socio-cultural circumstances, or psychological conditions are translated into votes. In this 
dissertation I aimed to address the questions of why people vote in one way or another and 
how social history is experienced and translated into votes. In the previous chapters I 
explored experiences of post-socialism and political subjectivities. This chapter is meant to 
show how particular experiences and subjectivities discussed in chapters 1–6 turn into votes 
and how politicians create a successful political spectacle.  
9.1 THE 1ST SCENARIO. THE SECOND ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS OF 2002 
9.1.1 Political drama of 2002 
My research started a few months after the victory of Rolandas Paksas in the presidential 
elections of 2002. On one of the days in the smallest village, having two bottles of beer in a 
bag, I was going to see Levonas. It was one of the few occasions when I took beer rather 
than chocolate as a small “thank you” gift for an interviewee. Levonas’s house was 
deteriorating. Broken door windows, paint peeling off the house, very old furniture inside—
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a table, two chairs, a closet for clothes, and a bed. On the wall there were portraits of 
Levonas’s parents, industrious farmers in the Soviet period. The sun was shining through the 
dirty windows. It made the thick dust in the air visible.  
Levonas was born in this village. He lived in Vilnius for twenty years where he 
worked as an engineer until his early retirement after the closing of the factory. He could not 
pay off the bills of his Vilnius apartment and sold it to pay for his only daughter’s studies at 
the Law school. After selling the apartment, Levonas moved to his parents’ house in the 
village. Levonas was too young to get a state pension. His income came from temporary jobs 
at a town nearby. Usually he was hired as a construction worker for 15 LTL a day, for which 
he could buy a loaf of bread, a kilo of the cheapest frankfurters, a bar of butter, one liter of 
milk, a package of flour, and a bottle of oil or something else. Two cows, a car, bicycles, the 
washing machine, the saw and other things that he inherited were sold. One villager said that 
everything that could be sold is gone, drunk away. Everything that I saw in the house was, 
according to Levonas, “from Soviet times,” including clothing and shoes in the closet. The 
skinny, dusty young black cat was “post-Soviet.” He was named after the new President 
Rolandas Paksas, because “their eyes looked the same.” Levonas noticed this similarity on 
the campaign flyer. He voted for Paksas, “not for that American [Adamkus]… because this 
old man [Adamkus was 76] is not going to accomplish anything… Paksas also will not be 
able to [accomplish anything].” Levonas remembered that Paksas promised a lot, that he was 
a pilot and landed everywhere with his helicopter. Like many others, Levonas claimed that 
”everyone promises, but nobody does anything, because swindlers are in power.” 
During the electoral campaign Rolandas Paksas, twice the mayor of Vilnius, twice the 
Prime Minister, expressed his willingness to be president also for two terms.171 He received 
54.71% of votes and defeated President Valdas Adamkus who collected 45.29% of the 
votes.172 Paksas’s electoral campaign was well-organized and well-financed. Social scientists 
and many journalists claimed that good organization and millions poured into the campaign 
                                                 
171 See Pekarskaitė, Jadvyga “R. Pakso siekis—dvi Prezidento kadencijos” (“R. Paksas’s aim—two 
terms in the president’s office”). Lietuvos rytas. 12/16/2002. No.291. P.2. 
172 The Central Electoral Committee. http://www.vrk.lt/2002/Prezidentas/rezultatai/reza.htm-
14+2.htm. 
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accounted for Paksas’s victory. The elections inspired discussions of electoral technologies 
and political marketing, and the public learned that “Paksas was created”173 rather than 
“real.” Paksas’s campaign was labeled aggressive,174 energetic, and using “black 
technologies.”175 People were thought to be deceived by Paksas’s promises, to be naïve in 
believing his slogans, vulnerable to campaign shows like landing at meetings with voters in a 
helicopter, or susceptible to subliminal shots in the TV commercials. 
Voters for Paksas were usually assumed to be the people of the second Lithuania (see 
chapter 1), poor, protesting, the Lithuania of losers and the disappointed.176 According to 
one journalist, voters for Paksas were people “unable with their mind and their work to find 
a place in Lithuania,” “willing to be happy doing nothing.”177 Some sociologists interpreted 
preferences for youth, energy, and resoluteness as well as for changes as “emotional 
decisions.”178 They argued that “people did not rely on their beliefs, but rather made 
spontaneous decisions and that a large part of population does not have strong opinions.”179  
Interpretations of voting results referred to people like Levonas. He was poor and 
disappointed. However, like many other informants who voted for Paksas, he was willing to 
work to earn proper money. Levonas was not making spontaneous emotional decisions. He 
was also not deceived by the promises, nor did he believe that Paksas would bring real 
changes. Nor was he hypnotized by the subliminal shots in the TV commercials, since he 
                                                 
173 See, e.g., Pečeliūnienė, Lina “Išsirinkome padangių erelį” (“We have elected an eagle soaring to the 
skies”). Valstiečių laikraštis. 01/07/2003. No.2. P.8.  
174 See, e.g., V. Radžvilas’s opinion about Paksas’s campaign. Bruveris, Vytautas “Antrojo turo 
išvakarėse—rėmėjų paieška” (“The search for financial supporters before the second round”). Respublika. 
12/28/2002. No.299. P.2.  
175 See, e.g., Pečeliūnienė, Lina “Išsirinkome padangių erelį” (“We have elected an eagle soaring to the 
skies”). Valstiečių laikraštis. 01/07/2003. No.2. P.8.  
176 See, e.g., Bruveris, Vytautas “Antrojo turo išvakarėse—rėmėjų paieška” (“The search for financial 
supporters before the second round”). Respublika. 12/28/2002. No.299. P.2. Only few commented that 
people who voted for Paksas were not the losers, pessimists, or the disappointed. In the TV broadcast 
Spaudos Klubas such opinion was expressed by Romas Mačiūnas, the director of the Baltijos Research. See 
Spaudos Klubas. 02/12/2003. “Lithuania after elections. Myths, stereotypes, and reality.” 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/www_misc.spaudos_klubas.  
177 Pečeliūnienė, Lina “Išsirinkome padangių erelį” (“We have elected an eagle soaring to the skies”). 
Valstiečių laikraštis. 01/07/2003. No.2. P.8.  
178 See also A. Liubinavičius’s discussion with V. Vareikis “Kodėl R. Paksas, o ne V. Adamkus”? 
(“Why R. Paksas, not V. Adamkus?”). TV “Balticum.” The broadcast “Rezonansas.” 01/09/2003.  
179 See Lithuanian Television broadcast Spaudos Klubas. 02/12/2003. “Lithuania after elections. Myths, 
stereotypes, and reality.” http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/www_misc.spaudos_klubas.  
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had no TV for the political hypnosis shows. Levonas voted for an insider (rather than 
Adamkus, whom he called the “American”), for the power and authority which was 
manifested in meaningful texts that resonated with Levonas’s knowledge, experience, and 
sensibilities. Levonas’s voting was the performance of subjectivity and social history, 
marginalized in official spaces. Examining it from those official spaces, Levonas’s vote was a 
protest vote since it opposed ideologies and hegemonies which informed those spaces. 
However, Levonas, like many other people, did not feel or think that he was protesting. For 
Levonas, naming him a “protestor” or a “sugar beet” was just another act of marginalization.  
The key to the success of the electoral campaign of 2002 was Paksas’s 
communication of ideas and values in terms of social texts which many people shared. It 
recognized social histories and subjectivities marginalized in many official spaces (see chapter 
1 and 2). It also tactically addressed passions (see Bailey 1983) towards post-socialist history 
common to people of various experiences (see chapters 1, 2, and 3). Moreover, the 
campaign, promoting Paksas as the young and firmly determined candidate, communicated 
power and authority and an ability to bring changes. The major slogan of Paksas’s electoral 
program, “The future is being created now” (“Ateitis kuriama dabar”) was “democracy for 
the individual, freedom for business, dictatorship for the mafia.” Paksas called his program 
“the Program of people’s expectations” (“Žmonių lūkesčių programa”).180 The essence of 
the program was respect for people and restoration of trust in the future and the self. In his 
New Year’s address to the people, Paksas claimed that he was waiting for victory, “The 
victory over poverty, untruth, and disappointment.”181 Paksas stated that his “aim is the 
better life of people, a just, safe, and wealthy Lithuania.”182  
Respect for the individual was defined in Paksas’s campaign as “the basis for Paksas’s 
victory.183 Such rhetoric appealed to people who were searching for dignity, pride, and 
                                                 
180 See Žigienė, Valentina “Pristatė žmonių lūkesčių programą” (“Introduced the program of people’s 
expectations”). Panevėžio balsas. 12/16/2002. No.289. P.3. 
181 In Lithuanian “Pergalės prieš skurdą, netiesą ir neviltį.” See Lietuvos rytas. 12/20/2002. No.295. 
P.8. 
182 See Paksas’s political advertising “Lietuvos žmonės nori permainų ir tvarkos” (“People of 
Lithuania want changes and order”). Lietuvos rytas. 01/03/2003. No.1. P.8. 
183 In Lithuanian “Pagarba žmogui—mūsų laimėjimo pagrindas.” See political advertising by 
Valatkevičius, Rimvydas “Pagarba žmogui rinkimų pažadų šlapdriboje” (“Respect for the individual in the hail 
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respect by invoking the “better Soviet times.” It also appealed to people who were cynical 
towards the post-socialist state (see chapter 6). It addressed sensibilities about equality and 
collectivity, moral relationship, and expectations of dependency shared by poor villagers as 
well as protesting people on the streets (see chapter 6). Respect also meant returning value to 
what was devalued by post-socialism. For example, one Paksas campaign ad addressed 
people’s concerns about milk, the value of which had so diminished that, according to 
villagers, it was better to pour it on the ground rather than take it to the milk delivery station 
(see also chapter 2). In the ad where milk is poured on the ground Paksas argued that he 
“will not allow mockery of the village people. It is important to return value to all that is 
created by their hands.” 
Paksas’s campaign appealed to and affirmed experiences and knowledge about 
various post-socialist developments, such as emigration, drug addiction, criminality, 
corruption, tax policies, education, medical care, and state bureaucracy. In his political 
advertising he targeted various strata and various experiences of post-socialism. Appealing to 
sensibilities about corruption and injustice (see chapters 1 and 2), Paksas argued that 
corruption prevails, with Lithuania being among the most corrupt states in the world.184 In 
his ad on criminality it was communicated that people should not find their cars with 
windows smashed and radios stolen, a popular crime in Lithuania, because “everyone who 
committed a crime, will know that he/she will be punished.” Like Vitkus, a 60 year old 
pensioner from the second largest village (see chapter 1) who thought that “if you steal a 
chicken, you may spend more years in prison than in the case of murder,” Paksas claimed 
that “in our system a person who stole a chicken from his neighbors to feed his hungry 
children, is put, roughly speaking in prison, while those who steal millions from the country 
cover themselves with collective responsibility, walk free and even teach others how to 
                                                                                                                                                             
storm of electoral promises”). Respublika. 12/18/2002. No.292. P.5. See also the program of the Liberal 
Democrats for the municipality elections of 2002. The major slogan was “To return respect to an individual is 
the core of my program, the reason for the victory” (“Grąžinti pagarbą žmogui—tai yra mano programos 
esmė, mano pergalės pagrindas”). Kauno diena. 12/05/2002. No.282. P.16. 
184 See the discussion of the Vilnius University seminar presentations, BNS and Lietuvos rytas 
information, “Į Prezidentūrą—ir populizmu išgrįstu keliu” (“Taking the populist way—to the president’s 
office”). Lietuvos rytas. 12/20/2002. No.295. P.4. 
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live.”185 In the TV debates Paksas mentioned that Rudolph Giuliani, the New York mayor in 
1994–2001, argued that there is no small crime, that small crime leads to big crimes. Every 
crime has to be solved.186 This resonated with people’s experiences of crimes and their fears 
of becoming the victims of crime (see chapter 1 and 3). Democracy, Paksas argued, had to 
be a “strictly established order, where everyone [emphasis in original] follows the law, 
including the President, the Ministers, the Prime Minister, and the people. Finally, […] the 
mafia, they also are forced to follow the law.”187  
Ideas about children, their future and parents’ role as providers were addressed in a 
poster with a young girl washing dishes, most likely she was a migrant from Lithuania in 
some foreign country. Paksas argued that “Everyone who wants to study has to have a real 
possibility to study at a college [aukštojoje mokykloje].”188 In other posters Paksas appealed to 
sensibilities about health, money and work (see chapter 2). In a poster with a shabby hospital 
room, it was argued that “Every sick person has to have access to quality medical care and 
medicine.”189 Connecting to the discourse by doctors themselves, Paksas claimed that the 
situation is not normal when health care institutions are blamed and persecuted for a job 
well done, but praised for funds saved at the expense of an individual’s health and life.190 
According to Paksas’s campaign, to change corrupt health care politicians you need a strong 
political will, which he certainly had.191
Responding to many small business entrepreneurs’ concerns, Paksas’s political 
advertising stated that “today the businessmen of Lithuania are forced to avoid paying taxes 
dishonestly, and feel almost like criminals, if they want to continue with their businesses and 
have at least a minimal profit. It is necessary to cut taxes and give more freedom to 
                                                 
185 See the final debates between Paksas and Adamkus. LNK television. Žodžio laisvė. 01/02/2003. 
186 See the electoral advertising broadcast “Presidential elections.” Lithuanian Television. 
01/02/2003. 
187 See the final debates between Paksas and Adamkus. LNK television. Žodžio laisvė. 01/02/2003. 
188 See, e.g., the ad in Lietuvos rytas. 12/06/2002. No.283. P.16.  
189 See, e.g., the ad in Lietuvos rytas. 11/30/2002. No.278. P.13.  
190 See Paksas’s political advertising, Rolandas Paksas “Kam naudingas pleištas tarp pacientų ir 
medikų” (“Why do we need a wedge between patients and doctors”). Respublika. 11/12/2002. No.261. P.6. 
191 Ibid. 
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business.”192 The question on the major campaign ads asked: “Do you want this to continue 
for five more years?” The political advertising also invited people to “Vote for change” 
(BALSUOKITE UŽ PERMAINAS) and stated that “Order will come. Rolandas Paksas” 
(Tvarka bus. Rolandas Paksas).  
In the political advertising there were reproduced anxieties, insecurities, and 
pessimism that were shared by many people of various social statuses and experiences, 
whether poor villagers or city intellectuals. Anxieties about becoming the victim of crime, or 
losing a job, sensibilities about money and buying things and services, insecurity about the 
one’s own and one’s children’s social and physical future were successfully addressed in 
Paksas’s campaign. In his general address to the people Paksas claimed that “the guilty must 
answer according to the law. Nobody has to steal or waste your money. People have to have 
a job, if they want to, they have to have the possibility to study, if they want to. You do not 
have to be afraid to get sick or old.”  
Paksas promised change and order, the major words appearing on most of his 
campaign posters. “Changes” and “order”193 are good political symbols to which many 
people can connect with their particular experiences and knowledge (see chapter 1). Images 
of various disorders, which resonated with articulations of social history as regression 
(chapter 1), challenged Adamkus’s positions about continuity and the stability of state 
politics.194 In 2002 Adamkus’s major slogan was “For the President, For a certain 
tomorrow!” (“Už Prezidentą, Už patikimą rytdieną!”). In his campaign it was claimed that 
the “major traits of President V. Adamkus are commitment to democracy, predictable 
                                                 
192 See, e.g., the ad in Lietuvos rytas. 12/16/2002. No.291. P.3.  
193 “Order” was used in other candidates’ electoral rhetoric. For example, Algimantas Matulevičius, a 
candidate in the presidential elections of 2002, used the slogan “Work, Order, Responsibility!” Kazys Bobelis, 
another presidential candidate, used the slogan “For order and justice in the state!” See “Sostinę išmarginę 
politikų plakatai vilniečiams kelia šypsenas” (“Residents smile at the posters of politicians in the capital”). 
Lietuvos rytas/ Sostinė. 12/14/2002. No.290. P.11.  
194 See, e.g., The Adamkus’s campaign ad in Lietuvos rytas. 01/03/2003. No.1. P.5. Adamkus also 
argued that there has to be important changes made in various spheres. For example, he claimed that legal 
processes have to be more effective and transparent. Transparency is needed in health care and 
pharmaceuticals. The state allocates millions which are not used effectively. Education has to be accessible to 
everyone. See the interview with Valdas Adamkus, Pečeliūnienė, Lina “Valdas Adamkus: Didžiuojuosi 
Lietuvos žmonėmis” (“Valdas Adamkus: I am proud of the people of Lithuania”). Valstiečių laikraštis. 
12/17/2002. No.101. P.1, 8. 
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political behavior, established relationships with political parties and other state structures. In 
other words, political parties which support V. Adamkus, associate him with political 
stability.”195 According to Paksas, stability would mean continuous emigration, surviving on 
small pensions, corruption, and impunity of the state bureaucrats. Paksas argued that, if 
“people are satisfied with the present situation when the young go abroad, when you can 
hardly survive on a pension, rather than live a normal life [kai galima tik egzistuoti, o ne gyventi], 
when higher education becomes only [the privilege] of the rich, when corruption and 
bureaucrats [valdininkai] prosper,—you need to vote for stability. But if people want to live 
normal lives [kaip žmonės], be able to let their children study and not think what to put on the 
table tomorrow, you have to vote for change.”196 Unlike Adamkus, Paksas provided content 
for the metaphors of “stability” and “change” in the language of the everyday experience of 
many people. 
Reaffirming people’s feelings and perspectives towards social history, community, 
nation, the state, and the self, Paksas’s campaign spoke to the prevalent pessimism (see 
chapter 1, 2, and 6). Pessimism communicated similarity and nativeness of the candidate. 
Adamkus’s relatively optimistic tone, in many cases, communicated foreignness. For 
example, unlike Paksas’s strategy to recognize people’s marginalization and the responsibility 
of the state which was meaningful to many informants, Adamkus encouraged initiative and 
industriousness which people could not imagine in their situations and with the resources 
and opportunities they had. Unlike Paksas who claimed to have power to bring change to the 
people, Adamkus invited people to find powers in themselves and to change (see also chapter 
6). At the Family Farmers’ Congress, Adamkus “urged farmers to adjust to the time 
requirements more quickly.”197 He argued that farmers have to reorient themselves, the 
faster, the better.198 Adamkus also invited Ukmergė region officials to strengthen self-
                                                 
195 See Dineika, Laurynas “Kodėl įtakingiausios politinės partijos pasitiki Valdu Adamkumi?” (“Why 
the most influential parties trust Valdas Adamkus?”). Lietuvos rytas. 01/03/2003. No.1. P.4.  
196 The interview with Paksas. Digrytė, Eglė “R. Paksas nenori “Williams” palaikiusių paramos” 
(“Paksas does not want any help from the supporters of “Williams””). Respublika. 12/24/2002. No.297. P.3. 
See also the final debates between Paksas and Adamkus. LNK television. Žodžio laisvė. 01/02/2003. 
197 See Sasnauskas, Valdas “Lietuvos šeimos ūkininkai—permainų kelyje” (“Family farmers of 
Lithuania—in transition”). Valstiečių laikraštis. 12/10/2002. No.99. P.5.  
198 Ibid. 
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government, not to wait for money from the Vilnius bureaucrats, but manage things 
independently.199 In Želva, when an old woman observed that the village was becoming 
deserted, Adamkus responded that the “villages [kaimas] which exist at present are not going 
to survive. However, it does not mean that everything will vanish. There is a possibility to 
preserve the Lithuanian village—to found a small business.”200 In Balninkai Adamkus 
emphasized that the initiative of village people is essential for great accomplishments, for 
escaping misery, poverty, and trouble.201 In an interview for Valstiečių laikraštis (The Farmers’ 
Newspaper), Adamkus claimed to be “proud of the people of Lithuania,” “I am very happy 
when I see initiative by people. Especially in villages. They start on bare ground. […] [they] 
know what they want, take risks, take loans. […] Obviously, there are people who cannot 
take initiative. But even their life is getting better. Most important is that people want to 
change their present life, overcome present-day difficulties. Everything depends on the 
people—we will have the Lithuania we want to have.”202  
Optimism for the future, encouraging people to be responsible for their lives, to take 
initiative and be creative, communicated the difference and foreignness of Adamkus and his 
agenda since it did not resonate with the pessimism and understanding of current 
developments people shared. It created space for Paksas’s team to claim that Adamkus did 
not understand people’s concerns and lives. Adamkus’s lack of understanding of people’s 
concerns was repeatedly invoked by many informants during my interviews when they 
discussed the electoral campaigns of 2002 and 2004. Paksas claimed to know people’s 
problems. His knowledge was validated not only by his rhetoric, but also by his actions in 
reaching out to people in various villages, towns, and cities of Lithuania. Paksas met 
thousands of people, and, in his words, shook their hands and looked into their eyes. “You 
                                                 
199 See Jastramskienė, Loreta “Prezidentas siūlė ukmergiškiams stiprinti savivaldą” (“President 
suggested Ukmergė residents to strengthen self-governance”). Valstiečių laikraštis. 12/14/2002. No.100. P.8.  
200 Ibid. 
201 See Šaknys, Bernardas “V. Adamkus: “Per kaimo bendruomenę—į gerovę!” ” (“V. Adamkus: 
“From village community to welfare!” ”). Valstiečių laikraštis. 11/16/2002. No.92. P.1, 4.  
202 See the interview with Valdas Adamkus, Lina Pečeliūnienė “Valdas Adamkus: Didžiuojuosi 
Lietuvos žmonėmis” (“Valdas Adamkus: I am proud of the people of Lithuania”). Valstiečių laikraštis. 
12/17/2002. No.101. P.1, 8.  
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said,” Paksas remembered, “that injustice and poverty has not decreased.”203 Paksas’s gaze 
reached out to many people and became commodified, as in the leaflets and flyers people 
had, or even embodied, as in the case of Levonas’s cat Paksas.  
Paksas’s campaign invoked the moral relationship between the state and people (see 
chapter 6). The state was expected to be positively present in people’s lives by giving proper 
pensions, assuring medical care, law and order, and entitling people to various benefits. 
Paksas argued that the ruble deposits, compensation for land, termination of 
“prichvatization” (see chapter 6) are the problems which have to be addressed first. “I know 
how and what resources the state can use to resolve grievances [atitaisyti skriaudas]. 
Unfortunately, we cannot resolve [grievances] for everyone—it hurts when you think that 
many people who suffered through occupation, deportation and labor camps did not live to 
retrieve their bank deposits and their land in a free Lithuania.”204 His campaign brought 
back the state congruent with people’s imaginations, and promised the state’s presence in the 
future. 
Activity and determination are essential to any political campaign and to the image of 
a leader (Εгорова-Γантман and Μинтусов 2002, Edelman 1964). Paksas argued that he is 
not afraid of responsibility.205 He had power, the political will and was determined and 
committed to bringing about change. His campaign advisor Dalia Kutraitė admitted that, “if 
you are a state leader, you are responsible for everything. People are disappointed with the 
new form of democracy where responsibility is diluted. […] I believe first of all people 
believed that Paksas is not afraid to be personally responsible.”206 The TV commercials 
conveyed “masculinity, energy, intellect, power, resolution, Rolandas Paksas—the President 
you need.” Landing in a helicopter to meet with people, riding a motorcycle or manning and 
flying a plane below the bridges of cities were rites signifying the leader’s power. 
                                                 
203 See the electoral advertising broadcast “Presidential elections.” Lithuanian Television. 
01/02/2003. 
204 See the Paksas campaign article “Lietuvos žmonės nori permainų ir tvarkos” (“People of 
Lithuania want changes and order”). Lietuvos rytas. 01/03/2003. No.1. P.8. 
205 See, e.g., the Paksas campaign program.  
206 Kutraitė, Dalia Lithuanian Television. 01/05/2003. The broadcast after the second round of 
elections. 
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9.1.2 Politics of hope and belief 
Paksas claimed to have power not only to return value, recognition, honor, respect, and 
dignity, but also hope and belief. In the mainstream newspapers Paksas political advertising 
carried the note “I will return hope and belief.” The campaign film about Rolandas Paksas 
also ended with the note “I trust. Rolandas Paksas.”207 At the municipality elections, which 
took place at the same time as the presidential elections of 2002, Paksas’s party of the Liberal 
Democrats argued on tones as the Paksas presidential campaign: 
I believe that I will return hope and belief in the family, the state, and the future. 
I believe that responsibility is the supreme law of the state. 
I believe that a strong President and order in the state will create a rich and secure Lithuania.  
I believe that the state will guarantee its future by creating possibilities for young people to 
study, work and earn [money]. 
I believe that by taking care of pensioners the state will honor the people who created it.  
I believe that the state has to care about the physical and the spiritual [dvasinę] health of an 
individual. 
I believe that we will overcome impunity, the major reason for criminality.  
I believe that Lithuania must remain a country of safe nuclear power. 
I believe that Lithuania will enrich the world and the world will enrich Lithuania.208
Rolandas Paksas 
 
Politics of hope and belief are central to many political campaigns. For example, the 
themes of hope, change, and the economy were elements of the Clinton political myth 
(McLeod 1999). Clinton’s rhetoric “bridged the gap between the hopes of middle Americans 
for change and their difficult economic plight” (McLeod 1999:363). Edelman argues that the 
“evocation of a hopeful future in a population beset by poverty and unemployment was the 
secret of Roosevelt’s rhetorical success” (Edelman 1975:8). Like change and order, hope and 
belief are good political metaphors to capture various experiences. They are among the most 
                                                 
207 The film (2002) about Paksas by Lina Svaranskytė was aired on the LNK television. 
208 See the program of the Liberal Democrats “To return respect to the individual is the core of my 
program, the reason for the victory” (“Grąžinti pagarbą žmogui—tai yra mano programos esmė, mano 
pergalės pagrindas”). Kauno diena. 12/05/2002. No.282. P.16. 
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popular passions which have a global political career and provide a route to power (cf. Bailey 
1983).  
The politics of hope and belief was reinforced by images of youth and future. These 
images were used in campaign discourses and were invested in Paksas’s character. In Vilnius 
there was a huge poster with a young man holding a small child in his arms. The note on the 
poster was: “The President. The future is close.” It was not clear whether the “President” 
referred to the small child, to an unknown young man, or to none of them. It was the 
“future” and “youth” which were associated with the “President” and which evoked Paksas 
rather than Adamkus. To anticipate the possible reasoning that youth implies incompetence 
and lack of experience, Paksas connected himself to the “global” genealogy of male heroes 
(cf. Verdery 1996): 
At 37 William Shakespeare wrote “Hamlet,” at 41 Christopher Columbus discovered America, 
at 37 Albert Einstein created the theory of relativity, at 43 John F. Kennedy became the 
President of the United States. There is a time to work, there is a time to think work over. 
Rolandas Paksas is coming to work. 
Paksas’s team and his supporters’ ideas about giving a way for the younger 
generation209 communicated that Adamkus is too old to be President. The article supporting 
Paksas argued: “The President is responsible not only for foreign policy, he is also the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Who is better for this position—Rolandas 
Paksas, determined and young, or Valdas Adamkus who served as a translator [in the unit of 
the anti-Soviet forces] forty years ago?”210 The dichotomy of youth and old age was very 
beneficial to Paksas. Many people considered Adamkus’s old age. The elderly compared him 
to themselves. Juozas thought that, if Adamkus is healthy and energetic at 76, it “means that 
he did not work seriously earlier.” Age did not matter much for the supporters of Adamkus. 
Adolfina from the second largest village said to vote for Adamkus despite his age, because 
                                                 
209 See, e.g., Valevičius, Vytautas “Valdas Adamkus: pažadai ir darbai” (“Valdas Adamkus: promises 
and work done”). Respublika. 12/31/2002. No.301. P.6. Adamkus addressed the question about his old age in 
electoral advertising article “Prezidentas V. Adamkus kviečia žmones balsuoti už geresnę šalies ateitį” (“The 
President V. Adamkus invites people to vote for a better future of the country”). Lietuvos rytas. 01/03/2003. 
No.1. P.7. 
210 See Valevičius, Vytautas “Valdas Adamkus: pažadai ir darbai” (“Valdas Adamkus: promises and 
work done”). Respublika. 12/31/2002. No.301. P.6.  
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“maybe Paksas is good, […] but we know Adamkus… What do I know about Paksas?.. his 
fists clenched, resolute, and all…” 
9.1.3 Politics of outsiderness 
Part of the media and the major political parties presented Paksas as an outsider to the state 
and the political elites. The outsiderness was communicated as a negative difference. 
However, people perceived it positively, as Paksas’s outsiderness to corrupt and immoral 
state officials. His resignation from the position of mayor of Vilnius and the Prime 
Minister’s position was communicated by his opponents as his inability to work with 
colleagues, to find solutions in critical situations, unwillingness to compromise, 
unpredictability, instability, avoidance of responsibility,211 and unreliability.212 Paksas’s team 
presented the facts of his resignation as determination, observance of the nation’s good 
rather than his own self-interest, refusal of power for a moral cause as well as opposition to 
the elites.213 Paksas’s service as Prime Minister with Adamkus’s support and 
recommendation and as Adamkus’s advisor after his resignation of the Prime Minister’s 
                                                 
211 See Dineika, Laurynas “Kodėl įtakingiausios politinės partijos pasitiki Valdu Adamkumi?” (“Why 
the most influential parties trust Valdas Adamkus?”). Lietuvos rytas. 01/03/2003. No.1. P.4. See also 
Simonaitis, Edvardas “Vadovavimas valstybei—tai nuolatinių kompromisų paieška” (“Leading the state is a 
constant search for compromises”). Panevėžio balsas. 12/28/2002. No.297. P.3. 
212 G. Kirkilas, one of the leaders of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, said that Paksas is 
“unreliable.” See Bruveris, Vytautas “Antrojo turo išvakarėse—rėmėjų paieška” (“The search for financial 
supporters before the second round”). Respublika. 12/28/2002. No.299. P.2.  
213 Paksas’s opposition to the state and the political establishment was reinforced in various campaign 
strategies. Paksas was presented as a Samogitian, a member of a historic ethnic and language community in 
Lithuania. Like the Samogitians Paksas was said to be resolute, determined, persistent, actively pursuing his 
goal, and reliable. See Paulius Rimeikis’s interview with Stasys Kasperavičius, President of the Samogitian 
Association. “Žemaičiai nebijo globalizacijos” (“The Samogitians are not afraid of globalization”). Respublika. 
12/09/2002. No.284. P.26. Responding to the contest “Who is afraid of Rolandas Paksas?,” Algimantas 
Gaudutis, a history teacher from Panevėžys, answered the question: “the politicians in power at present. To 
be precise, the politicians under power. They are controlled by the criminal world, which bribed and made 
our state dependent on the “elite.” It allows for concluding that the top stratum of the mafia is afraid of R. 
Paksas. […] They are all afraid of change.” See Gaudutis, Algimantas “Konkursui “Kas bijo Rolando Pakso?” 
” (“For a competition “Who is afraid of Rolandas Paksas?” ”). Respublika. 12/31/2002. No.301. P.7. See also 
Paksas campaign article “Kas ir kodėl bijo Rolando Pakso?” (“Who and why is afraid of Rolandas Paksas?”). 
Kauno diena. 01/03/2003. No.1. P.16. 
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office were used by Paksas’s team to communicate Adamkus’s trust in Paksas and approval 
of Paksas’s actions. 
Like Paksas, Adamkus’s image was structured outside the “state” by reinforcing his 
image as a moral politician. Adamkus’s moral image was communicated emphasizing 
honesty, responsibility, tolerance, decency, dignity, and elegance.214 The image of a moral 
politician and the status of an American Lithuanian was the important political capital which 
contributed to Adamkus’s victory in the presidential elections of 1997. As a person who 
lived many years outside Lithuania,215 for which Adamkus was included into the Guinness 
world records (2000 millennium edition) as the “President to have spent the least time in his 
country,” he was expected to be outside the polluting realm of politics and wealth.  
People remember Adamkus as a “good person,” “neither a thief, nor a liar like 
everyone else of ours.” Genė and Vincas from the largest village thought that it is also very 
important that Adamkus saw “the other culture, the other order.” Ramunė, a farmer from 
the largest village, remembered voting for Adamkus because she thought that “the foreigner 
will bring order.” In the first presidential elections of 1992, some voted for K. Lozoraitis, 
another “foreigner,” because, like Adamkus in 1997, he was “an American, rich, he wouldn’t 
need money…” (Povilas from the second largest village). The media reported similar 
perspectives. For example, Juozas Pociūnas from Petronių village, Ukmergė region, wrote to 
the newspaper Valstiečių laikraštis, that Adamkus had not stolen anything, he had not been 
bound to financial, political groups. He had not gone abroad using tax payers’ money. He 
knows foreign languages well. According to Pociūnas, Adamkus’s “education and intellect 
brings honor to Lithuania.”216
Some people, even if they did not challenge the moral image of Adamkus, claimed 
that Adamkus is unable to understand their problems because “he has not been part of our 
culture.” Jadvyga N., the former party secretary, like Levonas, voted for Paksas because 
                                                 
214 The TV commercials were shown during the concert of support for Adamkus. See LNK 
television. 01/03/2003. 8.15 p.m. “Dainos Prezidentui—dainos geresnei Lietuvos ateičiai” (“Songs for 
President—songs for the better future of Lithuania”). 
215 Adamkus fled from Lithuania to Germany in 1944. In 1949 he emigrated to the United States. 
216 See Pociūnas, Juozas “Valstybėje, kaip ūkyje, reikia išmanančio šeimininko” (“In the state, like on 
the farm, you need an experienced master”). Valstiečių Laikraštis. 11/23/2002. No.94. P.7.  
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Adamkus “you know, he is an American, he does not understand our problems. He does not 
understand our Lithuania.” Violeta, in her early 50s, a former CP member with high standing 
in Soviet times (and at present), reflected upon others benevolence towards Americans by 
articulating her opposition:  
he was an American that’s why he got the position [one of the Ministers of Lithuania]. They 
think, if you are an American, so you are like a God. O my God, my God… I don’t know. I 
was neither a nationalist, nor a racist, but, well, I think, I will become one in my old days. 
Against Americans. Against Americans and present bureaucrats. 
In the elections of 2002, Paksas’s campaign recirculated the positive image of 
Adamkus’s moral outsiderness to mean passivity, non-interference, and, as people claimed, 
unfamiliarity with people’s concerns. In this context Paksas’s outsiderness was positive: he 
was outside corruption, clan politics, and mafia dealings. Adamkus’s outsiderness became 
negative: it was non-interference, giving way for to corrupt elites to prosper and misbehave. 
Such image of Adamkus also contrasted with the image of the active and determined leader 
Paksas. 
Adamkus’s inability to positively influence political life in the state was exemplified in 
the process of privatization of “Mažeikių Nafta,”217 the oil refinery. The Lithuanian 
Government, “Mažeikių Nafta,” and American company “Williams International” signed an 
agreement, under which “Williams International” became a 33-percent owner and operator 
of “Mažeikių Nafta” in 1999. Paksas, Prime Minister during the privatization of “Mažeikių 
Nafta,” claimed to resign from his post because he was unwilling to sign an agreement which 
was unfavorable to Lithuania. According to Mečys Laurinkus, the director of State Security, 
the “coming of “Williams” to Lithuania was an attempt to reduce dependency on the 
enterprises of Russia. This was the only reason to make concessions.”218 In 2002 the Russian 
oil company YUKOS acquired a stake from “Williams International” and associated rights in 
“Mažeikių Nafta,” assuming all rights and obligations of “Williams International” under the 
                                                 
217 See, e.g., the final debates between Paksas and Adamkus. LNK television. Žodžio laisvė. 
01/02/2003. 
218 See Laurinkus, Mečys “Kaltinimų baimė trukdo priimti sprendimus” (“The fear of accusations 
disrupt decision making”). Lietuvos rytas. 09/19/2002. No.217. 
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1999 agreements with the Lithuanian Government, including operator rights”219 and making 
the political decision of 1999 to reduce dependency on Russian companies void. According 
to the Parliamentary Commission which investigated the privatization of “Mažeikių Nafta,” 
President Adamkus had an active role in “politically influencing the major decisions” during 
the process of privatization, thus, influencing an unfavorable privatization.220 The case of 
“Mažeikių Nafta” promoted Paksas’s image as the leader who possessed qualities Adamkus 
lacked who made successful decisions in contrast to the mistakes of Adamkus and who, 
when he resigned, was the victim of obstacles placed there by adversaries or enemies (cf. 
Edelman 1988). 
An outsider to the “state” is expected to act as an equalizing force, negating 
contradictions, effacing distinctions, restoring a mystical social unity and well-being, and 
undoing existing hierarchies. Among the many candidates in the first round of the 
presidential elections of 2002 an important outsider was V. Šerėnas, the fourth among the 17 
candidates (he gained 7.75% of votes). Šerėnas has a TV program of political satire 
“Dvyračio žinios,” which builds its popularity largely by criticizing the state and politicians. 
The votes for Šerėnas embraced cynicism towards state officials (see chapter 6), and, as the 
following citation illustrates, ideas about the value of the past. Jūratė, a professor from 
Kaunas, recalled choosing a “joker” (juokdarį) (she never used the candidate’s real name 
during the interview):  
We were raised differently. We have different relations [to surroundings and people]. That’s 
why this nostalgia for the past exists. […] I think many intellectuals chose a joker in the 
elections. I don’t know the other candidates. Maybe they did not know how to present 
themselves… all that money, advertising… where from? We don’t believe. We don’t have a 
developed capitalism that could allow one to run for office. It’s painful when they say that we 
have the leaders we deserve.  
When I asked why Jūratė voted for the “joker,” she responded: “You know from the 
fairy tales that a “joker” [like a fool] is the smartest [she laughed].” Like the ritual clown 
                                                 
219 See http://www.nafta.lt. 
220 See the discussion of the Parliamentary Commission conclusions on privatization of “Mažeikių 
nafta.” Danilevičiūtė, Vida “ “Williams” valios vykdytojams bausmės negresia” (“There will be no 
punishment for fulfilling “Williams’s” will”). Respublika. 06/03/2004. No.127. P.1,3. 
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among the pueblo-dwelling Indians of the southwestern United States who had both comic 
functions and others that were more serious, not the least of which were social control and 
the management of some important ceremonial events (Hall 1997:132), the Lithuanian 
“joker” was a combination much like that of the trickster who may be a vulgar comedian and 
comic character as well as a social transformer. The “joker” was an outsider capable of 
mediating between Jūratė and political and social life. He had the power to see underneath 
things and to laugh at them. His irony communicated disapproval of the state officials and 
their actions. Political rites and leaders were transformed into satirical subjects, deserving no 
respect and serious consideration. The “joker’s” irony resonated with Jūratė’s cynicism 
towards the state.  
Another notable outsider, whose Labor Party, founded in 2003, gained the majority 
in the elections to the European Parliament of 2004221 and the elections to the Parliament of 
2004,222 was Russian-born Viktor Uspaskich. Uspaskich arrived in Lithuania in 1985, became 
a citizen of Lithuania in the early 1990s and made an impressive career there, becoming a 
pickle magnate and a millionaire. One of his campaign strategies was defining himself and 
his party in opposition to the existing parties. Uspaskich’s Russianness, even if perceived as 
“foreignness,” was not an issue that would prevent many people from giving their vote for 
him or his party. In one of the meetings with people in Panevėžys, Uspaskich was given a 
question: “Why do you think that a Russian can make Lithuania happy?” Uspaskich 
responded: “Because a Lithuanian did not do this.”223 Uspaskich’s phrase was cheered in the 
audience because communication was about the state rather than the nation. The ethnicity of 
the state for many in the audience was irrelevant, even if most in the audience considered 
themselves Lithuanian (see chapter 5). During my research many informants argued that 
                                                 
221 The Labor Party in the elections to the European Parliament 2004 won 30.16% votes. This is 5 
seats at the EU Parliament out of 13 for Lithuania.  
222 The Labor Party in the elections to the Parliament in 2004 won 27.66%. This is 39 seats out of 
141. 
223 Panevėžio rytas. 05/06/2004. No.103. See also the Conclusions of the Commission “About 





Russians are sincere, душа224 (soul) people, honest, “they have nothing and need nothing. If 
there is fish and oil in the store, they are very happy” (Jadvyga M. from the largest village). 
Like the laughter in Panevėžys, these images were criticism for Lithuanians who were 
imagined as thieves, jealous and dishonest, “expecting all the time for the neighbor’s cow to 
die. That’s the mentality” [a driver, about 40 year old man]. It was part of a greater criticism 
aimed at the state and embracing social/political history (see chapters 1, 2 and 6). 
Attitudes towards outsiders reflected people’s identities. Those who invoked 
nationalist ideals to speak of themselves (see chapter 3) doubted Uspaskich and his agenda. 
Genovaitė from Kaunas wondered “how could a simple welder have become a millionaire? 
He must have been involved in the black market.” Anelė, a Kaunas resident, wanted to 
believe that he was not going to do anything wrong to Lithuania. Her husband Albertas tried 
to find facts to disprove his doubts about Uspaskich. He noted that “the people of Kėdainiai 
[the city where Uspaskich lives] are very happy with him because he helps them personally, 
always. On the TV, on the broadcast “Bėdų turgus” it was announced that he bought an 
apartment for one woman with children and asked that it be kept quiet. They found out 
about it only later.” Anelė remembered that “in Russia he built a church. Well,… it is good 
work. People will go to pray.” Karilė, a Kaunas resident, in her 30s, claimed not to like “the 
fact that he is not a Lithuanian. I don’t believe that a non-Lithuanian can do anything good 
for Lithuania. […] I don’t trust him.” 
 
On 5 January 2003 Rolandas Paksas was elected to the office of President of the 
Republic in second-round voting. He took the oath and assumed the duties of the President 
on 26 February 2003. After impeachment proceedings, however, he was removed from 
office on 6 April 2004. Paksas was impeached for violation of the Constitution of Lithuania 
and for breaking the President’s oath. He violated the Constitution and broke the oath by 
unlawfully granting Jurijus Borisovas, Paksas’s financial supporter during the electoral 
campaign, citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania; by not ensuring the protection of state 
secrets and letting Borisovas know that in his regard institutions of law and order were 
                                                 
224 See Pesmen, Dale (2000) Russia and Soul about the explorations of the Russian dusha. 
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conducting investigations and tapping his telephone conversations; as well as by not 
coordinating public and private interests.225
During the impeachment process and after it, Paksas was continually considered to 
be outside of the corrupt elites. As Edelman argued, in “politics it almost always remains 
possible for a person to believe what his social and psychological needs make him want to 
believe, as is evident from every set of responses to controversial political developments” 
(Edelman 1975:12). Many supporters of Paksas thought that the elites did not let him work 
or disliked him. People accepted and agreed with some accusations, such as that Paksas had 
no right to give the citizenship of Lithuania to J. Borisovas, a Russian businessman, because 
of Borisovas’s financial support to the presidential campaign. However, then Paksas was 
often presented as the one who is no more corrupt than others. The legal cases, such as a 
case on corruption in privatizing land, which included Parliament and Government 
members226 and which received a lot of media attention, were seen as the accomplishments 
of Paksas and as the beginning of changes he promised. Regina from Kaunas argued that 
during the impeachment: 
People had various opinions. Some thought that Paksas would have made order… and that 
there was a conspiracy against him. That he was hurt, but actually he was an angel. Those who 
supported him thought this way. That Paksas wanted good, but was kicked out. 
Neringa: What do you think? 
Regina: Well, I don’t know, when I saw that clairvoyant227 [aiškiaregė]… she is one. The 
second, when he got that million [from J. Borisovas, one of the financial supporters]… it did 
                                                 
225 See the Conclusion by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania (March 31, 2004) at: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/preps2?Condition1=229756&Condition2= or 
http://www.lrkt.lt/dokumentai/2004/c040331.htm (“On the compliance of actions of President Rolandas 
Paksas of the Republic of Lithuanian against whom an impeachment case has been instituted with the 
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania”). See the impeachment process transcript at the Parliament of 
Lithuania webpage (April 6, 2004): http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/preps2?Condition1=230143&Condition2=. 
226 See, e.g., the discussion by Čekutis, Ričardas “ “Apsivalymo” proceso grimasos” (“Grimaces of 
the “cleansing” process”). Atgimimas. 01/09–15/2004. No.1(778). 
http://www.atgimimas.lt/ssi.php?id=1073633506&which=1&f_text=. Accessed on 12/30/2005. See also 
BNS information “P. Gražulis ragina V. Junoką paskelbti visų parlamentarų žemgrobių sąrašus” (“P. Gražulis 
urges V. Junokas to announce lists of parliamentarians who appropriated land”). www.omni.lt. 03/16/2004. 
1:22 p.m. Accessed on 04/16/2004.073633506&which&f_tex78) 
227 In the media L. Lolišvili, a Georgian and a so-called clairvoyant (or sorceress) and a close friend of 
Paksas, was said to have a strong influence on Paksas. See the discussion of books about L. Lolišvili by 
Andrius Navickas and Arūnas Peškaitis “Lena Lolišvili—Lietuvos politikų šventoji” (“Lena Lolišvili—a saint 
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not make me trust him more. I think he is not suitable, not suitable for foreign policy. Well, I 
don’t know, I thought he wasn’t fit to be president. 
Regina voted for Adamkus in the elections of 2002. Impeachment of Paksas 
solidified her opinion that Adamkus was the right choice. She thought that Adamkus was 
good for “foreign policy because he knew [foreign] languages, was diplomatic and had 
something others lacked—elegance. […] He was not young, but maybe if he was elected [in 
2002] there would emerge somebody else [to replace him].” 
There were also people who agreed that they felt shame because they voted for 
Paksas and did not realize who he was. However, the prevalence of positive ideas and 
feelings about Paksas after the impeachment illustrate that financing, energy, and publicity, 
thought to be the major forces in giving Paksas victory in the presidential elections of 2002 
are not the only means to produce signification. Having power and media support, the 
Parliament was able to resignify Paksas as the violator of the democratic regime, law and 
order, and as a corrupt politician transgressing private and public boundaries. However, it 
did not produce a shared text among the people who voted for Paksas. The official images 
of the impeachment process and the hegemonic discourse were shared predominantly 
among those informants who did not vote for Paksas anyway. Many others, as mentioned, 
resignified Paksas in terms of shared social texts about the corrupt state and state officials 
including or excluding Paksas from them. The data on impeachment as well as voting 
conforms to Lakoff’s findings that “people think in terms of frames and metaphors, i.e., 
conceptual structures. The frames are in the synapses of our brains, physically present in the 
form of neural circuitry. When the facts don’t fit the frames, the frames are kept and the 
facts ignored” (Lakoff 2004:730). “The ideas have to be in place in people’s brains before 
the sound bite can make any sense” (Lakoff 2004:105). Lakoff argues that in the United 
States a huge number of people still believe that Saddam Hussein was behind September 11 
in spite of the report by the 9/11 Commission. According to him, people believe this 
because it fits their understanding of the world and because they have a frame and they only 
accept facts that fit that frame (Lakoff 2004:18). In the context of Lakoff’s reasoning, one 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the politicians of Lithuania”). Ekstra. 05/12–18/2003. No.19 (232). See 
http://www.lrytas.lt/ekstra/archyvas/2003/0512/. Accessed on 12/30/2005. 
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can conclude that the political mainstream in Lithuania lacks the power and capacity to 
produce frames (or social texts in my vocabulary) which can make sense to many people and 
which make sense in regard to people’s experience and subjectivities. It is indicative of the 
new nation-state’s failure “to produce convincing fantasies of the commensurability of its 
citizens” (Holston and Appadurai 1996:202, cited in Berdahl 2001). Rather than creating new 
convincing fantasies, the political mainstream incorporates so-called populism into its own 
body in order to win more votes. Paksas’s agenda was reprised by Adamkus and Prunskienė 
in the presidential elections of 2004 (see the discussion below).  
The criticism of Paksas’s campaign carried out by Adamkus’s supporters and the 
media ranged from identifying aggressive and disgraceful powers to associating him with 
Moscow interests and supporters of terrorists. J. Borisovas’s enterprise “Avia Baltika,” which 
gave 1 million litas to Paksas’s campaign, was said to sell helicopters to “Sudan, the patron of 
terrorists.”228 Paksas’s campaign was also claimed to be designed by the Moscow public 
relation company “Al Max.”229 Unlike Paksas’s destabilizing power, Adamkus guaranteed 
solidarity (santarvė), “because he had no interests. He was not working for anybody,”230 
Paksas was seen as “bought,” since “the owner of money is the owner of a bought thing [i.e., 
Paksas].”231 Political scientists argued that Adamkus’s electoral program did not carry empty 
promises, unlike Paksas’s campaign.232 Paksas’s promises were reapproached as extending 
beyond the competence of the President,233 whose primary field of involvement, according 
to the Constitution of Lithuania, is foreign policy. 
Paksas’s power and party symbolism were associated with fascism. A State Security 
officer during our interview conveyed that the eagle used in the Paksas’s campaign reminded 
him of the eagle of Hitler’s Luftwaffe. Paksas claimed that it was the ancient Roman eagle 
(Senovės Romėnų erelis). Paksas was also compared to radical and populist leaders, or 
                                                 
228 See Pečeliūnienė, Lina “Išsirinkome padangių erelį” (“We have elected an eagle soaring to the 
skies”). Valstiečių laikraštis. 01/07/2003. No.2. P.8.  
229 Ibid.  
230 Beresnevičius, Gintaras Respublika. 11/28/2002. No.275. P.6. 
231 Ibid. 
232 See comments by A. Krupavičius. Lithuanian Television. 01/05/2003. The broadcast after the 
second round of elections. 
233 Ibid. 
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protagonists of the integrationist politics (see Holmes 2000) in Western Europe, such as Jörg 
Haider and Jean-Marie Le Pen.234 The global political economy of terrorism, fascism, 
communism, and democracy was doubtfully meaningful to many informants and they did 
not respond to Adamkus’s final address on the last day of the campaign in which he argued 
that we “have to confront aggressive and disgraceful power. It raises concern about the 
future of our state. […] Everyone for whom our democracy, freedom and welfare is 
important come [to elections]. […] I am sure that the nation and its freedom cannot be 
bought for several million of uncertain origin.” 
According to Adamkus’s campaign organizers the defeat was due to lower financing 
and lower visibility. Ona Volungevičiūtė, the chief organizer of the campaign, argued that 
Paksas paid ten times more for TV ads than Adamkus.235 She also thought that many people 
might have voted for those who gave something “material,” i.e., gifts. The fact that the 
working President did not have time to travel as much as the opponents did was another 
reason for losing the election.236 One of Adamkus’s major mistakes was considered to be his 
reliance on his popularity, authority and major accomplishments like paving the way to 
NATO and the EU. I argued that elections were a semantic and symbolic competition (cf. 
Почепцов 2000) and it was a semantic defeat that Adamkus faced.  
The final debates were colored by Paksas’s anecdote: a car was going on a narrow 
road. On one side of the road there is a young girl, on the other an old woman. The driving 
instructor asks the driver, what you will do, if you are unable to pass between the women. 
Many students responded that you have to run over the old woman because she has lived 
her life. The instructor responded—you have to stop, not run over people.237 The anecdote 
was used to illustrate that Paksas was not going to take from some people and give to the 
                                                 
234 See Digrytė, Eglė “R. Paksas nenori “Williams” palaikiusių paramos” (“Paksas does not want help 
from the supporters of “Williams” ”). Respublika. 12/24/2002. No.297. P.3.  
235 Paksas’s media coverage was 2–3 times higher than Adamkus’s, according to the discussion of 
“Sic Gallup Media” survey in “Lapkričio 20 d. Lietuvos spaudos apžvalga” (“Lithuanian media coverage, 
November 20th”). Kauno diena. 11/20/2003. 07:48:46. Source: www.omni.lt.  
236 Ramunės Sakalauskaitės interview with Ona Volungevičiūtė, the chair of Adamkus electoral 
campaign. “Neiškovota pergalė nėra pralaimėjimas” (“The lost victory is not a defeat”). Lietuvos rytas. 
01/08/2003. No.5. P.3.  
237 See the final debates between Paksas and Adamkus. LNK television. Žodžio laisvė. 01/02/2003. 
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others. Paksas’s anecdote resonated with some villagers’ thoughts that the state is waiting for 
the old people to die out. It also resonated with talks that the old generation is “sovietized,” 
“longing for the torturer” (see chapter 5), “voting populist” (see chapter 1), and expectations 
that only the younger generation, born in freedom, will create the “modern state” (see the 
epigraph). This is the ideology of subalternity directed at the Soviet generation utilized in 
Paksas’s campaign to create his political spectacle. It is also the hegemony of the present, 
reflecting new powers, new values, for which people did not vote. They voted for the 
present congruent to the tradition of socialism, which was symbolically relevant for their 
post-socialist selves. They also voted for a future congruent with their experience and 
knowledge of post-socialism. 
9.2 THE 2ND SCENARIO. THE SECOND ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS OF 2004 
9.2.1 Meeting people 
On June, 2004 I was going back to Vilnius from the town of Biržai in the north of Lithuania 
where I was at Kazimiera Prunskienė’s, the woman candidate at the presidential elections of 
2004, meeting with Biržai residents. I was with some other people in a car of a so-called 
dušmanas (plural dušmanai), a man, in his early 40s whose name I never learned. Dušmanas, a 
term absent from the major Lithuanian language dictionaries and databases but well-known 
in Lithuania, means an illegal driver who gives a ride to people traveling from one place 
(usually a city) to another. They charge people less than bus station drivers and usually 
recruit people in bus stations or at the major bus stops by approaching them personally. 
Dušmanas usually implies full time employment. Several years ago dušmanai legalized their 
business. Now you can meet a former dušmanas by the major entrance to the bus station in 
Vilnius or Kaunas loudly pronouncing city names—their points of destination. However, the 
illegal business of dušmanai coexists with its legal forms.  
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A parallel “private” business exists in the bus stations. Some bus drivers, especially 
those who drive microbuses which make no stops between Vilnius and Kaunas, give no 
tickets to some people and often charge them a few litas less. Like in many other spaces, 
“private” business prospers within the public (or even private) sector (see also Wedel 1998, 
2001). Like political spaces, post-socialist economies are primarily informed by categories of 
difference, such as “state” and “people” rather than “private” and “public.” People 
themselves refuse to take tickets and comfort drivers on the poor conditions of business and 
life. 
As a professor from Šiauliai explained, dušmanas is a person who illegally carries goods 
from Pakistan to Afghanistan. According to him this word was introduced by people who 
served in the Soviet Army. Dušmanai belonged to the category of the excluded and deprived, 
they usually were “Asian” and “dirty.” The present usage of dušmanas has the meanings of 
“illegality,” “violation of driving rules,” and “speeding.” A historian from Vilnius argued that 
dušmanas is an Afghanistan partisan. He claimed that dušmanai referred to bandits, dishonest 
activists; however, people of Lithuania sympathized with them because they were “freedom 
fighters.” To the historian’s mind, at present dušmanai are cheaters, however, people 
sympathize with them because they help them to save some money.  
Dušmanas, whom I got to know, had his private clients. He benefited mostly from 
individual orders, such as picking up people at the airport in Vilnius and taking them to Riga 
or Tallinn. He also spent a lot of time commuting between towns and cities. He had several 
apartments in different cities and stayed in one or the other depending on his location at the 
end of the day. Dušmanas buckled up a seat belt when he spotted a police car on the highway. 
He commented that the police want to teach him to ride buckled up. The highway was a 
different space for dušmanas from travelers like myself. It was populated with the policemen 
whose behavior he knew and whom he most likely bribed to stay in business. Dušmanas 
argued that, if there were different laws and higher salaries, the police would behave 
differently. He sympathized with the policemen who were disadvantaged by the “system” 
and with whom he constituted a moral community against the higher corrupt and immoral 
authority or the “state.”  
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What kind of a subject was dušmanas? It looked like he was a successful entrepreneur, 
an example of a businessman in the unplanned market economy (cf. Wedel 1992), neither a 
real vagabond (Bauman 1998), nor a cosmopolitan (see Friedman 2001) in the globalized 
world. Since he had money, property, private business, was mobile and successful, he was 
not a “loser” of the transition. However, he lacked the status of a real businessman defined 
in the terms and values of the post-socialist neoliberal state, as well as social and legal 
recognition. Like Levonas who had the cat Paksas, he voted for the so-called populist Paksas 
in the elections of 2002. In the elections of 2004 he voted for Prunskienė, a supporter of 
Paksas during the impeachment process and a candidate not supported by the mainstream 
parties in her bid for President’s office.  
Dušmanas won two bottles of brandy from his friends because he was right about 
Prunskienė’s success in the first round. He was sure that Prunskienė would win the second 
round. Prunskienė’s opponent, the former President Valdas Adamkus, seemed to have little 
popularity in Biržai, if dušmanas were to be believed. He thought that young and stupid 
people in the cities vote for Adamkus. However, he knew no one who voted or was going to 
vote for Adamkus among his friends and acquaintances. He wondered how Adamkus got 
elected last time, in 1997.  
Dušmanas did not learn about my research. It was one of those situations when you 
do not think of doing research in the beginning and do not ask for consent as suggested by 
the code of ethics of the American Anthropological Association (see Bernard 2000:184–
190). However, it was one of those situations where you can check the validity of the ideas 
you have collected by informing people about your identity, your research, as well as asking 
for their consent. In this situation the space was outside my research sites and my identity 
was different, I was just a student going from Biržai to Vilnius who had participated in a 
meeting with Prunskienė for no particular reason. Maybe dušmanas assumed that I was a 
supporter. Knowing his and many others’ cynicism towards state officials, he might have 
thought that I was just curious. To my satisfaction the ideas dušmanas exchanged with me 
were very similar to those I had heard in village communities and in Kaunas.  
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The meeting with Prunskienė took place in a large culture hall. Most of the people 
were elderly, probably pensioners.238 When Prunskienė’s team arrived and started to 
distribute campaign books and pamphlets, many got very enthusiastic about getting a book. 
The pictures and pamphlets they acquired were necessary for their self-expression and 
thinking about their lives, necessities, losses, and future. During the meeting Prunskienė 
emphasized that she understands the “West” as the EU and the U.S.A. She remembered that 
in Soviet times the employed people had purchasing power which allowed them to live quite 
well. Now the average pension is 3.5 times lower the average salary. Prunskienė argued that 
the major problems are the social sphere, which has to be addressed by the President, the 
Government, and the Seimas. She talked about the low salaries of teachers, doctors, and 
pensioners. She promoted a socially sensitive state policy. Prunskienė addressed the politics 
of agriculture, questions of the nuclear industry and regional politics. She supported cheap 
energy which Lithuania could produce on its own in opposition to the mainstream political 




                                                 










The questions given to Prunskienė expressed concerns about shortages of money, 
low benefits, insecurity about one’s own and one’s children’s future, marginalization and 
stratification, low salaries and unemployment, the lavish lives politicians afford and the high 
salaries of bureaucrats, lost ruble savings, unfinished land restitution, and low milk prices. 
People asked: will there continue to be the elite and the sugar beets (runkeliai, see chapter 1)? 
Why are doctors devalued, why are their salaries so low, what will we do, if the doctors leave 
for other countries? How does Prunskienė think a family should live, if a single mother with 
three children gets a small salary and 100 litas for each child? When will the state begin the 
right pension politics? Why does my pension become lower, if I get benefits because my 
husband is deceased? Those who work, get money; what should an unemployed person do, 
if he cannot find a job, since he gets the unemployment benefits only for six months? What 
have teachers, doctors, workers, specialists, state sector workers done wrong that they get 
  280
salaries as small as pensions? One man asked about Prunskienė’s honeymoon after her 
second marriage about 10 years ago. Did she go to Australia? Prunskienė responded that 
there was no such a thing as a honeymoon at that time. “I was at the World Lithuanian 
Congress, we opened two government representative houses”… Then suddenly an old 
woman stood up, interrupting the discussion, and started complaining about her life… She 
did not stop even when asked to stop… This certainly was not the rule actors in political 
ritual like the meeting with a presidential candidate had to follow (cf. Bailey 1970). It brought 
confusion; one of the members of Prunskienė’s team left the stage and talked to the woman 
in person. 
In the other meetings which I attended with other political leaders and candidates the 
questions were similar. In August, 2004, in a town near the largest village, at a meeting with 
V. Muntianas, the candidate of the Labor Party to the Seimas, mayor of Kėdainiai and a 
close associate of V. Uspaskich, people asked about ruble savings, as one man, in his 60s, 
put: “when will the state return their debt to the people?" One woman claimed that she sold 
a house, put 25 thousand rubles in a bank and lost everything. A former student asked about 
education. After his graduation, he was unwilling to work for 600 LTL per month and was 
unemployed. He argued that the employers are looking for someone with experience. 
Jadvyga N., a former party secretary from the largest village, commented that, if you are 
experienced, you are too old to be hired. A man asked why bureaucrats get higher salaries 
than other people. One woman said that people think that Uspaskich is another thief. She 
asked this, as if expecting Muntianas to deny what she said. Another woman stood up and 
said that in the Seimas there is so much garbage that probably no one will be able to clean 
that place up. One man wondered why some get millions for milk while the people are paid 
so little.239  
                                                 
239 In media coverage of the elections of 2002 similar themes prevailed. It is reported that during a 
meeting with candidates in the first and the second round of elections people asked about the return of their 
ruble deposits, law and order, corruption and health care which could be accessible to everyone, the high 
salaries of politicians and low pensions. In Vosiliškis village people complained that children have to go to 
school several kilometers, the youth do not have anywhere to spend their free time because the municipality 
does not finance events at the culture house. See Ivaškevičiūtė, Kristina “Iš Prezidentūros—į atokiausius 
kaimus” (“From the presidential headquarters to the most distant villages”). Lietuvos rytas. 12/11/2002. 
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Meeting with Prunskienė and with other politicians was the political ritual that 
provided for the expression of social relationships and the rearticulation of hierarchies (cf. 
McLeod 1999). The low salary was seen as the devaluation of people and their work, people 
invoked the moral relationship between the state and its citizens (see chapter 6) as in the 
questions above about the guilt of doctors or the state’s debt to people. The politicians were 
associated with the state and she/he was seen as personally responsible for the lives people 
lead. The questions communicated experiences of injustice and denigration, and were 
expressive of anxieties, insecurities, and concerns about the present and the future. 
9.2.2 The West vs. the East 
In the political field Valdas Adamkus was the former President who “brought” Lithuania to 
the West and the EU and lost the elections of 2002 to Rolandas Paksas. Kazimiera 
Prunskienė was the first Prime Minister of Lithuania called the Amber Lady (Gintarinė Ledi) 
which genealogically included her into the scarce political community of Ladies, like M. 
Tatcher, the Iron Lady. She was also a leader of the Farmers’ and New Democracy Union 
(Valstiečių ir Naujosios Demokratijos Sąjunga), an advocate of Europe and Russia oriented 
politics, an exonerated KGB member, whose KGB pseudonym Šatrija,240 deriving from 
Lithuanian mythology, was not forgotten by many people. The facts that Prunskienė was the 
signatory of the Independence Act of Lithuania or that she was awarded the Minerva Prize 
for political activity reestablishing independence241 were never mentioned by informants. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
No.287. P.2. See also Sabalytė, Elvyra “Seimo vadovas rinkėjus viliojo dovanomis” (“The Chairman of Seimas 
attracted people with gifts”). Lietuvos rytas. 12/16/2002. No.291. P.2.  
For discussion of voting preferences at presidential and parliamentarian elections before 2002 see 
Degutis (1995, 1997, 2000) and Ališauskienė (1998). 
240 In Lithuania there is Šatrija’s Hill, a historic mound. The legends and stories variously explain how 
Šatrija’s Hill came into being and why it was named “Šatrija.” Part of those legends claim that it was a 
common meeting place of witches, and that because of witches’ actions the Hill was named “Šatrija.” One of 
the well-known writers of the Lithuanian literature of the 19th century had the pseudonym “Šatrijos Ragana” 
(The Witch of Šatrija). Because of the associations of Šatrija’s Hill with witches and because of the writer’s 
pseudonym, people often referred to Prunskienė’s KGB pseudonym as “Šatrijos Ragana” (The Witch of 
Šatrija) rather than “Šatrija” (the real KGB pseudonym). 





Figure 7. The meeting organized by Sąjūdis to support Adamkus by the Martynas Mažvydas 
National Library of Lithuania and by the Parliament of Lithuania. Vilnius. 06/25/2004. The poster says: 




Adamkus won 51.89%:46.66%, collecting 72,867 votes more than Prunskienė.242 His 
major electoral slogans were “I will be equally just to everyone” (Visiems lygiai teisingas),243 
“European well-being for every house!,” “For Lithuania without forgotten people!” It was 
the reprisal of his agenda of 2002 with the greater emphasis on what Adamkus’s team called 
“forgotten people.” 
                                                 
242 See The Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania. 
 http://www.vrk.lt/rinkimai/2004/prezidentas/rezultatai/rez_l_19_2.htm. Accessed on 
01/02/2006. 
243 See, e.g., Lietuvos rytas. 06/10/2004. No.133. 
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Adamkus claimed to have achieved the goals of his last term—Lithuania had become 
a member of NATO and the EU. The present goal was to use the advantages of 
membership and become a European welfare state by using EU assistance and funds. 
Adamkus claimed that the opportunities of membership have to be felt by every family and 
that “European money has to be directed to establish new job places rather than to build 
mansions.”244  
Prunskienė signified the “past,” the “East,” and “instability,” in Adamkus’s 
campaign. Her promotion of friendly relations with Russia was structured as the 
interruption of Lithuania’s pro-Western and pro-future commitment. If Prunskienė is 
elected, there will emerge space for Russian interests to flourish, argued Adamkus’s team.245 
The families of the victims of January 13th, 1991, dissidents and representatives of the 
academic community signed a memorandum which proclaimed that Prunskienė cannot be 
trusted by the state of Lithuania. They argued that Prunskienė suggested postponing the 
proclamation of the independence of Lithuania for two years during her visit in Washington 
in May, 1990 and that she had relations with the KGB.246
In 1992 the Supreme Court of Lithuania recognized that Prunskienė had deliberately 
given a promise to collaborate with the KGB. Prunskienė denied her collaboration. Before 
the presidential elections of 2002 she appealed to the Vilnius District Court requesting to 
renew the case.247 Prunskienė argued that she never betrayed “her country and its interests. I 
did everything for Lithuania’s independence following my beliefs, knowledge, and my heart. 
[…] I have never been and I will never be pro-Russian or pro-American. My land is 
                                                 
244 See “Europos gerovė turi ateiti į kiekvienus namus: Nesitraukiantis iš rinkimų V. Adamkus žada 
būti vienijančiu moraliniu autoritetu” (“European well-being has to come for every house: V. Adamkus stays 
at elections and promises to be a uniting moral authority”). Lietuvos rytas. 05/26/2004. No.120. 
245 See the electoral campaign program “Respublikos Prezidento rinkimai” (“The elections of the 
President of the Republic”). Lithuanian Television. 06/23/2004. 
246 Prunskienė denied this information. See Lietuvos rytas. 06/18/2004. No.140. P.4.  
      247 See BNS information “VRK prašys teismo nubausti rinkimuose dalyvaujančią ekspremjerę” (“The 
CEC [Central Electoral Committee] will ask the Court to punish the presidential candidate, the former Prime 
Minister”). Kauno diena. 12/07/2002. No.284. P.2. See also BNS information “Prunskienė—be šleifo” 
(“Prunskienė without a past”). Kauno diena. 12/18/2002. No.293. P.2.  
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Lithuania, you, dear people, your work, achievements, hopes, and future are the most 
important for me.”248  
Political advertising for Prunskienė stated that she planned to be a “European 
President of Lithuania” as well as the defender of European values in Lithuania.249 She 
promoted close relations with European, especially German politicians,250 and argued for 
balanced relations between neighbors in the East and in the West.251 Prunskienė’s team also 
argued against the pro-Americanism of Adamkus. Prunskienė opposed Lithuania’s 
participation in the “occupation of Iraq.” Our country, it was argued in Prunskienė’s 
campaign webpage, has to have an independent foreign policy rather than become a state of 
the United States.252  
The geopolitical reasoning distinct to Prunskienė’s campaign, which divided the West 
into Europe/the EU and America/the U.S.A., and produced the image of a European 
Lithuania vs. Lithuania as a state of the United States, had little resonance among people. In 
Lithuania the symbolic geography of socialism and the liberation movement which divided 
regions into two categories of the East (mainly Russia) and the West (Western Europe, 
Europe, and the United States) is still viable (see chapter 5). The tendency is to orientalize 
the East and to populate it with enemies (see chapter 5, see also Todorova 1994, Bakić-
Hayden 1995). The West, most often perceived as “Europe” after joining the EU, stands for 
quality, prosperity, the future, and modernity. People travel there in search of a better life 
                                                 
248 The campaign newspaper “Už Kazimierą Prunskienę!” (“For Kazimiera Prunskienė!”). P.1. 
Distributed in Biržai, at Prunskienė’s meeting with Biržai residents at the culture house, 06/21/2004. 
 The words in Lithuanian: “Niekada ir niekur neišdaviau savo valstybės ir jos interesų. Dariau viską, 
ką leido mano įsitikinimai ir protas, ką liepė mano širdis, kad Lietuva būtų laisva. [...] Aš žinau mūsų krašto 
žmonių skaudžiausias problemas ir rasiu būdus, kaip jas išspręsti. Niekada nebuvau ir nebūsiu nei prorusiška, 
nei proamerikietiška—mano žemė yra Lietuva, man svarbiausia—Jūs, gerbiami žmonės, Jūsų darbai, 
pasiekimai, viltys ir ateitis.” 
249 Mogenienė, Laima “Kokio vadovo reikia Lietuvai?” (“What leader does Lithuania need?”). The 
campaign newspaper “Už Kazimierą Prunskienę!” (“For Kazimiera Prunskienė!”). P.3. Distributed in Biržai, 
at Prunskienė’s meeting with Biržai residents at the culture house, 06/21/2004. See also Česnienė, Loreta 
“Kazimiera Prunskienė: žinau, kuo mane “muš” ” (“Kazimiera Prunskienė: I know how I will be “hit.” ”). 
Respublika. 06/15/2004. No.137. P.2. 
250 See www.prunskiene.lt. Accessed on 06/20/2004.  
251 Semėnas, Saulius “Profesorė akcentuoja gerą kaimynystę” (“The professor emphasizes good 
neighborhood”). Veidas. 06/10/2004. P.34–35. 
252 See www.prunskiene.lt. Accessed on 06/20/2004.  
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and economic prosperity. In Lithuania one can have a “European smile” by going to the 
dentist.253 One can get “European windows” by buying the windows of the company 
“Lanlita” (on the ad it is stated that the price is “Lithuanian”). One can also choose 
“European medicine” and experience professional, competent services, and qualified 
attention at the private medicine center “Kardiolita.” They have the best specialists, modern 
equipment, good care conditions and culture, all kinds of facilities, telephone, cable TV, and 
the patients do not have to wait in line.254 However, high quality means high price. 
“Europe” becomes the experience of people with “European” wages as well. These people 
can go to the expensive stores in the shopping mall “Europe” in Vilnius. The others can 
vote for the New Union (Social Liberals) at the elections to the EU Parliament which 
promise “European pensions and salaries.”255 In this context the “European well-being” 
promoted in Adamkus’s campaign was meaningful while “European Lithuania” and 
“Lithuania as the state of the U.S.A.” advertised in Prunskienė’s campaign was an 
ambiguous value.  
That there still exist different geopolitical imaginations is reaffirmed by public 
opinion surveys. For example, according to the Market and Opinion Research Center 
“Vilmorus Ltd.” among respondents who think that Russia is a modern state 58% vote for 
the Social Democrats (the ex-communist party), 60% of voters for the Lithuanian 
Conservatives (the opposition to ex-communist parties) thought that Russia still has imperial 
aims.256 Thus, people like Eglė (see chapter 3) prefer candidates symbolically related to the 
West. In Eglė’s case, the “East” signified her family’s painful experience in Siberia and 
Eglė’s experience of otherness in socialist Lithuania. Eglė did not vote for Prunskienė 
because of Prunskienė’s symbolic relation to the East, Russia and the KGB. For many 
                                                 
253 “Dėl europinės šypsenos—į stomatologo kėdę.” (“For the European smile—to the dentist”). 
Lietuvos rytas. 05/21/2004. No.116. P.1.  
254 See “Europietiška medicina Lietuvoje” (“The European Medicine in Lithuania”). Lietuvos rytas. 
04/17/2004. No.88 P.15. 
255 In the advertisement of the New Union on the TV it was claimed: “Lithuanians will come back, 
because there will be well paid jobs at home. Working in Europe we will seek for European pensions and 
salaries for a Lithuanian.” The elections to the European Parliament, June, 2004.  
256 See BNS information “Dauguma gyventojų mano, kad Rusija jau nepavojinga” (“Most residents 
think that Russia is not dangerous anymore”). Lietuvos rytas. 12/04/2002. No.281. P.4. 
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others, Prunskienė’s belonging did not matter and they even denied that she collaborated 
with the KGB. 
People who voted for Prunskienė were associated with the East; they were 
“orientalistic/orientalized variations on the theme” post-socialist Lithuania (cf. Bakić-
Hayden and Hayden 1992) promoted by the political mainstream. Like Paksas, Prunskienė 
was said to receive “protest votes,” the votes of the second Lithuania or the “sugar beets”257 
looking to the past. Historian Česlovas Laurinavičius commented that “Valdas Adamkus 
stands for the achievements of 14 years of independent Lithuania and for the geopolitical 
orientation achieved in those years. Kazimira [Kazimiera] Prunskienė represents those 
unhappy with this new period of history. Behind her there is the Paksas’s-phenomenon.”258 
In the mainstream newspaper Lietuvos rytas the victory of Valdas Adamkus was related to 
people’s willingness to live in a politically and economically stable Lithuania,259 creating a 
modern state, and giving priority to the West.260 Lithuania was seen as returning to the 
community of the states recognizing Western democratic values.261 At the press conference 
after the elections, Adamkus declared that people had to choose between the East and the 
West and that many chose the West, i.e., voted for him. He commented that this decision 
means that many look to the future and that “Lithuania takes and is going to take the 
democratic way.”262 Similarly, political scientists argued that Adamkus’s victory means a 
“strengthening of the pro-Western orientation.”263  
                                                 
257 Spurga, Saulius “Prezidentinis eurofutbolas” (“Presidential eurofootball”). OMNI laikas. 
06/14/2004. 12:00:39. www.omni.lt. 
258 Laurinavičius, Česlovas “Antrasis turas parodys, kokia bus Lietuva” (“The second round will show 
what Lithuania we will have”). OMNI laikas. 06/14/2004. 12:01:27. www.omni.lt. 
259 See the editorial “Sugrįžimas—po 16 audringų mėnesių: Lietuvos prezidento postą vėl užims 
buvęs šalies vadovas V. Adamkus” (“The return after 16 turbulent months: The former President V. 
Adamkus will take the office of the President of Lithuania”). Lietuvos rytas. 06/28/2004. No.147. P.1. 
 260 See Sotvarienė, Ramunė “Po nuopolio—vėl sėkmingas Prezidentūros rūmų šturmas” (“After the 
downfall—the successful rush at the presidential headquarters again”). Lietuvos rytas. 06/28/2004. No.147. 
P.3. 
261 Ibid. 
262 See ELTA news “V. Adamkus: Lietuvos žmonės pasirinko Vakarus” (“V. Adamkus: People of 
Lithuania chose the West”). 06/28/2004. 12:22:44. www.omni.lt.  
263 See ELTA news “Politologai komentuoja rinkimų rezultatus” (“Political scientists comment on 
election results”). www.lrt.lt. Cited by the OMNI laikas, www.omni.lt. 06/28/2004. 10:21:20. 
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9.2.3 Restoring social cohesion and order 
Reconciliation and social cohesion was another prominent theme in the elections of 2004. 
Česlovas Juršėnas’s, the candidate who lost in the first round, slogan was “Peace and Well-
being.” Adamkus’s program stated that the major task for today is the reconciliation of 
Lithuanian people, not dividing them into urban and rural residents, the elite and all the 
rest.264 Adamkus, having in mind his predecessor Paksas, argued that “society is divided, the 
authority of the presidential institution is completely ruined and people’s trust in state 
authorities [valdžia] has decreased.”265 Adamkus insisted on being a moral authority which 
could unite people presumably divided by his predecessor.266 In the “President Valdas 
Adamkus’s pledge to a citizen of Lithuania” (Prezidento Valdo Adamkaus priesaika Lietuvos 
žmogui), which was a campaign flyer signed by Adamkus and expected to be signed by a 
voter, Adamkus claimed to have never broken the President’s oath. The flyer was a 
reference to Paksas who was impeached for breaking the President’s oath and for violating 
the Constitution of Lithuania. In the flyer Adamkus invited people to create prosperity and 
trust in Lithuania. 
Prunskienė was presented by her team as the better uniting force, because she did 
not prioritize among village, town, city people and the Vilnius elite.267 In her webpage it was 
claimed that all people of Lithuania are equal. There is no Lithuania of the supporters of 
Paksas, ignorant “sugar beets,” losers, and others, the lords.268 Prunskienė argued: “I will try 
                                                 
264 Adamkus political advertising. June, 2004. www.adamkus.lt. Accessed on 07/01/2004.  
265 See “Europos gerovė turi ateiti į kiekvienus namus: Nesitraukiantis iš rinkimų V. Adamkus žada 
būti vienijančiu moraliniu autoritetu” (“European well-being has to come for every house: V. Adamkus stays 
at the elections and promises to be a uniting moral authority”). Lietuvos rytas. 05/26/2004. No.120. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Karbauskis, Ramūnas “Mūsų visų prezidentė” (“President of us all”). The campaign newspaper 
“Už Kazimierą Prunskienę!” (“For Kazimiera Prunskienė!”). P.6. Distributed in Biržai, at Prunskienė’s 
meeting with Biržai residents at the culture house, 06/21/2004. 
268 See “Keliom Lietuvom prezidentas?” (“A President—for how many Lithuanias?”). 
www.prunskiene lt. 
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to hear everyone who experienced injustice. I will put all my efforts to prevent old people 
from feeling like social outcasts. They have to have the place they earned.”269
Reprising the image of Adamkus created in Paksas’s campaign, Prunskienė 
emphasized Adamkus’s outsiderness to people and his elitism. Prunskienė claimed that she 
would not turn away from social problems, unlike Adamkus who “probably did this when 
he said that salaries and pensions are the matter of the government.”270 She argued her 
advantage over President Adamkus—in her knowledge of many spheres including social 
matters, economics, science, education, and culture.271 Prunskienė emphasized her 
insiderness by saying that Adamkus’s experience had not been connected as closely with 
Lithuania as hers.  
Prunskienė’s team also emphasized her simplicity, caring, honesty, sensitivity, and 
understanding of the Lithuanian people’s hard life.272 Having been born in a village, 
Prunskienė was presented as close to village life. Ramūnas Karbauskis, a parliamentarian and 
a farmer, claimed that Professor Kazimiera Prunskienė is from a peasant family and that she 
had hard life experience; her everyday work does not lead her to distance herself from 
                                                 
269 The campaign newspaper “Už Kazimierą Prunskienę!” (“For Kazimiera Prunskienė!”). P.1. 
Distributed in Biržai, at Prunskienė’s meeting with Biržai residents at the culture house, 06/21/2004. 
 The words in Lithuanian: “Stengsiuosi išgirsti kiekvieną, kurio gyvenimą palietė neteisybė. Visomis 
išgalėmis sieksiu, kad senas žmogus nesijaustų išstumtas iš visuomenės, o turėtų joje savo užtarnautą vietą.” 
270 See Česnienė, Loreta “Kazimiera Prunskienė: žinau, kuo mane “muš” ” (“Kazimiera Prunskienė: I 
know how I will be “hit” ”). Respublika. 06/15/2004. No.137. P.2. See also Mogenienė, Laima “Kokio vadovo 
reikia Lietuvai?” (“What leader does Lithuania need?”). The campaign newspaper “Už Kazimierą 
Prunskienę!” (“For Kazimiera Prunskienė!”). P.3. Distributed in Biržai, at Prunskienė’s meeting with Biržai 
residents at the culture house, 06/21/2004.  
271 See Česnienė, Loreta “Kazimiera Prunskienė: žinau, kuo mane “muš” ” (“Kazimiera Prunskienė: I 
know how I will be “hit” ”). Respublika. 06/15/2004. No.137. P.2. 
272 Bobelis, Kazys “Kazimiera Prunskienė puikiai atstovavo Lietuvai mūsų Nepriklausomybės 
pradžioje, jos veikla Respublikos prezidentės pareigose bus naudingiausia šaliai ir dabar!” (“Kazimiera 
Prunskienė was an excellent representative for Lithuania at the beginning of independence, her work as 
President will be the most advantageous for the country now!”). Respublika. 06/23/2004. P.16. See also 
Jančorienė, Meilė “Laiškas kolegoms” (“A letter to the colleagues”). Respublika. 06/25/2004. P.19. 
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people’s everyday concerns273 and that she “understood the tragic condition of our nation’s 
social life.”274
The Adamkus’s campaign appropriated the symbol of “disorder” successfully to refer 
to Paksas as well as to Prunskienė. In a poster which showed how people are caught in a 
wind while expecting Paksas’s arrival, it was proclaimed “No to turmoil and chaos!” In 
political advertising Prunskienė was associated with lawlessness, polarization [of society], 
hatred, dishonor, and the past. The ad reminded of the events of January, 1991, when 
Prunskienė’s government raised food prices by 300%275 and reached out to the experiences 
of hardships of the transition in terms of money and food. It was a moment remembered by 
many informants: “In the morning I went to the shop and there was little I could buy with 
my monthly salary” (a man, in his mid 40s, from Vilnius).  
9.2.4 Politics of suffering and care 
Adamkus, like Paksas, capitalized on social issues, problems, people’s anxieties and 
misfortunes. He emphasized social problems and argued that, if he was entrusted President’s 
office, he will “orient the state [valstybę] to decrease poverty.”276 Using the language of 
suffering, need and care277 he increasingly tried to reach out to those who are in need of 
                                                 
273 Karbauskis, Ramūnas “Mūsų visų prezidentė” (“President of us all”). The campaign newspaper 
“Už Kazimierą Prunskienę!” (“For Kazimiera Prunskienė!”). P.6. Distributed in Biržai, at Prunskienė’s 
meeting with Biržai residents at the culture house, 06/21/2004. 
274 Bobelis, Kazys “Kazimiera Prunskienė puikiai atstovavo Lietuvai mūsų Nepriklausomybės 
pradžioje, jos veikla Respublikos prezidentės pareigose bus naudingiausia šaliai ir dabar!” (“Kazimiera 
Prunskienė was an excellent representative for Lithuania in the beginning of independence, her work as 
President will be the most advantageous for the country now!”). Respublika. 06/23/2004. P.16. 
275 See, e.g., Lietuvos rytas. 06/23/2004. No.144. P.7. 
276 See “Europos gerovė turi ateiti į kiekvienus namus: Nesitraukiantis iš rinkimų V. Adamkus žada 
būti vienijančiu moraliniu autoritetu” (“European well-being has to come for every house: V. Adamkus stays 
at elections and promises to be a uniting moral authority”). Lietuvos rytas. 05/26/2004. No.120. See also 
Valdas Adamkus’s webpage www.adamkus.lt. Vladimiras Laučius interview with Adamkus. “V. Adamkus 
piktinasi menku valdžios dėmesiu savižudybių prevencijai” (“V. Adamkus expresses his resentment about the 
state’s lack of attention to suicide prevention”).  
277 See the campaign article, the interview with Valdas Adamkus’s wife, Alma Adamkienė “Alma 
Adamkienė savo gyvenimą aukoja vaikams” (“Alma Adamkienė sacrifices her life for children”). Respublika. 
06/25/2004. P.12. 
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assistance, living in poverty, unemployed, and in trouble.278 Adamkus’s campaign action 
“The Blossom of Hope” (Vilties žiedas) paralleled Paksas’s strategy to reach the disappointed 
and dispossessed. According to Adamkus, “The Blossom of Hope” was directed to 
strengthen the hope that people’s lives may improve. The former President visited socially, 
demographically and economically vulnerable regions and families. He went to Didžiasalis, a 
small town in the Ignalina region known for high unemployment, crime, alcoholism, and 
truant children.279 In the media his visit was portrayed as his first encounter with poverty. 
The headlines of an article covering Adamkus’s visit stated that “Adamkus encountered 
poverty for the first time: Finally he saw the real life of people of Lithuania and was 
perplexed by people’s neediness and despair in Didžiasalis.”280 The article described how a 
56 year old former factory worker Tamara Frolova asked the President how people can live, 
if they do not get a pension and have no job; “How can we survive? You tell us that we 
should live, if we can, if not, should we stick our heads into the noose?”281 For Adamkus to 
be a “discoverer of poverty” in 2004 was a better symbolic position than to be the 
“President not interested in people’s concerns” in 2002. His “discovery” did resonate in 
informants’ discussions. However, Adamkus’s “discovery of poverty” usually was invoked 
by those who did not vote for him to illustrate his distance from people’s lives.  
Part of the Adamkus campaign action “The Blossom of Hope” was a trip to 
Kupiškis, a town known for its high suicide rate. He visited a family where the father was 
deceased, the mother committed suicide, and the three small children were growing up with 
their grandparents.282 He also went to the Rokiškis region, known for demographic changes, 
                                                 
278 Ibid. 
279 See also “Adamkus hits provinces leading polls, while Paksas’s fate unclear.” The Baltic Times. 
05/20/2004. http://www.baltictimes.com/art.php?art_id=10090. 
280 See Verbienė, Irma “Adamkus pirmą kartą pamatė skurdą: Pagaliau su realiu Lietuvos žmonių 
gyvenimu susidūrusį kandidatą į prezidentus pribloškė Didžiasalio gyventojų nepriteklius ir neviltis.” Lietuvos 
žinios. 05/18/2004. No.113. P.3.  
281 Ibid. 
282 According to the article covering Adamkus’s visit in 2001, in the Kupiškis region 8.53 people out 
of 10,000 committed suicides. The average for Lithuania is 4.41 for 10,000 inhabitants. See “Maršrute—
savižudžių kraštas” (“The way goes to the suicide region”). Lietuvos rytas. 05/20/2004. No.115. P.2. 
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such as emigration of young people and decrease in birth rates.283 Adamkus visited the drug 
addicts in the Center for Dependence Diseases in Vilnius.284 Furthermore, in the campaign 
headquarters Adamkus’s team organized meetings with various socially disadvantaged 
groups, such as the disabled or mothers with many children. Most important was to get 
media coverage of these events and to establish a presence as a caring and interested 
President in the imagination of others.  
9.2.5 Political innocence 
Children as a political symbol were used in Adamkus’s and other candidates’ campaigns. 
Campaign posters pictured candidates among children, and in various trips the candidates 
visited schools and talked to children (see figure 8).  
 
 
                                                 
283 See Bartasevičius, Valdas “Svarbu ir valstybės žvilgsnis, ir žmogiška atjauta” (“State concern and 
human empathy are equally important”). Lietuvos rytas. 06/19/2004. No.141. P.7. 
284 See “V. Adamkus šiurpo nuo narkomanų istorijų” (“V. Adamkus was moved by the drug addict 









Children symbolically represent the future to which a candidate connects, escaping 
the present. Children also surround a candidate with an aura of innocence, common to 
spaces associated with childhood (see Grant 2001). The polluting realm of politics injected 
with innocence is transformed to invoke positive associations. For Adamkus, showing 
himself among children or the youth was also a strategy to associate himself with energy and 
vitality. Strongly criticized for his old age, the then seventy-seven-year-old Adamkus was 
represented as very active, determined, and full of life.285
                                                 
285 Adamkus’s wife also is represented as “sacrificing her life for [other] children” and supporting 
rural schools. See political advertising “Alma Adamkienė sacrifices her life for children.” See Respublika. 
06/25/2004. P.12. 
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Prunskienė was depicted with her granddaughter Augustė who even wrote a book 






Figure 9. The calendar with K. Prunskienė and her granddaughter. On the calendar there are the 




                                                 









“Children,” born and unborn, were the most successfully exploited political symbols 
in the campaign for the referendum for Lithuania’s membership in the EU in 2003. The 
campaign built its success largely by promoting children and the future. In the context of the 
largely meaningless “EU” and “Europe” (cf. Verdery 1996, Vitkus 2002), “children” and 
“future” became meaningful symbols for political action for various people.287  
 
                                                 
287 In 1996 Verdery argued that “Europe” was relatively uninteresting to many in the Romanian 
electorate, that “ “Europe” is an urban intellectuals’ conceit; they have not done enough to translate it 
positively into the life terms of everyone else. Romania’s entry into the “civilized” world is important in the 
self-conception of intellectuals, for whom culture and civilization are of the essences but these have rather 
little import for the daily existence of many villagers, for instance, either toeing with rudimentary equipment 
on tiny patches of land or commuting long hours to work in distant factories. What have Europe and civil 
society to do with this? For village residents, the defenders of “Europe” have not managed to constitute its 





Figure 11. The agitation poster for the European Union. “The Referendum. The mandatory 





In 2003 during my research before and after the referendum, when asked about the 
EU, many responded that they were not sure what it is or how people will live after joining 
the EU. For those whose identity was not informed by values of the West, Adamkus’s pro-
Western and pro-EU accomplishments on which he relied so much in the 2002 and 2004 
elections, mattered little. Even if Adamkus paved Lithuania’s way to Europe, he did not 
produce meaningful texts about it to which people could connect with their experience and 
knowledge. Povilas from the second largest village claimed that Adamkus “did not care 
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about agriculture. He cared only about NATO and the EU. So, we are in the EU now. So 
what?” 
Many people approached membership in the EU as an elite project which was 
expected to benefit primarily the elites themselves. Informants also disputed the elites’ 
commitment to the national cause (see chapter 5). Some saw the EU as “just another union” 
and compared it to the USSR. Some people also argued that joining the EU was losing 
sovereignty. Some, like Genė and Vincas, considered that in the EU it is going to be 
“better” because people can travel, get a job outside Lithuania, and maybe get higher 
salaries. However, people themselves did not expect to travel, get a job, or a higher salary. 
These expectations were bound to their children and grandchildren. Many voted for the 
future of their children responding to the campaign rhetoric which asked people to vote for 
the EU so as “not to be ashamed before their children [later].”288  
9.2.6 The end of political drama of 2004 
The leadership in the electoral campaign clearly belonged to Valdas Adamkus. Prunskienė’s 
campaign was the least financed of the five candidates who participated in the elections of 
2004. Furthermore, there was little negative information about Adamkus in the media, while 
Prunskienė was challenged because of her geopolitically related opinions, her support for 
the impeached President Rolandas Paksas,289 the blurred boundaries of her private and 
public interests,290 her concern with the criminal case of R. Mažylis, implying that 
                                                 
288 “Lietuva šįryt prabudo Europos Sąjungoje: Prieš tardami “taip” ES, žmonės ilgai bandė šalies 
valdžios ir Europos kantrybę” (“This morning Lithuania woke up in the European Union: Before saying 
“yes” people long tried the patience of the state and Europe”). Lietuvos rytas. 05/12/2003. No.108. P.1. See 
also Prezidento Pakso kreipimasis (The address by President Paksas). Lietuvos rytas. 05/08/2003. No.105. P.8. 
289 See Česnienė, Loreta “Kandidatės viltis—pašalintas prezidentas: K. Prunskienė įsitikinusi, jog per 
rinkimus ją paremtų dauguma R. Pakso šalininkų” (“The hope of the candidate—the impeached President: K. 
Prunskienė believes that R. Paksas voters will support her during elections”). Respublika. 05/31/2004. No.124. 
P.1,2.  
290 See, e.g., “Užklausta apie verslą kandidatė nutraukė pokalbį” (“When asked about her business, 
the candidate refused to continue the interview”). Lietuvos rytas. 06/19/2004. No.141. P.7.  
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Prunskienė was willing to help him using her authority,291 “exploitation” of a woman on her 
private farm and avoiding hiring the woman legally as well as paying taxes.292 According to 
the article in Lietuvos rytas, “On the politician’s farm the hired woman suffered like a slave,” 
the hired worker complained about Prunskienė’s demands, reproaches, and disrespect.293 In 
the continuation of the article it was argued that the hired woman was paid little, she had to 
take care of Prunskienė’s sick mother day and night, she also had to work in the field and 
the garden as well as be responsible for serving arriving guests.294  
The article addressed sensibilities about social stratification and changing relations of 
work (see chapter 2, 6). However, even if a candidate helped people, as Prunskienė did by 
sponsoring Christmas gifts in the elections of 2002, she could not escape the cynical 
observation of her as the “state.” In the article “The candidate’s presents made people cry” 
J. Vitkauskienė writes that some children cried, others were hit in the face by flying candies 
during the meeting with Kazimiera Prunskienė, the presidential candidate in winter, 2002 by 
the Christmas tree in Biržai where gifts were given out to children. The journalist writes that 
the real thing in all this “political supposedly Christmas fiesta was the wonderful Christmas 
tree presented by a resident of Biržai.” The tree has grown in the yard. People talked, 
                                                 
291 See “Byloje—K. Prunskienė’s ir V. Junoko pėdos: Šios savaitės įvykiai privertė STT pareigūną 
atskleisti skandalingus faktus” (“The case [shows] the tracks of K. Prunskienė’s and V. Junokas’s influence: 
the officer of the Special Investigation Services reveals scandalous facts”). Lietuvos rytas. 06/25/2004. No.145. 
P.1, 6.  
292 See Kiliulienė, Jūratė “Politikės sodyboje samdinė kentė vergės dalią” (“On the politician’s farm 
the hired woman suffered like a slave”). Lietuvos rytas. 06/19/2004. No.141. A Saturday issue Gyvenimo būdas. 
No.25. P.1. See also Kiliulienė, Jūratė and Jurgita Vitkauskienė “Darbdavė samdinei pinigus mokėjo nelegaliai: 
Nesudariusiai sutarties ir apgaudinėjusi valstybę K. Prunskienei gresia bauda” (“The employer paid money 
illegally: K. Prunskienė faces penalty for not signing an agreement and for cheating the state”). Lietuvos rytas. 
06/22/2004. No.143. P.1,2. 
293 See Kiliulienė, Jūratė “Politikės sodyboje samdinė kentė vergės dalią” (“In the politician’s farm the 
hired woman suffered like a slave”). Lietuvos rytas. 06/19/2004. No.141. A Saturday issue Gyvenimo būdas. 
No.25. P.1. 
294 See Kiliulienė, Jūratė and Jurgita Vitkauskienė “Darbdavė samdinei pinigus mokėjo nelegaliai: 
Nesudariusiai sutarties ir apgaudinėjusi valstybę K. Prunskienei gresia bauda” (“The employer paid money 
illegally: K. Prunskienė faces penalty for not signing the agreement and for cheating the state”). Lietuvos rytas. 
06/22/2004. No.143. P.1,2. 
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according to the journalist, that “the Christmas tree is so beautiful that it could have stayed 
without the decorations bought and praised by the politicians.”295  
Semantically and symbolically the elections of 2004 were not very much different 
from the elections of 2002. The important difference was the East/West distinction which 
was the major plot line of the political drama. Those who saw the symbolic division of the 
East and the West meaningful, like Juozapota and Eglė (see chapter 3), cast their votes for 
Adamkus. In the elections of 2002, some of these people voted for Paksas. The process of 
impeachment, during which one Kaunas resident claimed to be afraid to turn on the 
microwave because it may deliver news about Paksas, like the TV or radio, made many 
people wish for political quiescence. Thus, stability, unsuccessfully promoted during the 
electoral campaign of 2002 by Adamkus, became meaningful in 2004. People claimed to 
vote for Adamkus because Prunskienė may face Paksas’s career, i.e., “will be not allowed to 
work.” Jolanta, a doctor, in her 30s, and a Kaunas resident, thought that “no one would 
have talked to Prunskienė, as they did not talk to Paksas.” Prunskienė’s loss was attributed 
to low advertisement and financing, limited support of the parties, unfavorable influence of 
the media and the better organization of Adamkus’s staff.296 I also believe that some did not 
vote for Prunskienė because of the patriarchal imagery which underlies both ethnonational 
and citizen nations, where collective entities are nurtured and midwifed by the heroic deeds 
and sacrifices of men (see Verdery 1996:73–74). Prunskienė’s “deviant” woman’s status was 
already recorded, as was mentioned, by the patriarchal Soviet KGB. Unlike men, most of 
whom had various pseudonyms which were masculine names, Prunskienė had the 
pseudonym Šatrija, the name of a historic mound and a legendary witch meeting place. As 
mentioned, she was remembered as Šatrijos Ragana (Šatrijos Witch) or Šatrija by the voters 
in 2004. Her name embedded sinister (feminine) powers the patriarchal post/socialist state 
had to name and control.  
                                                 
295 See Vitkauskienė, Jurgita “Kandidatės dovanos pravirkdė vaikus” (“The candidate’s presents made 
children cry”). Panevėžio rytas. 12/16/2002. No.291. P.7.  
296 See ELTA news “Kokios K. Prunskienė’s pralaimėjimo priežastys?” (“What are the reasons for K. 
Prunskienė’s defeat?”). OMNI laikas. 06/28/2004. 05:07:21, www.omni.lt. 
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9.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Every electoral campaign is a semantic and symbolic competition. Paksas’s 2002 campaign 
was successful because in addition to good organization and financing he was able to stage a 
meaningful political spectacle which appealed to people’s experiences and knowledge of 
social history, as well as their perceptions of themselves. Paksas’s campaign successfully 
addressed people’s concerns, anxieties, insecurities, and general negativity as well as criticism 
about the state officials and post-socialist developments. Politics of respect, hope and belief, 
change and order were well-employed to achieve victory. Paksas’s pessimism, shared by 
many people, communicated his nativeness. Adamkus’s optimism for the future, 
encouraging people to be responsible, initiative, and creative, communicated difference and 
foreignness. In the campaign of 2002 Adamkus failed to translate his goals, such as 
furthering integration into the EU, into comprehensible local vocabularies. Adamkus’s 
image as a moral leader was recirculated in Paksas’s campaign to mean passivity and inability 
to make change. Paksas’s image communicated the responsibility and power Adamkus 
presumably lacked. 
In the campaign of 2004 Adamkus’s victory largely depended on the successful 
choice of a major plot line—the East vs. the West, his more visible and better articulated 
concern with “common people,” as well as promises of political quiescence which became 
meaningful after the impeachment of Paksas. Adamkus’s campaign was preoccupied with 
what was called a “populist” agenda in Paksas’ campaign (since the President’s involvement 
is primarily with foreign policy)—everyday life and social problems, such as unemployment 
or poverty.  
Neither Paksas, nor Prunskienė collected protest votes, unless “protest” is perceived 
as negativity towards the state/political mainstream and social/political history. People 
voted for the meaningful agenda rather than against the political establishment. 
Furthermore, as the discussion in chapter 6 showed, people of various social statuses and 
backgrounds are critical of the political establishment and the post-socialist “state” despite 
their voting. Thus, negativity or cynicism towards the post-socialist history/state is much 
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more widespread than reflected in the votes for so-called populists. To call the voters for 
Paksas and Prunskienė “protesters” or “losers” (or “sugar beets” in the popular vocabulary 
in Lithuania) is to engage in their marginalization.  
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10.0  CONCLUSIONS 
Scholarship on post-socialist Europe often rests on assumptions that socialism was 
“immoral,” “oppressive” and experienced as such by people (see Yurchak 2006). In the 
dissertation I claim that its immorality and oppression varied, from some villagers and party 
members who claimed not to have been oppressed to some deportees who were anxious 
about threatening Soviet powers even in the privacy of their homes. Furthermore, I argue 
that the Soviet period produced hybrid identities with people being both loyal and disloyal to 
Soviet-period rules and ideologies. The questions which interest me are how various 
identities have been produced and what it means for various people to have lived under 
socialism. I look at socialism as a site of people’s emotions, experiences and ideas and the 
ways in which the social becomes the political and in which the customary political is 
depoliticized and invested with meanings.  
Nostalgia is not trivial, inconsequential, or simple “mereness” (cf. Berdahl 1999, 
Herzfeld 1997). It is a way of political communication, rearticulation of self, social and 
political history. Post-socialist nostalgia is a cultural artifact. I see nostalgia not only as a 
property of particular groups, such as poor villagers who claimed to live better in Soviet 
times, but as a relation to social and political history of many people who lived in Soviet 
times. Nostalgia does not presuppose coherent imaginaries of Soviet times. It is dialogic, 
multiple and varied, and variously political.  
Unlike scholars who focus on the dominant and the dominated and on class politics 
(Willis 1977, Scott 1990), I look at the individual biography as an important site of state 
interest, and discuss how an individual is subjected to social otherness and regimes of 
difference by the state and in the community as well as how he/she experiences 
himself/herself as a social other to publicly produced social/political history. Opposition is 
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negativity (cf. Dunn, forthcoming) towards the state, community, and even self. It is an 
experienced foreignness to social history, a feeling embedded in action and subjectivity.  
Negativity towards social and political history materializes in cynicism towards the 
state. Cynicism is a structure of feeling (Žižek 1995) common in post-socialist and 
postcolonial contexts. Cynicism can be identified in Meiji Japan (Karlin 2002), in 
Shakespear’s works, and in the global politics of neoliberalism. By exploring cynicism, 
analysis transcends the socialist/pot-socialist dichotomy which often informs studies of 
post-socialism.  
In regard to nationalism and nationalist sentiment, I argue that nationalism does not 
produce lasting “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983). Communities can be imagined in 
historically constrained ways (Hanson 1989), however, they also cease to exist as a common 
imagination. Nationalist unity, promoted and existing during the nationalist upheavals, can 
evolve in competing nationalisms (cf. Karlin 2002). In Lithuania the “nation” which united 
people in an “imagined community” in the late 1980s and early 1990s, survived in 
fragmented spaces afterwards.  
In this dissertation I also argue that ideas and ideologies are articulated in the context 
of individuals’ experience. While the argument is not new in social theory, scholars generally 
engage it in respect to social groups or classes (see, e.g., Bourdieu 1984). I claim that the 
individual biography is an important site of scholarly interest. Integrating biography in social 
analysis, I am able to address some apparent contradictions and paradoxes in social theory, 
such as voting for nationalist ideals but a few years later for ex-communist parties. In both 
cases, people voted for their imagined social and individual future, not for contradictory 
ideals. 
Exploring the rise of the populist and the radical right, political scientist tend to speak 
about the losers of transition and explain the success of the ex-communist, radical and 
populist parties and politicians in terms of the politics of resentment, or protest voting (see, 
e.g., Minkenberg 2002, Betz 1994). These studies do not answer what subjectivities have been 
produced during post-socialism, and why/how they are articulated in particular dialogues 
among politicians and the people. By addressing these dialogues and exploring political 
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subjectivities, I aimed to arrive at some understanding of how people relate to political 
history, political campaigns and actions, and, ultimately, how they vote. I argued that voting is 
the interplay of social history, perception, and experience embodied in individuals which 
make politics discernible and votes legible. Voting is a meaningful action. The conceptual 
medium to understand subjectivities and experiences was primarily “social texts,” narratives 
about history, community and self containing particular meanings, values, and beliefs. I 
approached elections as textual performances, semantic and symbolic competitions and 
voting as enactment of social texts.  
The social text of socialism as the “better times” was indicative of some people’s 
post-socialist experiences of change and marginalization. The text reflected their negativity 
towards post-socialist values, meanings, and changed regimes of personhood to which they 
had to accommodate. By claiming Soviet times to be the “better” ones, people made 
comments about socialist social and individual life rather than about the Soviet political 
regime. Discourse on the “better” Soviet times was also a critique of the present. 
Invocations of the past in terms of prosperity and welfare were ideological positioning 
towards the present. People aspired to restore their dignity, pride, and respect as well as to 
reclaim the value of moral orders which had defined their lives. 
This “better times” discourse was prominent among workers and peasants who lost 
ideological, economic, and social support after the dissolution of the Soviet state and who 
lacked social and cultural capital to adapt to changed circumstances. It was also a property 
of the older generations who lived most of their lifetime in Soviet Lithuania. Younger 
generations (people in their late 30s or 40s) and others who were not vulnerable socio-
economically shared the text of the past as “better times” because they empathized with the 
marginalized or/and felt insecure and uncertain about the present and the future. 
The text of the past as “better times” constitutes an oppositional history to the 
officially supported histories of socialism and post-socialism and delegitimates the post-
socialist political present. People who invoke socialist history in this “better times” discourse 
are marginalized politically, since they are seen as protest voters who vote for “communists” 
and “populists.”  
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The social text of Soviet-time “oppression” was shared by people who constituted 
the opposition to the Soviet regime because of their background and social location. These 
people were subjected to classism, a Soviet technology and ideology of exclusion along 
imagined “class” boundaries, by “biographic cleansing,” i.e., discipline and punishment of 
those who had not lived according to Soviet-period scenarios. Classism was the ideology of 
reclassification and rearticulation of Soviet society which produced hierarchies of power, 
knowledge, privilege, and wealth. Many deportees, believers, and other Soviet “others” were 
at the bottom of the Soviet social hierarchy, unlike the first-class citizens of the Soviet state, 
the devoted Communist Party members. The former Communist Party members who lost 
their power and entitlements and/or who experienced ideological marginalization in post-
Soviet times remember the socialist past in common sense idioms and reclaim power, 
authority and legitimacy by criticizing the present.  
The text of “oppression” was indicative of the social otherness some people 
experienced in Soviet times. Present political history, which has promoted “oppression” as a 
hegemonic discourse, provides visibility, prestige, and recognition to Soviet-time “social 
others.” The Soviet-time “oppressed” became legitimate subjects and major protagonists of 
Soviet history. For them “nation” often is a compelling formulation of self. 
The social text on the “better” Soviet past may coexist with the text on “oppression” 
in the Soviet period. If people think about the Soviet period as “oppressive,” by “better” 
times they mean social guarantees, their higher personal economic and social status than in 
the post-Soviet period as well as everyday predictability. Some people who claimed to 
experience oppression never agreed that there can be anything “better” about Soviet times. 
The past was even used to explain the “regressions” at present.  
The texts of opposition, such as the texts of the “better times” in the post-Soviet 
period or “oppression” in the Soviet period, often arise because of experiences of social 
otherness or marginalization. Social texts of opposition reflect negativity, which is the 
backbone of a narrated genealogy of the self as a stigmatized social subject (social other). 
Negativity is a structuring feeling built into various stories people tell about themselves and 
to themselves. Opposition is expressed in overlapping feelings of insecurity, discontent, 
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uncertainty, anxiety, sadness, ambiguity and concern. It reflects displacement, estrangement, 
exclusion, intolerance, foreignness, and powerlessness. The semantic difference of social 
texts of opposition depends on people’s experience of different regimes of social otherness 
and available ideologies of interpretation, like post-Soviet nationalism.  
The social texts reveal individuals’ relations to the past, which stand for different 
political subjectivities. They also document values shared by people, such as “nation,” 
“liberation,” and the “state.” 
The social texts questioning “liberation”/ “freedom,” which question the necessity of 
a nation having a sovereign state, are expressive of dissatisfactions with post-socialist social 
and moral orders, and also of sensibilities about subjectivities, values and authority, 
challenged in the post-socialist period. Questioning of “liberation” was also a dispute over 
representation, i.e., over recognition of communities who share oppositional histories. A 
negative relationship to “liberation” included disappointment with post-socialism of people 
who supported the liberation movement in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, continuing 
opposition to “liberation” by individuals who did not support liberation, and questioning of 
“freedom” by people who thought of socialism as common sense or “better times” history 
and who in most cases also supported liberation. Negativity was articulated by strong 
supporters of national ideals and by people indifferent/opposed to “liberation.” The non-
existent imagination of a “nation-state” was common to most informants who questioned 
“liberation.” Absence of such an imagination partly accounted for negativity to “liberation,” 
because “liberation” was constitutive of the new imagination of the “nation(-state).” To 
imagine the community of the “nation(-state)” would mean to share a specific historic 
consciousness (including support for liberation, which is part of the master narratives of 
post-socialist history) and to have a particular sense of a national self congruent with the 
liberation period modes of selfhood (like fashioning oneself in terms of post-socialist 
national ideals not shared by most informants). Many people conceived “nation” as 
horizontal solidarity and ethnic relationship.  
The texts on the “state” reflected cynicism and entailed negativity, distance, and 
irony, rather than resistance towards the state. Cynicism encapsulated criticism of the state 
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officials, seeing them as self-interested, immoral, and unjust. It also manifested distrust of 
the authorities and difference between the people and the power elites. Cynicism derives 
from various contexts: the experience of power as omnipresent, immutable, and threatening 
prevalent in the socialist period and reproduced in post-socialism, beliefs in equality and 
loyalty to a collective which no longer inform social relations, mysterious post-socialist 
circulations of wealth from which many people feel excluded, experience of destatization 
and subalternity.  
During elections, candidates who are seen as standing for voters’ experience of 
difference and/or marginalization are voted against. In the presidential elections of 2004, 
Prunskienė, the (exonerated) KGB member associated with the “East” and Russia, was not 
supported by voters who shared the text of “oppression.” Meaningful appeals to people’s 
political subjectivities and knowledge about social/political history as well as comprehensible 
translations of political aims and visions into local vocabularies are rewarded. In the 
presidential elections of 2002, R. Paksas’s campaign was a successful political spectacle 
because he addressed people with oppositional histories, appealed to their sensibilities, 
feelings, and understandings, as well as promised them respect, recognition, power and 
privilege. The successful political competition accounts for common values, such as 
negativity towards the state. Adamkus’s moral authority and identity as a “foreigner,” 
Paksas’s outsiderness to the mainstream political elite, Uspaskich’s “Russianness” and the 
“Šerėnas-trickster” were politically profitable images. 
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